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2ABSTRACT
The Second World War Italian campaign has long been overshadowed by the Normandy 
landings. Yet it was the longest campaign in Europe in which British forces were involved, 
and the first to be crowned with success.
Much has been written about the strategic and tactical aspects of the Allies’ Mediterranean 
policy, and the Italian campaign within that context, but little attention has been paid to the 
soldiers who executed that policy. It was principally an infantry and artillery war: the 
topography of Italy mitigated against any larger-scale use of armour. This thesis examines 
the morale, the willingness to fight, of the British front-line soldier, the infantryman, and 
the factors which influenced his morale during the 22 months of the campaign, and it looks 
at the army’s response to fluctuations in morale, both at institutional and battalion levels.
Morale is never constant; it varies across time, across units and the individuals who make 
up the units, and there is ample evidence to suggest that morale in Italy, in the winter of 
1944-1945, was seriously degraded. But the evidence also indicates that as high as the 
desertion figures were, absenteeism was not in the main the result of men’s unwillingness 
to fight, a symptom of cowardice and self-interest. On the contrary, many deserters were 
men who had fought too hard, for too long, as the result of a series of political and military 
decisions over which they had no control, but whose morale was robust enough, in the end, 
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INTRODUCTION
Despite the wide-ranging literature on the Italian campaign, none of the existing works 
have explored the evolution of morale in the campaign to any great extent and depth. This 
thesis is intended to help fill this gap by examining the factors that degraded and sustained 
the morale of the British infantry serving with the Eighth and Fifth Armies in Sicily and 
Italy during the Second World War. It focuses on infantrymen because, according to all the 
primary and secondary literature cited, it was their morale which was particularly 
problematic. The role of the infantryman in battle has been described as “dangerous, 
arduous, unspectacular and unrewarding”.1 “No other soldier probably is called upon so 
frequently as the Infantryman to endure prolonged and unrelieved stress in war under the 
worst physical conditions.”2 Italy was, par excellence, an infantry and artillery war. It is a 
particularly good campaign, therefore, in which to site a study of the morale of the men at 
the sharp end of battle.
“Morale is to the physical as three is to one,” according to Napoleon’s famous maxim.3 
More than 150 years later Field Marshal Sir Bernard Montgomery echoed this sentiment 
when he wrote, in 1944, that “the more fighting I see, the more I am convinced that the big 
thing in war is morale ... morale is probably the most important single factor in war ...”4 
High morale has traditionally been associated with the willingness to fight, and the 
importance of bellicosity in the successful prosecution of warfare has always been 
recognised. Yet morale is not an easy concept to define, changing as warfare itself
1 Brigadier A.B. McPherson, Discipline (London: The War Office, 1950) p. 51
2 Ibid,
3 Ibid, p. 2
4 Lt.-CoI. J.H.A. Sparrow, Morale (London: The War Office, 1949), Notes on the Conduct of War and the 
Infantry Division in Battle, November 1944, p. 4
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changes. S.L.A. Marshall, who led American Historical Teams during the Second World 
War and oversaw the ‘Men Against Fire’ study, described morale as “the whole complex of 
an army’s thoughts.” 5 Field Marshal Earl Wavell, on the other hand, described it as “the 
inward, spiritual side of discipline.”6 Yet strictness of discipline, in its narrowest sense, 
may conceal serious defects in morale.7 In the Second World War only a comparatively 
small proportion of the Army found itself in action, and then, in general, only for a small 
proportion of its time. Seventy five per cent of troops never served in the front line.8 
Because of this Lt-Col. John Sparrow, who was attached to the Adjutant General’s office, 
and was Secretary to the Morale Committee of the Executive Committee of the Army 
Council during the Second World War, wanted to avoid a definition limited to the 
disciplined reaction to battle by front line troops when he wrote the official War Office 
report on the subject after the war. He believed that while high morale tended to be 
associated with fighting spirit or sheer courage, and with troops in the front line who were 
subject to danger and hardship, the importance of maintaining morale among administrative 
troops was not always realised, even though the men in the rear had to contend with 
inaction, monotony and boredom. Sparrow therefore defined morale as “the attitude of the 
soldier towards his employment”.9 The focus of this thesis is the morale of one particular 
kind of soldier, the infantryman, during one campaign in the Second World War, and 
morale, for this purpose, is defined as the infantryman’s attitude to his employment as a 
frontline fighting man.
5 S.L.A. Marshall, Men Against Fire: The Problem-of Battle Command (New York: William Morrow & Co. 
Inc., 1947), p. 158
6 Quoted in McPherson, Discipline, p. 2
7 Sparrow, Morale, p. 2
It was only with the introduction of mass armies and industrialized warfare between 1914- 
1918 that British military authorities first confronted, in a serious and sustained manner, the 
problems associated with understanding what factors degraded and improved the morale of 
a mass citizens* army. In 1920 the War Office Committee of Enquiry into “Shell-Shock”, 
chaired by Lord Southborough, met to collate the expert knowledge derived by the 
Services’ medical authorities and the medical profession from their experience of the war, 
with a view to recommending for future use what could be proposed to guard against the re­
occurrence of so-called “shell-shock”. Cases of battle exhaustion had been chronicled as 
far back as the early Greeks.10 It was during the First World War, however, that “shell­
shock” took hold of the British public’s imagination. “Shell shock” was a psychological 
disturbance caused by prolonged exposure to active warfare, in particular provoked by the 
experience of being under bombardment. Its symptoms ranged from irritability, the 
inability to sleep or take decisions, crying and shivering, to a gamut of nervous disorders, 
neuroses and, in extreme cases, hysterical manifestations including blindness, deafness, 
paralysis and amnesia. By late 1915, the Army Council reluctantly recognised the 
existence of “shell shock” but, despite all the evidence to the contrary, many military men 
continued to believe that “shell shock” was principally a manifestation of cowardice, and an 
excuse for desertion. Public concern about wartime executions of “shell-shocked” soldiers 
led to the abolition, in the face of Army Council objections, of the death penalty for 
desertion under fire in 1930.11 The death penalty, however, was retained for treachery and 
mutiny.
8 D. Englander & T. Mason, The British Soldier in World War II (Warwick Working Papers in Social History 
(n.d.), p. 2
9 Sparrow, Morale
10 W. Holden, Shell Shock: The Psychological Impact of War (London: Channel 4 Books, 1998) p. 7
11 McPherson, Discipline, p. 54
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Every witness before the Southborough Committee concurred that “shell-shock” was a
misnomer for the condition they had seen among troops in the trenches, which were
principally cases of psycho-neurosis or mental breakdown. In 1922, after 41 sittings and
the examination of 59 expert witnesses, the Committee published its findings.12 Many of
its expert witnesses had commented on the fact that well-disciplined troops with high
morale were less likely to suffer from “shell-shock” than those with poor morale. Dr.
Hurst, who had been the Officer-in-Charge of the Special Neurological Hospital, Seale
Hayne, for instance, pointed out that “high morale undoubtedly tended to lessen the
incidence of ‘shell-shock’ because morale is the acquired quality which in highly-trained
troops counterbalances the influence of self-preservation.”13 The Consultant Neurologist
for the British Armies in France, Gordon Holmes, believed that to increase in every way
possible the morale of the troops was the secret of all preventative measures.14 The first of
the Committee’s recommendations on “Prevention” stated: “Every possible means should
be taken to promote morale, esprit de corps and a high standard of discipline.”15 The
Committee then posed the question: What is morale? And answered:
Morale is confidence in one’s self and confidence in one’s comrades. It is 
collective confidence, the spirit of a good team at football. Morale can be, and 
has to be, created. It is the product of continuous and enthusiastic training.
Training must be continuous. The more a man is trained the more skilful he 
becomes; the more skilful he becomes, the more his confidence increases. If a 
man knows he can do a thing well, he develops confidence in himself. If he 
knows that his comrades are equally skilful, he gains confidence in them. His 
confidence is multiplied. Confidence is both contagious and inspiring.16
12 Report o f the War Office Committee o f Enquiry into “Shell-Shock” (hereinafter The Southborough 
Committee Report) House of Commons Reports: Accounts and Papers: (2) Army: Session 7 February 1922-4 
August 1922. Vol. XII (London: HMSO 1922)
13 Ibid, p. 29
14 Ibid, p. 39
15 Ibid, p. 190
16 Ibid, p. 208
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The Committee offered several recommendations on how to maintain that confidence. 
Training was obviously right at the top of the list. “Training should be sufficiently 
prolonged to ensure that the soldier is not only physically fit and efficient, but also that he 
has had time to acquire such a standard of morale as will enable him to put the welfare of 
his unit before his own personal safety.”17 Every witness before the Southborough 
Committee also “laid stress on the important role played by officers in setting a good 
example ... ‘the men are what their officers make them’.”18
The Committee made its recommendations, but little was done to implement them between 
the wars. The assumption of most regular officers seems to have been that good unit 
administration and discipline would suffice to maintain morale in any future conflict, and 
very little thought was given to the problem of morale in a citizen army, even though the 
Southborough Committee had explicitly stated that the incidence of nervous disorders, 
neurosis and hysteria were considerably higher among conscripts than regular soldiers.19 
General Sir Ronald Adam, who became Adjutant-General in May 1941, was forced to 
admit that “I was as much to blame as anyone, for I was a chief instructor at the Staff 
College for more than three years and commandant for a few months. I can recall only one 
lecture dealing with morale in a conscript army.”20
Yet the vast increase in army personnel at the beginning of the Second World War was 
largely achieved through conscription. In September 1939 the actual strength of the
17 Ibid, p. 190
18 Ibid, p. 151
19 Ibid, p. 4
20 Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King’s College, London (hereinafter LHCMA) Adam Papers 8,
p. 2
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Regular British Army, following the introduction of the Militaiy Training Bill in April of 
that year, and a strong recruiting drive, was 12,000 officers and 180,000 men.21 The 
number of soldiers increased dramatically as full mobilisation of society was achieved. By 
January 1st 1943, the approximate effective strength of British troops (excluding Indian, 
Colonial and Dominion Forces) was just over 2.5 million: 405,600 were stationed in the 
Middle East and Malta; 186,600 in India; 150,000 in North Africa; 86,400 in Persia and 
Iraq; and 1,690,000 remained stationed in the UK.22 The change from civilian to soldier 
was unwelcome to many men, and the desertion figures (one of the key indicators of 
morale) for October 1940 to September 1941, when most conscripts were stationed in the 
UK but were away from their families, perhaps for the first time in their lives, were the 
highest of the War. In those 12 months 22,248 men deserted -  about one per cent of the 
total average strength of the army.23
Most conscripts, no matter how long they remained in the Army, and for some their Army 
service dragged on for seven years, remained civilians at heart. There was never the sense 
of commitment so evident among the early volunteer army of the First World War. The 
conscripts of the Second World War had grown up in a cynical age, the legacy of the 1914- 
1918 carnage, and the subsequent debasing of all military institutions, which saw Army 
officers either as “chinless wonders” or “Colonel Blimps”.24 After three years at war “the 
average conscripted soldier seems to remain to a greater extent than is necessary a civilian, 
and there is a regrettable tendency to think of officers, ‘the authorities’ and ‘the Army’ as
21 LHCMA Adam Papers II. Notes for S. of S. Estimate Speech, n.d.
22 LHCMA, Adam Papers IV, n.d.
23 R.H. Ahrenfeldt, Psychiatry in the British Army in the Second World War (London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, 1958) p. 273.
24 S.P. Mackenzie, Politics and Military Morale (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992) p. 77
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an impersonal They’.”25 This attitude was not noticeably amended during the course of the 
war and as late as September 1944 it was still noted in a War Office Memorandum that 
“there exists in the citizen forces a strong reaction against traditional service outlook.”26
The question of how to motivate these “civilians in khaki”,27 how to meld them into a 
fighting force which could take on the well-trained and successful Wehrmacht, was to 
exercise the minds of the War Office a great deal during the War. Following the series of 
reversals suffered by the British Forces in the first years of the Second World War -  the 
evacuation of Dunkirk (May 1940), the evacuation of British Forces from Norway (June 
1940) and from Crete (May 1941), the fall of Singapore (February 1942), and of Tobruk 
(June 1942) -  the mood and confidence of the Army, both abroad and at home, was to 
cause concern not only to the Army Council but also to the War Cabinet, and Prime 
Minister Winston Churchill’s faith in the Britain’s military capability was seriously 
undermined.28 During the first two and a half years of the war no member of the Army 
Council was officially responsible for morale. Following the fall of Singapore in February 
1942, however, and the ensuing crisis of confidence and fear that the army’s morale was 
dangerously low, the Army Council was forced to consider much more closely the fighting 
spirit -  or lack thereof -  of its soldiers. As a result, the Morale Committee, which came 
within the purview of the Adjutant-General, whose department was responsible for army 
personnel, was established in March 1942, with Brigadier E.J. O’Donnell assuming
25 National Archives (hereinafter NA) WO 163/161 War Office Committee on Morale in the Army Report 
to the Committee, August-October, 1942
26 NA WO 163/245 Morale (Far Eastern) Inter-Services Committee Memorandum to the Committee by Air 
Vice Marshal R.V. Goddard on Conditions and Requirements in India and South East Asia, 23 September, 
1944.
27 NA WO 259/62 Morale Note la, hand-written, anonymous, entitled “Notes on the Spirit of the Army”.
28 T. Ben-Moshe, Churchill: Strategy and History (Hemel Hempstead, Hertfordshire: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 
1992) p. 23
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responsibility for the work of the morale section.29 Assessment of morale for the 
subsequent quarterly Committee Reports was drawn firstly from reports submitted through 
commands from divisional and district commanders and secondly from the very full reports 
submitted by the Army Mail Censorship authorities on the mail of troops at home and 
overseas. These reports were digests of the unsolicited opinions expressed in soldiers’ 
letters on all topics, constant and ephemeral, which might effect morale. They were 
supported by very full verbatim extracts from the letters grouped under subject headings. 
The names of the writers were invariable excluded by the Censor and in no single instance 
was disciplinary action taken against the letter writer.30 A further source, initially, was a 
summary of letters of complaint and enquiry received by Professor John Hilton, who gave 
weekly broadcasts on the BBC and answered questions in the News of the World. His 
broadcasts were addressed primarily to the families of men in the services, but were very 
popular with the troops as well.
From these reports, Lt.-Col Sparrow, Secretary of the Morale Committee, was able to list a 
number of factors that he believed influenced morale, although there was obviously some 
cross-over in the various categories. Generally they reflected the areas highlighted by the 
Southborough Committee, but they exhibited more breadth. The views of officers and 
doctors before the Southborough Committee were augmented by the input of the Second 
World War conscripts themselves and included more welfare-related influences on morale, 
in line with the changing social and political climate during the war. Sparrow cited, in 
particular: the general, and the immediate military situation; confidence in leaders (both in 
the unit and in the High Command); efficiency of training and weapons; efficiency of unit
29 LHMCA, Adam Papers 8, Morale & Discipline.
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administration; discipline in unit; comradeship, pride in unit and esprit de corps; 
consciousness of fitness for the job in hand and understanding what it was; efficient “Q” 
Services, that is quarters, mail, rations; and “A” Services, covering medical, entertainment, 
newspapers, canteen and “welfare”; the efficiency of machinery for the supply of 
reinforcements; the administrative rules and routine regulations (home leave, promotion, 
etc.); and wider, including political, considerations, e.g. the attitude of the soldier towards 
the cause for which he was fighting and towards the government which directed the 
conduct of the war and determined the lot of the ex-soldier on demobilization.31
Not all of these were of equal importance to front-line infantry soldiers. For them morale 
was most positively influenced by immediate concerns such as the successful outcome of 
operations in which they were involved; low casualty rates; their own appreciation of their 
particular military situation and their hope that their own side -  especially the artillery -  
would destroy the enemy before the enemy could retaliate; the ability of their officers and 
NCOs to lead them effectively and maintain good levels of training and discipline; the 
efficiency of their weapons; the knowledge that, if wounded, medical assistance would be 
prompt and efficient; the speed and quality of reinforcements; strong esprit de corps and 
comradeship/small group cohesion; good rations while in the line; and comfortable living 
conditions, with sufficient hot food, washing facilities, entertainment and leisure time out 
of the line. Regular contact with home through a steady supply of national and local 
newspapers, radio broadcasts and letters to and from loved ones, arranged by efficient “Q” 
and “A” services, was also vital to conscripts who remained civilians at heart.
30 Sparrow, Morale, p. 29 
#
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The close correlation between morale and the incidence of breakdown, noted by the 
Southborough Committee, was also recognized in the Second World War. One psychiatrist 
wrote:
It may be said of all cases of psychiatric breakdown in warfare: that they have 
failed in their job as soldiers; have dissolved their comradeship in arms; and 
have experienced a breakdown in morale.... As a group they are further 
characterised by the extreme infrequency of wounds, by markedly lower
incidence amongst officers and amongst troops of high m orale The
soldier’s morale prior to his breakdown may be high or low ... In most cases 
morale is at a low ebb at the time of the breakdown.32
There is some question, however, as to whether it was low morale which produced
breakdowns, or whether, conversely, it was the onset of the breakdown which brought
about low morale. One psychiatrist, Dr. Emanuel Miller, pointed out that, in the case of
the First World War:
There is official evidence to show that in a very large proportion of cases, 
before the breakdown, the man has done credit to himself and his unit. Against 
overwhelming mental forces calling him to abandon his struggle to fight on, he 
has frequently carried on. In fact the proportion of men with neuroses who 
received decorations for valour showed little difference from the proportion of 
other soldiers who received decorations.33
All men have a breaking point. Lord Moran, who had fought in the First World War and
had served as Churchill’s physician during the Second World War, wrote that each man had
a “bank of courage”. It could be augmented, during periods of success such as El Alamein,
when morale would become heightened. Courage, however, he wrote, “is will-power,
31 Ibid, pp. 3-4
32 The Wellcome Library for the History and Understanding of Medicine, Contemporary Medical Collection 
(hereinafter CMAC), GC/192/18 Major H.A. Palmer, “The Problem of the P. & N. Casualty -  a Study of 
12,000 Cases”, Apppendix “E”, pp. 3-4 (n.d.)
33 Dr. E. Miller, quoted in Ahrenfeldt, Psychiatry, p 14
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whereof no man has an unlimited stock: and when in war it is used up, he is finished.”34
One Southborough Committee witness opined that:
.. .Even the bravest man cannot endure to be under fire for more than a certain 
number of consecutive days, even if the fire be not very heavy. Lord Byng, I 
am pretty sure, found this out in South Africa, after 80 or 90 days. My brother, 
Brigadier-General Charles Fortescue, had, in his column in South Africa, a 
Canadian officer who was a proverb for daring; but even this officer broke 
down for the time after every enterprise of any continuance and needed a 
fortnight’s rest from fire to restore him. To this fact I attribute the occasional 
notices of the mysterious disappearance of tried old soldiers in former wars.35
By the Second World War, British medical authorities, like most of the expert witnesses in 
front of the Southborough Committee, found the term “shell shock” to be a misnomer. The 
official preference was that forward medical officers used NYD (N), for Not Yet Diagnosed 
(Nervous), although a wide variety of terms were used, including psychoneurosis, anxiety 
neurosis, battle stress, battle exhaustion or, simply, exhaustion.36 In the Second World War 
battle fatigue among British troops usually occurred in 200-240 aggregate combat days, 
where 10 combat days were taken as equivalent to 17 calendar days.37 The Journal of 
Neurology reported in 1942 that “a man reached his peak effectiveness in the first 90 days 
of combat After this his efficiency fell away ...’,38 But in Tunisia, doctors compiling 
records of the men passing through their care, found that after 30 days of continuous 
fighting, 98% of infantrymen would break down.39 It was not only the duration, but also 
the type of fighting, in particular static warfare, that was an important consideration in 
general levels of infantry morale. One expert witness before the Southborough Committee,
34 Lord Moran, The Anatomy of Courage (Garden City Park, New York: Avery Publishing Group Inc., 1987) 
p. xvi.
35 The Honorable John Fortescue, Historian of the British Army, The Southborough Committee Report, p. 9
36 T. Copp & B. McAndrew, Battle Exhaustion: Soldiers and Psychiatrists in the Canadian Army, 1939-1945 
(Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1990) Footnote, p. 22
37 Ahrenfeldt, Psychiatry, p. 172
38 Holden, Shell Shock, p. 101
39 Ibid
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General Lord Home, considered that “shell shock” became a serious factor on the Western 
Front due to the particular character of the war. “The high explosives and bombardment 
had never been known before. He thought that in moving warfare we should not 
experience anything like it.”40 Another witness, Dr. Hurst, was of the same opinion: “I 
think what produces ‘shell shock’ much more than the sudden danger is prolonged danger 
in a static position, where the man cannot get away from it. It is the wear and tear and slow 
sapping of his nervous powers.”41 This was extremely important for the morale of soldiers 
in Italy during the Second World War since a great deal of the fighting there resembled the 
trench warfare of The Western Front. In his study of The Mystery o f Courage, William 
Miller mused on different forms of courage, the masculine and the feminine. “Men did 
well with the glorious sacrifice, the greater love of the falling-on-the grenade variety, but 
withdrew between times. Such grand gestures were signatured male -  a one-shot burst 
ending in death or exhaustion.”42 Traditionally women were allowed the courage of 
endurance.43 The inaction forced upon men by static warfare, with no chance of immediate 
retaliation, shredded nerves. The added burden in these circumstances was the inability to 
answer the fight or flee adrenalin-fuelled imperative, leading to both physical and mental 
distress.
The correlation between desertion and poor morale/neuroses was well-established. Robert 
Ahrenfeldt was the Deputy Assistant Director of Army Psychiatry in the Second World 
War. Subsequently he wrote the semi-official study of Pyschiatry in the British Army in the 
Second World War. In this he included, in his chapter on morale, the findings of a survey,
40 The Southborough Committee Report, p. 6
41 Ibid, p. 29
42 W.I. Miller, The Mystery of Courage (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2000) p. 248
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The Study in the Psychology o f Desertion and Absenteeism in Wartimer and its Relation to 
the Problem o f Morale, based on interviews with 2,000 deserters in the British Army of the 
Rhine. The author of the study, Colonel Penton, noted that when the morale of a unit in 
war ceased to hold a soldier in his place, one or two reactions was likely: the soldier would 
either become ill with battle exhaustion, or he would evade battle by other means, usually 
desertion. Factors cited as lowering morale and causing desertion or absenteeism were:
1. Psychiatric instability
2. Emotional immaturity
3. Campaign stress -  25% of deserters had been in previous campaigns. Regular 
soldiers deserted as readily as conscripts.
4. A preponderance of infantrymen -  89% of the total
5. Lack of morale-building factors such as insufficient training, self-confidence, 
identification with unit, etc.
6. Presence of morale-destroying factors -  external strains such as battle stress; 
internal strain such as separation or change in group; poor leadership; 
grievances; domestic and personal difficulties. Domestic stress was present in 
33% of cases and was a deciding factor.44
The need for a good Army Psychiatric Service, to maintain the mental health and morale of
soldiers, was foreseen by the Scarborough Committee:
As far as it is possible to foresee the conditions of any future war on 
a large scale, it seems probable that the circumstances are likely to 
make even greater demands upon the mental and nervous resources 
of the personnel of the fighting services than the events of 1914- 
1918. If this should prove to be die case, appropriate measures 
designed to admit into the services only those who are possessed of 
at least an average degree of mental and nervous health and stability 
will be a factor of prime importance in the successful conduct of the
45war.
Despite this prescient advice, in 1939 there were only half a dozen Army Medical Officers 
with psychiatric training.46 The Directorate of Army Psychiatry, whose brief was to 
maintain and promote the mental health and efficiency of the Army by every possible
43 Ibid, p. 249
44 Quoted in Ahrenfeldt, Psychiatry, pp. 123-4
45 The Southborough Committee Report, p. 15
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means, was not established until April 1942.47 It was, in fact, the senior officers of both 
the “Q” and “A” services, rather than the medical administrative authorities, who first 
became aware of the importance of the contributions which could be made by Army 
psychiatry to the understanding of many problems relating to morale.48 Bad soldiers, 
disruptive personalities and psychologically unfit men in general were “grit in the military 
machine from the point of view of morale”.49 By 1942 there were enough “misfits” 
already in the Army to cause considerable harm. Between 1942 and 1945, 14% of recruits 
who passed through the General Service Corps were referred to psychiatrists.50 The policy 
of the early weeding out of recruits unfit for service had a marked effect on the number of 
discharges on the medical grounds for mental disorders between 1943-1945. Discharges of 
psychopathic personalities fell from 17.18 per 100 of all mental discharges in 1943 to 14.79 
per 100 in 1945.51
Some commanders continued to believe that dull men made the best soldiers, but what was 
needed in the Second World War was “initiative, intelligence and military knowledge on 
the part of every private soldier.”52 Mental dullness was often found to be a frequent cause 
of military delinquency, particularly absenteeism. The tendency to desert appeared to be 
greatest among men of relatively low intelligence: some 50% of all deserters were in the
46 Ahrenfeldt, Psychiatry, p. 15
47 Ibid, p. 19
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lower half of the intelligence rating scale.53 In the North African campaign, before the 
introduction of psychiatric screening, the percentage of psychiatric casualties was estimated 
at between 7% and 30%.54
Even in the early years of the Second World War the British authorities continued to 
officially underestimate the problem. Copp and McAndrew, in their ground-breaking study 
of soldiers and psychiatrists in the Canadian Army, pointed out that although the official 
British medical history, based on Consultant Psychiatrist Brigadier G.W.B. James’ notes, 
stressed that the campaign against the Italians in December 1940-March 1941 produced less 
than 200 acute cases for all services, James’ own figures indicated that in 1941 one in every 
six battle casualties was psychiatric.55 Despite this, in Tunisia both military commanders 
and medical administrators in the First Army were strongly opposed to the presence of 
psychiatrists and flatly refused to accept an adviser at army headquarters.56 General Sir 
Ronald Adam noted in 1942 that the older school of medical men disliked psychologists 
and psychiatrists intensely, “and will do anything to stop their use.”57 The situation in the 
Eighth Army was slightly better in that a psychiatrist was attached to a mobile general 
hospital from the second Battle of El Alamein.58 A three-tier system of treatment was 
generally followed. At first sufferers were sent to forward psychiatric centres, attached to 
Casualty Clearing Stations, where they were sedated and allowed to sleep as long as they 
needed. Sleep was the first line of defence against battle fatigue since “...gross fatigue
53 Ahrenfeldft, Psychiatry, p. 79
54 Holden, Shell Shock, p. 99
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alone leads some men to the psychiatrist.”59 Continuing contact with comrades was 
encouraged, and a ‘curative’ atmosphere was established, which would lead each soldier 
under treatment to anticipate an early return to duty.60 Some 30%-60% of men were 
returned to their units within a week, especially where a strong esprit de corps existed.61 
There was, however, no way of judging the rate of recidivism. Figures for relapses and on 
the effectiveness of those returned to their units were elusive.62 If the patients could not be 
returned fit to carry on, they were sent back to specially designed military Psychiatric 
Rehabilitation Centres, which the Eighth Army in the Middle East set up in the summer of 
1943. Here the four-week rehabilitation scheme of psychiatric cases was possible within 
the general framework of an ordinary military Convalescent Depot, provided there was a 
special psychiatric wing under the supervision of a psychiatrist.63 Those men who did not 
respond to treatment were repatriated.
The term “battle exhaustion” came into common military parlance during the campaign in 
North Africa, when troops were constantly on the move, advancing 30 miles a day.64 This 
led many officers to believe that the condition was temporary, that if exhausted men could 
rest they would recover. To commanders worried about the manpower shortage, temporary 
exhaustion was far more preferable than irretrievable breakdown. The War Office 
therefore produced informative, educational films for officers and NCOs on the signs of 
incipient breakdown, so that sufferers could be taken out of the line before they became a 
liability to themselves, their unit and the Army in general. Since some officers continued to
59 Ibid, p. 166
60 Ibid, p. 169
61 Ibid, p. 166
62 Copp & McAndrew, Battle Exhaustion, p. 153
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believe that “shell-shock” was simple cowardice, the films made a point of stating that 
sufferers did not have a “yellow streak”.65
During the inter-war years, and in the aftermath of the Second World War, the study of 
soldiers’ morale remained largely the purview of doctors or psychiatrists, particularly those 
who had themselves worked with the psychiatric services during the conflict, and 
concentrated on the treatment of sufferers.66 Lord Moran’s seminal study, Anatomy of 
Courage, was first published in 1945. The semi-official history of Psychiatry in the British 
Army in the Second World War appeared in 1958.67 It was some years before historians 
took up the challenge. Initially much of the work focused on the experiences of soldiers on 
the Western Front in the First World War. John Baynes’ ground-breaking work, Morale, 
concentrated on one battalion, The Second Scottish Rifles, and studied various influences 
on their morale.68 He considered five to be the most important: regimental loyalty;
excellent officer-other rank relationships; strong discipline; the sense of duty of all ranks 
and, finally, sound administration. His concerns perhaps reflected the fact that he was 
himself a Regular Army officer. They can be regarded as the traditional approach to 
morale. Most applied equally to the Italian campaign. The only exception was regimental 
loyalty, due to the reinforcement situation in Italy, which will be examined in detail in 
Chapter III.
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In the 1970s military historians, in common with colleagues in other specialisms, turned 
their attention to the ‘history of everyman’. Reflecting the view of the Nineteenth Century 
French soldier and military theorist, Ardant du Picq when he wrote, ‘The man is the first 
weapon of battle. Let us study the soldier, for it is he who brings reality to it”, soldiering 
in general, and the experiences of fighting men, has been subjected to considerable 
attention.69 Even as the Second World War was ending attention was being drawn to the 
requirements, particularly in terms of the maintenance of morale, of a conscript army.70 
Thirty-one years later, Keegan’s The Face o f Battle, first published in 1976, studied the 
battles of Agincourt, Waterloo and The Somme.71 Keegan argued that the inclusion of the 
experiences of ordinary soldiers in the history of war was “the first and most important step 
in understanding battle ‘as it actually was’.72 The Face o f Battle was heralded as “a military 
history from the battlefield, a look at the direct experience of individuals at ‘the point of 
maximum danger’,” and the Somme section included a chapter on “The Will To Combat”, 
touching on the reasons why men did or did not fight. This was followed nine years later 
by Richard Holmes’ examination of front line soldiering, Firing Line.73 The reaction of 
soldiers in various campaigns of the Second World War was highlighted in James Lucas’ 
The British Soldier and Paul Addison and Angus Calder’s Time to Kill.74 The Second 
World War British Army was considered in detail in David French’s Raising Churchill*s 
Army and Jeremy Crang’s The British Army and the People*s War.75 Face-to-face killing
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in Twentieth Century warfare was investigated immediately after the war in S.L.A. 
Marshall’s study, Men Against Fire, which suggested that in the Second World War, 
among American soldiers at any rate, even in the most aggressive infantry companies, the 
number of men engaged with any and all weapons rarely rose above 25% and that the men 
who actually shot to kill were a mere two per cent76 There have been academic dissenters 
to Marshall’s finding: Roger Spiller, for instance, pointed out that Marshall’s ratio of fire 
could not be proved.77 More than 50 years after Marshall published his findings, Professor 
Bourke’s An Intimate History o f Killing aimed “to put killing back into military history.”78 
She contended that for many men and women, killing “was what made ‘a lovely war’”.79 
However, research carried out by other Allied forces at the end of the Second World War 
appears to have backed Marshall’s figures. In The Truth About Killing, both Lt.-Col. Dave 
Grossman, Professor of Military Science at Arkansas State University, and author of On 
Killing: The Psychological Cost o f Learning to Kill in War and Society, and Vietnam 
veteran and Professor of Psychology Richard Gabriel, agreed that Marshall’s conclusions 
were probably correct.80 Grossman commented that “the truth is that at the end of the 
Second World War the findings were not controversial. Military leaders knew it was true. 
The average boy out on the front line looking over his sights at another human being was 
not able or willing to kill the poor schmuck in front of him ...”81 This had obvious 
implications for morale in its more traditional definition of fighting spirit: men might be
76 Marshall, Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command
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willing and able to withstand the rigours of battle and remain in the front line, but were not 
willing and able to kill the enemy at close quarters. Conversely, others might be willing to 
kill, but were unwilling to submit to the demands of army discipline.
Given that morale is associated with so many aspects of a soldier’s experience, both on and 
off the battlefield, it is not surprising that it has developed a wide-ranging historiography. 
Timothy Bowman widened the debate with the regard to raising morale in the First World 
War when he looked to the Irish regiments. Building on the work of Baynes, and J.G. 
Fuller’s Troop Morale and Popular Culture,® he highlighted factors such as organized 
sports; regimental holidays; the work of Army chaplains; concert parties and films, all of 
which were expanded upon in the Second World War. He also noted that although the 
regimental system “clearly did help to build morale ... the system did lead to a number of 
problems during the war”, particularly with cross postings.83 Tony Ashworth sought to 
understand why men fought and how they performed in combat in the First World War and, 
more importantly, how they sustained their morale. This study paid particular attention to 
the informal social relationships among combatants, often termed primary groups, where 
each man guarded not only his own welfare but also the welfare of the others in the group. 
Other areas of importance he identified were the regimental tradition, although he pointed 
out that while this was strong in elite battalions, esprit de corps was almost entirely missing 
from non-elite units. Secondly, he suggested that men acted bravely in combat to fulfil an 
aggressively masculine code of behaviour. Thirdly, there was the influence of abstract
82 J.G. Fuller, Troop Morale and Popular Culture in the British and Dominion Armies 1914-1918 (Oxford, 
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values such as the nation state, the flag, and here Ashworth concluded that identification 
with the wider society did influence combat behaviour in indirect but positive ways.84
In the 1990s the psychiatric aspects of warfare were once again investigated. Battle 
Exhaustion was a seminal work of 1990, a study of soldiers and psychiatrists in the 
Canadian Army which fought in Italy as well as Normandy.85 This was followed by Shell 
Shock, a look at the subject across the 20th Century, and a further wide-ranging study, A 
War of Nerves?* These studies of the Second World War and later conflicts presented a 
far wider gamut of personal insights into the effects of “battle exhaustion” and thus offered 
a greater understanding of how the perception of this condition, and its treatment, has 
evolved since the First World War.
The Southborough Committee recognised the officer-other ranks relationship, as “the most 
important factor in maintaining morale....”87 Gary Sheffield examined such relationships 
on the Western Front and concluded that “the ethos of the pre-war officer corps, which 
stressed the need for the officer to exercise paternal care for his men, was a major factor in 
the maintenance of wartime morale.”88 He also noted, however, that good officer-man 
relations did not necessarily lead to combat-effectiveness. “If officers identified too closely 
with their men, this could lead to a reluctance to take aggressive action and thus put the 
group at risk.” The advantages of the officer-man relationship, however, he concluded, in
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terms of its morale-sustaining role, greatly outweighed the disadvantages.89 Discipline was 
the responsibility of the officer, and another aspect of morale, its relationship with 
discipline, was considered by Bowman for the Irish Regiments and was also the subject of 
an article on the British Army in Italy in the First World War. In the latter Gerard Oram 
highlighted the effects of illness and worsening conditions on the morale of the British 
troops and argued that these factors had as much impact on discipline as did the military 
operations. This, in turn, resulted in an increasingly lenient approach to discipline within 
which capital convictions were avoided.90 Illness and appalling conditions in Italy were not 
limited to the First World War and their effects on infantry morale in the Second World 
War, which were considerable, inform part of this thesis. In his larger study of Military 
Executions during World War /, Oram also posited that, on the Western Front, with the 
change-over from a volunteer to a conscript army in 1917, and increasing evidence that the 
consent of British troops could no longer be taken for granted, less use was made of the 
death penalty. “The relationship between morale and discipline is a complex one and it was 
continually redefined during the war. The progress of the war itself was probably the most 
influential factor. The failure of the first three years prompted a new approach.”91 In his 
overarching chapter on morale, Oram described the change over time from the pre-war top- 
down paternalist approach to morale which depended heavily on discipline, the use of 
deterrents, esprit de corps and patriotic fervour, to a bottom-up emphasis on an adequate 
and regular supply of good food, a good mail service to maintain close ties with home, and 
home leave. He stated: “Concerns about conditions at home were often the final straw for
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soldiers in the trenches, causing some to desert.”92 These bottom-up morale-boosting 
initiatives were to prove equally as important in the Second World War, spearheaded by the 
Welfare Directorate.
More recently historians such as Jeremy Crang, David French, Timothy Harrison Place,
S.P. MacKenzie, and Mark Connolly and Walter Miller, et al, have tried to understand how 
various aspects of soldiers’ morale in the Second World War evolved, and how it 
influenced their actions.93 Training and leadership, regarded as paramount in the provision 
of good morale by the Southborough Committee, have attracted particular attention. The 
Southborough Committee had recommended that the first three months of training should 
be seen as probationary, after which “all recruits should be regarded by expert observers 
and judges, and detailed for branches of the service for which they are physically and 
temperamentally suited.”94 Yet the soldiers’ common grouse that the Army deliberately 
put them into a branch of the service for which they were least suited caused concern in the 
early stages of the Second World War, as this malplacement not only had “obvious 
implications for operational efficiency, but also for soldiers’ morale since men often 
became maladjusted through being employed either above or below their capacity.”95 It 
was not until June 1941 that the Directorate of Selection of Personnel was formed, with 
Selection Boards being set up in every command at home and abroad in January 1942.
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Scientific officer selection was also instituted. It became obvious in the first years of the 
Second World War that the quality of officers, junior officers in particular, left much to be 
desired. Jeremy Crang, who looked at the changes which occurred within the British Army 
principally from 1940-42, including not only officer selection, but also other rank selection, 
officer-man relations, welfare and education, has shown that there were complaints from 
units overseas about the quality of new officer material and, in addition, “the cumulative 
effects of poor selection were evident in the number of officers who proved unable to 
shoulder the burdens of leadership.”96 The breakdown rate among officers was so high in 
1939-40 that Adam asked for a procedure of officer selection to be set up, based on the 
German model, which had been in operation since 1926.97 The “leaderless group project” 
was devised, which, according to Major Wilfred Bion, who was put in charge of one such 
selection board, “provided a framework in which selecting officers, including a psychiatrist, 
could observe a man’s capacity for maintaining personal relationships in a situation of 
strain that tempted him to disregard the interests of his fellows for the sake of his own.”98 
David French has suggested that the introduction of these War Office Selection Boards not 
only improved the quality of new officers but also had a positive impact on the morale of 
other ranks; an increased number of them were willing to put themselves forward for 
commissions and both successful and unsuccessful candidates believed they had been 
treated fairly.99
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Timothy Harrison Place investigated training, and contended that the combat effectiveness 
of British troops, particularly infantry and armour, proved weak during the Second World 
War.100 The British Army’s leadership failure to establish a coherent tactical doctrine 
meant that infantry minor tactics came to be regarded as an alternative to artillery-based 
tactics “rather than a set of complementary techniques to be applied when the blunt artillery 
instrument was no longer suitable.”101 The fact that “infantry tactics ultimately advanced 
little from the standards of 1916 is disgraceful.”102 When it looked at training, the opinion 
of the Southborough Committee was that it should inculcate the highest possible standard 
of morale, discipline, esprit de corps, esteem of officers and confidence both individually 
and collectively; and ensure and maintain mental, physical and moral fitness and technical 
efficiency. Training should aim both at the automatic obedience of orders, in order to 
consolidate the sense of collective responsibility and efficiency, and yet, at the same time, 
should also aim at creating the spirit of individual effort.100 This in itself was a tall order. 
At the start of the Second World War the old barrack square drill, started in the days of the 
musket, remained the recognised basis for teaching initial co-operation, uncritical 
obedience, self control and confidence in weapons.104 Many conscripts despised “square 
bashing” and considered it a waste of time, yet the Army believed that attention to detail at 
all times might save their lives. The often unwilling and unenthusiastic civilian soldiers 
forced military leaders to look at training with a fresh eye in order both to inculcate the 
necessary military ethos and to instil adequate levels of weapons training. A report on the 
“Lessons of the Tunisian Campaign” pointed out that there were numerous complaints from
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units as regards the standard of training of reinforcements. “In the case of infantry it was 
usually lack of training in basic infantry weapons, and in platoon tactical training. 
Untrained men are a liability to the unit.”105
By 1943 a new training regime had come into play. Battle drill emphasised “fire and 
movement” (fundamental to infantry minor tactics), infiltration, camouflage, speed, sub­
unit initiative, NCO and individual decision and self-critical co-operation.106 Whether the 
latter points were fully taken on board by all conscripts is doubtful: initiative is, after all, 
inherent and cannot be taught. It was believed that what battle drills did instil was a 
template for “fire and movement” tactics which any soldier could fall back on “in the 
absence of any ideas of his own or alternative orders from above.”107 The first Battle 
School was formed early in 1942. There teaching contained three elements: battle drill, 
vigorous, practical, physical action by all students and live fire, aimed at conditioning men 
to the noise and turmoil of war.108 The tougher the training, it was found, the stronger the 
group identity and consequently morale. “Hate” training was also attempted, which had a 
detrimental effect on morale. Plans were made to “condition” students to the sight of blood 
by visiting slaughterhouses and throwing blood about the training areas during active 
exercises.109 It had to be abandoned after the first course, following incidents of fainting 
and vomiting among the trainees. Instead of spurring the men on, it depressed them. 
Montgomery, then Army Commander, South-Eastern Command, in a Memorandum on 
Battle Drill (May 1942) observed that attempts to create an artificial blood-lust or hate
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during training was worse than futile since such an attitude was foreign to the British 
temperament.110 Harrison Place concentrated on training in the UK between Dunkirk and 
D-Day, and on the North-West European operations. Italy was, above all, an infantry war, 
and British infantrymen gained considerable on-the-spot battle experience there willy-nilly. 
This enabled many of them, from privates upwards, to demonstrate “enterprise and 
initiative ... which emerged despite, rather than because of, the training system.”111
Training was supposed to inculcate discipline, both self-discipline and unquestioning 
obedience to orders, which was regarded as proof of high morale. Desertion denied both, 
and it was extremely high in Italy.112 Army Commanders there believed that without the 
death penalty for desertion their options to enforce discipline were limited. John Peaty, in 
his article, “The Desertion Crisis in Italy”, examined the deterrents available to army 
commanders and concluded that the threat of prison was not effective: the exemplary 
sentencing of some deserters at Anzio to five rather than three years had no effect on the 
desertion rate.113 Exemplary sentencing was not limited to Italy during the Second World 
War. Mark Connelly and Walter Miller examined its use by British courts martial in North 
Africa.114 They also examined another aspect of morale in the Second World War, that of 
the surrender of the British Expeditionary Force in 1940. They reached a conclusion that
108 Ibid, p. 55
109 Ahrenfeldt, Psychiatry, p. 200
110 Ibid, p. 200
111 Ibid, p. 175
112 Anomymous, “The Desertion Crisis in Italy: Some Views from an Eighth Army Infantry Platoon 
Commander”, The Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies (RUSI) Journal, Vol. 147, No. 5, 
October 2002, pp.84-8;
113 J. Peaty, “The Desertion Crisis in Italy, 1944”, The RUSI Journal, Vol. 147, No. 3, June 2002, p. 79
114 M. Connelly & W. Miller, “British Courts Martial in North Africa, 1941-3,
38
contradicts the accepted belief that the BEF was a demoralised army; surrender was a 
pragmatic decision taken by soldiers with high morale.115
High morale and strong group cohesion are linked, yet, as Omar Bartov demonstrated in his 
book on the German Army on the Eastern Front, where a high casualty rate undermined 
group solidarity, something must take its place to motivate fighting men.116 In the case of 
the German soldiers it was ideology, but British troops very rarely fought for King and 
Country. S.P. MacKenzie examined the attempts to inculcate a will to win and deepen the 
British soldier’s faith in the cause for which he was fighting in Politics and Military 
Morale, and concluded that in both World Wars it was the perceived need to win the hearts 
and minds of the troops when their morale appeared to be in question that gave rise to 
current-affairs and current citizenship education, but that neither produced any dramatic 
results.117
Other areas of soldiers’ physical and mental wellbeing became legitimate subjects of study, 
both by doctors and historians. Soldiers’ relationships with women, who were judged vital 
to the maintenance of morale, were commented upon as early as 1954 by a psychiatrist, Dr. 
Pearce, and later by historians Mark Harrison for the Second World War and K. Craig 
Gibson for the First World War.118 Studies of malaria and VD, both of which took their 
toll on the armies in Italy, have also come in for greater attention in recent years.119
115 M. Connelly & W. Miller, “The BEF and the Issue of Surrender on the Western Front in 1940”,
116 O. Bartov, Hitler's Army: Soldiers, Nazis and War in the Third Reich (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1991)
117 MacKenzie, Politics and Military Morale
118 J.D.W. Pearce, “Problems of Sex in the Service,” The Practitioner, Vol. 172, April 1954, pp. 436-439: M. 
Harrison, “Sex and the Citizen Soldier; Health, Morals and Discipline in the British Army during the Second 
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These works provide the general context for any scholarly study of morale during the
Italian campaign. But there is also a large body of work on Italian campaign itself, mostly
from the strategic and tactical point of view, or concentrating particularly on the principal
battles. One of the first books published on the campaign, immediately after the end of the
war, was by the journalist Christopher Buckley, who told his readers that: “The book aims
at being a serious military narrative.”120 Morale was not mentioned at all. It was followed
in 1951 by Eric Linklater’s semi-official account, part of “a popular military history by
various authors, in eight volumes” on The Second World War. He pointed out that, in the
winter of 1944-45, there was a “worrying decline in the morale of certain units” and offered
up the following reasons:
They had suffered too heavily in battle and been too long away from home: 
domestic trouble, unhappily frequent when a soldier has been serving overseas 
for more than two years, may find a dark reflection in the battle-area, and a 
woman’s infidelity can weaken a man’s fighting-spirit almost as gravely as the 
discovery that he is short of ammunition.121
In The Battle for Italy, published in 1967, General Jackson, who himself participated in that 
operation, concentrated on the strategic and tactical aspects of the campaign. He mentioned 
morale in passing, and only in general terms. He noted, for instance, that “fighting men’s 
instincts are acute; any idea that their efforts are unlikely to have a decisive effect on the
Gibson, “Sex and Soldiering in France and Handers: The British Expeditionary Force along the Western 
Front, 1914-1919”, The International History Review, Vol. XXIII, No. 3, September 2001, pp.535-579
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war soon destroys the willingness to take risks.”122 He also touched upon the desertion 
problem in the winter of 1944-45, putting it down to ‘end of war’ psychosis. “As far as the 
British soldiers were concerned, the death sentence for desertion had been replaced by 
penal servitude. Most soldiers believed that there would be an amnesty after the war and so 
it was preferable to desert and survive rather than stand another winter in the mountains, 
taking part in hopeless attacks on strongly held German positions.”123 There was thus an 
acknowledgement of a problem, and two different views as to its genesis, one welfare- 
based, the other a traditional army viewpoint, but no details. These had to wait until the 
official war history, The Mediterranean and Middle East, Volume V, Part 1, published in 
1984, detailed the problems of training, reinforcements and supplies, all of which 
influenced morale.124 This was followed in 1987 by Volume VI, Part II, which enumerated 
desertion statistics. The latter pointed out that there were just under a million men on the 
ration strength of the British Central Mediterranean Forces. The desertion/AWOL figure, 
therefore, at worst, was about 0.1%. This was not bad in overall terms, but as most 
deserters were from the infantry, it had a profound impact.125
The Italian campaign has always attracted conflicting views, and morale garnered a 
different emphasis and importance from each author. Gregory Blaxland, in Alexander's 
Generals, wrote that the challenge the Italian campaign presented was in the maintenance 
of morale. At various points throughout the book he identifies periods when morale was
122 W.G.F. Jackson, The Battle for Italy (London: William Clowes and Sons, 1967) p. 255
123 Ibid, p. 284
124 Brigadier C.J.C. Molony, The Mediterranean and Middle East, Vol. VI, Part I, Is* April to 4* June 1944 
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high, or low, and gives an indication of the number of deserters.126 John Strawson, a 
veteran of the campaign, wished to put The Italian Campaign in perspective in his 
overview.127 He posed the question: “Was Italy worthwhile?” and concluded that it was. 
The main thrust of his overview was therefore political and strategic, and rarely touched 
upon the soldiers’ experience. In his introduction to Circles o f Hell Eric Morris, an 
historian, not a military man, stated that: “It tells the story of the front-line soldiers.” Its 
emphasis, however, was not on soldiers’ morale, but rather on why the campaign was 
fought in the first place.128 Apart from some reminiscences from veterans, it did not deal 
with troop morale. Former artillery officers-tumed-historians Shelford Bidwell and 
Dominick Graham, on the other had, touched upon many faces of morale in Tug o f War, 
including desertions, terrible living and fighting conditions, battle fatigue and methods 
employed to maintain morale.129 Biographies of senior commanders in Italy mentioned 
morale, but were not expansive on the subject.130 The biography of General Sir Brian 
Robertson, Alexander’s Administrative Officer, brought up the question of manpower 
shortages and desertion and detailed Robertson’s actions with regard to the latter pressing 
problem.131
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Specific battles have attracted serious attention from historians, but again most of them
have focused on strategic issues. This is certainly true of accounts of the Sicily
campaign.132 Three in-depth examinations of the Salerno landings mention morale if it
impinged in any way on the course of the battle, and all refer to the Salerno Mutiny, the
largest mutiny and expression of discontent and low morale in the British Army in the
Second World War.133 But it was left to Saul David to look at the mutiny in detail.134 He
did so from a legal rather than a morale standpoint, viewing the sentencing of the mutineers
as a gross injustice. According to David, the Army itself contributed to such a catastrophic
failure of morale among men of hitherto spotless disciplinary and fighting reputations by
sending them, without their prior knowledge and consent, to battalions other than their
own. The whole question of esprit de corps, one of the Army’s basic morale-boosting
tenets, was put into question at Salerno, and during the Italian campaign as a whole. John
Ellis’s scathing attack on the Cassino operation was sympathetic to the plight of the PBI
(Poor Bloody Infantry) of all the nations involved. He noted that the rate of casualties
amongst the rifle companies were around 34%, and praised the fighting troops’ endurance:
The Allied fighting troops had been brought to the very extremes of physical 
and mental suffering. Icy cold, rain, sleet, snow, mud, hunger, numbing 
fatigue, the crash of shells, severed arteries, exposed innards, exploding brains, 
and fear, gut-wrenching, bowel-moving fear -  these had been the motifs of 
Cassino. Yet amidst this infernal ambience men had attained epic stature, 
keeping tight hold of themselves during their long days’ dying and rising when 
bidden to trudge forward into fire up the slopes of yet another godless, barren 
hillside. And now all they had to look forward to was yet more of the same.
Truly had Casino been a hollow victory.135
132 For detailed accounts of the Sicily Campaign, see: H. Pond, Sicily (London: William Kimber, 1962); C. 
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Other works on Cassino, including Fred Majdalany’s seminal work, Cassino: Portrait o f A 
Battle, are military appreciations of all the nationalities involved, with little or no mention 
of infantry morale.136 Alex Bowlby’s Countdown to Cassino, on the other hand, painted a 
vivid picture of the winter of 1943 and how the soldiers, and their morale, were influenced 
by the conditions in which they found themselves.137 This is hardly unexpected given that 
the author had fought as an infantryman in the campaign. Anzio, like Cassino, has attracted 
much attention, but again, historians tend to deal with the political and strategic imperatives 
of the operation.138 Carlo D’Este, however, did suggest in Fatal Decision that “the most 
worrisome problem facing the commanders was not their enemy but morale.”139 
References to morale were scattered throughout his study. The highs and lows of morale 
were also charted in Douglas Orgill’s The Gothic Line, the last major assault of a well- 
fortified German defensive line in 1944.140
The histories of armies, division and battalions tend to gloss over anything which might 
show their subject in a less than favourable light. Some of them do, however, indicate 
when, and why, morale was low, and if desertion or battle fatigue became a problem. 
Richard Doherty, whose history of the Eighth Army was published in 1999, when the full 
scale of the desertion problem in Italy was well known, dealt with morale in some depth, as 
well as detailing what was done by army commanders before the Final Offensive to address
136 See, for instance: G. Forty, Battle for Monte Cassino (Hersham, Surrey: Ian Allan Publishing, 2004); D. 
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the situation. He also included material from veterans, as did Ken Ford in his history of the 
78th Division, and Peter Hart in his look at the activities of the 16th Durham Light Infantry 
in Italy.141 But the most acute sense of what infantrymen felt while they toiled up Italy can 
be gleaned not from the works of historians but from the compilations of interviews, 
personal memoirs, diaries and papers of the Italian campaign veterans, both published and 
unpublished.142 The Recollections o f Rifleman Bowlby, Fred Majdalany’s memoirs of his 
time at Cassino and Wynford Vaughan-Thomas’s account of the Anzio beachhead all 
underscore the hardships the infantry faced in Italy, and the fluctuating state of their 
morale.143
The literature on morale in the British army in the era of the First and Second World Wars 
has thus produced an eclectic list of factors that degraded and sustained the morale of front­
line soldiers. These include, among other elements, esprit de corps or group cohesion; 
leadership; training; length of time in the line; continuous noise and exhaustion; casualty 
rates and the fear of illness; living conditions in and out of the line; sports and
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entertainments; food; a good mail service; length of time away from home and domestic 
stress; and the feeling of being forgotten and unappreciated. The more specific literature 
on the Italian campaign has touched upon issues relating to morale without examining in 
any detail how and why it varied across time and place. But there is no sustained analysis 
of how morale amongst the most vulnerable soldiers in Italy, the infantry, developed across 
the whole course of the campaign. This thesis will fill that gap.
The starting point for this examination of the infantryman’s attitude to his employment as a 
front-line fighting man are the two pamphlets produced by the War Office on the eve of the 
Italian campaign, Comrade in Arms and The Soldier's Welfare. Issued by the Army 
Council, they set out the British Army’s official doctrine on morale in the middle years of 
the Second World War.
Drawn up just six months after the Morale Committee was instituted, Comrades in Arms
took the form of three lectures issued to junior officers and officer cadets “to assist them in
the handling of their men”.144 The introduction noted that:
Your relationship with your men, and how you understand them and look after 
them, is just one of the four ways of attaining real efficiency in war -  the others 
being training, discipline, and administration.
All four are completely interdependent, and equally important, and on them the 
morale and efficiency of a unit depends. If one link is weak, the others lose 
much of their effectiveness, and morale and efficiency suffer accordingly.145
The general approach of the first lecture was the standard paternal pattern, unchanged since 
before the First World War:
144 Comrades in Arms (The War Office, September 1942), front page
145 Ibid, p. 2
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Between you and many of your men a real friendship is bound to grow, and 
sometimes there will be a little more than that. There is nothing sloppy or 
sentimental about such a relationship, nor should it be in any way bad for 
discipline. If you are a youngster, some of the older men will feel kind of 
paternal towards you and will want to look after you - and you, in your turn, 
will feel the same way towards some of your young soldiers. All perfectly 
natural and human, and excellent for morale.146
The first lecture laid out various points which the Army Council regarded as essential to
the maintenance of morale. They were:
1. No seeking of popularity or relaxing of discipline
2. You must be efficient
3. Give them a sense of unity
4. Put men’s interests first
5. Explain things to them
6. Do things with them. Share unpleasant duties, eat with them when on field
training
7. Be their champion. Make sure your men do their fair share and are not imposed
on
8. Know their names
9. Make the salute a greeting between comrades
10. Be friendly without being familiar147
Advice was also given to the junior officers on their relationship with their NCOs. They 
were told that the NCO was the man who “should not only see to the carrying out of your
orders, but who acts as a kind of interpreter between you and your men If he is good
and loyal to you, his value is beyond price.” If, on the other hand, he was bad, the officers 
were told to get rid of him. The worst types were the bullies; the petty tyrant and the 
double-faced man. “Until you have got good NCOs, you cannot have a good unit.”148
The second lecture referred to men’s mental and emotions needs and enumerated the six 
reasons why men differ from one another, viz: where they came from; their job; their
146 Ibid, p. 3
147 Ibid, pp. 4-7
148 Ibid, pp. 7-8
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temperament; their religion; their upbringing and their politics.149 The latter, particularly, 
was an acknowledgement that the army was a civilian army, and the men were often 
“suspicious and resentful of those in authority.”150 Junior officers were advised to talk 
informally to their men when the occasion presented itself, read about the localities from 
which their men hailed, and employ a general knowledge of psychology, to understand and 
appreciate their men’s situation. The third lecture dealt with the men’s welfare. “The main 
object of welfare is to keep the men as happy and contented as possible, so that they may be 
at all times fighting fit and fit to fight.”151 This, it was emphasised, was the officer’s job, 
not the padre’s.
The men’s welfare must always be the direct concern of the regimental officer. 
Otherwise he does not command them in any real sense, nor will he get to know 
them, and build up that essential relationship of mutual confidence and respect.
The padre and the local welfare officer are available to help him to do the job
better, but not to relieve him of it No officer can ever afford to neglect at
any time the welfare of his men, whether it is during periods of inactivity or in 
actual fighting. If he does, the morale and fighting efficiency of his men is 
certain to suffer.152
Attention was drawn specifically to various points regarding the soldier’s welfare. They 
took on board the question of leave, “the best thing both for morals and morale”; messing, 
which should always be as good as possible; the necessity of letters and contact with home; 
interviews about private affairs, which was the most important aspect of welfare, “judging 
from the letters the Welfare Directorate so often gets,” and one where officers seemed to be 
failing a little. The officer needed to be able to talk to his men about a variety of subjects,
149 Ibid, p. 9
150 Ibid, p. 12
151 Ibid, p. 16
152 Ibid, p. 17
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including sex and money. Finally, the officer was advised to keep friends together and 
group men carefully.153
The Soldier's Welfare was first issued in 1941 and ran to four editions. The second edition,
which came out six months after Comrades in Arms, covered much the same ground, but
with much greater emphasis on welfare.
The welfare of a civilian army is a vast subject, and it is worse than useless to 
refuse to face the fact when as has already been pointed out, good welfare is 
one of the main essentials to sound morale and fighting efficiency.154
The two main objects of welfare work in the Army, the pamphlet stated, were:
1. To strengthen the morale of the men by making the fullest possible provision for 
the need of their spirits, minds and bodies, so that they may at all times be 
fighting fit, ready to fight, and able and willing to give their best
2. To link officers and men together in a bond of mutual friendship and respect, 
which will not only stand the hardest tests of war, but will be strengthened by 
them.135
In addition to the welfare points raised in Comrades in Arms -  leave, messing, mail, 
interviews about private affairs, including sex and money -  The Soldier's Welfare included 
Health; Education; A.B.C.A.; Sport and Games; Entertainment; Relations with Civilians; 
Relations with Allied and Dominion Troops; Discharge and “After the War”.156
The three key questions that this thesis will address are: (a) the extent to which the War 
Office’s doctrine, as expressed in Comrades in Arms and The Soldier's Welfare, correctly 
identified and weighed the main factors likely to degrade and sustain morale; (b) the extent 
to which the prophylactic measures the War Office doctrine recommended could be, and 
were, pursued in Italy; and (c) their success or failure and the reasons for them. To this end
153 Ibid, pp. 18-25
154 The Soldier’s Welfare (2nd Edition, London: The War Office, 1943), p. 7
155 Ibid, Foreword, p. 5
49
key influences on morale - sickness, casualty rates, manpower and desertion - will be 
examined in the first four chapters. The Army’s reaction in the face of rising desertion and 
AWOL figures will be considered in Chapter V, and finally, the measures taken by both the 
Army and at battalion level, by officers and the men themselves, to maintain morale, will 





Sick men cannot fight effectively, and sickness was the biggest drain on manpower during 
the 22 months of the Italian campaign. It was only for a few weeks during particularly 
heavy fighting that battle casualty numbers exceeded the number of men sick.
Table 1.1
Admissions to aU Medical Units, B.N.A.F. and C.M.F., 1943-19451 
(ratios per 1,000)
Causes of Admission 1943 1944 1945
Total Admission on account of:
Sickness: 574.83 512.67 440.98
Battle Injuries: 63.86 89.60 9.81
Other Injuries: 65.06 44.41 53.28
Montgomery noted, just before he left Italy at the end of 1943, that
My total casualties since I landed in Italy .. .are:
598 Officers >
9,428 other ranks } up to 15 Dec
It is very interesting to note that since I have landed in Italy ... I have had the 
following through my hospitals:
Wounded 5,400
Sick 32,700
You see the proportion of sick to wounded -  nearly 7 times as much. Hence the 
importance of a good medical service, and of good care of the men by the 
regimental officers.2
“Health” was one of the topics included in The Soldier's Welfare. Officers, the pamphlet 
stated, had to be “keenly alive” to their responsibilities with regard to their men’s health. 
One of the best tests of a unit’s efficiency was the size of the sick parade, and while 
malingers were “always exceptional, save in badly disciplined units”, many men, according
1 F.A.E. Crew, The Army Medical Services, Campaigns, Vol. Ill (London: HMSO, 1959), extract from Table 
34, p. 504
2IWM Montgomery Ancillary Collection 18, General Sir Frank Simpson MSS, Montgomery to Simpson, 17 
December 1943
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to The Soldier's Welfare, were reluctant to report sick or were ignorant or careless about the 
rules of health and sanitation.3
The principal ailments suffered by troops in Italy are given below (Table 1.2). The most 
pressing cause of concern for army commanders at the start of the campaign was the high 
incidence of malaria. Later in the campaign the increase in the number of VD cases 
became a major drain on manpower levels.
Table 1.2
Principal Causes of Admission to all Medical Unites, B.N.A.F and C.M.F., 1943-5*
(Ratios per 1,000 and percentage of Total Sick)
Causes of Admission Annual ratio per 1.000 Percent of Sick Admissions
1943 1944 1945 1943 1944 1945
Malaria 107.65 73.53 19.49 18.73 14.34 4.42
Alimentary Tract* 106.18 62.25 38.89 18.47 12.14 8.82
Skin & I.A.T. (excl. Scabies) 82.00 69.66 58.88 14.27 13.59 13.35
Infective Hepatitis 49.07 25.08 13.70 8.54 4.89 3.11
Respiratory Tract 36.33 31.24 36.35 6.32 6.09 8.24
Venereal Disease 31.29 49.86 68.81 5.44 9.73 15.60
Dysentery 26.56 11.51 4.39 4.62 2.25 1.00
Scabies 19.54 18.89 56.02 3.56 3.69 12.70
Psychoneurosis (excl. 
Exhaustion) 8.86 19.78 6.30 1.54 3.86 1.43
♦Alimentary excludes dysentery and was largely due to tonsillitis and pharyngitis
There are three main areas of investigation here which can shed light on morale: the type 
of illnesses suffered; the response of regimental officers and the Army Medical Services to 
the situation; and how the soldiers themselves were influenced by illness.
3 The Soldier’s Welfare, p. 17
4 Crew, The Army Medical Services, Table 34, p. 504
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Despite the advice in The Soldier’s Welfare about health, there are indications that, at the 
start of the Italian campaign, men suffered the debilitating effects of malaria not only 
through ignorance, but also through failures of army administration, poor leadership and 
lack of unit discipline. Malaria was a particularly severe drain on manpower in Sicily and 
Italy in 1943-44. The whole Sicilian coastal belt where the Eighth Army landed on July 
10th 1943 was malarious and so was the Catania Plain, where they were concentrated for 
much of the Sicily campaign.5 A captured document showed that the dangers of this area 
were known to the Germans and that this might have influenced their tactics.6 Eighth 
Army lost approximately 9,(XX) battle casualties during the Sicilian campaign as against 
11,590 to malaria.7 Malaria was not a new problem for the Army. Eighth Army was 
forced to leave 1,000 malaria sufferers behind in North Africa prior to HUSKY, and the 
first 300 cases in Sicily were North African in origin. It was just new to some of the 
reinforcements who had been brought in to swell the ranks of the depleted infantry 
battalions following the North African campaign. It appears that some men did not think 
that malaria was a problem at El Shatt when they were training there. The 2nd Bn Royal 
Scots Fusiliers Battalion Routine Orders of June 21st 1943 put a stop to this 
misapprehension. “It has been unofficially stated that the area of the El Shatt camps is non­
malaria, this is not so. Full malarial precautions will be taken...”8 Full malarial 
precautions included anti-malarial creams, nets and mepacrine, a synthesized quinine, as a 
prophylactic. At that time the standard Medical Instructions on Anti-malarial Precautions
5 NA WO 222/1494, The Campaign for Sicily, p. 13
6 Ibid, p. 25
7 Taken from the report of the Surgeon, AFHQ, North Africa, on Malaria in the Sicilian Campaign, quoted in 
Crew, The Army Medical Services, p. 53
8 NA WO 169/10289 2nd Bn The Royal Scots Fusiliers War Diary for June 1943
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stated that the Officer Commanding a Unit was responsible for all anti-malaria measures 
within his unit. He should ensure that two tablets of mepacrine were taken, on a parade, 
after the evening meal on each Monday and Wednesday. He was also to ensure that each 
man had a proper container with anti-mosquito cream to be smeared on all exposed parts of 
the body at four hourly intervals; that each Officer, NCO and man was provided with either 
a mosquito, sandfly or bush net or mosquito-proof bivouac, and that this equipment was 
always kept in good repair.9 Many battalion orders stressed that “all anti-malaria 
instructions will be strictly adhered to.”10
In Sicily the attitude of officers and NCOs was paramount in the battle against malaria and 
the failure of junior officers, and many senior officers too, to set a good example by taking 
mepacrine regularly and using mosquito nets must be acknowledged.11 Montgomery 
believed that “anti-malaria discipline has not been too good in some units, and officer and 
men have got slack about taking the precautions laid down.”12 Despite this, it is possible 
that the high officer casualty figures in Sicily may have contributed to the incidence of 
malaria. The Assistant Director of Medical Services of the 50th Division pointed out that 
officer casualties had a powerful influence regarding continuity of control of anti-malarial 
measures.13
9 NA WO 222/1494 The Campaign in Sicily (Medical) p. 23
10 For example see NA WO 169/10204 8th Bn The Durham Light Infantry War Diary for July 1943 
Operation Order No. 1,5 July
11 NA WO 222/159 Malaria Control in Mobile Warfare: Italian campaign 1943-1945 Thompson, Malaria 
Control, 7
12 S. Brooks (ed.), Montgomery and The Eighth Army (London: The Bodley Head for The Army Records 
Society, 199 l)p. 262
13 NA WO 177/401 Medical Diary -  ADMS 50th Division September 1943 Lessons from Sicilian Campaign 
- “Malaria”, p. 3
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But it is too simple to equate a relatively high incidence of malaria with universally poor 
discipline. There was also a failure in Eighth Army organisation because “some of the 
Divisions were desert minded and would not listen to advice” about precautions.14 
Equally, many of the reinforcements sent to Sicily from the UK had either never had 
mepacrine and knew nothing of its significance, or had been irregularly issued with an odd 
tablet or two.15 In addition, policy regarding malaria control was not uniform across the 
Army. Troops arriving from the Middle East were taking two tablets of mepacrine on 
Mondays and Wednesday and those from Tunisia were taking one tablet on Monday, 
Tuesday, Thursday and Friday.16 Eighth Army divisions from the Middle East were 
inclined to scorn mepacrine, and one division even failed to draw its supplies, so that 
AFHQ had to insist that the tablets be accepted.17 A lot of mepacrine tablets were lost 
when the troops waded ashore on July 10th 1943 because they had not been packed in 
waterproof containers.18 Because of this a suitable container was introduced before the 
start of the malarial season in Italy the following year.19 But apart from some slackness in 
mepacrine administration, there were other reasons for the outbreak of malaria: the failure 
of malaria control units to arrive early; and a lack of appreciation by the troops of the 
importance of personal protection methods such as repellents, veils and suitable clothing 
after sundown. Even so, 168th Brigade (50th Division), which lost its bush nets and had 
none for the first two or three weeks in Sicily, showed the lowest incidence as a Brigade. 
“It is difficult to ascertain if that, because of the lack of nets, the anti-malarial creams, long
14 NA WO 204/1580 Allied Forces Headquarters, Office of the Surgeon: Malaria in the Sicilian Campaign 
9 Jul-10 Sep 1943, Part I -  Report, p. 1
15 NA WO 177/410 Medical Diary - ADMS 50* Division September 1943 Lessons from Sicilian Campaign 
-  “Malaria”, Item II (d), 30 September
16 Crew, The Army Medical Services, p. 71
17 Ibid, p. 47
18 Ibid
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sleeves and trousers in the evenings were given more attention in this Brigade,” although it 
was also pointed out that this Brigade “was not quite so much engaged in forward battle 
positions as the other Brigades both before, and after its arrival in Sicily (D+5).”20
There was undoubtedly a disinclination among some soldiers to take proper precautions, 
though this was probably down to plain ignorance. Some men did not realise what malaria 
could do to them and did not really care if they caught it: they thought it would be better 
than ‘catching a burst from a Spandau’ and might keep them out of the firing line for a few 
days.21 Others would sell the tablets to gullible Sicilian girls as “anti-baby pills.”22 But the 
principal bar to ensuring that proper prophylactic practices were followed, Sir Ronald 
Adam, the Adjutant-General, believed, was that no one believed that malaria really still 
existed in Europe.23 Mepacrine was the only anti-malarial measure which could be carried 
out under all and every circumstances, even in the firing line.24 Unfortunately it turned the 
skin and whites of the eyes yellow, and the outbreak of gastro-intestinal disturbances which 
coincided with the initiation of mepacrine suppressive treatment made it very unpopular 
during the first part of the campaign.25 There were also rumours that mepacrine caused 
impotency, a fear emphasised in German propaganda.26 Even troops who wanted to 
maintain anti-malarial discipline had difficulties. “Troops in isolated fighting positions and 
in small detachments have not been clear as to the day of the week and, under the stress of
19 NA WO 222/144 Medical Research Council, Malaria Committee, Sub Committee on Prophylaxis in 
Combat Areas, 1944
20 NA WO 177/401 Medical Diary -  ADMS 50th Division August 1943 Sitrep, 23 August
21 E. Taylor, Front-Line Nurse: British Nurses in World War II (London: Robert Hale, 1997) p. 76
22 Ibid
23 LHCMA Adam Papers 3.13, Sickness
24 NA WO 222/144 Medical Research Council, Malaria Committee, Sub-Committee on Prophylaxis in 
Combat Areas.
25 Ibid, Combat Area Prophylaxis.
26 LHCMA Adam Papers 3.13, Sickness
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battle and work have, in a small proportion of cases, omitted to stick to regular doses or 
days. One tablet each night (except Sunday) would be easier to understand and could result 
in better spread out control.” 27 This suggestion was adopted, probably more for ease of 
use than in the belief that an increased dosage would be more efficient in reducing the 
incidence of the illness, and then a three-day course of quinine for the worst affected 
battalions was prescribed at the end of August 1943, although the incidence of malaria had 
peaked by mid-August. Mepacrine was a temporary expedient and not a true preventative 
measure.28 Nor was it totally effective.29 In the 78th Division 95% of malaria sufferers 
stated that they had observed full anti-malarial precautions, yet they still went down with 
the illness.30
Other precautions were urged as well. Lt.-Col Wilson’s Battalion Orders (1st Bn London 
Scottish) of August 23rd 1943 gave precise instructions how to use head veils, bush nets and 
mosquito proofed shelters. ‘The smallest tear,” he finished, “must be closed by 
stitching.”31 This was undoubtedly good advice, but not every soldier in Sicily was in a 
position to profit from it. Lt.-Col Peter Pettit recorded in his diary on August 28th: “Big 
drive on anti-mosquito precautions but no nets available for issue as replacements or for 
mending the old one. What an army.”32 Nor was the mosquito cream without problems: it 
was mooted that it could be a contributory factor in the rising incidence of impetigo.33
27 NA WO 177/410 Medical Diary - ADMS 50lh Division September 1943 Lessons from Sicilian 
Campaign -  “Malaria”, 30 September, p. 4
28 Crew, Army Medical Services, p. 54
29 Imperial War Museum (hereinafter IWM) 94/8/1 I.B. MacKay, “Fighting Fit. The Story of a Regimental 
Medical Officer in World War II”
30 NA WO 177/420 Medical Diary -  ADMS 78* Division August 1943
31 NA WO 169/10256 Ist Bn The London Scottish War Diary for August 1943
32IWM 62/89/1 Lt-Col. Peter Pettit Diary, 28 August, 1943
33 NA WO 177/401 Medical Diary - ADMS 50* Division September 1943 Monthly Hygiene Reports, 
Appendix J, Item 7,10  September
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After their experience with malaria in Sicily, both the 5th and 78th Divisions maintained 
higher malarial precautions, with mepacrine being taken until November 15th 1943. The 
high 5th Division sickness figures, following the landings on the toe of Italy, included the 
very large number of men who contracted malaria in the advance from Reggio to Foggia, or 
who suffered relapses from Sicily, where the Division had been heavily infected.34 Malaria 
was also a problem at Salerno for X Corps. Some Salerno veterans remember that the 
mosquitoes were worse than the Germans.35 The mosquitoes at Salerno, “were no ordinary
mosquitoes  In clouds of thousands they were active not only by night but in broad
sunlight too. And they bit through every form of protective clothing that anyone could 
devise.”36 They also ate the cream.37 Nets and cream were therefore useless. 56th 
Division had 38 confirmed cases of malaria on September 18th, a figure which rose to 131 a 
week later. The 46th Division had considerably fewer cases of malaria -  only 13 -  in 
September, but that figure was to rise steeply in the following months.
After its disastrous brush with malaria in Sicily in 1943, the British Army was taking no
chances at the start of the new malarial season. General Routine Orders by General Sir H.
Maitland Wilson, Supreme Allied Commander, CMF, at the end of March 1944, devoted
considerable space to the question of malaria.
1. Malaria is one of the most important health problems in the Mediterranean 
theatre of war. During the 1943 malaria season the disease seriously reduced 
the efficiency of all units that failed to take adequate anti-malaria precautions. 
Owing to the slackness on the part of officers and men alike, the Sicilian 
campaign was gravely handicapped by a high rate of malaria casualties. It is
34 Crew, The Army Medical Services, p. 523
35 C. Whiting & E  Taylor, Fighting Tykes: The Yorkshire Regiments in WWII (London: Leo Cooper, 1993) 
p. 23
36 Morris, Salerno, p. 173
37 Pbnd, Salerno, p. 101.
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estimated that this rate rose to ten times the figure that would have occurred had 
orders been obeyed.
2. Commanding officers are reminded that they are responsible for the health of 
their men and that they will incur a grave responsibility should they neglect to 
enforce orders on the subject of malaria. Their responsibilities extend to areas 
outside their lines where conditions exist which may prove injurious to the 
health of their men. Where the remedying of these conditions is beyond the 
resources of the unit a full report will be made to area or divisional 
headquarters.
3(f). For suppressive treatment of malaria, mepacrine will be issued, with the 
rations, on the scale of seven (0.7gm) tablets per man per week during the 
period 1st May to 15th November.
A very small proportion of officers and men may prove intolerant to the drug.
In such cases the medical offer with concurrence of the Officer Commanding 
will record the fact on AB 439 or AB 64 and such an officer or man will not 
take mepacrine. Certificates of intolerance will not be given until every attempt 
has been made to accustom the subject to the drug.38
At the same time, a concerted drive towards the eradication of the mosquito breeding 
grounds was implemented. The first batches of DDT (dichlor-diphenyl-trichlorethane) 
arrived in Italy.39 Experiments with DDT as a residual spray in buildings demonstrated 
that, using 5% DDT in kerosene, rooms would remain mosquito-free for about two months. 
“This method offered, for the first time in military history, the possibility of really effective 
malaria control in forward areas.”40 Malaria Control Units were responsible for the 
spraying, but “on the whole the conditions under which these units had been formed had 
made them the repository of the misfits and throw-outs of every arm of the Service.”41 This 
seems to have had a deleterious effect on the spraying programme until at least July 1944. 
Nor was it always possible to spray in the front line. At Cassino, for instance, conditions
38 NA WO 170/2 G1 (Br) AFHQ April-June 1944 General Routine Orders by General Sir H. Maitland 
Wilson, 31 March 1944
39 NA WO 222/159 Malaria Control in Mobile Warfare: Italian Campaign 1943-45, p. 9
40 Ibid
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were perfect for the breeding of mosquitoes. “The stagnant pools which had formed within 
the craters after the bombing and the torrential rain... was hell for humans... it was heaven 
for mosquitoes, bullfrogs and fireflies at night and every kind of fly by day.”42 Front-line 
troops were particularly vulnerable to mosquito and fly-borne illnesses: it was difficult to 
take precautions when lying immobile in a trench or sanger. The 2nd Bn The Duke of 
Cornwall’s Light Infantry, with 4th Division, recorded, on April 21st 1944 “a further 13 
cases, believed malaria, in B Coy area, since 15 April, and a number of cases, approx. 12, 
from other Coys as well. Present camp area will be a very bad one shortly, and MO is 
taking vigorous steps, with Coy anti-malaria squads, to eliminate breeding grounds.”43 4th 
Division had 86 fresh cases and 93 relapses in April.44
The battalion anti-malarial squad was made up of an NCO and two men under the 
supervision of the Unit MO. The 1st Bn Royal West Kents’ squad was responsible for the 
daily inspection of mosquito nets and their proper use, spraying all tents, bivouacs and 
buildings with ‘Flysol’ each morning and evening and reporting any breaches of individual 
anti-malarial precautions 45 The 274th Hampshires recorded that when the malarial season 
commenced all anti-malarial precautions were taken: mosquito nets and creams, and insect 
repellents were issued and a Battalion Advisory Committee was set up to assume 
responsibility for the co-ordination of anti-malarial measures.46 Malaria discipline was 
insisted upon by all commanders, backed by less than subtle warnings. On battalion noted 
that “only by strict control will the menace of malaria be defeated. Other factors being
41 Ibid, p. 10
42 Brutton, Ensign in Italy, p. 32
43 NA WO 170/1379 2nd Bn The Duke of Cornwall’s Light Infantry War Diary for April 1944
44 NA WO 177/378 Medical Diary - ADMS 4th Division April 1944
45 NA WO 170/1419 1st Bn The Royal West Kents War Diary for May 1944
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equal, the incidences of malaria in respective coys will be taken as an index of the zeal with 
which these measures are carried out.”47
These measures produced some positive results. Malaria admission to hospital, which had 
accounted for 18.73% in 1943, dropped to 14.34% in 1944, but still accounted for 73 in 
1,000 hospital admissions.48 Thus it remained a massive drain on manpower. It is possible 
the official figures underestimated the problem, since uncertain cases were generally 
classified as ‘Not Yet Diagnosed’ (NYD) fever, rather than malaria. In 56th Division, there 
were 370 cases of NYD -  four officers and 366 ORs - during the last three months of 1943. 
The difficulty in diagnosis at a time when there were insufficient microscopes to keep up 
with the demands for accurate blood tests is suggested by the fact that on December 16th, 
when 56th Division was preparing for a 14-day rest period, the ADMS suggested that MOs 
should find out from Company Commanders which NYD men should be seen by a 
psychiatrist.49 Once diagnosed, only the mildest cases of malaria could be treated in 
forward areas. Treatment of the more severe cases, at the Casualty Clearing Station or at 
base, lasted more than three weeks.50 At the start of 1945 the medical authorities and army 
chiefs were keen to ensure that all the good work put in in 1944 to reduce manpower losses 
from malaria was maintained. It was known that the Lombardy and Ravenna Plains, and 
the Po Valley, which still lay ahead of the Allies, were highly malarious, but with 
operations at a standstill from January they had an opportunity to make plans for forward 
spraying of DDT and Paris green [a vivid green toxic crystalline salt of copper and arsenic,
46 NA WO 170/1399 2/4*811 The Hampshire Regiment War Diary for May 1944
47 NA WO 170/1419 1st Bn The Royal West Kents War Diary for May 1944
48 Figures, respectively, from Crew, The Army Medical Services, p. 504, Table 34 and NA CAB 101/224 
“The British Soldier in Italy”, p. 8
49 NA WO 177/414 Medical Diary - ADMS 56* Division December 1943
61
used as an insecticide] by aircraft, and for training the spraying teams. A storage and 
loading depot was established on the airfield at Rimini and spraying started on March 18th, 
working first along the main routes in the worst areas, with the aim of destroying as many 
hibernating mosquitoes as possible.51 Eighth Army’s principal attack in the Spring 
Offensive was launched on April 9th 1945 and in 23 days the campaign in Italy had ended. 
The speed of the advance made it impossible for the spraying teams to keep pace with the 
forward troops, which is reflected in the rise in the figures for the second quarter of 1945.
Figure 1.3
Eighth Army Malaria Statistics, 1943-1945 52
Primary Malaria
1943 3 rd Quarter 12,532
1943 4th Quarter 4,178
1944 1st Quarter 901
1944 2nd Quarter 3,037
1944 3rd Quarter 3,288
1944 4th Quarter 927
1945 1st Quarter 365
1945 2nd Quarter 650
It is clear from the figures in Table 1.3, however, that the measures against malaria put in 
place in 1944, and continued in 1945, did produce a considerable saving of manpower. At 
battalion level MOs lectured troops on the dangers of malaria in the forthcoming operations 
in the Po Valley.53 Every effort was made to ensure that each man followed personal 
malaria precautions, including a more humorous approach than usual in the Royal West 
Kent’s battalion newspaper, The Invicta News, entitled “What Will Your Wife Think?”54 
(See next page).
50 Harrison, Medicine and Victory, p. 138
51 Crew, The Army Medical Services, p. 589
52 Ibid, p. 590
53 NA WO 170/5045 2nd Bn The London Irish Rifles War Diary for April 1945
54 NA WO 170/5022 6th Bn The Royal West Kents War Diary for April 1945 Invicta News
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As the campaign advanced it was VD which became more worrying in terms of manpower 
loss. “In December 1943, nearly 4,000 cases were admitted to hospital with VD. The 
average time spent in hospital was twenty days, and therefore in this case equivalent to the 
loss of four infantry battalions for three weeks. In Italy the rate of sickness from VD is 
greater than the battle casualty rate ...’,55 There are no statistics for Italy showing what 
percentage of the total of sufferers were front-line troops, but at the beginning of 1943 a 
working party set up to investigate the incidence of VD in North Africa showed that lack of 
opportunity was the single most effective bar to catching VD, in that the lowest incidence 
was among forward troops and the highest among soldiers at the base.56
The first cases in Italy seem to have been contracted among men of 5th Division in 
Francavilla, when 161 cases were reported in the week ending October 9th 1943. Then, 
when V Corps troops passes through Taranto and Bari, the weekly figure reached its peak 
of 226 cases on October 23rd.57 The main locations of infection in 1943 and early 1944 
were Naples, Salerno, Bari and Campobasso. The first three were leave centres and the last 
a transit and staging area.58 Rome and then Florence became the main sources of infection 
as the armies moved north. Most cases of VD could be traced back to leave in a major 
town. During January-March 1945, VD was the largest cause of sick wastage in the Allied 
Armies. The X Corps DDMS reported that it was only when X Corps rest centre, located 
in one of the main streets of Rome, closed that the number of cases in that formation started 
to decrease. Eighth Army rest centre, which was located very much further out of Rome,
55 DMS AFHQ Health Notes, quoted in Crew, The Army Medical Services, p. 536
36 Harrison, Medicine and Victory, pp. 146-7
57 Crew, The Army Medical Services, p. 533
58 Ibid, p. 537
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did not produce cases to the same degree.59 VD accounted for 50 in 1,000 hospital 
admissions in 1944.60 There was a steady rise in the incidence of cases in the last four 
months of the year, most infected while on leave, notably in Rome. The average number of 
notifications weekly for the whole of Eighth Army was:
Table 1.4
Average Weekly notifications of VD cases in Eighth Army, Sept-Dee 194461 
Month No. of Cases
September (5 weeks) 190
October (4 weeks) 245
November (4 weeks) 281
December (5 weeks) 303
Among a sampling of British divisions, the figures were:
Table 1.5
Average Weekly Notifications of VD cases per Division, Sept-Dee 1944
Formation: September October November December
1st Division: - 66 54 68“
4th Division: 85 48 20 -®
56th Division: 19 25 126 76s4
From the autumn of 1944 the rise in the incidence of VD coincided with the policy of
giving troops more time away from the front line. Figures for Italy, per thousand per
annum, from October to February, were:
Figure 1.6 
Incidence of VD in the Italy Campaign65 





February 45: (about) 64
59 Ibid, p. 541
60 NA CAB 101/224 “The British Soldier in Italy”, p. 8
61 NA WO 222/1495 The Campaign in Italy, 1943-1945, Medical, p. 148
62 NA WO 177/375 Medical Diaries - ADMS 1st Division October-December 1944
63 NA WO 177/394 Medical Diaries - ADMS 4th Division October-November 1944
64 NA WO 177/414 Medical Diaries - ADMS 56* Division September-December 1944
65 NA WO 204/6701 AFHQ Morale Committee Report for the Quarter ending 28 February 1945, p. 7
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The British Army’s attitude to VD in general was that it should not be contracted in the first 
place and should be regarded as if it were a self-inflected wound. “It should clearly be 
understood by every man that it is a disgraceful act to endanger his health while on active 
service by consorting with a loose woman.”66 The moral dimension involved in all 
discussions of sexually transmitted diseases was very evident in some of the Army 
recommendations, and their authors appear to have conflated moral and morale. The 
Consultant Venereologist to the MEF, Brigadier R. Lees, recommended that: “A high code 
of personal morality must be followed and all must be taught that complete abstinence from 
sexual intercourse is not detrimental to health or vigour. Association with public 
prostitutes is ‘conduct unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman’.”67 This was an attitude 
reflected in the UK. At a meeting on VD staged in London in 1943 by the Central 
Council for Health Education the Archbishop of Canterbury, the Most Rev. W. Temple, 
spoke out against the distribution of prophylactics to troops on the grounds that it would be 
an inducement to fornication. He insisted that Army education should stress the sacredness 
of sex and the possibility of chastity.68 Such exhortations might have satisfied the moral 
code of the person making the recommendations, but did little to stem the seemingly 
inexorable rise of cases, and had little to do with maintaining morale. Indeed, one soldier 
remembered that Montgomery, who was “quite a moralist... realized that the morale of his 
men must be kept as high as possible. Consequently the issue of contraceptives to every 
soldier going on leave was as important as a tin of bully beef.”69
66 Recommendations for the prevention of VD in CMF, December 1943, quoted in Crew, The Army Medical 
Services, p. 534
67 NA WO 204/6725 Recommendations for the Prevention of VD Amongst Allied Forces in the Central 
Mediterranean Theatre of War
68 M. Harrison, Medicine and Modern Warfare, pp.225-250.
69IWM 88/48/1 D.O. Helm, p. 67
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In October 1943, the army medical authorities had noted that since the landing in Italy the 
incidence of VD had risen and was still rising, despite the measures which had so far been 
taken to prevent it. It would become an even more serious problem as more large towns 
were occupied unless a comprehensive policy was adopted. Three points were raised for 
consideration by the DDMS:
(a) Rapid development of welfare and Social amenities, Restaurants, Clubs, 
Cinemas. Organised Games, Boxing, Education, etc. is of first importance.
The R.A.Ch.D., [army chaplains] Welfare, NAAFI, YMCA, Church Army, 
should work together to get the best results. Delivery of mail from home 
should be expedited.
(b) Reconsideration of the Brothel policy. It is considered that it is better to 
allow certain controlled houses which have to conform to high hygienic 
standards, than to close them all, leaving uncontrolled Brothels and Clandestine 
prostitution as the only alternative.
(c) Effective action to be taken against clandestine prostitutes whatever Brothel 
policy may be. The legal aspects should be clearly defined and sufficient 
Military and Civil Police must be made available to enforce the regulations.70
The reaction of the Allied Forces Headquarters to the recommendations was to emphasize 
(a) and (c) and ignore (b). Officers were urged to organise entertainment and sport to 
occupy their soldiers’ off-duty hours. It was recommended that The Women’s Auxiliary 
Services were to be employed in all base areas, “as the presence of women from the home 
countries, with their high standards of conduct, undoubtedly raises the standard of conduct 
of the troops.” All brothels were to be placed out of bounds by the local military authority, 
and the civil authorities were to suppress clandestine prostitution.71 By February 1944 
there were 3,200 cases of VD under treatment in British hospitals in the CMF, the 
equivalent of one brigade permanently out of action. The contributory factors were seen as:
70 NA WO 204/6725 VD: Measures for Control: Aspects of Disciplinary Action. Letter from DDMS to 
AFHQ, Adv. Admin. Ech., CMF, 25 October 1943
71 Ibid, Letter from the Chief Administrative Office, Allied Forces Headquarters, 19 January 1944
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2(a) Female
(i) Poverty and starvation leading to prostitution
(ii) High percentage of infected women
2(b) Male
(i) Reaction after battle
(ii) Lack of precaution after intercourse
(iii) Failure to realise seriousness of avoidable sickness
(iv) Lack of leadership. Unit and Sub unit control and self discipline.72
A lack of fighting spirit was not cited as a contributory factor, but two undoubted causes 
were omitted: boredom and the strain of a long separation from home. According to Fred 
Majdalany, the first thing soldiers wanted to do when they got out of the line was have a 
good sleep, then get cleaned up, put on some new clothes and get into a town. “It didn’t 
matter which town. Any town would do. Where there were streets to walk in and shops 
and cafes and women. Above all they wanted women. They didn’t necessarily want to 
sleep with women. They just wanted to be in places where there were women.”73 
Unfortunately a fair percentage of the women the men were likely to meet in leave towns 
were infected with venereal disease. Italian women sold themselves for food - prostitution 
was the result of semi-starvation among the civilian population. The Bureau of 
Psychological Warfare stated in an April 1944 bulletin that 42,000 women in Naples, out of 
a nubile female population of 150,000, were engaged either on a regular or occasional basis 
in prostitution.74 The Military and Civil Police in Naples tried to deal with the problem: in 
the four months up to May 11th 1944 they arrested 345 pimps and 4,590 prostitutes.75 
Brothels were closed down in all towns frequented by troops, and clandestine prostitutes 
and ‘pimping’ was discouraged as far as possible.
72 Ibid, Letter from Brigadier, DA & QMG, Eighth Army, 11 February 1944
73 Majdalany, The Monastery, pp. 9 4 5
74 N. Lewis, Naples ’44 (London: Hand, 1983) p. 115
75 NA WO 204/6725 VD: Measure for Control: Aspects of Disciplinary Action. Provost Marshal’s letter, 
11 May 1944.
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It was recommended that rest centres should to be sited as far from unhygienic areas and
leave to towns such as Naples was to be restricted, if not discontinued.76 The problem
with that policy was it could lead to boredom and resentment and was not necessarily
effective in its stated aim of keeping men away from temptation. When the 2nd Bn The
Iniskillings were in reserve the battalion took billets
in a giant farm sprawling alone amidst miles of rolling grassland. Generally 
we had nothing to complain about. The accommodation and food were 
adequate. No shells burst upon our toilet or our meals; and the rituals of 
training, marching, parading, form-filling and being inspected for this or that, 
were observed no more than fanatically. But there was one thing wrong with 
the place. It was stupefyingly dull. In a country of inexhaustible fascination, 
we were cut off from everything by miles of boring, dispiriting grass. There 
were no fine buildings, restaurants, shops or avenues where we could elevate 
our minds, fritter away our lire, improve our Italian or chase the girls -  these 
being activities reserved to relieve the stress of war on staff officers and Base 
troops. Indeed the only two birds in the vicinity, feathered or unfeathered, of 
whom I heard, were two prostitutes whom some resourceful platoon conjured 
out of the grassland and then kept fully occupied for an hour or so.77
Everything possible was done to discourage soldiers from associating with prostitutes. 
Spike Milligan remembered that “if the brochure was telling the truth, venereal disease was 
walking the streets of Naples and one could contract it just by shaking hands with a 
priest.”78 When some KOYLI men were given a three-day leave in Naples they noticed 
that the roads leading to the city were plastered with signs warning of the perils of VD. 
“The leavemen were startled to see Military Police cordoning off whole areas of the city in 
surprise raids, grabbing all women from 16 to 60 and, without explanation, carting them off 
for blood tests.”79 This attempt to deal with the problem at source, so to say, was bound to
76 Crew, The Army Medical Services, p. 535
77 Cole, Rough Road to Rome, p. 106
78 S. Milligan, Mussolini: His Part in My Downfall (London: Michael Joseph, 1978) p. 27
79 Whiting & Taylor, Fighting Tykes, pp. 27-28
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fail when it was possible to use a tin of corned beef “in exchange for the body of any girl of 
easy virtue”.80
The army made great efforts to educate the soldier by religious instruction, film and
lectures on the prevention and probable effects of VD. One soldier recalled a VD
exhibition at the Palace in Caserta:
Venereal disease was a real problem in Italy -  hence the exhibitions - which 
consisted of two or three rooms displaying coloured and black and white 
photographs of the results of having intercourse and picking up the disease.
They were truly terrifying and if temptation had been put before me I should 
certainly have thought twice. I feel that these exhibitions must have been a 
deterrent to any sane and responsible man but there must have been many who 
were prepared to risk the consequences.81
Another remembered that they were
compelled to see a photographic exhibition showing the ravages of venereal 
disease. They were pretty ghastly photographs, not the sort of thing you want 
to see immediately before lunch. The infantryman’s view is, “Sod it, I may get 
killed tomorrow so why not!” But I think it put a lot of the lads off their nooky 
for quite some time and it made a lot more take precautions -  they no longer 
rode ‘bare back’!” (Corporal Kenneth Lovell, B Coy, 16th DLI).82
The education campaign started off with a major article entitled “Big Losses -  But Not In 
Battle” in the Union Jack, one of the British Army newspapers, on January 26th 1944. “If 
you get syphilis or gonorrhoea you are not only ruining your health, but you risk bringing 
suffering and misery to your wife and children later. Is it worth it?” demanded the writer.® 
The answer, to quite a few, given the figures, seems to have been ‘yes’. “They wanted a
80 Lee Harvey, D-Day Dodger, p. 71
81IWM 99/72/1 Captain P. Royle, p. 20
82 Hart, Heat o f Battle, p. 159
83 NA WO 204/6725 VD: Measures for Control: Aspects of Disciplinary Action The Union Jack, 
26 January 1944
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woman if they could -  they were all human. They probably hadn’t seen a woman for six 
months, and naturally if they had the chance they would.”84
In January 1944 the Deputy Director of Medical Service pointed out that most troops were 
indifferent to the risk of VD. He cited the fact that during November and December, 353 
cases of the disease were reported in one area, a rate of 100 per 1000 per annum. Out of 
this total of 353, 223 men took no form of preventative treatment, and only 36 men visited 
a PA (Prophylactic Ablution) Centre.85 This is not to be wondered at since the PA Centres 
were unwelcoming and discouraging facilities, as can be seen from Appendix I. Despite 
this, pragmatic measures were continued. The Colonel ADMS, 56th Division, wrote to his 
medical offices that “Men will be getting leave -  see that you have protective sheaths and if 
possible E.T. [early treatment] packs in the R.A.P. ... Try and get the warning round the 
unit, how high the V.D. incidence is in Italy and that failure to take adequate precautions is 
asking for trouble.”86
Lack of leadership and discipline was cited as a factor in the rising incidence of VD. 
According to the pundits, a well-disciplined unit would have a low incidence of VD. 
“Troops with bad discipline are more prone to expose themselves to V.D. and ignore all 
advice and precautions.”87 Yet, according to Brigadier R. Lees, Chief Venereologist, MEF,
84 Company Sergeant Major L. Thornton, quoted in Hart, Heat of Battle, pp. 158-9
85 NA WO 204/6725 VD: Measures for Control: Aspects of Disciplinary Action. Letter from DDMS to Adv. 
Adm. Ech., CMF, 8 January 1944
86 NA WO 177/414 Medical Diary -  ADMS 56* Division December 1943 Rest Periods, Item 2
87 Crew, The Army Medical Services, p. 534
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too many officers were tolerant of their men visiting prostitutes, and many considered sex
to be essential to morale.88 The discipline of the Guards was legend, but one remembered:
 every effort was made to see that men did not spend too long in the line
without some sort of relief. This was particularly the case in the winter of 
1944/45 when conditions were far from easy.
For some months we ran our own camp in Prato by re-organising the Bn on a 
three rifle company basis and using the nucleus of the 4th company to run the 
camp. This was quite successful although I fear that the sexual orgies that went 
on would not have met with the approval of wives and girl friends.
The principal billet in Prato had a resident prostitute and I gathered from what I 
heard (I did not have first hand experience) that she was available at any hour 
of the day or night.. ,.89
Despite the fact that lack of discipline, whether self-discipline or unit discipline, was 
regarded as the root cause of the problem, the contraction of VD was not, in itself, a 
disciplinary offence. The offence lay in concealing the fact that the disease had been 
contracted.90 It was suggested by some that greater punitive action should be taken against 
any man who contracted the disease, either through increased financial penalties (the 
British Army was almost alone in retaining financial penalties as a deterrent) or disciplinary 
action.91 The Judge Advocate’s Office, however, could not support such measures on the 
following grounds:
1. In my opinion unless it is made an offence for an officer or soldier to 
have sexual intercourse with a woman other than his wife it cannot be alleged 
that an officer or soldier is guilty of conduct to the prejudice of good order and 
military discipline if he contracts V.D.
2. Syphilis, I understand, may be contracted without the man having 
sexual intercourse with a woman. In some cases kissing an infected woman on 
the mouth or even a less intimate contact may pass on the disease.
3. It may well be that gonorrhoea can only be contracted by sexual 
intercourse but I think that it is established by medical opinions that no matter
88 Harrison, Medicine and Victory, p. 150
89IWM 82/37/1 E.P. Danger, “Diary of a Guaidsman”, Vol. 2, p. 239
90 NA WO 204/6725 VD: Measures for Control: Aspects of Disciplinary Action. Letter from DA & QMG, 
Eighth Army, 11 February 1944
91 Ibid, Letter Allied Forces Headquarters G1/B/3174/A3,15 May 1944
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what precautions the man may take he invariably runs the risk of infection as 
the germ is extremely potent and active.92
Increased financial penalties would require War Office approval, and it was doubtful that
that would be forthcoming. In addition, past experience had indicated that punishment of
soldiers who contracted the disease had not resulted in a reduction in the incidence of the
disease, but rather to an increase in concealment, which resulted in a delay in effecting a
cure.93 By the end of 1944, however, the situation was regarded as so serious the
concealment of VD became a court martial offence in all cases, charges being preferred
under Section 11 of the Army Act (Neglect to Obey Garrison or Other Orders).94
The DDMS, Eighth Army, believed that there was one overriding reason for the rising
incidence of VD, and that was lack of home leave.
The solution of the V.D. problem in this theatre will not be found in the 
provision of better P.A. Centres, in propaganda or education, or by suppressing 
or controlling prostitution.... The only measure likely to produce any 
substantial lowering of V.D. rate in an expeditionary force is leave to U.K. at 
reasonable intervals.
The majority of cases of V.D., and the majority of men making use of P.A. 
Centres, are individuals who have served overseas for two years or more....the 
newcomer to any formation which has been serving overseas for a considerable 
length of time observes a subtle peculiarity of psychology which is difficult to 
define, but which is reflected in the case of officers in a narrowing of 
intellectual activity and in the type of conversation and humour which finds 
favour. Amongst others ranks, with their more limited resources for 
sublimation through social and intellectual interests, the effect of long 
continued service overseas is seen in an increase in the V.D. rate ..
92 Ibid, Letter from the Judge Advocate General’s Branch, 3 April 1944
93 Ibid, Aspects of Disciplinary Action Chief Administrative Office, Allied Force Headquarters, Letter, 15 
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94 NA WO 170/5 Gl(Br) AFHQ December 1944 Routine General Orders by Field Marshal The Hon. Sir 
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In only 13 weeks in the whole of 1944, but in 11 out of the first 13 weeks of 1945, was the 
incidence higher than 1/1,000/week. The opportunities in 1944 were not less. The most 
significant difference was the fact that another year had been added to the length of service 
overseas.96 The rise was a manifestation of the war weariness of men too long in the line 
and too long away from home.
The manpower losses through VD were finally reduced not by moral exhortations, or 
attempts to educate, but by medical advances. In October 1944 it was decided to treat with 
penicillin every case of Gonorrhoea and of Primary and Secondary Syphilis.97 This cut the 
average number of days a man spent in hospital from 19.1 days during the quarter April- 
June 1944 to 3.48 during the quarter October-December.98 The saving in manpower was 
considerable, but the success of penicillin itself did nothing to deter the ever-rising number 
of cases.
Ill
Another cause of sick wastage, especially in 1943, was infective hepatitis, or jaundice as it 
was known.
This illness became epidemic with the troops in North Africa and Italy. It was 
not very serious in itself as a general rule, although deaths were not unknown, 
but the total loss of manpower was quiet serious because it usually involved the 
sufferer being in hospital for about three weeks The cause did not seem to be 
known but it was believed to be picked up from unwashed fruit. The symptoms 
were a general feeling of lassitude and an upset stomach which became very 
tender and painful. It was accompanied by yellowness of the skin, eyes, and 
urine, hence Yellow Jaundice.99
96 Crew, The Army Medical Services, p. 540
97 NA WO 177/375 Medical Diary - ADMS 1** Division October 1944 Medical Administrative Instructions, 
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A total of 3,298 cases were admitted to hospital during September-November 1943, and in
December there were 1,435. This disease was dubbed the “Officers’ Disease” as the ratio
of officers to ORs suffering from it was four to one.100 In the 6th Bn The Lincolnshires
every officer who landed at Salerno had contracted jaundice by December.101 This was
particularly worrying as “in and out of battle there is no doubt that the Commanding
Officer is the focal point of unit morale.”102 However, despite the 6th Lincolnshires’
experience, it may well be that its occurrence in officers was higher in the rear echelons
overall than in the front line. One doctor with 46th Division wrote:
It has been suggested that these cases were more common amongst officers, and 
it was thought that utensils in the Officers [sic] Mess may be a cause of cross 
infection. However, in an Infantry battalion on Active Service there was rarely 
an Officer’s [sic] Mess set up. All the cases seen by me were from all ranks 
and from all the different companies.103
Other suggestions for the cause of jaundice abounded. One soldiers from the 2nd Bn 
Northants, for instance, was told that “a lot of soldiers had it due to the tinned bacon which 
was so fatty. It came out of the tin wrapped in a kind of greasy paper and you could hardly 
see the lean for thick fat covering everything.”104
Although the doctors were asked to look out for particular aetiological factors, no concrete 
reasons were put forward. Some doctors believed that, due to its infective character and 
seasonal incidence (September-January) it was a virus, others that it was a bacterial disease 
spread by flies. It was only in 1944 that scientists in the UK and the USA demonstrated 
that the jaundice appearing amongst troops was in fact two kinds: one a viral jaundice
100 Crew, The Army Medical Services, p. 531
101 NA WO 169/10252 6* Bn The Lincolnshire Regiment War Diary for December 1943
102 NA WO 222/158 “Divisional Psychiatry”: Report to the War Office by Major P.J.R. Davis, Psychiatrist 
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My corporal tried to kid me he had jaundice . . .  damn fool, everyone knows 
jaundice is for officers only!'
Source: Jon's Complete Two Types (London: Bellew Publishing, 1991) p.119
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(now known as Hepatitis B) spread by poorly sterilized syringes and the other, more 
common form (Hepatitis A) was shown to be a virus excreted in faeces. These discoveries 
had little impact upon the prevention of the disease during the war.105 No explanation has 
been out forward as to why jaundice was “the officers’ illness”, although, given that its 
early symptoms included a lack of appetite, it may well have be misdiagnosed, or used as 
an excuse to give hard-press officers a short rest. Such an expedient was not without 
precedence. In a letter to his mother, one officer wrote: “A very small piece of a bomb did 
hit my thigh, but did not lodge therein; merely making a slight cut and a big bruise. 
However, the doctor has used it as an excuse to get me some rest, so for a few days I am 
living in a dressing station.”106
IV
Some illnesses had particular relevance to front line soldiers, being a direct outcome of the 
conditions in which they lived. The weather was appalling in the winter of 1943/1944 and 
the incidence of illnesses directly related to the inclement elements became more prevalent, 
although not particularly numerous, as the year progressed. Colds and influenza were 
common. In the first half of December 1943 “torrential rain fell incessantly turning the 
ground into a sea of mud. For days everyone was soaked to the skin .. .”107 With so many 
men soaked, it was no wonder that most had coughs and colds. “At night, it was said, 
British and German patrols were by now disclosing their presence to each other from afar 
by hacking coughs and explosive sneezes.”108
104 Quoted in Taylor, Front Line Nurse, p. 100
105 Harrison, Medicine and Victory, p. 133
106IWM 95/33/1 Major Philips. Letter, 16 October 1943
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Exposure and trench foot in particular were both a direct result of conditions in the front 
line. Fighting in Italy resembled more and more the First World War Western Front, with 
men pinned down in holes in the ground by artillery fire for long periods, unable to move, 
to change clothes, or wash. The torrential winter rain ensured that every trench was filled 
with water and trench foot, or immersion foot as it was called, made its appearance. Trench 
foot was caused by prolonged standing in cold water or mud, and the continued wearing of 
wet socks. Contributory factors were the absence of hot food, insufficient clothing and lack 
of exercise.109 The first 30 cases were reported in November 1943, among men who had 
spent up to six days in an exposed position on the mountainside under enemy 
observation.110 A further 50 were reported in December. Most cases of immersion foot 
were mild, and rigid ‘foot’ discipline was immediately instigated. Men were advised that 
before going into action their feet should be thoroughly washed and dried, then dusted with 
Foot Powder. Each man carried a spare pair of socks, so that they could be worn on 
alternate days, and that where possible, hot meals or drinks should be given.111 A Sock 
Laundry Service was opened in Roccamonfina in November 1943. The Laundry held new 
socks on a scale of 500 pairs per Brigade. As dirty socks came in to be washed they were 
exchanged for clean ones.112
The winter of 1944-45 was not very pleasant, very wet and cold, remembered a doctor from 
46th Division. “We had many cases of pneumonia, and [sic] as the troops were very down 
at heart, away from home for a long time, the war was drawing to an end, and resistance to
109 NA WO 177/414 Medical Diary -  ADMS 56th Division November 1943 Appendix H, ‘Trench Foot’,
12 November
110 Crew, The Army Medical Services, pp. 547-8
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disease was low.”113 Sick rates far exceeded casualty rates in Eighth Army for the first 
three months of 1945. Battle casualties totalled 2,109, with total sick standing at 12,510 
and non-battle injuries at 1,780. The weather had obviously played its part in the level of 
illness in January, when gales and snowstorms meant that the men were in constant danger 
of frostbite and exposure.114 The 8th Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders (78th Division), 
however, reported “surprisingly few ill effects from cold and damp of living conditions” in 
January.115 It was in February, when the 78th Division were transferred to the Eighth Army 
on the Adriatic Front, that the after-effects of the winter exposure seem to have made 
themselves felt. “Sickness, principally bronchial and rheumatic, attacked all but the most 
robust and though the majority of cases were not serious, the depletion of the ranks had a 
deleterious effect on training for the coming offensive and on morale, as extra duties 
devolved upon those sound in wind and limb.”116
V
Another major drain on manpower was exhaustion in all its forms, ranging from extreme 
tiredness through to full-blown battle fatigue. The psychologist F.C. Bartlett emphasised 
the connections between physical fatigue and psychiatric breakdown in battle. ‘In war,’ he 
wrote, ‘there is perhaps no general condition which is more likely to produce a large crop 
of nervous and mental disorders than a state of prolonged and great fatigue’.117 Loss of 
sleep interferes with the ability to think logically, to concentrate and remember, and it can 
produce uncharacteristic patterns of behaviour ranging from deep gloom to wild elation.118
113IWM 91/16/1 Captain H.M. Jones Italy and Austria July 1944-November 1945
114 Ray, Algiers to Austria, p. 189
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Simple exhaustion was a major factor in lowering a man’s morale, his ability to fight or to 
put up with the conditions in which he finds himself: tired minds and bodies exaggerate 
terrible conditions. It was not surprising that men suffered from exhaustion. During 
daylight hours front-line troops were generally forced to remain in their slit trenches or 
sangars, and the continuous noise of shells and mortars, from both sides, which was so bad 
for the nerves, forced them to stay alert. At night, when they might have had a chance to 
sleep, there were supplies to see to and all the activites which could not be accomplished 
during daylight hours. Some men were “so exhausted that we slept for twelve hours 
through a series of barrages which were fired with the gun crews holding their hands 
against their ears.”119
At Anzio most of the fighting took place at night, so few men managed a period of 
uninterrupted sleep. The 5th Bn Grenadier Guards had no sleep for 72 hours during an 
engagement in February; the 1st Bn The London Scottish reported that all the men were 
“very tired through lack of sleep”; and the Royal Fusiliers noted: “troops now very tired 
after 20 days in the line” 120 There was no quiet spot in the beachhead and personnel who 
were at a ‘B’ Echelon [the battalion supply column or base] position for a rest said “Some 
rest!!!”121 The exhaustion and noise became too much for some and they broke down. By 
January 30th 1944, a week after the landing, 1st Division was treating their first exhaustion 
cases. Immediate treatment consisted of the prophylactical application of barbiturates to 
enable a sustained period of complete rest A large proportion of cases were returned to
118 Ibid, p. 124
119 Brutton, Ensign in Italy, pp.69-70
120 NA WO 170/1350 5th Bn Grenadier Guards War Diary for February 1944; NA WO 170/1434 Is* Bn The 
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unit after 48-72 hours.122 On February 23rd the 1st Division ADMS was visited by the 
Psychiatric Advisor (US Forces) AFHQ and Psychiatric Advisor 5 Army. “They had 
visited 3 Fd Amb and were impressed by the number of cases of ‘exhaustion’ returned to 
unit. Approx. Figures up to date show 60% RTU [Returned To Unit] of which some 10- 
15% relapse later.”123 1st Division opened an Exhaustion Centre with 100 beds and, at the 
end of March, a Psychiatric Centre located at 3 Field Ambulance with 100 “stretcher” beds 
under the supervision of Major Mason, a specialist in Psychological Medicine from 13 
Corps.124 At battalion and unit level, arrangements were made to give the men as much rest 
as possible as soon as operational considerations made it feasible. In March ‘C’ Company 
of the 2/7th Queens “started a shuttle service with their platoons, one platoon going back for 
48 hours each day, and a fresh platoon comes out.”125 The Medical Officer of the 2nd 
Inniskillings started a rest centre in May so that two men per company could rest for a 
day.126
Official figures show that out of the original 15,979 men of 1st Division landed at Anzio on 
January 22nd, 550 exhaustion cases were evacuated out of the beachhead by sea (see Table 
1.11 at the end of the chapter). Battle fatigue or acute exhaustion therefore accounted for 
3.4% of the total strength of the Division. This is a considerably higher figure than at 
Sicily, where less than 1% of the strength of 50th Division, for instance, suffered from battle 
fatigue. Being pinned down in a small bridgehead, permanently under the all-seeing eyes 
of the enemy and living in a state of semi-hysteria took its toll. Even the numerous
121 NA WO 170/1429 Is* Bn The Loyal Regiment War Diary for February 1944
122 NA WO 177/375 Medical Diary - ADMS Is* Division January 1944
123 Ibid, February 1944
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nightingales who lived around the mouth of the Moletta, the ‘quiet’ sector at Anzio, could
shred over-stretched nerves:
We had a lad who was with us who let them get on his nerves so much that he 
loosed off with his rife every time he heard them sing -  he was “bird-happy”, if
1 127saw a man.
1st Division maintained complete records of exhaustion cases at Anzio, with a follow- 
through on each case showing how many men were returned to their units, relapses and the 
number finally evacuated to hospital (Table 1.11). What is most striking about these 
figures is that it was not just front-line soldier who suffered from exhaustion. The stress at 
Anzio was all-encompassing, not just in the front line, as was normally the case. There is 
no indication of whether the sufferers were newcomers or old hands, but at the Fortress, a 
particularly dangerous stretch of the Anzio trench system, a lance-corporal who had been in 
Sicily was “one of the few Catania Plainites to have kept a sound nerve.”128
56th Division also registered an increasing numbers of men suffering physical exhaustion in 
the Anzio bridgehead from February 19th- March 4th:
Table 1.7
56th Division Cases of Physical Exhaustion, Feb-March 1944129
Date: Officers: O.R.S
February 19: - 68
February 26: 2 150
March 4: 1 170
These, of course, do not include the 168th Brigade totals listed under 1st Division for
February 3rd-15th, nor is there any indication how many these men were RTU and how
many were evacuated. There are no figures for 5th Division.
126 NA WO 170/1403 2nd Bn The Inniskilling Fusiliers War Diary for May 1944
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One observation about the 56th Division physical exhaustion figures is that officers seem to 
have suffered less, either because their responsibilities made them more resistant to battle 
fatigue or, more likely, because their condition was reported as some other medical 
condition. There was also more opportunity for officers to be sent on courses away from 
Anzio during the static warfare period and in this way get some much needed rest. A 
bomb-happy officer, after all, was a danger not only to himself but to the men under his 
command.
Commanders accepted the need for adequate rest for front line soldiers as long as 
operational requirements were satisfied. In early January 1945, for instance, a new 56th 
Division policy was decided upon. Each of the two brigades -  167th & 169th -  would spend 
three weeks in the line, then be relieved by the other brigade. The brigade out of the line 
would spend its time with leave for the first week, and training and schemes for the second. 
The 2/6°* Queen’s diary opined, undoubtedly with past experiences in mind, that “the first 
week’s programme sounds doubtful.”130 Another 56th Division initiative was a small party 
of two officers and 43 ORs sent to the Division from PAIFORCE, to be substituted for 
“war weary” personnel who had served under two years with the Division.131
At the other end of the exhaustion spectrum were those men who broke down completely. 
The most common precipitating cause was the real or imagined “near miss”, which was the 
origin of the term “shell shock”. “It is a condition of impaired military efficiency shown
129 NA WO 177/414 Medical Diaries -  ADMS 56th Division February and March 1944
130 NA WO 170/5060 2/6* Bn The Queen’s Royal Regiment War Diary for January 1945
131 Ibid, War Diary for February 1945
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most characteristically in terms of loss of fighting morale.”132 Immediate predisposing
factors for breakdowns were to be found in domestic stress, frequently accelerated by the
absence of mail, and the death of a close comrade. In general, the better the discipline in a
unit, the fewer the cases of battle fatigue. “Far too many men have broken down because
of having indifferent officers.”133 If an officer failed to spot a man who was on the verge
of breaking down, that single individual could have a disastrous effect on the morale of the
whole unit, just as an unwilling soldier was a danger to his comrades and a source of low
morale. Battle fatigue could affect anyone, veterans and inexperienced newcomers,
officers and ORs. There was often a sense of “there, but for the grace of God ...” In his
memoirs, sapper Richard Eke recalled that he was getting water from the top of a cliff near
the landing beach in Sicily when he came across “an infantry corporal huddled in the rocks.
He looked to be in trouble, but we found he was not wounded only shell-shocked, and
crying like a child for his mother. We could not persuade him to leave his fox-hole and we
left him in peace, at least until the next [air] raid.”134 Another incident occurred at the
beginning of an attack:
A few of the shells dropped short and this didn’t help matters. One of my men 
started screaming at the top of his voice. Absolutely hysterical. It only wants 
someone to do that and it has a very adverse effect of the company who are 
already tensed up. I caught hold of him by the front of his battledress and said 
‘I am telling you to stop that noise!’ It didn’t make a scrap of difference at all 
to him, he just kept on screaming. Imagine it, rain, two haystacks alight, 
ground soggy, going into the attack and there was this man creating an 
unpleasant situation. I knew there was only one thing I could do -  I hit him
with my fist on the chin and it stopped him!  As far as he was concerned
that was the end of his fighting, he went back as a battle exhaustion case and I 
didn’t ever see him again.135
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Some exhausted soldiers were dealt with by their own officers rather than going to the
RAP. Lance Corporal Allnutt was asked by his CSM to look after a young fusilier who
was “bomb happy” and was upsetting those around him. The CSM believed that Allnutt
was not worried about the shelling and that his courage would be infectious.136 Others were
“stiffened” by regular discipline.
A round dozen men from 3 Coy (admittedly rather shaken from the previous 
day) went “bomb happy” and found their way back to the RAP where they 
exhibited all the symptoms of what in the last war was known as “shell 
shock”.... In this particular case all the men, who were not absolutely out of 
their minds, were assembled in three ranks outside the RAP, treated exactly as 
if on parade and marched back in quick time to their Coy.137
Despite its experiences in North Africa and Tunisia, the British Army remained reluctant to
institutionalise forward psychiatry and no provision was made for forward treatment in the
planning of the invasion for Sicily. Only one psychiatrist was made available to work with
British troops in Sicily.138 The rising tide of breakdowns, however, ensured that a number
of psychiatrists were swiftly drafted into Italy. The reporting of exhaustion only became
standardised in February 1944. From that time “Exhaustion (including all cases of nervous
and physical exhaustion, however caused), Anxiety Neurosis and Hysteria” were to be
referred to as “Sickness and not as Battle Casualties”.139
Exhaustion and “bomb happy” cases were usually evacuated as soon as possible before 
they could have a direct and immediate effect on the morale of their fellow soldiers. 
“There was no way of knowing which men will stand up well to battle. The big, manly
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types seemed to have been the ones who broke first.”140 The average case, whether it was a 
battle weary veteran or a novice cracking under sudden and violent strain, was treated at the 
Corps Exhaustion Centre, run by the Corps Psychiatric team. Over one third of the men 
were returned to their units within five days. A further 10% were also able to return after 
longer treatment, which took place either at a Base Psychiatric Centre or at the 
Reinforcement, Reallocation and Training Centre, originally known as the Rehabilitation 
Centre.141 The Rehabilitation Centre was opened at the end of January, 1944. Earlier that 
month, with a new offensive at its height, so-called psycho-neurotics were arriving in 
hospitals at the rate of some 50 a day. The IRTD [Infantry Replacement Training Depot] 
was full to capacity and the newly-arrived psycho-neurotics were being discharged from 
hospital to 159 Transit Camp. There they were left to their own devices and that was 
having a bad effect on them. These men fell into three categories: those who had been 
downgraded and were waiting shipment to North Africa; those requiring just a short period 
of rest and rehabilitation; and those awaiting treatment by the psychiatrist before a definite 
decision could be made. The majority fell into the last category.142
At the Rehabilitation Centre men were reassured that they were in no way abnormal, that 
they were still soldiers and perfectly able to cope with life on equal terms with their fellow 
men. They were treated as soldiers, and given basic military training although it was 
considered best to avoid battle training and to concentrate on “peace-time soldier 
training”.143 The treatment of psycho-neurotics was gaining in importance for two
140 IWM Sound Archives 13251 K.C. Lovell, Reel 9
141 NA CAB 1021/224 “The British Soldier in Italy”, p. 10
142 NA 204/6633 Psycho-Neurotics (Rehabilitation Group) January -August 1944, letter from DAG, 25 
January
143 Ibid, Letter from DAG, 29 January 1944
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principal reasons: the conservation of manpower and the conservation of finance. Firstly, 
shortage of manpower meant that troops who could be returned to their original units, or re­
graded and re-trained, could remain part of the war effort. Secondly there was the worry 
that if a man were left for ever as “bomb happy” he could remain neurotic all his life and 
eventually claim on the Ministry of Pensions.144 During one month of the new practice at 
the Rehabilitation Centre about 100 men were “recovered”, and about one third of them 
“actually volunteered to return to their units in the line.”145
Psychiatric disorders, apart from exhaustion cases, accounted for only 20 out of 1,000 
hospital admissions in 1944 (compared to 50 out of 1,000 for VD cases).146 Total British 
admissions to the Advance Psychiatric Wing for the first two months of 1944 were 355. Of 
these 29 were from the 5th Bn Royal West Kents and 25 were from the 5th Bn The Essex 
Regiment, six of whom legally suffered from a mental handicap. Both units were from the 
8th Indian Division. Another nine were from the 6th Bn The Royal West Kents (78th 
Division). Thus, one-fifth of all British Army admissions were from just three infantry 
units. The blame for such a high figure in these battalions was laid fair and square on two 
factors: the failure of the RMOs of the units to weed out unsuitable men, and the bad 
psychological sorting of the ‘intake’ in the UK, since these men should never have been 
posted to first line infantry units.147 Subsequently, the CO of the 5th Bn The Royal West 
Kents pointed out that only a very small percentage of the battalion’s exhaustion cases were 
original members of the battalion. “They joined as reinforcements during the action and
144 Ibid, Letter from DAG, 20 February 1944, p. 1
145 Ibid, DAG letter, 20 February 1944, p. 1
146 Crew, The Army Medical Services, p. 504, Table 34
147 NA WO 204/6633 Psycho-Neurotics (Rehabilitation Group) January-August 44, Letter from ADMS,
14 February 1944
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never had the advantage of sub-unit training before going into action and consequently had 
to fight as an individual rather than as a sec. or pi. with the usual poor results. ” 148 In the 
5th Essex there were “reinforcements from 22 different regiments within the battalion and 
nobody knows anybody else... people are rather on the jumpy side owing to this.” 149 “The 
presence of reinforcements in large number who were not of the highest standard” was 
cited as a contributory factor to degraded morale. 150
“It is generally accepted that the number of psychiatric battle casualties, relative to total 
casualty, that occur, gives a fairly accurate index of morale.” 151 78th Division, which had 
the highest desertion rate of all British formations between October-December, 1944, also 
had the highest psychiatric casualties. 1st Division’s rates were considerably lower, as were 
its desertion figures:
Table 1.8
152Divisional Psychiatric Casualties as a percentage of Total Battle Casualties 
Formation: October November December
78th Division: 22.0 37.0 23.0
^Division: 7.9 9.0 7.0
The psychiatrists were brought in to look closely at 78th Division. Lt.-Col J.D.M. Pearce, 
Adviser in Psychiatry, AFHQ noted that morale was “essentially a factor of mental health.” 
He wrote: “Weighting for the degree and duration of stress and incidence of desertion, self­
inflected wounds, venereal disease and psychiatric illness prove a good index of the state of 
morale.” He continued:
148 Ibid, Letter from CO, 5* Bn The Royal West Kents, 8 April 1944
149 LHCMA 4/2 Lt-General C.W. Allfrey, Diary of Campaign, Italy, 22 December 1943-8 August 1944, 
Friday 14 January 1944
150 NA WO 222/158 “Divisional Psychiatry”: Report to the War Office by Major Davis
151 Ibid
152 Crew, The Army Medical Services, p. 516
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The practical value of this is instanced by the observation that the psychiatric 
battle ratio (i.e. psychiatric casualties + all casualties x a hundred) was much
greater in 78 Division during the winter than any of its sister Divisions, led to a 
scrutiny of all personnel in that Division during a retraining period in March, 
and 1% of the whole division was deemed unfit for battle, 90% fit and 
apparently 9% uncertain. The sequel was that the Division did well in battle 
and had a low psychiatric battle ratio. 153
There is no indication whether those deemed unfit or uncertain for battle came from the 
rifle companies. Psychiatrist Major Palmer classified soldiers’ breakdowns as follows:
Table 1.9
i c i
Classification of Main Syndromes in Percentages 
For every 100 cases allow two Psychotics 
Simple Stress Reaction:
a. Simple loss of grip 30%
b. Simple anxiety reaction 15% 
c Simple anxiety with hysterical
features 20%_______ 65%
True Illness Reaction:
a. True Battle Anxiety State 15%
b. True Battle Dissociative State 10%
c. Acute Battle Anxiety Hysteria 3%
d. Guardmen’s Hysteria 2%
e. True Campaign Neurosis (the
burnt-out soldier) 5%_______ 35%
100%
Simple Stress Reaction was associated with men of poor morale, who generally just “threw 
in the sponge”. Many of them could be returned to full duty after a short course of 
continuous narcosis. Many of the victims of True Illness Reaction were men of high 
morale, who became “bomb-happy”. It was possible for such men to be returned to duty 
after a course of continuous narcosis and a fairly long period of rehabilitation. Palmer 
wrote: “I consider such men are very brave and must suffer from much anguish in so 
returning to duty.” Thousands of men of high morale carried on in the service of their
153 CMAC GC/192/18 J.D.M. Pearce, Report by Advisor in Psychiatry, September 1945 Morale
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country, despite being near breakdown. “As might be expected, this condition is most 
frequently found in N.C.Os and Officers and is most particularly common amongst Medical 
Officers, the compassionate nature of whose duties induces them to carry on long past the 
stage when they should have reported sick.” 155
His study of burnt-out soldiers prompted Palmer to ask “what is the morale life of an 
average well-trained man?” His answer, in terms of a single intensive day and night 
situation, was five days. In terms of more or less intermittent action, nine months. In terms 
of active service overseas, two years, “with the incidence of factors expressive of 
demoralisation commencing to express themselves after 18 months, and having a sharp 
increment after 21 months. ” 156 Many infantrymen in Italy, particularly from the Regular 
Divisions such as 1st Division, were on active service overseas for far longer than two 
years, so it is perhaps not surprising that men eventually succumbed to battle fatigue and 
totally degraded morale. One Guardsman remembered the nerve-shredding cumulative 
effect of battle:
Jerry was on his mountain. Every so often he’d lob a salvo of mortar bombs at 
us from behind his peak -  you’d hear a sort of multiple cough in the distance 
and the next thing would be a whistling glissando of sound that screwed your 
nerves up against the blast. You felt yourself shrivelling up inside your skin 
just waiting for the explosion. Every near-miss destroyed something in your 
brain, so you were less prepared for the next stonk when it came. One poor 
bloke got up from his shelter and walked among the falling shells as though he
was looking for something he’d lost You didn’t have to get your flesh
ripped apart to become a casualty of war. 157
154 CMAC GC/192/18, Major H.A. Palmer, “The Problem of the P & N Casualty -  a Study of 12,000 Cases”, 
pp.4-5
155 Ibid, p. 7
156 Ibid, p. 10
157 IWM 87/42/1 L. Waller, p. 61
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VI
There is little evidence to suggest, overall, that during the Italian campaign the sick rate
was a manifestation of poor morale. Indeed, what few reports there are of malingering
suggest not poor fighting spirit but rather a dislike of army life in general. One sapper
remembers that the prospect of an Army inspection, after nine months of freedom from the
discipline of normal army life since he had left England
aroused more fear than would the news of another forthcoming beach assault.
There was only way out, and that was in the morning to report ‘sick’.
The next morning almost half the platoon were on ‘sick parade’. We were 
taken to the Medical Officer at Taranto. As each Sapper entered the surgery 
with a petty complaint, so the M.O.’s temper increased as he realised he was 
dealing with malingerers. I was one of the last to go in, fitter than I had ever 
been in my life, but complaining of the only blemish I could find, a wart on my 
back. It must have been the last straw, I received his full rage with a needle 
wielded like a bayonet just below my shoulder blade. I let out an 
uncontrollable howl of shock and pain at the unexpected treatment, and was 
dismissed. We arrived back at the camp and were put on cleaning duties for the 
rest of the day. We found out that the parade had been cancelled and the rest of 
the platoon [had] been given the day off in Taranto. 158
That is not to say that men did not try to avoid battle by reporting sick. Men who were 
hypochondriacs, or work-shy, in “civvie street” retained these traits in the army. Medical 
Officers who knew the men in their units dealt with malingers robustly and sent them back 
to duty. Such cases were never recorded, either in battalion or medical diaries. There were 
also cases of men perhaps unconsciously exaggerating the effects of wounds. One 
Guardsman who suffered a hand injury wrote about the Medical Board he was sent before 
to see whether he was fit enough to rejoin his regiment. “After they’d studied my medical 
history the senior surgeon held my left hand in his and asked me to squeeze as hard as I
158 IWM 92/1/1 C.R. Eke, p. 74
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could. Well, he seemed a bit disappointed with my efforts, but he didn’t say anything...”
The soldier was re-graded Bl.
I didn’t know whether to laugh or cry. Bl meant that I was unfit for active 
service. It meant that I would probably crawl out of this war with nothing 
worse than a missing finger. Couldn’t I have squeezed that MO’s hand a bit 
harder if I’d really wanted to? Or had I cheated and deliberately saved my 
miserable skin? It was something I would have on my conscience for the rest 
of my life, I knew that. 159
True malingering, if the number of men charged under Section 18 of the Army Act 
(Disgraceful Conduct, which covered a wide range of misconduct, including malingering, 
self-injury, wilfully prolonging or aggravating a disease or infirmity, and stealing or 
receiving stolen army property) are reliable, would appear to have been a minor concern, 
particularly as there is no way of knowing how many of the men were charged specifically 
with malingering or wilful prolonging a disease or infirmity, as against stealing army 
property, in order to avoid active service. Table 1.10 (below) gives the number of men 
charged under Section 18 in Italy, on a monthly basis. There are a few points to make 
about the figures. Firstly, the figures gathered prior to June 1944 may be an under­
representation in that infantrymen attached to armoured divisions have not been included in 
the infantry totals. Secondly, the sudden rise in the percentage of infantrymen charged in 
June of 1944 was due to a change in the way GHQ 2nd Echelon recorded their statistics. 
Previously the numbers were gathered by formation, with the highest number of offences 
being recorded for GHQ, Army and Corps troops. From June 1944 onwards, the statistics 
were recorded by service arm, and this saw the infantry percentage rise dramatically. 
Thirdly, the rise in the infantry percentage for November 1943 is misleading in that four of 
the nine infantrymen charged under Section 18 came from 51st Division, which was at that 
time undertaking garrison duties in Sicily while awaiting return to the UK.
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Figure 1.10
Monthly No. of British soldiers charged under Section 18 of The Army Act160 
Month: Overall Infantry Infantry
Army Nos. Nos: Percentage
1943
July 58 17 29.3%
August 40 2 5.0%
September 61 1 1 .6 %
October 36 0 0 .0 %
November 51 7 13.7%
December 81 4 4.9%
1944:
January 64 5 7.8%
February 78 8 10.3%
March 80 1 1.3%
April 44 1 2.3%
May 58 _4 6.9%
Total: 651 50 7.6%
1944 (cont):
June 76 2 0 26.3%
July 44 13 29.5%
August 74 29 39.1%
September 55 15 27.3%
October 67 19 28.3%
November 55 9 16.7%
December 46 2 2 47.8%
1945:
January 130 2 2 16.9%
February 93 17 18.3%
March 72 29 40.3%
April 124 44 35.5%
Total: 836 239 28.9%
One psychiatrist wrote that “actual malingering is rare, though by no means unknown. It is 
fair to record that the psychiatrist is less likely than any other responsible officer to be
159 IWM 87/42/1 L. Waller, pp. 66-67
160 The monthly figures are taken from weekly GHQ 2nd Echelon Summary of Offences, British Formation in 
the 2nd Echelon War Diaries, as follows: NA WO 169/8439 War Diaries for July-September 1943. NA WO 
169/8440 War Diaries for October-December 1943. NA WO 170/40 War Diary for January 1944. NA WO 
170/41 War Diary for February 1944. NA WO 170/42 War Diary for March 1944. NA WO 170/43 War 
Diary for April 1943. NA WO 170/44 War Diary for May-June 1944. NA WO 170/45 War Diary for July 
1944. NA WO 170/46 War Diary for August 1944. NA WO 170/47 War Diary for September 1944. NA 
WO 170/49 War Diary for October 1944. NA WO 170/50 War Diary for November 1944. NA WO 170/51 
War Diary for December 1944. NA WO 170/4125 War Diary for January 1945. NA WO 1709/4126 War 
Diary for February 1945. NA WO 170/4127 War Diary for March 1945 and NA WO 170/4128 War Diary 
for April 1945
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deceived by the malingerer. Conscious exaggeration of symptoms is common and is a 
useful indication of the impoverishment of the man’s morale. ” 161 It was not so easy to 
gauge the validity of symptoms presented to a psychiatrist rather than the battalion MO. 
Some men deliberately exhibited psychiatric symptoms to avoid duty. Psychiatrist Major 
H.A. Palmer wrote that he viewed all patients who claimed amnesia with suspicion, 
especially when he scrutinised the periods for which the amnesia was claimed. “Up to 33% 
of cases will claim loss of memory of which only 13% are genuine. ” 162 In the early days of 
the war “psychiatric cases poured into British Military Hospitals, their symptoms being 
mainly related to gastro-intestinal tract. ” 163 The exaggeration of gastric symptoms was not 
uncommon, and tended to increase with each admission to hospital. It was decided that all 
cases of functional dyspepsia [indigestion with no discernible organic cause] should be 
returned to their units, “where many of them subsequently became useful soldiers. 
Following the adoption of this policy the wastage due to the gastric neuroses was 
checked. ” 164 As the war progressed treatment of neurotics was evolved to avoid reinforcing 
in the patient’s mind that he was a sick man and therefore unable to fight. 165
VI
It would appear, therefore, that malingerers were a drop in the ocean compared to the 
number of men away from their units through genuine illness. Equally, there is little 
evidence to suggest that large numbers of men deliberately courted illness. The men who 
suffered from malaria did so initially through a lack of adequate preparations across much 
of the army, the difficulty in utilizing the approved prophylaxis in front-line conditions, or
161 J.D.W. Pearce, MD, FRCPEd., DPM, Lieut-Col. RAMC, Command Psychiatrist, “Clinical Aspects of 
Psychiatric Problems in the Army”, The Practitioner, Vol. 154, pp 33-38, January 1945
162 CMAC, GC/192/18, H.A. Palmer, “The Problem of The P. & N. Casualty -  A Study of 12,000 Cases”
163 H.J.C.J. L’Etang, “A Criticism of Military Psychiatry in the Second World War”, Part III, Historical 
Survey, The Journal of the Royal Army Medical Corps, Vol. XCVII, No. 5, November 1951, pp 316-324
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through ignorance. As the illness became better understood and more effective 
preventative measures were enacted, the number of sufferers fell. Very few of the large 
number of VD cases can be directly attributed to a reluctance to fight, although anecdotal 
evidence indicated that some deserters were willing to mimic the symptoms to avoid 
prison. 166 It is impossible to say what percentage of sufferers were infantrymen, but they 
had fewer opportunities to contract a venereal disease than the majority of the army 
permanently in the rear. The principal causes of the rising VD rate were the ready 
availability of poverty-stricken women, and the lengthy time away from home of many of 
the soldiers.
Infantrymen were particularly liable to occupational illnesses such as trench foot, exposure, 
bronchial and rheumatic conditions, skin ailments and fatigue. There was a strong 
connection between fatigue and psychiatric breakdown in battle. Some of the men who 
suffered from battle fatigue needed a short period of rest away from the line. Others 
required far longer palliative care. Nine months of more or less intermittent front line 
action was regarded as the morale life of an average well-trained man. Many front-line 
infantrymen in Italy were on active service for far longer than that and yet remained 
capable of front-line duty.
The high rate of sickness in the Italian campaign was not an indication of poor morale. It 
was the result of ignorance, of too long an absence from home and family, and of the
164 Ibid
165 CMAC GC/192/18 H.A. Hunter, “The Problem of the P & N Casualty”, p. 3
166 See E. Taylor, Combat Nurse (London: Robert Hale, 1999) p. 178. They [deserters] discovered that 
the easiest way to escape from arrest was to get into hospital for treatment A way of achieving this was to be 
diagnosed as suffering from venereal disease, then rife in southern Italy. A deserter would deliberately bum a
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conditions under which the soldiers laboured. While not the product of poor morale, its 
prevalence drained manpower and forced a decreasing number of men to shoulder an 
increasingly heavy burden of fighting to the detriment of their morale. The remaining 
rifleman found himself “a sentry more often, with bigger gaps between sections and 
generally far more lonely. ” 167
sore on the end of his penis with a lighted cigarette. This they thought would look like the typical syphilitic 
chancre when seen hurriedly by doctors and nurses.”
167 NA CAB 101/224 “The British Soldier in Italy”, p. 36
Table 1.11
1st Pivfefon Exhaustion Cases-Jammry 22* J mm .6*, i m le*
Units (a) (bl (cl (dl (el (f)
24* Guards Brigade 
5 Gren Gds 41 7 22 19
1 Scots Gds 47 7 - - 23 24
1 Irish Gds 26 1 - - 18 8
Total: 114 15 - - 63 51
2 Infantrv Brigade 
HQ: 2 2
1 Loyals 61 12 2 1 36 25
2 N. Staffs 83 16 2 - 58 25
6 Gordons 49 8 1 - 32 17
Total: 195 36 5 1 128 67
3 Infantrv Brigade 
HQ: 2 . . 2
1 D.W.K. 68 9 1 - 44 24
2 Foresters 117 19 3 - 68 49
1 K.S.L.I. 117 24 1 - 79 38
Total: 304 52 5 - 191 113
R.A.
2 Fd Regt R.A. 9 6 3
19 Fd Regt R.A. 56 12 3 - 37 19
67 Fd Regt R.A. 11 - - - 5 6
81 A/TTk Regt R.A. 11 - - - 5 6
90 Lt A/A Regt R.A. 22 5 - - 11 11
Total: 109 17 3 - 64 45
R.E
6 Fd Pk Coy R.E 2 2
23 Fd Coy R.E. 16 3 - - 14 2
238 Fd Coy R.E 20 2 - - 12 8
248 Fd Coy R.E - - - - - -
Total: 38 5 - - 28 10
Others:
2/7 Mx Regt 43 8 2 28 15
1 Recce Regt 36 2 - - 27 9
R.A.S.C. 1 - - - - 1
Sigs 4 - - - 3 1
Med 20 1 - - 10 10
Ord 1 - - - 1 -
R.E.M.E 7 - - - 6 1
H.Q. 1 Div 1 - - - 1 -
Total: 113 11 2 _ 76 37
GRAND TOTAL: 873 136 15 1 550 323
Units _______ (a) ,._ib) ... . . (c) . . . ....(d) ..... f e ) — (f)
168 LHCMA Penney Papers 14/1 Is* Division Exhaustion Cases
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168 Infantrv Brigade 
(attached temporarily to 
Is* Division, Feb 3rd-15*) 
1 L.I.R. 21 2 13 8
1 London Scots 33 - - - 22 11
10 R. Berks 35 2 - - 17 18
510 Fd Coy R.E 15 3 - - 13 2
168 InfBdeSp Gp 2 - - 1 1
Total: 106 7 _ 66 40
40 Commando 11 7 4
Notes:
(a) Number of men admitted counting first admission ONLY
(b) Number of men admitted for a second time, i.e. cases in column (a) who were RTU
after original admission and were re-admitted for a second time
(c) Number of men admitted for a third time, i.e. cases in columns (a) and (b) who were
RTU on two separate occasions and were re-admitted for a third time
(d) Similarly man admitted on four separate occasions
(e) Final disposal by evacuation by sea
(f) Number of men whose final disposal was RTU; excluding men who were RTU on




Illness, not battle casualties, was the main drain on manpower in the Italian campaign. 
There were occasions, however, when battle casualties exceeded the number of sick. In the 
first ten complete days of battle of Operation HONKER (the final battle for Cassino), for 
instance, the number of wounded evacuated from the front area was 6,979, against 5,286 
sick evacuated. 1 During the whole period from May 1 l^-June 30th 1944, Eighth Army 
Field Medical Units admitted 14,133 battle casualties as against 13,375 sick.2
A high casualty rate was one of the elements listed by Lt.-Col Sparrow as a major cause of 
degraded morale.3 High casualty rates were also cited by the British psychiatrist Robert 
Ahrenfeldt, who wrote the seminal work on psychiatry in the British army in the Second 
World War, as one of the factors which had a detrimental effect on morale.4  The question 
of whether it is possible to assess to what extent casualty rates influenced the morale of 
fighting soldiers in Italy is examined in this chapter. The areas of investigation are: 
casualty rates in both offensive and defensive operations; the effect of a high casualty rate 
on battalion organization and efficiency; the range of wounds suffered; the infantrymen’s 
attitude to casualties; and, finally, their impact on morale, through an examination of the 
number of self-inflicted wounds, deserters and men absent without leave.
1 NA WO 204/7949 Medical Aspects of Operation HONKER (Operation against Cassino 11 May-30 June 





In any assessment of the effect of casualties on fighting spirit, consideration must first be 
given to the number and type of casualties. The nature of the fighting in Italy, usually 
against well-defended enemy positions on the commanding heights, or across rivers with 
the Germans well dug-in on the opposite banks, invariably meant that there would be 
relatively high casualty rates. Between September 3rd 1943 to May 19th 1945, two weeks 
after the German surrender in Italy, there were 6,299 officer and 86,805 OR verified battle 
casualties. 5 The majority were front-line troops. According to Gary Sheffield, in the 
North African and Italian campaigns the average casualty per battalion per month was 70. 
But, on some occasions, casualty rates matched anything in Normandy, where the average 
was 100 casualties per battalion per month, and where 175 per month “was not 
uncommon”. In the “bloodbath” of the Western Front of the First World War, casualties 
averaged 100 per battalion per month. However, in the Second World War, “ ... casualties 
were sustained by a relatively small sector of the military population. ” 6 With a decrease in 
the “teeth” to “tail” ratio, rifle companies suffered a disproportionately high rate of 
casualties.7 This was certainly true for the Italian Campaign, for between September 3rd 
1943 and July 31st 1944, Guards and Infantry OR casualties were recorded as 38,232, or 
71.6% of total battle casualties for that period.8 Figures gleaned from battalion diaries 
during offensive operations show just how debilitating the casualty rates could be, 
particularly in offensive periods.
4 Ahrenfeldt, Psychiatry, pp. 208-9
5 NA WO 170/4129 GHQ 2nd Echelon, CMF War Diary for May 1945
6 G. Sheffield, “The Shadow of the Somme: the Influence of the First Worid War on British Soldiers’ 
Perceptions and Behaviour on the Second World War”, in P. Addison & A. Calder, (eds.), Time To Kill, The 
Soldier’s Experience of War in the West, 1939-1945 (London: Pimlico, 1997) pp. 35-6.
7 In 1918,32% of the British Expeditionary Force were front line troops; in the Second World War the figure 
was 25%. Figures taken from Fuller, Troop Morale and Popular Culture, p. 4; and Englander and Mason,
The British Soldier in World War II, p. 2
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At the very start of the Italian campaign, one of the bloodiest engagements in Sicily was the 
battle for Primosole Bridge, the key to Montgomery’s advance into the Plain of Catania. 
The attempts to capture the bridge, by the three Durham Light Infantry battalions of 151 
Brigade (50th Division), was abortive and costly. Total casualties in the 6 th Battalion were 
120 killed, wounded or missing.9 This was a large proportion of the total battalion losses 
for the whole of the Sicilian campaign, which amounted to 17 officers and 194 ORs, killed, 
died of wounds, wounded or missing. 10 The 8 th Durham Light Infantry lost nine officers 
and 247 ORs killed, died of wounds, wounded and missing (26% of officers and 34% of 
ORs, given an average War Establishment of 35 officers and 726 ORS in 50th Division 
battalions at the start of the Sicilian Campaign) . 11 The 9th DLI losses were 25 officers and 
283 ORs (71% of officers and 39% of ORs). A 6 th DLI platoon commander’s diary entry at 
Primosole recorded:
Men who had served in the battalion since France in 1940, at Gazala, Alamein 
and Mareth had not seen so much slaughter and destruction in such a small 
space. The area around the 8 th bridgehead and along the sunken road where we 
and 9th attacked was a shambles, 500 casualties had occurred in our three 
battalions, representing 1 in every 2 men in the assault. Over 300 German dead 
lay there, tom trees, smashed guns, tanks and equipment everywhere. Now 
little rough wooden crosses made from ration boxes began to appear as we 
buried our dead. There was one grave of 20 men of the Battalion in our 
company area. 12
Such high casualties were a considerable blow to the brigade, but even more importantly, 
the casualties were from the rifle companies, where roughly three quarters of the battalions’ 
fighting strength was destroyed. Morale in the 50th Division plummeted with the losses at
8 NA WO 162/279 Manpower & Wastage, Italy
9 NA WO 169/10203 6* Bn The Durham Light Infantry War Diary for July 1943
10 NA WO 162/291 Infantry Rifles: Battle Casualties Sicily
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Primosole and the divisional medical war diary remarked, with typical British 
understatement, that “even some of the old soldiers were a bit jumpy. ” 13
The Durham Light Infantry were not the only infantry battalions to suffer heavy losses in 
Sicily. The number of officers and men killed, died of wounds, wounded or missing for 
three other battalions was:
Table 2.1 
Infantry Battle Casualties, Sicily 14 
Percentage of Officer and O.R. Losses 
Battalion Casualties Percentage of Battalion
Officers ORs Officers ORs
1st Royal Irish Fusiliers 12 206 33% 25%15
1st York & Lancaster 21 215 60% 30%16
1st KOYLI 17 170 49% 23%17
The total number of British army personnel killed between July 10th and August 18th in 
Sicily was 213 officers and 1,952 ORs: 507 officers and 5,830 ORs were wounded, with 
94 officers and 1,521 ORs posted missing. 18 Total battle casualties, all ranks, were 10,117 
(5.4% of the estimated average strength of British Army forces in Sicily). Most were in 
the Infantry, which lost 17% of its total officer strength and 11.3% of ORs. In comparison 
(see Table 2.2) the Royal Artillery (Field) lost considerably fewer men.
11 For instance, NA WO 169/10203 6* Bn The Durham Light Infantry, War Establishment 35 officers and 
726 ORs; NA WO 169/10177 10111 Bn The Royal Berkshire Regiment, War Establishment 35 officers and 726 
ORs; NA WO 169/10308 5th Bn The East Yorkshire Regiment, War Establishment 35 officers and 727 ORs
12IWM 84/2/1 Colonel D.J. Fenner, p. 9
13 NA WO 177/401 Medical Diary -  ADMS 50* Division September 1943 Hygiene Report, 10 September
14 NA WO 162/291 Infantry Rifles. Battle Casualties Sicily.
15 NA WO 170/10235 I8* Bn The Royal Irish Fusiliers War Establishment 36 Officers and 815 ORs
16 NA WO 169/10310 1st Bn The York & Lancaster Regiment War Establishment 35 officers and 726 ORs
17 NA WO 169/10244 1st Bn The King’s Own Yorkshire Light Infantry War Establishment 35 officers and 
726 ORs
18 NA WO 162/291 Casualty figures taken from Final Returns: Sicily -  Battle Casualties
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Table 2.2
Sicily Wastage, British Service Only: 10 June-18 August, 194319
Arm Estimated Average Battle Casualties Sickness
Strength of Forces (K, W & M) (Estimated)
Officer ORs Officers ORs Officers ORs
Infantry20 2,295 40,826 391 (17.0%) 4,604(11.3%) 69(3.0%) 1,117(3.0%)
RA Field 1,233 17,571 55(4.5%) 358(2.0%) 37(3.0%) 480(2.7%)
RE 706 17,818 27(3.8%) 386(2.2%) 16(2.3%) 493(2.7%)
Army Air Corps 170 5,127 12(7.1%) 323(6.3%) 9(5.3%) 170(3.3%)
At Salerno, Battle casualties admitted to the Main Dressing Station of the 46th Division in 
the first few days of Operation AVALANCHE were: September 9th -  274: September 10th 
-111: September 12th -  141. By September 16th battle casualties were approximately 5% 
of the Division, principally, of course, from among the front line infantry. 21 There was such 
a shortage of infantry after the first few days ashore that all available men were seconded 
into the front line -  men from the Recce Regiment, beach landing parties, Royal Engineers, 
clerks, cooks and truck drivers.22 Even lightly wounded infantrymen were asked to go back 
to Battipaglia. 23 In the 46th and 56th Divisions, from September 9th to October 31st 1943 the 
smallest number of casualties endured by any battalion was 11 officers and 115 ORs.
Some battalions suffered far great losses, as can be seen from the percentages of losses 
based on a best-case scenario of a full War Establishment for each battalion:
19 NA WO 162/291 Sicily Wastage -  British Service Only
20 Infantry, Rifle & Motor, including Foot Guards
21 NA WO 177/394 Medical Diary -  ADMS 46th Division September 1943
22 V. Selwyn, D. Davin, E. deMauny, I. Fletcher (eds.), From Oasis Into Italy, War Poems and Diaries from 
North Africa to Italy, 1940-1946 (London: Shepheard-Walwyn Publishers, 1983) p. 180; Elliott, Esprit de 
Corps, p. 56; Hickey & Smith, Operation Avalanche, p. 147; Ibid, p. 177
23 Pond, Salerno, p. 147
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Table 2 3
Percentage of Battalion Strength Lost through Casualties 
9 September-31 October, 194324
Battalion Casualties Percentage
Officers ORs Officers ORs
2nd Hamps 1 1 354 30.6% 43.8%
174th Hamps 16 287 44.4% 32.2%
214th K.O.Y.L.I. 2 2 426 61.1% 52.7%
5th Foresters 23 537 63.9% 66.4%
16th D.L.I. 13 367 37.1% 45.4%
9th R.F. 25 547 69.4% 67.6%
3rd Coldstream Guards 24 282 66.7% 34.7%
2nd Scots Guards 27 304 75.0% 37.6% 25
Average: 2 0 388 56.0% 47.6%
The number of casualties, per division, for the first half of 1944 are listed in Table 2.8, but 
the official history, Brigadier Molony’s The Mediterranean and Middle East, notes that 
between January 18th-22nd inclusive, the start of the Garigliano Offensive, casualties in the 
whole of X Corps (which included 5th, 45th & 56th Division) were 1,312.26 Just three 
battalions of 5th Division lost about 565 men that week: The Royal Scots Fusiliers’ 
casualties were approximately 140, including seven officers, to which a further 53 
casualties had to be added on January 23rd -  a total of 209.27 The Field Returns of January 
22nd for the 6 th Seaforth Highlanders show a complement of 27 officers and 608 ORs, 
against a War Establishment of 36 officers and 815 ORs. The battalion was forced to 
reorganise into three Rifle Companies, so it must have lost in the region of 100 men. 28 The 
1st Bn Y ork & Lancaster lost 256 men during the week ending January 22nd. 29 The 2nd Bn
24 Casualty figures taken from Crew, The Army Medical Services, p. 142
25 War Establishment for September-October 1943 taken as 36 officers and 809 ORs. See, for instance, NA 
WO 169/10224 2nd Bn The Hampshire Regiment War Establishment 36 Officers and 809 ORs War Diary 
for October 1943: NA WO 169/10296 5th Bn The Sherwood Foresters War Eatablishment of 36 officers and 
809 ORs and NA WO 169/10216 16* Bn The Durham Light Infantry War Establishment of 35 Officers and 
809 ORs War Diary for October 1943
26 J.C. Molony, The Mediterranean and Middle East, Vol. V, (London: HMSO, 1973), p. 620
27 NA WO 170/1471 2nd Bn The Royal Scots Fusiliers War Diary for January 1944
28 NA WO 170/1474 6* Bn The Seaforth Highlanders War Diary for January 1944
29 NA WO 170/1490 2nd Bn The York & Lancaster Regiment War Diary for January 1944
105
The Wiltshires, also from 5th Division, lost 195 men during the Garigliano operations (two 
weeks) . 30 According to the 56th Division ADMS, divisional troop casualties for the week 
ending January 22nd were 40 officers and 659 ORs.31 Eric Morris, in Circles o f Hell, gives 
the figure of 4,000 British casualties in the first battle of Cassino (January ^-February 
13th 1944).32 The 56th Division ADMS Medical Diary for January records 76 officer and 
1311 OR casualties in January - a total of 1387 .33 Early on in the campaign, at the Battle 
of the Mignano Gap in front of Cassino, one company of the 2/5* Bn The Queen’s 
Regiment, normally 120 men strong, could only muster one officer and eight men.34 But 
casualties were never constant over time. Losses in British infantry divisions during the 
Second and Third Battles of Cassino, prior to May, for instance, were relatively light. In 
April, 4th Division casualties were 212.35 The number of casualties rose dramatically yet 
again as the 4th Battle of Cassino (May 1 l th-June 4th 1944) unfolded. In just one month, 
May 11 th-June 5th, the casualties in the 21 British battalions in Eighth Army amounted to 
4,782: 1,068 killed, 3,506 wounded and 207 missing. The casualty rate amongst infantry 
companies was 31.6%
Casualties during the first week of the Anzio landing were unacceptably high in some of 
the battalions. The Irish Guards, for instance, suffered 89 casualties in the battle of 
Carroceto Factory on January 25th/26th 1944, up to 20 of whom were killed. The battalion’s 
padre, Father Brooke, described January 26th as “the worst day he had ever spent in this war
30 Molony, The Mediterranean and Middle East, Vol. V, p. 632 Footnote
31 NA WO 177/414 Medical Diary - ADMS 56th Division January 1944
32 Morris, Circles of Hell, p. 270
33 NA WO 177/414 Medical Diary - ADMS 56th Division Januaiy 1944
34 Bowlby, Countdown to Cassino, p, 25
35 NA WO 177/378 Medical Diary -  ADMS 5th Division April, 1944
36 Ellis, Cassino, p. 469
106
or the last” .37 In the same engagement the Grenadier Guards lost 29 officers and 579 
ORs.38 The beginning of February in the beachhead did not see any amelioration in the 
appalling casualty levels. The Germans began their counter-attack on February 3rd. In it 
the Duke of Wellington Regiment lost 260 officers and men; the Gordon Highlanders 320; 
and by February 4th the Irish Guards were reduced to 270 strong, “including the reserve 
that had come up from ‘B’ Ech. This number was re-enforced by a further 80 during the 
day made up of those had had found their way back to ‘B’ Echelon. ” 39 Total casualties in 
the division were about 1,400?° At Anzio, “the two infantry battalions holding the wadis 
on the left sector of the [1 st] divisional front were averaging twenty eight casualties each 
day” .41 “Any battalion going to the Fortress would reckon on losing a third of its personnel 
within a week. ” 42 It was on the beachhead the 1st Bn Scots Guards sustained the heaviest 
casualties by any Scots’ Guards’ battalion during the war.43 According to the official 
history of the Italian campaign, if it could be assumed that the British infantry battalions of 
the 1st Division and the 168th Brigade had gone into battle at Anzio at full war 
establishment, their effective strength on February 10th, expressed in percentages was:
Figure 2.4
Percentage of 1st Division and 168thBrigade battalions* strengths on February 10th, 194444
5th Grenadier Guards 50% 2nd Foresters 65%
1st Scots Guards 55% 1st KSU 65%
1st Irish Guards 60% 10th Royal Berks 30%
2nd North Staffs 55% 1st London Scottish 40%
6 th Gordons 65% 1st London Irish 40%
1st D.W.R. 65%
37 NA WO 170/1354 1st Bn Irish Guards War Diary for January 1944 ‘The Battle of Carroceto Factory”.
38 R. Trevelyan, Rome '44: The Battle for the Eternal City (London: Martin Seeker & Warburg, 1981) p. 70
39 NA WO 170/1354 1st Bn Irish Guards War Diary for February 1944
40 Molony, The Mediterranean and Middle East, Vol. V, p. 729
41 A.M. Cheetam, Ubique (Formby, Lancs: Freshfield Books, 1987) p. 128
42 Trevelyan, The Fortress, p. 217
43 Vemey, Anzio 1944, p. 84
44 Molony, The Mediterranean and Middle East, Vol. V, p. 735 footnote
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Battle Casualty Statistics for the 1st Infantry Division from January 23rd-June 6 * (from the 
initial landing at Anzio to the fall of Rome) show that there were 369 officers killed or 
wounded during that period, and 5,408 ORs.45 The total number of killed, wounded or 
missing was 470 officers and 8 , 8 6 8  ORs.46 But the death rate, as one Guardsman pointed 
out, “was not as heavy as might have been expected in such difficult circumstances. ” 47  
The total number of men killed in 19 weeks was 92 officers and 993 ORs.48
Casualties during Operation OLIVE, the attack on the Gothic Line, which opened on 
August 25* 1944, were extremely high. In 26 days, during which Eighth Army advanced 
30 miles, 14,000 men were killed, wounded or missing, and more than half the casualties 
were from the Infantry.49 At Croce, two companies of the 8 th Fusiliers suffered such 
withering German fire that one company was reduced to a strength of three men and the 
other could only count 20 still standing.50 In just one week, the week beginning September 
13th, Eighth Army lost an average of 750 men killed and wounded every day -  roughly the 
equivalent of an entire infantry battalion daily.51 The 16th Bn DLI reported that from the 
time the battalion was committed on August 27th until September 28th, their casualties were 
as high as the total from Salerno to the Garigliano, a period of six months. 52 At the 
beginning of September the 2/6* Queens recorded that total casualties in just a few days’ 
fighting were “no less than 1 2 0 ” .53 At the beginning of October it noted that “Bn now
45 LHCMA Penney Papers 14/2 Battle Casualty Statistics, “The Anzio Beachhead”
46 Ibid
47IWM 82/37/1 EP. Danger, “Diary of a Guardsman”, Vol. 2 , 153p.
48 LHCMA Penney Papers 14/2
49 NA CAB 106/427 Operations of British, Indian and Dominion Forces in Italy, Part II, The Campaign in the 
Northern Apennines, p. 14
50 Orgill, The Gothic Line, p. 105
51 Ibid, p. 131
52 NA WO 170/1385 16* Bn The Durham Light Infantry War Diary for September 1944
53 NA WO 170/1466 2/6* Bn The Queen’s Royal Regiment War Diary for September 1944
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rather small in numbers. ” 54 The 211th Queen’s also suffered severe casualties in September 
and at one point, on September 13th, could muster only 1 officer and 30 ORs in ‘D’ Coy, 
with ‘A’ & ‘C’ Coys down to about the same numbers.55 The 1st Bn London Scottish lost 
11 officers and 220 ORs in four days’ fighting. 56 The 56th Division suffered particularly 
heavily in September, with 176 Officer and 2,156 OR battle casualties.57 Individual 
battalion casualty figures illustrate how grievous the losses could be:
Figure 2.5 
Selected Gothic Line Casualty Figures 
Battalion Killed Wounded Missing
Officers ORs Officers ORs Officers ORs
7th Ox & Bucks* 1 2 1 7 78 3 1458
7th Ox & Bucks** 3 41 2 2 125 1 4 5 9
2/7 Queen’s*** 1 18 5 64 - 8 60
♦Casualties suffered between September 1-8,1944 
** Casualties suffered between September 13-20,1944 
*** Casualties in one day
The high casualty rates during Operation OLIVE gave the Germans a perfect opportunity to 
launch a propaganda leaflet headed “The Rifle Regiment Attack!” which read “Hundreds of 
dead and wounded are lying before our lines. ” 61 As with all German propaganda leaflets, 
“The Fusiliers were unimpressed. ” 62 The 2nd Royal Fusiliers noted in their battalion diary 
earlier in the year that the troops regarded German propaganda leaflets “with humour” .63 
Another battalion noted that the shower of propaganda leaflets fired on their position was
54 Ibid
55 NA WO 170/1467 2/7* Bn The Queen’s Royal Regiment War Diary for September 1944
56 NA WO 170/1435 1st Bn The London Scottish War Diary for September 1944
57 NA WO 177/414 Medical Diary -  ADMS 56* Division September 1944
58 NA WO 170/1464 7* Bn The Oxfordshire & Buckinghamshire Regiment War Diary for September 
1944
59 Ibid
60 NA WO 170/1467 2/7* Bn The Queen’s Royal Regiment War Diary for September 1944
61 Bowlby, The Recollections of Rifleman Bowlby, p. 203
62 Northcote Parkinson, Always A Fusilier, p. 245
63 NA WO 170/1389 2nd Bn The Royal Fusiliers War Diary for March 1944
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“an amusing diversion which helped to pass the morning, and the leaflets themselves came 
in very useful, as the Commanding Officer pointed out, for purposes other than those 
originally intended. ” 64 Combat rations never had sufficient toilet paper.65
II
Such high casualty rates in individual battalions during offensive operations were not only 
tragic on an individual level. They also destroyed the ability of the battalions to function 
efficiently. Without a solid core of battle-hardened men and officers who had trained and 
fought together, and who knew each other, the battalions lost their heart, and no amount of 
fresh blood, of reinforcements, could replace it. A key factor here was that the turn-over of 
personnel in any battalion included officers. Comrades In Arms emphasized that the right 
relationship between officers and men was the most important component for the morale of 
a unit. The men wanted “like most of us, the stimulus of a personal leader -  someone 
whom they know and like to look up to, and admire. ” 66 Even the temporary loss of officers, 
especially those who had gained the confidence of their men, would negatively influence 
the fighting spirit of their men. High officer and NCO casualty rates in particular meant 
that the command structure - the sergeants, sergeant majors and some experienced officers 
-  could no longer instil a feeling of confidence among the men. Instead of able to say, 
“well, he was there, he was in France, he ought to know what he’s doing”, the worry was 
“he’s new, what does he know? ” 67
64 NA WO 170/1354 l 8* Bn The Irish Guards War Diary for Februaiy 1944
65 Morris, Circles of Hell, p. 284
66 Comrade in Arms, pp. 1-2
67 Conversation (August 2001) with Brigadier D.E. Ballantine of The Wiltshire Regiment, who served at 
Anzio
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One officer recalled that by the end of January 1944, of the 36 or so fellow officers who
had landed with him in Sicily, 14 had been killed and 16 wounded, some of them twice and
“some so badly as never to return. ” 68 “An infantry officer had only two options in World
War Two”, wrote an officer who had a leg amputated in Italy, “death or being wounded.
Virtually none survived intact in the front line through the North African campaign and
Italy. ” 69 A soldier from the Irish Brigade commented that when officers had the
opportunity to celebrate:
..they certainly made the most of it, of course there would be a lot of empty 
places when they drank together again. We had a big turnover in officers, some 
joined us in line one night and went back wrapped in a blanket the next night.70
The loss of experienced officers was thus particularly detrimental to morale. The overall 
ratio of officer to OR casualty during the Italian campaign was 1:14.71 In Sicily, however, a 
marked feature was the high proportion of officers killed to other ranks killed: “as high as 
1 to 6  in some units; and averaging 1 to 9 in the whole army,” Montgomery wrote to Sir 
Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, on July 27th.72 German snipers in Sicily 
were particularly accurate and seemed to have aimed specifically for officers’ heads.73
At Anzio there were some battalions which lost a proportionally high percentage of their 
officers: the 2nd Bn Sherwood Foresters, for example, lost 100% of its men and 200% of its 
officers. 74 In January the 5th Bn Grenadier Guards reported that there were only 11 officers 
left in the battalion, “only five of whom were with Rifle Coys. 3 Coy had no officer left at
68 Cole, Rough Road to Rome, p. 179
69 D. Forman, To Reason Why ((London: Andre Deutsch, 1991) p. 190
70IWM 999/85/1 K.R. Druiy, “One Man’s Memories -  Fifty Years On”, Behind the line celebrations
71 Based on figures given in NA WO 170/4129 GHQ 2nd Echelon, CMF War Diary for May 1945, Summary 
of Battle Casualties
72 Brooks (ed.), Montgomery, p. 255
73 LHCMA W/C 20/9 Major Murnoe Sym, PSart III, p. 18
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all. ” 75 The 1st Bn KSLI also suffered devastating officer losses: in an action at Buon 
Risposo Ridge on February 8 th 1944 all officers in ‘B’ and ‘C’ Companies were either 
killed or wounded, two officers in ‘D’ Company were wounded and one officer in *C* 
Company was missing. In addition, the Company Sergeant Majors of ‘A, ‘C’ and ‘D’ 
Companies were all wounded.76 In other battalions a far smaller proportion of Officer 
losses to Other Ranks seems to have been the norm. To extrapolate from the admittedly 
small sampling offered by the 56th Division records, at a time when the fighting was 
particularly intense, the ratio of Officer/OR casualties at Anzio was lower than in Sicily.
Iftbte 2,<?
Weekly 56th Div Casualties collected to Medical Units at Anzio Bridgehead only77 
Date: Officers ORs Ratio of Officers
to OR casualties
Week beginning February 19: 17 219 1:13
Week beginning February 26: 63 847 1:13
Week beginning March 4: 26 325 1:13
One reason for this was undoubtedly that in Sicily the British were advancing, and officers 
in the lead provided an easy target for the enemy. At Anzio everyone spent most of their 
time in trenches, so officers, while still leading their men, were less likely to be to be an 
obvious target, particularly for snipers. By this time, too, the wearing of tin hats, which 
had supposedly become compulsory from just after the landing, rendered it more difficult 
for the enemy to distinguish between officers and ORs. 78 After a month in the beachhead it 
became apparent that the incidence of head injuries among British troops from shrapnel in 
particular was four times as great as among the Americans, so the tin-hat rule was enforced 
with stiffer penalties:
74 D’Este, Fatal Decision, p. 300
75 NA WO 170/1350 5* Bn Grenadier Guards War Diary for January 1944
76 NA WO 170/1416 1st Bn The King’s Shropshire Light Infantry War Diary for February 1944
77 NA WO 177/414 Medical Diaries -  ADMS 56* Division February and March 1944
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The Bde Comd directs that “tin-hats” will be carried at all times, and that it will 
be kept close at hand during the night so that it can be put on or over the face 
whilst lying down. Head injuries suffered where “tin hats” were NOT worn 
will in future be investigated by Coy Comds with a view to disciplinary action 
being taken.79
In addition, a large sign was erected on the coastal road, featuring Jane [a very popular 
Daily Mirror comic strip character] unclothed, but with a steel helmet. The sign said: 
‘Wear your helmet at all times. Jane does’ .80 The sign eventually had to be taken down as 
it was provoking too many traffic accidents.
Ill
As high as the casualty figures could climb during offensive operations, it was the steady 
attrition rate during defensive periods that was perhaps more demoralising. At least when 
battalions were pushing forward the men felt they were achieving something, and were 
sustained by an adrenalin rush, rather than sitting in trenches and suffering for no 
immediate tangible results. In March 1944 the 1st Bn East Surrey Regiment (78th 
Division) reported the loss of 52 men (one officer killed, one missing, and four wounded; 5 
ORs killed, 31 wounded and 10 missing) in 28 days.81 During the same period Fred 
Majdalany recorded the loss of over 70 officers and men in four and a half weeks in the 
mountains. “In any other arm of the service it would be considered a lot for a period of 
‘doing nothing’ . ” 82 The 2nd Bn Lancashire Fusiliers, between March 26th and April 27th, 
lost 10 ORs killed, 5 officers and 37 ORs wounded and 4 ORs missing when they were in 
defensive positions in the mountains. The 5th Buffs, in the line at Cassino station in March,
78 See, for instance, NA WO 170/1382 Is* Bn The Duke of Wellington Regiment War Diary for February 
1944
79 Ibid, Routine Orders
80 J. Hillier, The Long, Long Road to Victory,: War Diary of an Infantry Despatch Rider 1940-46 
(Trowbridge, Wilts: privately published, 1995) p. 136
81 NA WO 170/1482 1st Bn The East Surrey Regiment War Diary for March, 1944
82 Majdalany, Monastery, p. 96
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suffered the loss of one office and 10 ORs killed and 36 ORs wounded in just eight days.83
Sometimes the losses occurred in a far shorter time. In just ten minutes’ shelling on the
Castle at Cassino, on March 25th, the 6 th Bn Royal West Kents lost 16 killed and 17
wounded. 84 A 4th Division soldier wrote about his spell in Cassino town in April:
The time we had spent so far in Cassino had, all of it, been in one of the ‘quiet 
periods’, in one of the ‘lulls’ between battles. Even so, we had lost quite a high 
proportion of our Company strength, a sobering thought for later days.85
Casualties among the Guards Brigade on Monte Battaglia (September-October 1944) ran to
something like 10 a day from shelling, even when no attack was being made. “In the
opinion of the Grenadiers, the misery of holding Monte Battaglia exceeded that endured
even at Cassino. ” 86 Patrolling too, could result in high casualties: on the Sangro
bridgehead the Royal West Kents of 78th Division lost more men in just 10 days’ patrolling
than any other battalion had in the main battle.87 “One of the worst things of the lot, a
patrol. You were on a hiding to nothing. Nobody liked the patrols,” opined one corporal. 88
Patrolling could result in a slow but steady haemorrhaging of manpower, so most patrols
avoided risks. “There was no advantage in sticking your neck out ... you went out 50
yards, not a hundred, because the Germans were 100 yards away. ” 89
1945 opened with another static period, and although newspapers back in the UK reported 
that conditions were quiet, since no major operations took place, there was a good deal of 
small scale activity for the infantry, which continued defensive operations. There was a 
steady drain of battle casualties, amounting to about of third of the number incurred during
83 NA WO 170/1368 5th Bn The Buffs War Diary for March, 1944
84 NA WO 170/1421 6th Bn The Royal West Kents War Diary for March, 1944
85IWM 85/18/1 C.T. Framp, p. 97
86 Blaxland, Alexander’s General, p. 216
87 Ford, The Battleaxe Division, p. 136
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the December offensive. 90 56th Division medical records show a steady drip of daily 
casualties in January ranging from 19 to nil, with the total number of casualties evacuated 
during the 31 days reaching 167. The total number of casualties for February was 292, with 
the majority of casualties incurred towards the end of the month (57 casualties evacuated 
on February 24th, 14 on the 25th, and 28, 26 and 29 respectively evacuated during the final 
three days of the month) . 91 Casualties for the final offensive, Operation GRAPESHOT, in 
the British units of Eighth Army from April 9th-May 2nd were 708 killed; 2,258 wounded 
and 1 0 2  missing.92
IV
The most common types of wounds in Italy were caused by high explosive, mortar and 
artillery fire. Infantrymen were thus the victims of violence meted out to them by an 
enemy they could not see, which made their plight even more stressful. One veteran of 
Anzio recalled:
We grew to distinguish the sound of various guns, as if they were voices -  
some were alto, some bass, some grumbly, some like baying wolves, some as 
retchy as the cough of a tubercular in his last stages. But all these were more or 
less noises off; nearer to hand were the staccato eugh-eugh of two-inch mortars, 
the snarly spandau-ripple, the more deliberate bren-crackle, and the swift 
searing whine past of a single bullet, generally tracer and half-seen like a 
miniature comet.93
In one battalion, the 16th Durham light Infantry (46th Division), between September 1943 to 
March 1944, there were 181 casualties from shelling (42% of total casualties); 63 casualties 
from gunshot, rifle and machine gun fire (34.8%); 26 casualties from mines (14.4%) and 16
88IWM Sound Archives 17621 W. Virr, Reel 10
89 IWM Sound Archives 16719 E  Grey, Reel 6
90 NA CAB 106/441 Operations of British, Indian and Dominion Forces in Italy 3 September 1943-2 May 
1945 Part IV The Campaign in Lombardy, 1 April to 2 May 1945, p. 6
91 NA WO 177/414 Medical Diaries - ADMS 56th Division January and February 1945
92 Jackson, The Mediterranean and Middle East, Vol VI, Part III, p. 334
93 Trevelyan, The Fortress, p. 17
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from hand grenades (8 .8 %)." During Operation OLIVE, in September 1944, about two 
thirds of injuries dealt with by Field Medical Units were due to shell or mortar fire.95 
Figures for 1945 show that casualties from shell and mortar fire far exceeded those from 
machine gun fire, bombs or mines.96 Wounds to the upper and lower limbs formed the 
majority of cases treated. An indication of the distribution of wounds by anatomical region 
suffered by soldiers in Italy was provided by the XIII Corps figures for the second half of 
1944 and the first quarter of 1945:
Table 2.7
XIII Corps Percentage Distribution of Wounds, by Anatomical Region97
Aug-Sept Oct-Dec Jan-Mar
1944 1944 1945
Head, Face, Neck 10.5 16.1 15.4
Chest 8.5 5.1 7.2
Upper Arm 5.7 6.4 8.5
Forearm and Hand 30.5 26.8 27.6
Abdomen 3.8 3.0 3.7
Back 2 . 8 2 . 2 3.1
Buttock 4.7 5.0 3.2
Thigh 12.4 17.1 13.5
Leg and Foot 20.9 17.8 18.5
Genitalia 0.9 0.5 0.3
The wounds most feared by soldiers were those to the abdomen, eyes, brain and genitals. 98 
One Medical Officer, the CO of No. 7 CCS in Sicily, Colonel J.D.P. Macpherson, 
estimated that the mortality rate in cases of abdominal wounds in his CCS was 50%, and 
added that this was the experience of other CCS. 99 Abdominal wounds could be caused by 
shrapnel wounds to the buttocks, where the shrapnel passing upwards into the pelvis and 
damaged the lower bowel and bladder, resulting in peritonitis. 100 Wounds to the buttocks
94 IWM 91/16/1 Captain H.M. Jones, The Work of a Battalion Medical Officer, p. 2
95 NA WO 222/1495 The Campaign in Italy -  Medical, p. 138
96 Crew, The Army Medical Services, Table 56, p. 519
97 Ibid, Table 54, p. 516
98 Holmes, Firing Line, p. 182
99 Taylor, Combat Nurse, p. 141
100 IWM 91/16/1 Captain H.M. Jones, The Work of a Battalion Medical Officer, pp. 2-3
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were often received when the men were not properly dug-in. A battalion commander wrote
in the battalion orders in July 1943:
I am always assured that there is no need to teach men to dig in as they will do 
that automatically.
Unfortunately it is not the case. Quite 75% of X Coy casualties on the 4th were 
avoidable. The PI. which received the heaviest shelling had merely shallow 
scrapes to lie in. By the morning of the 5th they had not improved them. Some 
men consider that they are well dug in when they are down 2ft 6 ins. The net 
result of this is that most wounds are in the bottom or back as there is no room 
for that part in the holes. 101
One infantryman remembered that the first thing one did when up front was to dig in.
The carving out of a shallow trench in the earth or rock to enable one to crouch 
below ground level meant the difference between being killed by enemy fire or 
staying alive. It was as simple as that. Only very rarely indeed did a slit trench 
... get a direct hit. 102
The importance of properly dug-in slit trenches was emphasised throughout the campaign. 
When the 2/4 Hamps trained at the end of March 1944 they dug slit trenches of a “defence 
drill” . 103 The 5th Buffs’ diary noted on March 19  ^1944 that the battalion was now at eight 
hours notice to move, “and modified training was carried out, and practice was given to the 
digging of slit trenches. ” 104 The CO of the 176th E. Surreys spoke to his battalion in 
September 1944 and stressed “the importance of digging in immediately when in a forward 
area in order to reduce the risk of unnecessary casualties. ” 105 The 6 th Bn The Royal West 
Kents tried the humorous approach to encourage the appropriate preparation of trenches 
(see next page).
101 NA WO 169/10174 8* Bn The Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders War Diary for July 1943 Battalion 
Orders, 1 July
102 Harpur, The Impossible Victory, p. 95
103 NA WO 170/1399 2/4* Bn The Hampshire Regiment War Diary for March 1944
104 NA WO 170/1368 5* Bn The Buffs War Diary for March 1944
105 NA WO 170/1486 1/6* Bn The East Surrey Regiment War Diary for September 1944
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Are you anxious­
ly  awaiting an Id ea l 
Rome at the end of
the War 7 so,,
you had b etter  spend 
the time, u n t il  then .. 
in  studying b etter  b a ttle  buildr  
ing,. Only by th is  means can you  
ensure that you w il l  be an 
applicant for a cosy house a fter  
the War.
F irst l e t . ua study the Rattle 
Bed -  s i t t in g  Ream,, or s l i t  
trench. F ir s t  i t  must be safes.
, I t  should be s ite d  on a s o f t  
foundation, and dug fa s t  and deep,
A wide study of the safe -  
construction of th is  one room 
apartment shows that the more 
d if f ic u l t  and dangerous the  
s itu a tio n , the higher the quality  
of the work -  a groat, tr ib u te  to  
B ritish  workmanship,.
So far  so good, but, what 
about beauty ? Do we want
to d isfig u re  the. countryside 
by a build ing scheme which leaves  
behind i t  b lo ts  and scars of up­
turned earth 7 Emphatically
BO, and the Germans do not lik e
it .  e i th e r ., , Ihey w i l l  show 
th e ir  d isp leasure by shooting  
most accurately a t an i l l .  -  
b u ilt  housing e s ta te .
R xterior• decoration then i s  
upefu l, as w e ll as ornament-., 
a l ,  in  fa c t  i t  i s  a l i f e  -  
saver fur the ten a n ts. At 
the moment, in  our community; 
the standard i s  low.
As soon as the Bed -  
S it t in g  Room i s  complete i t  
oust bo decorated, so that 
i t  fades in to  the surrounding 
country^ lo t  our homes bo 
neat but not " g o r e d y " H o  
matter how t ir e d , camouflage 
your home before r e t ir in g  to  
bed. He who sleep s f i r s t  
may nevor wake up,
- o  0 o -
See overlea f fo r  d e ta ils  of JURAT) BGME COllSBTITIOH.
Source: NA WO 170/1421 6th Bn The Royal West Kents Routine Orders War Diary for March 1944
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Despite the high percentage of casualties due to shelling, many men were more terrified of 
the threat posed by mines, because there was no warning before the first explosion. Italy 
became a giant mine field ‘‘and no weapon Is uglier, for it waits in silence, small and secret, 
and it can kill any day, not only on the day of battle.106 Mine fields often accounted for 
more than one casualty: the first man to stand on one, and then his mate or the stretcher- 
bearer who would go in to rescue the first victim.107 Corporal William Virr from the 16th 
DLI said:
Mines was one of the things I dreaded most -  there were that many ingenious 
way of setting them up. ‘S’ mines especially, they were a shrapnel mine, you 
stood on that and It jumped about five feet in the air and then exploded with 
about 350 ball bearings inside. You’d really no chance, you stood on one of 
them and that was it. With a mine if you stood on it that was it -  you’d lost 
your foot or lost your life.1®
The mine known as ‘The De-bollocker’ was particularly loathed by infantrymen. It was a 
small pipe barrel about nine inches long with a bullet inside. The pipe was on a small 
platform which was put In the ground at an angle. “When you stood on it the bullet fired, 
up your leg -  and that was why it was called the ‘De-bollocker’!”109 In contrast, a small 
flesh wound could bring its own rewards. “To those In the know”, suggested an unwilling 
infantryman, “being flesh wounded, or even serious wounds were blessings in disguise. 
Flesh wounds got you out of the action usually for six to eight weeks, and could lead to 
downgrading and out of the infantry, and into a base job.” 110 A more severe wound, a 
‘Blighty’ wound, would eam the injured man repatriation back to the UK. At the very least 
a wound meant a bed with sheets and an opportunity to rest. Captain Pat Mayhew, the 5th
106 M . G e llh o m , The Pace o f War (L o n d o n : V ira g o  P re ss , 1986) p . 131
107 T a y lo r , Front-Line Nurse, p . 7 6
mm j ^ a rt>  The Heat o f Battle, p . 118
109 Ib id
110 B . M ills , One for Grandad! The Really, Realty, Real Dad’s Army (p r iv a te ly  p ro d u c e d  p a m p h le t,  n .d .) , p. 31
119
Northamptons’ intelligence officer, remembered clearly his first reactions when he was 
wounded:
Well, I’m not dead. Odd, I would have betted against my ever being hit. 
What’s wrong with my arm? I can’t feel it at all. Is it still there? (I felt with 
my right hand). Thank heaven, it moves around when I push it. I don’t think 
I’ve even broken a bone; a flesh wound and something wrong with the nerve.
I’m bound to get 48 hours rest for this -  48 hours of wonderful sleep.111
A wound could be counted on to get a soldier away from the fighting: “If you were never
wounded, you didn’t get out of the line.”112 A third wound rendered a soldier eligible for
return to the UK. The 6th Royal West Kents sent their first man home on these grounds,
one of the old members of the battalion, Sgt. Wilkins, in February 1944.113
V
The speed and efficiency of the medical services attending to casualties was vital to the 
maintenance of morale. When men were wounded they wanted to know that they would be 
treated as quickly as possible to ensure the best possible chance of recovery. Generally, 
casualties in action were dealt with immediately by the medic and the stretcher bearers. 
The wounded were then ferried back to the Regimental Aid Post, which was located quite 
close to the action. Here a doctor gave instant treatment and decided upon the severity of 
the wound. Serious cases were passed back immediately to the Advance Dressing Station, 
where they could be operated on, and to the Casualty Clearing Station where their long­
term care was decided upon. Recovery and convalescence was catered for in hospitals 
some distance from the front, sometimes in countries far away from the fighting.
111 IWM X (41).422 97/61 T.A. Buchanan, The Fifth Battalion in North Africa and Sicily, p. 29 
Recollections of Captain Pat Mayhew
112 IWM Sound Archives 12436 R. Sherlow, Reel 9
113 NA WO 170/1421 6* Bn The Royal West Kents War Diary for February 1944
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One Northampton infantryman remembered his experience at a CCS when he, and half his
platoon, were injured in Sicily:
We were evacuated by the usual route of RAP, ADS and CCS. I was operated 
on at the CCS. The operating theatre was a bam with straw on the floor. It was 
lit by shadowless lamps powered by a generator. The surgeons all wore oilskin 
aprons well splattered with blood. Italian prisoners had been pressed into 
service as stretcher bearers, for the surgeons were operating on a conveyor belt 
system. There would be one wounded man being given knock out drops and 
pre-med, one man on the operating table being seen to and a third man, having 
been operated on having his wounds dressed.114
The ADS could be very rough and ready establishments. A wounded Grenadier Guard
recalled his visit to one:
The ADS was just a stone hut with half a roof. A tarpaulin partly covered the 
entrance and kept some of the rain off the wounded who’d been left outside by 
the stretcher-bearers....
Inside the hut, the MO had a petrol fire going, boiling a pan of sooty water for 
sterilizing his instruments. His hands and face were as black as a coalminer’s 
from the petrol smoke that hadn’t escaped through the roof. When my turn 
came he gave me an injection and some sulfa tablets, tied a label to me and sent 
me off to the next ADS ..
As I staggered along I thanked my lucky stars that I wasn’t a stretcher case. I 
wasn’t relying on thirty relays of bearers to get me safely to the nearest 
ambulance, as those poor buggers lying out in the rain were.115
Unfortunately the topography of Italy mitigated against swift medical assistance for much 
of the time. Fighting in the mountains, where there were goat tracks rather than roads, 
seriously hampered medical efforts to get the injured down to an ADS. Where there were 
roads jeeps could be used, but more often than not the infantry were fighting in areas were 
roads were a luxury and casualties had to be hand-carried. The medical units were 
seriously handicapped by a shortage of personnel: casualties occurred among the fittest 
stretcher bearers, who operated in the forward areas, and the reinforcements received were
114 Ford, Battleaxe Division, p. 79
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“physically of a very poor standard and ill-suited to the task of stretcher-bearing in the 
hills.”116 Every possible avenue of additional manpower was utilised, including gunners 
from a Light Anti-Aircraft regiment, and at one time, on Monte Camino, there were 250 
RAMC and 280 non-RAMC men, in addition to the regimental stretcher-bearers, 
employed.117 In the winter of 1943/44, the terrain was so difficult that the interval between 
the time of wounding and surgical intervention sometimes extended to nearly 24 hours.118 
Although most casualties were treated more speedily, their journey down the mountains 
were often rough and ready and it was not unknown for casualties to be tipped off the 
stretchers.
The knock-on effect of fighting in mountains -  both the additional, tiring porterage duties
which were often undertaken by infantrymen temporarily out of the line, and difficulties in
evacuating the wounded -  contributed to the general exhaustion and a lowering of morale.
Everything that could be brought up was brought up -  two man bivvy’s [sic] -  
gloves - socks -  rubber soled patrol boots -  NAAFI over and above the daily 
ammunition and rations. Down the same route all casualties are evacuated.
Every few hundred yards are stretcher bearer posts, and stretcher cases are 
handed on down this line from post to post. This is the only possible system, 
and it is well organised. But it means that a man, however badly wounded, has 
to wait 14-20 hours before he can get proper treatment ,119
The 4th Division Medical services admitted that this was not the ideal scenario for men who 
needed to know that medical assistance, if they were wounded, would be prompt. Prompt 
evacuation was a necessity to maintain morale, but: “Carriage was slow. Evacuation by 
night was often impossible. Intermittent shelling of the tracks added to the difficulties of
115 IWM 87/42/1 L. Waller, Saturday 12 February 1944
116 Crew, The Army Medical Services, p. 168
117 Ibid, p. 169
118 Ibid, p. 133
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evacuation from forward RAPs .. .the time interval between wounding and operation at this 
CCS was long.”120 One injured officer from the 78th Division, whose leg was badly 
shattered by a smoke cannister, had to be lowered down the precipitous mountain side. 
After that, he said: “I have fleeting memories of a seemingly endless nightmare trip in a 
field ambulance with five other wounded men, all of us screaming for water, of which there 
was none.”121 Many of the casualties, wounded in the mountain and brought down by mule 
and jeep were “in a very sorry state by the time nurses removed their field dressings and 
cleaned them up.”122
The evacuation of casualties was just as difficult over the winter of 1944/45. The 46th
Division ADMS noted in December that:
Bad weather and bad roads cause extremely serious evacuation difficulties. All 
roads in Div area are closed from 0800-1400hrs and from 2000-0200hrs. Even 
during open periods there are frequent blocks. The rule is not relaxed for 
ambulance cases, consequently casualties are being held for long periods at the 
A.D.S., jeopardizing the lives of many. It is anticipated that priority cases will 
die.123
56th Division echoed the concern felt at the problems of evacuation:
ADMS ordered a check-up of number of deaths in A.D.P. and R.A.P.S of 169 
Bde during this battle. The route of evacuation was so bad that cases were 
taking up to 14 hours and probably was the cause of the small number of 
abdominal cases reaching the F.D.S.124
The Guards Brigade was on Monte Battaglia in October, 1944. Its time there was,
according to the 1st Guards Brigade history:
119 NA WO 170/1347 2nd Bn Coldstream Guards War Diary for February 1944 Appendix
120 NA WO 177/378 Medical Diary -  ADMS 4th Division March 1944
121 Ford, Battleaxe Division, p. 156
122 Taylor, Front-Line Nurse, p. 177
123 NA WO 177/394 Medical Diary -  ADMS 46th Division December 1944
124 NA WO 177/414 Medical Diary -  ADMS 56® Division December 1944
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...the most unpleasant of any experienced by the Brigade since we held the 
Garigliano bridgehead last winter. In addition to the almost continuous enemy 
fire (which killed 12 men and wounded over 20 on the nights of the relief 
alone), our troops had to endure torrential rain-storms, which were quite 
unprecedented in that part of Italy.125
A causeway was the only possible approach to the Guards’ positions, “A veritable knife-
edge, so narrow that in places it was only possible to stand with feet astride upon it,
registered by enemy mortars and swept by gales of driving rain. But the greatest enemy by
far was the mud,” wrote the Brigade historian. He continued:
As there was only one track, in use by 150 mules and 100 men night after night, 
its surface became a knee-deep glutinous morass, which only a month of 
unbroken sunshine would dry it. Once the surface had been liquified, a mule’s 
spindly leg, digging deeply in with each step, was a sure way of making the 
quagmire almost bottomless.
It can well be imagined how difficult it was to evacuate casualties from the 
forward companies. We had 200 men from an Italian Pioneer Company, in 
addition to our own stretcher-bearers, strung out at 400 yard intervals along the 
causeway, but in spite of the limited distance which each stretcher party had to 
cover, a casualty would normally take three and a half hours for the three mile 
journey from the Castle to the ADS near Valmaggiore.126
In October 1944 the 1st Division ADMS had several general points to make about the
evacuation of casualties from the mountains, particularly with reference to the use of mules:
The magic words “mule litters” often cause a false impression and lead 
individuals to think that they are the be-all and end-all for evacuation of 
casualties in mountain warfare. Their use is very strictly limited and in this 
formation they have been rather looked upon in the nature of an insurance.
There is no doubt that evacuation by this method is uncomfortable -  far more 
uncomfortable than on a jeep with properly fitted stretcher gear.
They are as wide as a jeep and taking it on the whole -  where a mule with two 
litters can go -  so can a jeep. If muddy conditions make it impassable to a jeep 
-  so more often than not does it do similarly for a laden mule.




Down steep irregular and precipitous slopes the jolting progress of a mule 
makes it extremely uncomfortable, hazardous and terrifying to the casualties.
When casualties are large in number -  carries are long -  jeeps are unsuitable -  
and manpower in stretcher bearers is limited -  then mules must be used. With 
few casualties there is no doubt whatsoever that hand carriage is infinitely 
superior in every way.127
Unfortunately hand carriage, especially at times when casualties were mounting up, meant 
bringing up “resting” battalions as porters and stretcher bearers, to release all the men of 
“active” battalions for battle. Over and above the potential for casualties among the 
“resting” battalions during their porterage duties, they also had to contend with morale- 
sapping exhaustion.
The advances in medical treatment, especially the introduction of penicillin, undoubtedly 
cut mortality rates which might otherwise had equalled those of the First World War. 
Denis Forman, who had had his leg amputated at Cassino, wrote: “I was lucky ... that as 
septicaemia spread up my limb, I had access to plasma and penicillin. Penicillin was new. 
There was only enough for a few dozen cases, and as an officer of field rank I was one of 
those who got it. Other ranks died.”128 An army nurse recalled: “We called it gold dust 
then. We could see it was going to alter the whole treatment of the wounded and save 
millions of lives...This first variety of penicillin was in powder form. Injections came 
later. It was placed in a ‘sterile gun’ and puffed into the wound. At first it was used 
sparingly, but later everyone had it. No more gas gangrene -  the dread of the wounded.”129
127 NA WO 177/375 Medical Diary -  ADMS 1st Division October 1944 p. 5
128 Forman, To Reason Why, p. 190
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Penicillin was one of the items which could be freely bought on the black market which 
flourished in Italy, but which were in short supply in the Army itself in the first half of 
1944. Every sick civilian could go to a pharmacist and get a course of penicillin injections 
at a time when supplies in the military hospitals were about to run out. “At last the time 
has come when the effect of the black market on the war effort has become evident” 
recorded the man charged with investigating the penicillin racket in Naples in May of that 
year.130 Penicillin did, however, become more readily available as the campaign 
continued.
VI
It is extremely difficult to judge to what extent the casualty rate had a detrimental effect on 
morale. There are certain indicators to suggest that its influence was limited for at least the 
first half of the campaign. Firstly, despite the high casualty rates in specific battles, and the 
steady rate of attrition amongst infantrymen while maintaining the line, the number of self- 
inflicted wounds, used as a measure of low morale, does not point to degrading fighting 
spirit. On May 19th 1945, GHQ 2nd Echelon, CMF reported that since September 3rd 1943, 
one officer and 49 ORs had been charged with having deliberately wounded themselves. It 
is almost certain that the official figures are an understatement of the real figure, but diary 
entries and oral records present a mixed picture of the extent of the problem. At Anzio, 
getting away from the beachhead was so important for some that they were driven to 
shooting themselves. Raleigh Trevelyan recalled how his wireless operator, on the way out 
on patrol, panicked and deliberately shot himself in the foot.131 Other men would 
deliberately shoot off their trigger finger -  a sign that they had been stretched too far.132
130 Lewis, Naples ’44, pp. 135-9
131 Trevelyan, Rome ’44, p. 279
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One infantryman recalled how, on the way to Italy, “one man had died unaccountably on
board from a bullet from his own rifle and another had shot himself in the foot.”133 The
same man wrote about another self-inflicted wound:
.. .A mobile canteen, manned by a kinswoman of General Sir Oliver Leese, had 
visited us. This was always a bad sign, well recognised by the men, for it had 
often meant in the past that we were soon to be in battle. Soon afterwards a 
sten gun stuttered and a man was found to have a self-inflicted wound in his 
mouth.134
Such men were probably diagnosed as “bomb happy” and seen by a psychiatrist. Not
every case of self-inflicted injury, however, was driven by fatigue or shell shock:
A chap I shared a dug-out with said to me “It shall not be long before I’m in 
Blighty”. I told him perhaps it wouldn’t be long before we would all be there. 
Within forty eight hours he had shot himself in the foot. At first it was as 
though he felt no pain, but soon he was screaming and he was carted off to 
hospital. As I was the only witness I had to describe what happened. I said that 
he had his rifle cocked ready for action, the trigger caught in a twig and caused 
the rifle to shoot him. My story was accepted and the people at the enquiry 
expressed their sympathy to the “unfortunate” soldier who was dispatched to 
Blighty.135
There is no way of knowing how many cases of self-inflicted wounds were never reported. 
Some, like the case above, were undoubtedly glossed over by fellow soldiers. One recalled 
that a friend
shot himself in the thigh. A lot of soldiers at that time were carrying lugers, 
picked up off the POWs, and the story goes, I didn’t see it happen, that he had it 
in his pocket and it inadvertently went of and, of course, being in his pocket in 
the first place it hits in his thigh, and a Luger carried a 9mm shell like a Sten 
gun, so it makes quite a hole. But of course the end product is that if you go 
away to a hospital and get sheets and blankets, something to be revered. I think 
he may have [done it deliberately] to be tactful.136
133 IWM 81/5/1 N.J. Fnskney, Chapter 1, p. 8
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Equally, units might have neglected to report such incidents for the sake of a battalion’s 
reputation. One private in the 16th Durham Light Infantry agreed that “there were cases of 
it,” but acknowledged “it wasn’t common.”137 John Renshaw, as a surgeon at Anzio, 
would have been in a good position to see the results of self-inflicted wounds, but he wrote 
that the only run of such wounds he saw in Italy were among Cypriot muleteers.138
Not all cases of self-inflicted wounds were brought about by fear. One soldier was so fed 
up one wet night, with an unending round of moving forward and starting to dig in, only to 
be ordered to move forward again, that he told his mates that if he had to move again, that 
was the last straw.
Well, we did get the order to move again, so he picked up the 2” Mortar, which 
has a spayed based plate on it, put his hand on a rock, gave it a wack and 
smashed his hand. Then the word came round, ‘dig in, we’re in the position 
we’re going to be in’, so we wouldn’t have moved again anyway. He came 
back to the battalion, but his hand was one hell of a mess.139
A low incidence of self-inflicted wounds does not in itself, of course, indicate high morale, 
merely that few men were driven to the extreme of injuring themselves to avoid front line 
duty. Evidence from the Italian campaign would also seem to suggest that it is difficult to 
draw any firm conclusion about the morale of front-line troops from the number of 
casualties: the effect of the casualty rate on desertion was not straight-forward, certainly 
during the first half of the campaign. Diana Butler, an official war historian, drew up a list 
of weekly offences in British infantry divisions, including desertion and AWOL, set against 
the casualty rates during the first few months of 1944 in her study of British soldiers in
137 Private James Corr, 16* Durham Light Infantry, in P. Hart, Heat o f Battle, p. 165
138 Renshaw, Memoirs of An Army Surgeon, p. 237
139 IWM Sound Archives 16593 T. Chadwick, Reel 5
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Italy. The ratio of desertions and AWOL to casualties for each division during operations 
periods has been extrapolated from the figures:
Table 2.8
Comparison of Divisional Weekly Offences with Battle Casualties Suffered140
Jannary-Jyne, 1944 
(Taken from Summaries in CMG GHO 2nd Ech WDs)
Ist DIVISION:
Date









Battle Casualties Ratio of Deserters/ 











Ratio of Deserters/ 
AWOL to 
Casualties
Jan21-Feb 11 4 0 4 0
Feb 18-March 24 Garigliano 28 66 1 2
March 31 - 5 17 1 3
April 7-April 21 North of Cassino 16 184 1 11
April 28-May 12 Cassino Town 16 187 1 11
May 19: Assault 10 1628 1 163
May 26-June 2 - 25 272 1 11
5th DIVISION




Ratio of Deserters/ 
AWOL to 
Casualties
Jan 7-Jan 14 Moving 12 45 1:4
Jan 21-March 3 Garigliano 98 2432 1:25
March 10-May 19 Anzio 317 1959 1:6
May 26-June 2 To Rome 22 948 1.43
46th DIVISION:




Ratio of Deserters/ 
AWOL to 
Casualties
Jan 7-Jan 14 
Jan 21
Jan 28-Feb 4 
Feb 11-March 3 




















140 Extrapolated from figures given in NA CAB 101/224 “The British Soldier in Italy”
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56™ DIVISION




Ratio of Deserters/ 
AWOL to 
Casualties
Jan 7-14 Coastal Sector 71 173 1:2
Jan 21-28 Garigliano 79 1120 1:14
Feb 4-March 10 Anzio 132 4167 1:32
March 17-April 21 
Left Theatre
" 185 73 3:1
78™ DIVISION:




Ratio of Deserters/ 
AWOL to 
Casualties
Jan 7-Feb 4 Mountain 81 25 3:1
Feb 11-March 17 Moving/Training 207 79 3:1
March 24-April 28 Rapido Valley 137 548 1:4
May 5-12 Leave/Training 65 - -
May 19-June 2 Division Forward 87 964 1:11
From this it can be seen that a direct correlation between high casualty rates and desertion 
is tenuous. In Diana Butler’s weekly totals, on which Table 2.8 is based, figures indicate 
that there were 10 absentees in 4th Division during the week ending May 19th, when 
casualties were 1,628. That was just two more absentees than the previous week, when 
there were just 21 casualties. In 5th Division there were 10 absentees set against 1,518 
casualties for the week of January 28th, when the previous week there had been 48 
absentees and 26 casualties. Among the more long-serving divisions there seems to be a 
greater correlation between high desertion rates and moving into battle. Men did not 
normally desert when they were in the front line. They deserted when they were ordered to 
go back to the front. As can be seen from Table 2.8, 56th Division’s desertion/AWOL was 
highest just before the division left Cassino for Anzio and in 78th Division desertions were 
highest when it was training. 78th Division suffered from high desertion rates during the 
whole of the Italian campaign, yet their casualty rate was the lowest:
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Figure 2.9




46th Division: 609 10055
56th Division: 861 14827
78th Division: 367 6082
Average: 595 10,155
A far more persuasive argument than a direct link between desertion and casualty rates in
lowering morale is the correlation between the length of time in line/fighting experience
and desertion. 78th Division, for instance, had been involved in “tricky hill fighting” in
Tunisia and Sicily and was then in continuous contact with the enemy from the beginning
of November 1943.142 56th Division was engaged in difficult fighting on M. Camino and
the Garigliano assault, and was then moved, one brigade at a time, to Anzio. The time in
line correlation breaks down with 4th Division, but:
The explanation may lie in the unhappy early history of the Division. After the 
cancellation of the Crotone assault it lost its Commander (General 
Hakwesworth) and was more or less used as an expendable force for plugging 
gaps and supplying unskilled labour; 1,500 infantrymen were ordered away as 
reinforcements, another 1,000 men were set to work in the docks. Its tank 
brigade was detached and when it was given a third brigade (28 Infantry) it was 
of only two battalions and had seen no active service, having spent all the war 
in Gibraltar.143
There is even evidence that morale could be at its peak when casualties were at their 
highest - at Anzio, in particular. There, by January 31st 1944 the 1st Division had suffered 
2,100 casualties.144 Amongst them was a large part of the 2nd Bn Sherwood Foresters,
141 NA WO 106/3975 AFHQ, Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff ‘Operations of 15th Army Group’, 3 January 
1945
142 NA CAB 101/224 “The British Soldier in Italy”, p. 37
143 Ibid, p. 38
144 Molony, The Mediterranean and Middle East, Vol. V, pp. 676-7
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which was reduced to just 258 all ranks.145 The American General Harmon went to the
Sherwood’s position:
I had never seen so many dead men in one place. They lay so close together 
that I had to step with care. I shouted for the commanding officer. From a 
foxhole there arose a mud-covered sergeant with a handle-bar moustache. He 
was the highest ranking officer still alive. He stood stiffly to attention. “How’s 
it going?” I asked. The answer was all round me. “Well, sir,” the sergeant said, 
“there were a hundred and sixteen of us when we first came up, and there are 
sixteen of us left. We’re ordered to hold out till sundown, and I think, with a 
little good fortune, we can manage to do so.”146
On February 4th the King’s Shropshire Light Infantry reported that “confidence pervaded 
the Bn” and that following orders that the ground which had been won was to be held at all 
costs, “the fighting went on all day and in no phase did the K.S.L.I. give ground.”147 Nor 
was there any feeling of defeatism among the front-line troops. All German formations 
referred to tough Allied resistance during their February offensive.148 A Grenadier officer 
went round his platoons just before they were overrun in the German offensive of February 
11th-15th:
After telling one of the few old soldiers still left, a lance-corporal, that artillery 
support was coming and that a counter-attack was expected at any moment, the 
latter looked quizzically at his platoon commander. “Well, it’s very nice of you 
to say that, Sir, but there ain’t no — artillery, is there?” “No, I don’t think there 
is, really,” came the reply. “And there ain’t no — counter-attack, is there, Sir?” 
“Well, probably not actually just yet,” the platoon commander answered. “Oh 
... well, Sir, it’s very nice of you to speak to us. Don’t worry, we’ll go on 
sitting here,” patting his bren gun as he spoke.149
One reason here may have been the circumscribed, concentrated nature of the beachhead
where the misery was shared by all equally.
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146 Trevelyan, Rome '44, p. 77, and Vaughan-Thomas, Anzio, p. 103
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VII
Though there does not seem to have been an immediate link between the number of 
casualties and poor morale, high casualty rates undoubtedly had an influence on the 
bellicosity of front-line soldiers in two ways. Firstly, high casualties in individual 
battalions, particularly among officers, destroyed the organizational cohesion and 
leadership functions, to the detriment of morale. Secondly, the influence of casualties on 
morale had a cumulative effect over time. Most British soldiers were fighting not for King 
and Country but for their mates. Over time, the death or injury of mates and the continuing 
fear of being wounded themselves nibbled away at every soldier’s thirst for battle, if, 
indeed, they had ever had it in the first place. The longer a division was in the line, the 
more casualties it suffered, the more they were forced to acknowledge their mortality, 
especially if the number of casualties in a single operation was particularly high. Alec 
Bowlby recalled that when his company moved up the Line on January 1st 1945, it was 
missing 11 deserters, mostly from ‘C’ Company, who were Tossignano survivors.150 At 
Tossignano, during the night of December 12th/ 13th 1944, part of the support barrage had 
fallen on ‘C’ Company, killing or wounding a whole platoon.151
Equally, men who had been wounded once became far more cautious with their own lives, 
less rash in battle. ‘There’s nothing like a bullet wound or a shrapnel wound to knock the 
idea, once and for all, out of a man’s head that he’s somehow different, that mutilation, or 
death are rather more for others than for himself,” wrote one survivor.152 As time went by, 
men became less keen to put themselves in a position where they could become the next
150 Bowlby, The Recollections of Rifleman Bowlby, p. 204
151 Ibid, p. 199
152 IWM 85/18/1 C.R. Framp, p. 128
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statistic, particularly as they knew the war was coming to an end. One NCO recalled that 
“always at the back of your mind is the thought ‘Am I going to be killed.”153 In similar 
vein, an officer said: “Everyone I knew had been killed and it weighs on your mind that 
your time is coming.”154 The longer the campaign dragged on, the greater the impact of 
casualties on morale.
153 IWM Sound Archives 10421 L. Thornton, Reel 21




Reinforcements were a vital component in buoying up the spirits of fighting men. “Men 
become tired of war, and armies which are always in action tire as well,” wrote John 
Baynes, in his seminal work Morale. He added: “The only way they avoid this process is 
be being replenished with new men. The unpleasant truth is that heavy losses lead to big 
reinforcements of fresh men.”1 The speed with which the battalions were reinforced with 
an infusion of fresh young men who had not yet been wounded and who would, in 
principle, exhibit a keener fighting spirit, could be extremely beneficial to a unit’s morale.2 
The sad fact about the Italian campaign, however, is that there were no big reinforcements 
of fresh men. Even by the start of the Sicily campaign the British Army was in a parlous 
position with regard to reinforcements.3 “Whatever criticisms may be made against them, 
the Allied Commanders in Italy cannot be accused of hoarding their capital for they never 
had any capital to hoard,” commented Eric Linklater.4
It is not true to say that there were no reinforcements; there were, but never enough. Before 
looking at what measures the Army introduced to try to ameliorate the situation, it is 
worthwhile examining the reinforcements situation to gauge the level of infantry manpower 
deprivations; then how the Army tackled the shortfall; and the resultant influence on 
morale.
1 Baynes, Morale, p. 101
2 NA WO 222/1494 The Campaign for Sicily, p. 12
3 NA WO 231/14 Operations in Sicily: Notes on the Campaign, Operation and Administrative Reports, 
9 December 1943, Notes by Col. T.N. Grazebrook, 8
4 Linklater, The Campaign in Italy, p. 159
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The reinforcements shortage was particularly acute in the Infantry: “ ... there was never 
enough infantry to go where the tanks could not, a reversion to the false doctrine that 
infantry was outdated, an anachronism, whose function had been usurped by the 
mechanised juggernauts of air and land, the aeroplane and the tank,” wrote one Italian 
campaign officer.5 This view was echoed by the Commander, 1st Division, when he noted 
“... infantry bns still short. ‘No rifle coys, no nothing’ -  this simple truth has escaped 
emphasis the whole war.”6 Sicily and Italy brought home one indisputable truth: Infantry 
was the decisive arm on the battlefield and mechanization was no substitute for manpower. 
Yet British commanders persisted in thinking of Armour as a decisive attacking arm.7 To 
what extent the pre-war belief in Armour still affected infantry reinforcement levels by 
1943 as against a general shortage of manpower after over four years of war is impossible 
to assess. Whatever the cause, the result was the same.
By the end of the Sicilian campaign in August 1943, 265 officer and 6,380 OR 
reinforcements had been sent to Sicily.8 This was set against the total Eighth Army 
casualty figures for Sicily of 2,062 killed, 7,137 wounded and 2,643 missing in action.9 
This shortfall was to remain a permanent feature of the whole Italian campaign, and fell 
disproportionately heavily on infantry battalions. 5th Division had a fighting strength of 
1,0% officers and 20,437 ORs on September 5th. By September 16th the figures had gone 
down to 894 and 17348 respectively, and on October 10th there were 830 officers and
5 IWM 90/29/1 Capitain J.B. Tomlinson, Vol. II, p. 128
6 LHCMA, Penny Papers 8/33 Notes by Comd 1 Div, 21 April 1944
7 Molony, The Mediterranean and Middle East, Vol. V, p. 852
8 NA WO 204/6627 Analysis of Inf Rfts supplied to or to be supplied to HUSKY by Mideast & BNAF, 18 
August 1943
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16,466 ORs. The Division received reinforcements and by the end of October there were 
960 officers and 19,714 ORs. But by the end of the year the fighting strength had again 
been depleted, with a complement of only 782 officers and 16,173 ORs.10 78th Division 
seems to have fared slightly better before it arrived in Italy: on September 19th it was 
reinforced up to a fighting strength of 826 officers and 17,988 ORs (from 769 officers and 
15,615 ORs on September 5th), but lost so many men in September that there were only 615 
officers and 13,862 ORs left on October 3rd. One 78th Division battalion, the 2nd Lancashire 
Fusiliers, was 201 men below strength (including sick and missing) on October 8th, and 
received two officer and 27 OR reinforcements on October 12th.11 78th Division was 
reinforced to a level of 1,133 officers and 23,746 ORs at the beginning of November, only 
to go down to 783 officers and 16,987 men at the beginning of December. By the end of 
the year the Division’s strength stood at 927 officers and 19,227 ORs.12 Lack of 
reinforcements was one the reasons the Mt. Camino attack by X Corps was called off on 
November 15th 1943.13 Between October 7th and November 15th there were approximately 
3,OCX) casualties in X Corps.14 At Mt. Taborra the leading company of the 2/5th Queens was 
reduced to one officer and eight men (out of 120).15 Of the 483 Grenadier Guards who 
went up Camino, only 263 returned.16 General Clark informed Alexander that continuing 
the operation might so deplete the 56th Division “that it would be non-operational for a 
considerable period. This division was under strength at the start of the Italian campaign 
and its subsequent losses especially in officers and Non Commissioned Officers have been
9 S.E Morison, Sicily-Salerno-Anzio (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1984) p. 223
10 NA WO 169/8521 ‘A’ Branch, Main HQ, 8th Army War Diaries for September-December 1943
11 NA WO 169/10251 2nd Bn The Lancashire Fusiliers War Diary for October 1943
12 NA WO 169/8521 ‘A’ Branch, Main HQ, 8th Army War Diaries for September-December 1943
13 Crew, The Army Medical Services, p. 141
14 Molony, The Mediterranean and Middle East, Vol. V, p. 454
15 Bowlby, Countdown to Cassino, p. 25
16 Ibid, p. 70
137
heavy. It has been in action since September 9^. Supply of reinforcements has not
equalled losses.”17 One veteran has suggested that “had there been a fresh division behind
the 56th on the Garigliano, the enemy might have been dislodged even without the threat to
his communications” [the landing at Anzio].18 Journalist Christopher Buckley also
bemoaned the lack of manpower.
One cannot know all the circumstances which resulted in the bright promise of 
the spring and summer being dissipated in the winter shambles around Ortona 
and Cassino. What is abundantly clear is that when the hour of opportunity 
struck, the British and Americans did not possess the necessary forces with 
which to exploit it. The ‘tide in the affairs of men’ was upon them, but they 
failed to take it at the flood.19
There were no fresh divisions, nor enough men to reinforce the existing divisions. In 
January 1944, 5th, 46th and 56th Divisions received 219 reinforcements against a requirement 
of 4,686.20 On February 18th 1944 three 1st Division battalions, the 6th Gordons, the 1st 
Loyals and the 2nd N. Staffs, were each over 300 ORs short. The other battalions in the 
Division were all short of between 150 and 300 men. Officer deficiencies ranged from six 
to 21 (the latter in the 2nd Sherwood Foresters) and high officer deficiencies, as already 
noted, were detrimental to morale. There were no reinforcements en route from training 
depots or under orders at the Reinforcement Training Depots. In 5th Division deficiencies 
were less, although the 2nd Inniskillings recorded a shortage of 14 officers and 145 ORs. In 
46th Division the battalions were short of anything from six officers and 15 men (6th York 
& Lancs) to 18 officers and 181 men (1/4* Hamps). Deficiencies in the 56th and 78th 
Divisions were similar. The only reinforcements available in Italy the week ending 
February 18th 1944 were one officer and 92 ORs for the 2/611 Queens; nine ORs for the 2/7th
17 NA WO 214/25 Alexander Papers: Italian Campaign -  Progress of OPERATIONS BAYTOWN and 
AVALANCHE, 13 November 1943
18 Northcote Parkinson, Always A Fusilier, p. 156
19 Buckley, The Road To Rome, p. 187
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Queens (56th Division) and four officers and 110 ORs for the Irish Brigade (78th Division).21 
On May 12th there were no Infantry reinforcements either en route from Reinforcement 
Training Depots or under orders at Reinforcements Training Depots for any British 
Division.22
Before Anzio the 1st Division battalions were made up to full strength or almost full 
strength for the coming confrontation. The Irish Guards, whose War Establishment at the 
beginning of 1944 was 36 officers and 817 Other Ranks, had 36 officers and 820 ORs on 
January 22nd.23 The 2nd North Staffordshires (2nd Brigade), whose War Establishment was 
36 officers and 809 ORs, had 28 officers and 793 ORs.24 The 3rd Brigade’s 1st Duke of 
Wellington’s Battalion (War Establishment 36 officers and 809 ORs) landed 33 officers 
and 806 ORs.25 The worst-off battalion in terms of manpower before Anzio was the 2nd Bn 
The Sherwood Foresters, whose War Establishment was 36 officers and 809 ORs but which 
could only muster 33 officers and 744 ORs on January 15th -  totals which rose, however, to 
38 officers and 792 ORs by January 29th.26 Soon after the landing losses reached around 
50% of the battalions, but, when they were desperately needed, there were few 
reinforcements available. Anzio was supposed to relieve pressure on the Cassino front, but 
instead, battalions had to be shifted from Cassino to Anzio to bolster the depleted 1st 
Division. This was far from ideal. The reinforcements were exhausted, and exhausted men 
did not have high morale. 168th Brigade was normally part of 56th Division and had been 
fighting with the 5th Army on the Garigliano Front up until January 26th. One of the
20 Molony, The Mediterranean and Middle East, Vol. V, pp. 602-3
21 NA WO 170/41 CMF Allied Forces Italy, GHQ 2nd Echelon War Diary for February 1944
22 NA WO 170/44 CMF Allied Forces Italy, GHQ 2nd Echelon War Diary for May-June 1944
23 NA WO 170/1354 Is* Bn Irish Guards War Diary for January 1944
24 NA WO 170/1487 2nd Bn The North Staffordshire Regiment War Diary for January 1944
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Brigade’s battalions, the 1st Bn London Irish Rifles, had been in the line there for 26 days 
without a break.27 Another, the 10th Bn Royal Berkshires, had been part of the attacking 
force on Point 411 [a First Battle of Cassino objective] on January 24th and company 
strengths after that action were: ‘A’ -  four officers and 48 ORs: ‘B’ -  two officers and 38 
ORs; *C* -  three officers and 38 ORs; and ‘D’ -  just 37 ORs, when a company was usually 
composed of some 120 men.28 In the last few days of January the three battalions received 
reinforcements: the 1st Bn London Scottish had an approximate strength of 729 men on 
February 3rd, and the 10th Royal Berks arrived with 740 men, four of whom became 
casualties the first day.29 Many of the newly-arrived men were soon to become casualties. 
By February 8th the Adjutant of the 10th Royal Berks estimated the strength of the battalion 
to be 15 officers and 340 ORs, and on February 12th the battalion reorganised into one rifle
■ancompany.
On February 24th three fresh British battalions, the 18th Infantry Brigade, arrived at Azio to 
replace the exhausted and shattered Guards Brigade of 1st Division. The Guards, who could 
only be reinforced by guardsmen, had no more reinforcements available and were therefore 
a totally spent force. All five regiments of the Brigade of Guards in Italy were re-organised 
and re-grouped in February 1944 due to a shortage of reinforcement. On March 12th, 
following hard on the heels of 18th Infantry Brigade, 5th Division landed to replace 56th 
Division. 5th Division had left the UK in March 1942 and having been stationed in India,
25 NA WO 170/1382 1st Bn The Duke of Wellington’s Regiment War Diary for January 1944
26 NA WO 170/1475 2nd Bn The Sherwood Foresters War Diary for January 1944
27 NA WO 170/1432 1st Bn The London Irish Rifles War Diary for January 1944
28 NA WO 170/1365 10* Bn The Royal Berkshire Regiment War Diary for January 1944
29 NA WO 170/1434 1st Bn The London Scottish War Diary for February 1944; NA WO 170/1365 10* Bn 
The Royal Berkshire Regiment War Diary for February 1944
30 NA WO 170/1365 10* Bn The Royal Berkshire Regiment War Diary for February 1944
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Persia, Iraq, Syria, and then Egypt, took part in the landing on Sicily and all subsequent 
operations in Italy.
The reinforcements for Anzio, therefore, such as they were, came in in dribs and drabs, 
after they were really needed, and always in insufficient numbers to do what was required. 
But by the time the battalions had broken out of the bridgehead and arrived in Rome, their 
strength was once again almost up to War Establishment.
Figure 3.1
Strength of British Infantry battalions pre- and post-Anzio31
Ist DIVISION:
Battalion Strength on Januarv 22th Strength on June 10th
Officers ORs Officers ORs
2nd Bn North Staffs: 28 793 27 750
6th Bn Gordon Highlanders: 32 785 34 762
1st Bn Duke of Wellingtons: 33 806 34 764
5™ DIVISION
Battalion Strength on March 12th Strength on June 10th
Officers ORs Officers ORs
1st Bn York & Lancs: 38 700 29 703
2nd Bn Northants: 27 691 35 743
6th Bn Seaforth Highlanders: 32 629 28 717
So great was the shortage of reinforcements in infantry battalions by February IS
was decided that they would not be reinforced beyond a battle strength of 26 officers and 
700 ORs, although every effort would be made to maintain battalions at a high strength.32 
In March the expedient was officially adopted in the Mediterranean theatre of reducing the
31 Figures taken from War Diaries NA WO 170/1487 2nd Bn The North Staffordshire Regiment;
NA WO 170/1394 6th Bn The Gordon Highlanders; and NA WO 170/1382 1st Bn The Duke of Wellington’s 
Regiment; NA WO 170/1490 1st Bn The York & Lancaster Regiment; NA WO 170/1445 2nd Bn The 
Northamptonshire Regiment; and NA WO 170/1474 6* Bn The Seaforth Highlanders
32 NA WO 204/6627 Reinforcements Policy August 1943-March 1944 Letter from the Chief of General 
Staff, 20 February 1944
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establishments of infantry battalions from 844 all ranks to 726.33 It was the drain on 
manpower that was to lay at the heart of all morale problems in the second half of 1944. 
The number of British reinforcements arriving in Italy, from January-December of that 
year, according to figures given in the extant Minutes of the DAG’s Fortnighty 
Conferences, were:
Figure 3.2
No. of British reinforcements am
Conference Date: Officers ORs
January 11 371 8,135
February 8: 403 8,562
February 22: 270 998
March 9: 312 3,690
March 21: 235 3,747
April 4: 129 1,473
April 18: 557 11,128
May 2: 193 1,216
May 16: 175 791
June 13: 127 1,240
June 27: 228 1,407
August 15: 68 735
August 29: 141 1,181
September 12: 438 2,909
September 28: 145 1,664
October 5: 64 1,151
October 19: 351 2,131
November 2: 169 2,165
November 22: 268 873
December 5: 400 2,674
December 13: 126 503
Totals (11 months): 5,170 58,373
There are no records for the DAG Fortnightly Conferences in July, the month GHQ moved 
to Italy, but 2nd Echelon records the following reinforcements “expected in theatre or 
arrived but not yet T.O.S.” [Taken on Strength] during July. As can be seen from the 
percentages in Tables 3.3 and 3.4, very few were destined for the Infantry.
33 Molony, The Mediterranean and Middle East, Vol. V, p. 423
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Figure 3.3
Percentage of Infantry Reinforcements from Total Arriving in Italy in July 194435
Date: Total Total Infantry Infantry Percentage
Officers ORs Officers ORs Off ORs
July 10: 205 2,619 38 305 19% 12%
July 17: 504 5,227 95 394 19% 8%
July 31: 493 4,779 170 1,297 35% 27%
A lack of infantry replacements was evident later in the campaign as well:
Figure 3.4
Reinforcements Arrived But Not Yet T.O.S. or Expected by the Following Dates36
Date: Total Total Infantry Infantry Infantry
Rfts Rfts Rfts Rfts Percentage
Officers ORs Officers ORs Off ORs
1944:
October 4: 289 2,693 30 369 10% 14%
December 16: 512 2,577 46 432 9% 17%
1945:
February 10: 372 2,494 69 840 19% 34%
March 10: 283 1963 19 193 7% 10%
Battle casualties alone for the 16 months from September 3rd 1943 to December 30th 1944 
amounted to 5,747 officers and 80,247 ORs.37 It might appear, therefore, on paper, that 
reinforcements were keeping up with casualties. However, as the figures for July, and later 
in the campaign, indicate, very few of these reinforcements were intended for the Infantry, 
where the real need lay.
34 Figures taken from NA WO 170/1 Gl(Br) AFHQ War Diary for January-March 1944 DAG Fortnightly 
Conferences
35 NA WO 170/45 CMF Allied Forces Italy, GHQ 2nd Echelon War Diary for July 1944 Reinforcements 
Expected in Italy but Not Yet T.O.S. Appendix ‘B’ for 10 July, 17 July and 31 July 1944
36 Figures taken from NA WO 170/49 CMF Allied Forces Italy, GHQ 2nd Echelon, War Diary for October 
1944 Reinforcements Statistics, Appendix H, 4 October; NA WO 170/51 CMF Allied Forces Italy, GHQ 2nd 
Echelon War Diaiy for December 1944 Reinforcement Statistics, Appendix H, 20 December;
NA WO 170/4126 CMF Allied Forces Italy, GHQ 2nd Echelon War Diary for February 1945 Reinforcement 
Statistics, Appendix H, 14 February; NA WO 170/4127 CMF Allied Forces Italy, GHQ 2nd Echelon 
War Diary for March 1945 Reinforcement Statistics, Appendix H, 14 March




A major problem with regard to reinforcements was not just the quantity, but also the 
quality. Normally the infusion of fresh blood into a battalion was a morale-builder, 
bringing untried courage and enthusiasm into a group of war-weary men. The veterans, in 
their turn, would teach the newcomers the realities of front-line life. This was not the case 
at Anzio. Many experienced men were lost, although often temporarily, as wastage there 
exceeded estimates by more than 100%.38 Not that this was a new phenomenon. In Sicily, 
Major Sym (2nd Seaforth Highlanders) noted that the marked preponderance of 
inexperienced troops over the veterans made him realise how extensively the Eighth Army 
had been reinforced throughout and after the North African campaign.39 In November 1943 
the X Corps Commander had noted that “In certain cases, reinforcements, particularly 
Medical and Infantry, are arriving in an unfit condition, and of low medical category.”40 
There was an incident in 78th Division towards the end of 1944 when one platoon of the 
East Surreys refused to attack.41 This battalion had only a small number of its seasoned 
veterans remaining.
At Anzio the veterans were replaced by “green” soldiers. According to the Deputy 
Assistant Director of Army Psychiatry, Anzio was not suitable for “green” recruits and the 
mismanagement of reinforcements had a damaging effect on individual and group morale 42 
There were no opportunities for men to get to know each other, and train together. This 
meant that there was no time to build up any esprit de corps, or indeed, in some cases, even
38 Molony, The Mediterranean and Middle East, Vol. V, p. 423
39 LHCMA W/C 20/9 Major Munroe Sym, 2nd Bn Seaforth Highlanders, Part III, p. 23
40 NA WO 204/6627 Reinforcements Policy Memo from Commander X Corps to G1 (Br) AFHQ, 10 
November 1943
41 LHCMA (GB99KLCMA) General Sir Sidney Kirkman Letter, 23 December 1944
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any small group cohesion, so essential for morale. A corporal in the 1st King’s Shropshire 
Light Infantry (1st Division), noted in his diary that the first event of note at Anzio “was the 
arrival of reinforcements, our first since leaving Africa. They are all of them youngsters 
direct from Blighty. Poor devils, they do not realise what is ahead of them but will soon 
learn.”43 Some never got the chance. Often new drafts were sent to the front as soon as 
they arrived.44 Several recruits from the Black Watch were sent to the Sherwood Foresters. 
“The officers arrived in the dark, we had to send them out on patrol that night because we 
had no one else to go out, and they were all killed in the night, and none of us saw them in 
daylight. It was tragic.”45 In another incident at the Fortress, a particularly dangerous 
position in the Anzio ‘wadi’ system: “All the recruits were completely raw and very 
young, with no battle experience. Less than a day after their arrival they had to be flung 
straight into the attack, with disastrous consequence.”46
Throughout the Italian Campaign the 16th Durham Light Infantry, at least, took a proactive 
approach, wherever possible, to try to avoid their new reinforcements becoming early 
casualties. “In my company we had a buddy boy system, where each chappie who came 
who had not been in battle before was turned over to one of the chaps who had been, to sort 
of help them through the early part, to show him the ropes, in other words, until he was able 
to stand on his own feet.”47
42 Ahrenfeldt, Psychiatry, p. 214
43 IWM PP/MCR/51 1944 Diary of Corporal R.H. Turner
44 NA WO 170/1434 1st Bn The London Scottish War Diary for February 1944
45 Trevelyan, Rome 44, p. 77
46 Trevelyan, The Fortress, p. 153.
47 IWM Sound Archives 13251 K.C. Lovell, Reel 13
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At Cassino, as at Anzio, the life expectancy of the new, inexperienced men could be short.
A Cassino veteran recalled:
Very often these chaps had only been in the army for a matter of six weeks or 
so, and they were under the illusion that they were going to finish the war off in 
no time, just as we did when we first started...We would advise them what to 
do and what not to do, but it never seemed to work. I saw men come in and be 
dead after just a few days. We would tell them always to keep their heads 
down, but inevitably they would look up and get caught by snipers. The only 
way they seemed to learn was by seeing their comrades die -  then they knew it
48was no game.
hi
The problem with reinforcements in general was not just that they might not arrive when 
and where they were most needed. They might not even be trained up to standard. The 9th 
Royal Fusiliers reported at the end of September 1943 that a minefield had not been laid 
owing to the inexperience of the patrol which had been sent to the battalion as trained 
infantry reinforcements.49 Lt-General Kirkman, Commander XIII Corps, noted in his diary 
that he:
Visited Gen Hayman Joyce [commander 4th Division until 20 April] at his 
request. He is unhappy about his 28 Inf. Bde. Scott the new Brig who replaced 
Purvis [on 12 April] says that they are untrained and jumpy. Difficulty is that 
Hayman Joyce has planned to attack with them & owning to other reliefs a 
change is exceedingly difficult now.50
Thus, however rapidly reinforcements arrive, they could not restore a battalion to its
previous efficiency without a period for rest and training during which its newcomers could
be absorbed into and identified with their fighting-teams.51
48 Matthew Salmon, 56* Division, quoted in M. Parker, Monte Cassino (London: Headline Book Publishing, 
2003) p. 33
49 NA WO 169/10214 9th Bn The Royal Fusiliers. War Diary for September 1943
50 LHCMA, Kirkman Manuscript, Diary Entry, 18 April 1944
51 Linklater, The Campaign in Italy, p. 135.
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The arrival of the 1st Guards Brigade and 4* Division in the Cassino area in February 1944,
to replace 46th and 56* Divisions on that front, did not mean that the British had sufficient
manpower to be able to withdraw exhausted divisions from the front line and replace them
with impunity. They were robbing Peter (in this case the Middle East) to pay Paul. Neither
newly-arrived formation was trained and ready for the conditions they would face. Ten
days before climbing up Monte Omito, the Welsh Guards had been training as lorried
infantry to 6th Armoured Division.
To be suddenly thrown into some of the hardest hill fighting yet encountered in 
World War II as an ordinary Infantry Brigade meant that there was a great 
many alterations to our way of thinking that could only be learnt the hard way.
The conditions were far tougher than anything we had known. The marching 
and climbing up the Italian hills was something a Battalion used to TCVs found 
hard to accustom itself ...
The type of fighting in the mountains was something quite new to us. To build 
a ‘sangar’ of stones, rather than dig out traditional slit trench came as a surprise, 
and I think the lack of knowledge of this kind as self defence cost us 
considerable casualties. Neither had we ever encountered the enemy at such 
close range.52
4th Division was also ill-prepared. Most of the Division
-12th, 1943) and had then remained in the Middle East.
28th Infantry Brigade in March 1944. It had previously
Salerno Landings and had remained there until March.
General Kennedy at the War Office:
4th British Division arrived in a very low state of training. As a result of this I 
talked to John Harding and we have just had Ronnie Scobie over here in order 
to discuss the training of formations in the Middle East. He was very receptive 
to new ideas and we arranged for officers of his staff, etc., to come over at 
frequent intervals. 28 Bde in particular ... which contains two regular 
battalions from Gibraltar, knew absolutely nothing about infantry-cum-tank 
tactics. I have put in a new Brigadier, Andrew Scott of the Irish Guards, and I
had last fought in Tunis (May 5th 
The 2/4* Hampshires joined the 
served as a Beach Group for the 
General Leese wrote to Major-
52 NA WO 170/1347 2nd Bn Coldstream Guards War Diary for February 1944 Appendix
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hope they will quickly learn battle technique. Hayman-Jones, who commands 
the Division, is a solid stick with no battle experience. When he gets this I 
hope he will be alright.53
IV
A particularly acute problem was the shortage of infantry officers: good officers were vital 
to the maintenance of morale, yet the shortage of officers was acute. Repeated requests 
were made for more infantry officers but it appears that BNAF made no provisions for 
officer reinforcements to meet Eighth Army’s repeated demands and warning.54 As early as 
August 17th 1943 it had been recognised that there was a deficiency in infantry officers in 
North Africa and Sicily and that the full scale of such officers could not be provided among 
reinforcements scheduled for Italy in September.55 In some Eighth Army battalions, before 
the River Trigno battle at the beginning of November 1943, the number of officers present 
was as few as 17, with no replacements available.56 There were therefore practically no 
officers available to command platoons in these battalions. The 5th Bn Sherwood Foresters 
reported that during the first week of January 1944 they had just seven subalterns out of a 
War Establishment of 19.57 The 6th Royal West Kents recorded in March that “the question 
and problem of offr reinforcements still being an acute one the A/Adjt, Capt T.R. Hartland 
went to No. 1 IRTD to try to collect 2 offrs reinforcements. He returned with Lt. J.R. 
Oxenham ex RAC he being the only offr at the IRTD available for posting.”58 2nd Echelon 
was forced to request the return of 116 Infantry officers to regimental employment who 
were then serving with A(l) list units.59 The problem seems to have been that the
53 NA WO 216/168 Leese Papers, Letter, 16 April 1944
54 NA WO 169/8521 ‘A ’ Branch, Main HQ, 8* Army War Diary for November 1943
55 NA WO 204/6627 Reinforcements Policy Memorandum HQ 15 Army Group, 17 August 1943, p. 1
56 NA WO 214/25 Alexander Papers: Italian Campaign -  Progress of OPERATIONS BAYTOWN and 
AVALANCHE, 3 November 1943
57 NA WO 170/1476 5® Bn The Sherwood Foresters War Diary for January 1944
58 NA WO 170/1421 6th Bn The Royal West Kents War Diary for March 1944
59 NA WO 170/40 CMF Allied Forces Italy, GHQ 2nd Echelon War Diary for Januaiy 1944
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proportion of officers to OR casualties was taken by AFHQ to be 1 to 20, whereas the ratio 
was 1 to 10.60
The Infantry Rifle Officer shortage on November 8th 1943 amounted to 179 in Eighth Army 
and 261 in X Corps.61 South African officers were brought in to fill the void.62 It is worth 
noting that by the end of the campaign the majority of officer reinforcements were not 
British. Of the officer allotment of reinforcements disembarked in Italy during the fortnight 
ending April 4th 1945, 11 were British Army and 138 were listed as ‘Other Nationalities’.63
The impact of replacement officers in influencing morale could be either beneficial or 
detrimental. When a temporary CO was attached to the 2nd Wiltshires the men “found it 
hard at times to understand his accent and to act quickly to his order. So we became 
jumpy.”64 After a short while they got another CO. “This CO was strict, a very fair man; 
he gave credit where it was due, and men could feel he knew the way to fight a war, and 
this was good for morale. We were a First Class Fighting Battalion ready for anyone, and 
proud of it.”65
Administration could also have been better: Major P.J.D. Johnson, a DMT Observer who 
submitted a report on “Lessons from HUSKY”, made the point that “reinforcements are too 
little and too late. Officers and men are kept hanging about in transit and reinforcements
60 NA WO 204/6627 Reinforcements Policy Letter from Major-General Sir Brian H. Robertson, Deputy 
Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ, Adv.Adm. Eeh, CMF to Ll.-General Sir Humfrey M. Gale, Chief 
Administrative Officer, Allied Force HQ, 1 November 1943
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63 WO 170/1428 Gl(Br) AFHQ Diary for April 1945
64 Hillier, The Long Long Road to Victory, p. 110
65 Ibid
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camps, while forward units are crying out for them.”66 In November 1943 Major-General 
Hawkesworth, Commander 46th Division, asked X Corps if officer reinforcements could be 
sent to the Division in bulk to allow the Division to do the posting. His reasons were:
1. I know the requirements of each unit and its state of efficiency -  and it 
materially helps a backward unit to have some of the better officers 
posted to it.
2. I am able usually to ensure that specialist officers go where they are 
most needed -  and this includes not only recognised specialists such as 
anti tank or signals officers, but also others such as officers capable of 
training snipers or officers suitable for pioneer platoons.
3. The posting of officers should not be merely on a numerical basis. The 
capacity of a unit to absorb and train officers, and the numbers and state 
of efficiency of the NCOs in a unit have a direct bearing on the case. A 
unit which is weak in NCOs needs considerably more officers than one 
with good NCOs which can manager with considerably fewer officers.
4. I have found that this method of posting officers has had most beneficial 
effects on the officers themselves and on units. Reinforcements officers 
feel that a human interest is taken in them from the start and units feel 
that their requirements really are studied.67
The Corps Commander was sympathetic to the Divisional Commanders’ wish to post their 
own reinforcement officers. ‘This desire actually only arises at times when there is a 
shortage -  it is a matter of making the very best possible use of limited resources -  and in 
the Corps Commander’s view such circumstances require special treatment.”68
The loss of officers in the first four months in Italy meant that every avenue of increasing 
their numbers was exploited. An Officer Cadet Training Unit Board was established in 
Naples and potential officers were sent there for selection.69 By December 19th 1944 there
66 NA WO 204/7543 Lessons from “HUSKY” General Points
67 NA WO 204/6627 Reinforcements Policy Letter from Major-General J. Hawkesworth to 10 Corps, 18 
November 1943
68 Ibid, Letter from Brigadier G. Lucas, Rear Headquarters, 10 Corps, to Colonel W.G. Piddsley, AAG, 
AFGQ, 22 November 1943
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were 923 successful OCTU candidates for the infantry in Italy, and 1655 in other arms.70 
Between January 1st 1943 and December 19th 1944, there were 197 infantry commissions 
granted.71 It was possible for an able man to rise to the top of his profession in this way -  
John Kerr rose from being Company Sergeant Major to CO of the Royal Inniskilling 
Fusiliers in 18 months.72 On the other hand, many men with leadership potential chose not 
to rise up the ranks after surveying the casualty rates among officers and NCOs. A junior 
officer in Italy felt that one of the main problems was getting people to accept promotion. 
“There just weren’t sufficient men of adequate leadership calibre available and most were 
very reluctant to accept the extra responsibility.”73
V
Faced with a manpower crisis, and with so few infantry reinforcements forthcoming, the 
Army looked round for alternative sources of front-line soldiers. They came from three 
sources:
1. Infantrymen who were already in Italy, in non-combatant units
2. Under-employed units, such as the anti-aircraft artillery, or depleted infantry battalions, 
which were disbanded and their men used as front-line reinforcements
3. From among the ex-hospital infantry
Firstly, in the summer of 1944, the misuse and unauthorised employment of army 
personnel, either by way of attachments surplus to establishments or unauthorised 
formation of units, was tightened up. “This mis-use of personnel is, directly or indirectly, 
at the expense of reinforcements required to replace wastage in fighting formations, and it 
is felt that the acute manpower situation cannot be appreciated by those responsible for 
their mis-use.” The writer continued:
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It is frequently found particularly in the case of some standard WEs, that under 
particular circumstances certain personnel are not fully employed. This is 
particularly the case in base and L of C units where by adjustment of work 
within the unit under static conditions and by making full use of the 
employment of civilians, tradesmen can be released to make up deficiencies in 
forward units where they are so badly needed.
It is the duty of every commanding officer to keep under review the WE of his 
unit in relation to its task and make every effort to effect economies by 
releasing personnel held on WE who are not fully employed.74
The use of civilian replacements in the rear was somewhat contentious. The Major General 
Commanding HQ 2 District pointed out in a letter to HQ, AAI, that unless the British 
personnel were replaced by Italian Military who could be ordered to accompany the HQs or 
units, irrespective of destination, there was a considerable risk of their mobility being 
affected, “since civilians recruited locally are not likely to volunteer to leave their homes 
for service elsewhere.” Further objections hinged on the fear that there would be 
administrative breakdowns due to absenteeism on Sundays and Saints’ Days and because 
civilian staff might not be available to work on demand throughout a full 24-hour day. 
There were also concerns over language difficulties. In general it was deemed preferable 
for replacement labour to be drawn from the Italian Military rather than civilians.75 The 
upshot was that it was finally decided that the maximum dilution of units with Italian 
Military and civilian personnel had to be undertaken “compatible with efficiency, even at 
the expense of inconvenience in administration.”76
73 Anon., “The Desertion Crisis in Italy”, pp. 84-87
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Copp & McAndrew noted that in the Canadian Army some officers got rid of disruptive or 
unsuitable soldiers by posting them to front-line infantry units.77 Such soldiers were not the 
most suitable to be sent to an operational theatre of war, and there is reason to suspect that 
the experience of the British Army was similar. One infantryman remembers that 
reinforcements were “the dregs of all the reinforcement camps in North Africa.”78
Secondly, it was decided to convert and retrain large numbers of Officers and ORs from 
other arms of the service which were no longer so important to the conduct of the war, 
particularly A A Regiments which could be disbanded due to the complete Allies’ air 
superiority.79 The total number of personnel made available to other arms by AA 
disbandment and dilutions was roughly 29,700 by the end of 1944.80 But in time this 
expedient was to cause morale problems.81
One AA-tumed-Infantry subaltern started out as a gunner manning a ‘Z’ rocket battery in 
Liverpool. But once Liverpool was no longer threatened by the Luftwaffe he, and over a 
thousand other gunnery officers like him, spent two months of 1943 “learning the art of 
infantry warfare.” 82
We had all served as young subalterns in A.A. command and had spent the 
previous two months at Dunbar in Scotland on the Lammermuir hills preparing 
for the change over to infantry regiments. There was sound reason for such a 
redeployment of about a thousand young officers, but the process was initiated 
by the War Office with sad ineptitude. Men, often from pre-war Territorial 
Army units, were sent with little notice and no reason given to retrain. There
77 Copp & McAndrew, Battle Exhaustion, p. 60
78IWM Sound Archives 16719 E  Grey, Reel 6
79 NA CAB 106/451 Operations of British, Indian and Dominion Forces in Italy, 3 September 1943 to 2 May 
1945, Part V, Monograph 4, Notes on AA Disbandment and the Conversion of Personnel of other Arms to 
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80 Ibid, p. 10
81 Doherty, A Noble Crusade, p. 226
82 IWM 81/5/1 N.J. Friskney Chapter 1, p. 2
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were ugly rumours of discontent. In January 1944 the Adjutant General was 
sent from London to Dunbar to address the first draft of 500 young officers.
The whole Officers’ Training Unit convened in a local cinema and His 
Majesty’s Adjutant General was shouted down. The matter never reached the 
press -  for it was war time -  but things could have been better handled. Things 
settled down after a while and with weekend leave possible at the Officers Club 
in Queen Street, Edinburgh, morale improved.®
Many of the former AA Personnel were unhappy at being transferred to the Infantry. “The
end of November was a truly sad time for me... I found that I was transferred with others to
IRTD, which was in effect a unit giving infantry training. None of us took too kindly to the
training.”84 Soldiers never had a good word to say about the IRTDs:
God, how we hated those places and the staff who ran them -  most, if not all of 
whom, we were sure, had never, themselves, either fired or seen a shot fired in 
anger. The bullshit commenced immediately you arrived at the place, you were 
put on charges for the least little infringement of the rules. The saluting drills, 
foot drills, arms drills, P.T., white-washing, blancoing, polishing were 
endless.85
In fact, the IRTD in Italy was not initially geared to provide basic infantry training which 
would normally be carried out in the UK so a new training battalion, seven companies 
strong, was established at the IRTD to carry out the infantry conversion training. Each 
company was to handle 300 men, retraining them over a three month period. The new 
training battalion required instructors, who had to be withdrawn from units, and were 
therefore not able to start their training tasks until mid-June, 1944, “which meant that no 
relief would be felt in the reinforcement field before mid-September. Pressure described as 
‘urgent operational reasons’ forced a reduction of the syllabus to two months in the middle 
of the first course.”86
® Ibid, p. 9
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85 IWM 85/18/1 C.T. Framp, Chapter 15, p. 117
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Light Anti-Aircraft men “took the infantry very hard,” wrote one infantryman.87 A platoon
commander recalled: “There were a number of arrivals who showed a lack of guts from the
time of their arrival in the platoon”.88 The British History Section, in its Monograph on
Desertion, stated that the root cause of the desertion problem was undoubtedly the quality
of the available infantry reinforcement:
In the latter stages of the campaign infantry reinforcements had to be found by 
the conversion of units from other arms rendered surplus by disbandment. 
While a number of these men rendered excellent service a proportion were 
undoubtedly disgruntled, or for other reasons felt out of their depth.
A case in point is that of the divisional light Anti-Aircraft units who were 
frequently employed in the latter stages, owing to the eclipse of the German 
Airforce, as infantry or sappers and on mine clearance, with great success when 
operating as units. On the other hand, when the units were broken up and the 
men posted, after a short and sometimes perfunctory training, as individual 
infantry reinforcements, it was not surprising that many of them showed no 
inclination for the work and became a definite source of discontent in their new 
units.89
The Psychiatric team of XIII Corps noted in the last quarter of 1944 that they came across a 
“small but constant number of cases where factors other than battle stress were prominent. 
Some cases of soldiers recently transferred to the infantry from other arms such as RA 
might be included here. Many of these, although having records of good service in their 
original units, might be termed inadequate for the role of infantrymen.”90
46th and 56th Divisions were the first divisions to be brought up to strength with former AA 
personnel when they were taken out of the line in March, 1944.91 The divisions returned to
87 IWM 74/118/1 S.C. Loveday, p. 51
88 Anon., “The Desertion Crisis in Italy”, p. 84-87
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Italy at the beginning of July, as 5th Division left for Palestine. 5th Division would not be 
back in Italy until February 1945. 78th Division had been “hard at it for 18 months. ’,92 It 
was withdrawn to Egypt in July for rest and re-training and returned in September, by 
which time it was the only relatively “fresh” division on the battlefield.
Another expedient that the War Office adopted to “stretch” its manpower resources, despite
the fact that British doctrine insisted that one of the foundations of high morale was strong
esprit de corps, was to disband some battalions and use their men to reinforce others. For
some men changing regiments was not a problem. The Northamptons (78th Division) War
Diary pointed out that:
During recent actions, men who have joined from other units came through the 
ordeals extremely well and have shown themselves to be keen and enthusiastic 
soldiers. One notable instance was when a former member of the East 
Yorkshire Regiment was asked what regiment he belonged to -  he promptly 
and proudly replied -  THE NORTHAMPTONSHIRE REGIMENT OF 
COURSE.93
And a medical officer pointed out that: “Esprit de Corps grows up no matter how it may be 
checked by frequent changes of personnel, and the unit one is with is the best unit at that 
time.” 94
But for other men the expedient of disbandment and cross-posting in Italy was very hard on 
morale. Men in the soon-to-be-disbanded battalions had fought together and developed 
their own traditions and unit cohesion which were now going to be destroyed, not by the
92 NA WO 204/10205 Distribution of Troops Build-Up in Italian Campaign, February-July 44 Message from 
CIGS to General Wilson , 7 July 1944
93 NA WO 169/10271 5th Bn The Northamptonshire Regiment. War Diary for November 1943
94 Renshaw, Memoirs of An Army Surgeon, p. 179
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enemy, but by their superiors. Divisional commanders were well aware of this. In a
confidential report from Anzio the 1st Division Commander noted that:
Another difficulty is our present chaotic system of reinforcement and the 
resultant “dog’s breakfast” in units. Whatever views may be held on the 
regimental system, it has got a grip and the majority of men serve better in their 
own regiment and amongst their friends.95
Needs must, however, and the 6th Battalion Inniskilling Fusiliers was disbanded in July
1944 owing to the lack of Irish reinforcements. Its place in the Irish Brigade was taken by
the 2nd Bn Inniskillings, which was transferred from 5th Division. The 6th Inniskillings were
promised that as many personnel as possible would be absorbed into the 2nd Inniskillings,
and others would go to the 1st Royal Irish Fusiliers and 2nd London Irish Rifles, thus
keeping as many of them as possible in the Brigade. “The Bn received the news with
mixed feelings, none of them pleasant, for the men of the Bn had done a lot of good work
together and had played a leading part in building up the reputation of the ‘Irish Bde’.”96
In September 1944 it was decided to reduce 168th Brigade (56th Division) and 18th Brigade
(1st Infantry Division) to cadre. 168th Bde (1st London Scots, 1st London Irish Rifles and 1st
Welch Regiment) was amalgamated with 167th Brigade (8th Royal Fusiliers, 9th Royal
Fusiliers and 7th Oxf & Bucks) following the amalgamation of 8th Royal Fusiliers with 9th
Royal Fusiliers and the disbandment of 7th Oxf & Bucks. 1st Welch was also reduced to
cadre (temporarily), so that from September 23rd 1944, 167th Infantry Brigade was made up
of the 1st London Scots, the 1st London Irish Rifles and the 9th Royal Fusiliers. The
historian of the Royal Fusiliers wrote on the amalgamation:
This was the result of an inability to find reinforcements for all the depleted 
battalions there were now in the field. In commenting on this process one must 
fairly state that the manpower position was difficult and that the Adjutant-
95 LHCMA Penney Papers 13/5 Memo in the Field, Point 5,14 March 1944
96 NA WO 170/1405 6* Bn The Inniskilling Fusiliers War Diary for July 1944
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General took such a step as this with great regret. At the same time, one cannot 
fail to record the effect of such a decision on the Regiment, on the unit 
concerned, on the morale of the troops and on the minds of the individuals 
affected.97
The men from 18th Brigade (1st Buffs, 9th KOYLI and 14th Sherwood Foresters) were sent to
46th Division, as reinforcements. For 18th Brigade this was a bitter end to its wartime
service -  there were more Africa Star ribbons in its ranks than in any other.98 The 14th
Sherwood Foresters diary noted:
It has been a difficult period for all ranks, but in spite of their disappointment at 
having to leave their old Bn, the men have taken the blow extremely well, and 
their loyalty in accepting the decisions of higher authority has not fallen below 
its customary high standard. In posting men to 139 Bde the policy adopted was 
to keep our ‘older’ men until last, to post our ‘younger’ Foresters to 5 Foresters 
and, so far as possible, to send those men who had been posted to us recently 
from other regiments, to the regiment for which they had the higher territorial 
or regimental claim. It is to be hoped that the spirit which they made for 
themselves in this Bn will go with them to their new units.99
Many receiving battalions tried to make their new drafts as welcome as possible. The 277th
Queens, for instance, got drafts from both the 7th Oxf & Bucks and the 1st Welch. “As far
as possible specialists are being absorbed, the remainder being split up between rifle coys,
every effort is being made to keep those who know each other together.”100 Major-General
Hawkesworth, the 46th Division’s commander, made a point of greeting the veterans as they
arrived at his battalions for posting:
...propped on his long ashplant stick, he told them that they should regard 
themselves as footballers transferred from one team to another and that in his 
division the infantry were regarded as the elite, always to be allotted the best 
billets when out of the line, always to be provided with every possible ounce of 
fire support when making an attack. Certainly the men needed every possible 
ounce of encouragement to keep them going.101
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The effect on morale can perhaps best be indicated by the reaction of a battalion that 
believed it was in danger of being reduced to cadre earlier in the year, but which survived -  
the 11th Lancashire Fusiliers. “The possibility of the Bn being split up is removed, for the 
time being at least... on receipt of information that Bn still exists as such, spirits of troops 
100% higher.”102
Not only was the disbanding of battalions bad for morale of the men involved, but cross
postings had long been acknowledged as having a detrimental effect to fighting spirit.
Despite this, in March 1944 it was decided that all infantry drafts from the UK would be
available to reinforce any battalion, a practice that had been already in operation in the
Italian campaign for some considerable time.108 The Regimental History of the Irish
Guards recorded that when they were due to be relieved by the Dukes at Anzio:
At dusk a slow file of men plodded up the track [towards the Boot]. They were 
introduced as the Dukes, but the first six men denied it and gave the names of 
six different regiments, till a sergeant said, “you’re Dukes now,” and then, 
apologetically, “They’re new, Sir, we only got them this morning.”104
On one occasion a draft of 30 men included representatives of no less than 28 different
regiments.105 One RASC driver has been in 16 different units.106
Where possible reinforcements were sent to battalions from the same region. On February 
17th 1944 The London Scottish, for instance, received reinforcements from the Black 
Watch, Camerons, Cameronians, Royal Scots and Seaforths.107 The 2nd Bn North Staffs 
received reinforcements from the South Staffs and S. Lancs as well as their own
102 NA WO 170/1426 11* Bn The Lancashire Fusiliers War Diary for June 1944
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regiment.108 In March, 1944 Major-General Penney, Commander of 1st Division, wrote to
Lt-General John Harding, CGS, GHQ, that he was trying to sort out reinforcements.
I spoke to a batch of men in the reception camp who had come from 56 
Division and were originally intended for us. When I told them that it had been 
decided that the Green Howards would go to the Bn of that regiment in 5 
Division, the Irish Fusiliers to the Inniskillings and so on their delight was 
transparent and a little pathetic.109
One Surrey officer noted how the character of his battalion changed with each new man
from a different battalion:
Many new drafts kept building us up but rarely were they Surreys. We received 
Officers and men from the DCLI, Royal Norfolks, Royal Sussex, Highlanders, 
and eventually Gunners. The Commanding Officer... was from the Wiltshires 
and quite a few senior officers were not of the Regiment... possibly over 50% 
of the battalion were “foreigners”.110
The army normally tried to minimise these risks. In January 41 ORs were returned to the
2/4* Hampshires from the 1/4* Hamps, with more coming from 5* Hamps.111 But the
Duke of Cornwall’s Light Infantry received two drafts from the 6* Bn The Devons.112 At
least in that case the geography was close. But in May the 6* Black Watch received
reinforcements not only from their own regiment, but “for some extraordinary reason 83
came from the Somerset Light Infantry and 32 from the Wilts.”113 Even the Irish Brigade
“was full of sassenachs as well as true-born Irishmen”.114
Most men, given the chance, would have returned to their own battalions. The men of the 
1st Welch certainly chose to do so when their battalion was reformed in December. Of the 
137 infantrymen who had been transferred to the 1st London Scottish in September, 120
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elected to return to the 1st Welch.115 Of the 80-odd men who had been transferred to the 1st
London Irish Rifles, 50 chose to return to the 1st Welch. Their departure from the 1st
London Irish Rifles caused the latter problems in turn:
The result of two officers and approx. 50 ORs leaving necessitated a 
considerable amount of reorganisation. In order to bring the other coys up to 
strength, ‘A’ Coy which had only been reformed a few days before had to be 
reduced to a skeleton and took upon the responsibility of a reinforcement coy.
At a time when people were just beginning to settle down the loss of the Welch 
men was very disturbing and put the clock back considerably.116
The treatment of men on their way to their new units, or indeed of any men being cross­
posted, and their sense of resentment influenced their fighting spirit once they arrived at 
their new battalions:
The state of morale of the average reinforcement by the time he finally reached 
his unit was a factor which cannot be ignored. The atmosphere of the base 
depot and the apparently incalculable way in which the Army ordered the life of 
the reinforcement were factors which, although perhaps often inevitable had a 
marked effect upon the men concerned. The soul-destroying feeling, often 
persisting for months on end of being ‘nobody’s baby’ undoubtedly did 
immense harm to some men’s self-respect and self-confidence; for them, it was 
the small points which mattered most: the Englishman posted to unit composed 
almost entirely of Glasgow Scots; the hospital casualty who had spent his entire 
Army career with one regiment posted on discharge to a new unit; the man who 
languished seemingly forgotten, at a base depot; or the man who was switched 
from unit to unit and never settled down; these were the trivial beginnings 
which so often ended in a charge of desertion.117
The Salerno “mutiny” was the strongest expression of the soldiers’ dislike of cross­
postings. Some 1,500 British reinforcement landed at Salerno on September 17th 1943. “It 
was said -  in an army where no one ever volunteered for anything -  that the new arrivals 
were all volunteers from Monty’s Eighth Army, men who had even risen from their sick
114 Horsfall, Fling our Banner to the Wind, p. 10
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beds to come and fight.”118 Most, in fact, were young draftees being posted to their first 
units. Others were indeed Eighth Army veterans from the 50th & 51st Divisions, but they 
had not volunteered to help X Corps. They had been told at Eighth Army 155 Transit 
Camp in Tripoli, where most of them were recovering from wounds or malaria, that they 
would be going back to their own Divisions. The 50th (Tyne Tees) Division had strong 
battalion loyalties, and the 51st (Highland) Division was renowned for its strong divisional 
and clan loyalties. The men of both Divisions had always been told by their officers, right 
up to Montgomery, that if they were wounded they would always be returned to their old 
units. The return of wounded to their unit was considered to be of great importance to the 
morale not only of the wounded man, but of the unit as a whole.119 When they discovered 
that they were destined for other Divisions at Salerno instead, they staged a “sit-in” in the 
field where they had been directed upon their arrival there.
When Captain Rankin of 16th Durham Light Infantry heard that men from his Regiment 
were involved in the “sit-in”, he went down to the field and quickly discovered that they 
did not want to join either the 46th or the 56th Divisions. Rankin found it difficult to 
sympathise with the new arrivals. Excessive loyalty, he felt, was understandable, but 
deliberate refusal to fight when ordered amounted to mutiny.120 That seemed to be the 
general consensus among the 16th DLL “I don’t think many of us had much sympathy for 
them because we accepted that they’d had a pretty hard time, a lot of them had been 
wounded and they were cheesed off, but you’re in the army and you do what you’re told or
118 Whiting & Tayor, Fighting Tykes, p. 25
119 NA WO 163/162 Morale Committee Reports from Overseas Commands. November 1943-January 1944
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suffer the consequences -  that’s the point.”121 Another DLI officer, Colonel Johnny 
Preston, decided to see if he could persuade the protesters to join his battalion. “I give you 
my firm promise as an officer, and Johnny Preston always keeps his word, that as soon as 
the situation here resolves you will go back to your own battalions -  you’ve got my firm 
word on that!” All but a few decided to take up his offer.122 Among the Scotsmen only the 
Black Watch men marched off the field en bloc as reinforcements, and that was because 
they had one of their own regimental officers with them, whom they knew.123 Some of the 
Black Watch men decided in the end to remain with their new battalions, when rumours 
that 51st Division was being trained for a future landing began circulating, on the grounds of 
“better what you know ...”.124 Lieutenant-General McCreery, commander of X Corps, 
tried to talk to the mutineers. He promised them that as soon as the military situation 
improved they would be returned to their units, that if they carried out their duties in a 
proper manner the whole incident would be forgotten and no one would suffer.125 All but 
192 men decided to respond to his pleas. The Salerno Mutiny was, in fact, the largest 
mutiny in the British Army in the Second World War: 192 men were found guilty of 
mutiny and sentenced to several years’ imprisonment.
There is some controversy about the urgency felt by the Eighth Army men to leave 155 
Transit camp. Saul David maintains in Mutiny at Salerno that the men were motivated only 
by their desire to return to their units, and that they had no prior knowledge of the 
impending return to the UK of 50th & 51st Divisions from Sicily. The final decision to send
121 Hart, The Heat of Battle, p. 50
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the Divisions home was not made officially until September 18th, three days after the men 
left Tripoli, and the various battalions were not informed officially until October.126 
According to General McCreery, however, the situation was somewhat different. A 
decision had already been taken in London by the Second Front planners that the two 
divisions would be returned to the UK and bad security had ensured that this news had 
percolated through all ranks.127 The only fear of the convalescing soldiers was that if they 
remained in the transit camp they would miss the homeward-bound draft and after three 
years in the desert that was too bitter to contemplate.128
Whatever the motives of the mutineers, three points stand out. The first is that, even among
the mutineers, sick and tired though they were, there is no evidence that the men would
refuse to fight if they were returned to their own units. Morale, in its most limited
definition, does not therefore seem to have been an issue here. The second was the
importance of officers who were known to the men in influencing the actions of the men.
The third was the fact that by 1943 the regimental system had to a large extent broken
down and the Salerno mutiny highlighted the extent to which that breakdown was resented
by some men. Regimental loyalty had been fostered by all means possible since the
Cardwell-Childers Reforms of 1870-1881 and it did, indeed, play a major role with regard
to morale among regular soldiers in particular.129 A major in the Oxf & Bucks wrote:
I wish we could be reinforced by officers and men from the Regiment; there 
must be plenty of Regimental officers who could be sent out to us. I know that 
Regimental esprit de corps is of tremendous value in keeping up the morale of 
troops when they are tired and conditions are not too good; but the policy of 
treating officers and men as so many numbers and posting them hither and
126 David, Mutiny at Salerno, p. 64.
127 See, for instance, NA WO 204/6627 Manpower, 18 August 1943
128 Pond, Salerno, p. 209
129 Molony, The Mediterranean and Middle East, Vol. V, pp. 421-2
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thither at random makes the task of keeping alive a regimental spirit well-nigh 
impossible.130
Although the most famous, Salerno was not the only occasion when aggrieved men 
mutinied during the Italian campaign. Sometime in 1944 a party of Royal Fusiliers 
returning from hospital refused to join another regiment and they were court martialled. 
They even served part of their prison sentence before being accepted back into the Royal 
Fusiliers. Their adjutant believed that their imprisonment had arisen “because of bad man- 
management as they were known to be first class soldiers.”131 Poor man management was 
also highlighted in the case of some Anzio reinforcements who did not belong to battalions 
fighting in the beachhead in that at no time had been informed that they would not be 
returning to their own regiments. “Personnel under reference belong to Cameronians and 
Seaforths. It is important that such rfts are fully informed of the position before the 
despatch.”132
The third major source of reinforcements were ex-hospital personnel, and many battalions 
had to wait until their own men returned from hospital. Ex-hospital personnel could not, 
however, fill the gaps completely. The 56th Division ADMS recorded that of the 2,800 
casualties from the Division whose whereabouts was known, 1,000 were not likely to return 
to their battalions.133 Men were not automatically returned to their own units from hospital. 
“Owing to the present difficult rft situation, particularly as regards infantry, it has become
130 IWM 95/33/1 Major D.A. Phillips Letter to his Mother, March 1944.
131 IWM 80/46/1 G. Allnull, Chapter VI, p. 2
132 NA WO 204/6627 Reinforcements Policy Letter from Brigadier ADAG, 23 February 1944
133 NA WO 177/414 Medical Diary - ADMS 56* Division November 1944
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necessary in certain circumstances to treat ex-hospital personnel as pool rfts.”134 This led
to discontent among the personnel concerned.
Shortage of man-power for infantry also resulted in men who had served and 
perhaps fought and been wounded in one regiment, being posted on return to 
another regiment in which they were strangers.135
The need to maintain the good will and morale of the ex-hospital personnel was always a 
consideration. Using a carrot and stick technique, the IRTD was told to inform the 
unhappy ex-hospital personnel “that their not being returned to their original unit will 
merely delay the successful prosecution of the present battle, and consequently their return 
to their own units.”136 By December 1944 56th Division policy “now is to reinforce a 
battalion in the line only with men who have been in it before (i.e. returning sick and 
wounded). Why wasn’t that thought of years ago?” mused one battalion diarist 
facetiously.137
VI
Illness, battle casualties and desertion, although the principal ones, were not the only 
contributory factors in the manpower crisis. Strategic considerations also played their part. 
Alexander lost five divisions, mostly French and American units, to Operation ANVIL 
(later renamed DRAGOON), the invasion of the South of France timed to coincide with 
Operation OVERLORD, and only received the equivalent of one and a half divisions in 
return. This placed extra strain on the divisions left fighting in Italy. In addition, the 
PYTHON Scheme, which gave home leave to long-serving soldiers, came into operation in
134 NA WO 204/6627 Reinforcements Policy, August 1943-March 1944 Letter from AFHQ to HQ IRTD, 19 
February 1944
135 NA CAB 106/453 Operations of British, Indian and Dominion Forces in Italy, 3 September 1943 to 2 May 
1945, Part V, Monograph 5, The Problem of Desertion, p. 3
136 NA WO 204/6627 Reinforcements Policy Letter from AFHQ to HQ IRTD, 19 February 1944
137 NA WO 170/1466 2/6* Bn The Queen’s Royal Regiment War Diaiy for December 1944
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1944 for soldiers who had been on active service for at least five years. For most of 1943, 
only men who had served overseas for more than six years were posted back to the UK. 
However, in October of 1943, with the opening up of the Mediterranean to more Allied 
ships after Operation HUSKY and the surrender of the Italian fleet, it became possible to 
start an exchange scheme, whereby men who had completed six years’ service abroad were 
posted home, with, in theory, replacements being sent out from the UK on a man for man 
basis. By January 1944 it was possible to reduce the qualifying period to five years, with 
eligibility based on five years’ overseas service before 1st January 1944.138 It was not 
possible to reduce it further due to the shortage of reinforcements available from the UK 
“where every available man is needed at present for the building up of the armies which are 
to invade the Continent.”139 By May there was a shortfall of 2,000 reinforcements from the 
UK against the numbers being repatriated through PYTHON, and it was known that the 
next draft home of 1,000 men to the UK would only see 400 replacements in return.140
In May 1944 the Adjutant General, Sir Ronald Adam, was well aware of the compound 
effect this was having on the manpower crisis in Italy, but he wrote to General Sir H. 
Maitland Wilson, Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre, asking whether he 
would care to consider continuing to send home the maximum number of men with 
overseas service without insisting upon a head for head exchange. Adam realised that this 
might not be possible, but asked Wilson to consider it “in view of the undoubted damage to 
the morale of a force which feels it is condemned indefinitely to a minimum of five years or
138 NA WO 204/10170 Repatriation of Long-Service Personnel Open Letter by General Sir. H. Maitland 
Wilson, Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre, “To be read by all ranks with four and a half 
years or more continuous service overseas”, June 1944
139 Ibid, GHQ, MEF Open Letter, “To be read by all ranks with four and a half years or more of continuous 
service overseas”, May 1944
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more continuous service overseas, you may feel that an enlargement of the numbers sent 
home, if necessary without replacement, may pay high dividends in improved morale and 
so not cause any nett loss of efficiency.”141
PYTHON created a permanent wastage from all overseas commands which had to be taken 
seriously into account in all manpower calculations.142 Particularly damaging were the 
losses of senior NCOs. In July 1944, because of the high number of Warrant Officers and 
NCOs due to be repatriated, it was decided to retain half their number in Italy for a further 
month.143 The loss of so many experienced men, the backbone of their units, was 
obviously of considerable concern to many battalions. A report on the sharply declining 
morale of one battalion highlighted the “ineffectiveness of young NCOs”.144
Personnel repatriated to the UK under PYTHON were posted to Home Establishments for a 
period of not less than three months, including disembarkation leave, before being 
considered for posted to another theatre, “and will then only be posted to North West 
Europe unless they volunteer for despatch to any other theatre.”145 Despite this assurance, 
when the required length of service was reduced to four and a half years, the reduction was 
greeted with reserve -  “was it perhaps a government trap to get men to the Far East?”146
140 Ibid
141 Ibid, Leller from The Adjutant General to General Sir H. Maitland Wilson, 8May 1944
142 NA WO 277/12 “Manpower Problems”, p. 52
143 NA WO 204/10170 Repatriation of Long-Service Personnel Letter from Lt-Col. Peter Higgins, 5 July 
1944
144 NA WO 204/6683 Royal West Kents -  Replacement of Battle Weary and Unsuitable Personnel Appendix 
A, Point 16
145 NA WO 170/3 General Routine Orders by General Sir H. Maitland Wilson, Supreme Allied Commander 
Mediterranean Theatre, 18 August 1944, Item 661 Return to UK of Long Service Personnel
146 NA CAB 106/224 “The British Soldier in Italy”, p. 20
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Men could waive their place on PYTHON if they wished by signing a certificate. “I can 
cancel this certificate whenever I wish, merely by the stroke of a pen, and will then be put 
back at the top of the waiting list for a passage home,” wrote one artillery officer. His 
reasons for staying in Italy were mixed. Firstly, self-interest played its part in that he 
would have to take a reduction in rank if he returned to the UK. Secondly, “I want to be in 
on the kill. I want to see the Germans in Italy smashed as I saw them smashed in Tunisia. 
And I want to experience the thrill of crossing the German frontier as a member of the 
Eighth Army.”147
But the majority of men serving in Italy did not qualify for PYTHON, and mindful of the ill 
effects of prolonged service overseas, the Army introduced the LIAP Scheme (Leave in 
Addition to PYTHON) in October 1944. The first men to enjoy 28 days’ home leave the 
UK under the LIAP Scheme started leaving Italy in November. Places were allotted within 
units according to the length of continuous service overseas. The numbers involved were 
small, only 2,000 men in each convoy sailing at intervals of 18-21 days, or about 3,000 per 
month.148 LIAP was limited to “personnel medically fit and desirous of returning to this 
Command and accepted on the grounds of special qualifications for return because of:- (a) 
Knowledge and experience of non-U.K. troops, or (b) Special knowledge of this Theatre of 
Operations”149 However, there was a price to pay vis-a-vis the manpower situation of 
such home leave. “No replacements are provided from U.K. for those personnel who may 
be granted leave under this GRO. In many cases it may be impossible to provide
147 C. Seton-Watson, Dunkirk-Alamein-Bologna; Letters and Diaries of an Artilleryman 1939-1945 (London: 
Buckland Publications, 1993) p. 237
148 NA CAB 106/453 Operations of British, Indian and Dominion Forces in Italy, 3 September 1943 to 2 May 
1945, Part V, Monograph 6, Leave to the UK, p. 1
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What -  go home on leave in an English winter*
Source: Jon’s Complete Two Types (London: Bellew Publishing, 1991) p.133
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replacements for those who qualify. For these reasons this HQ will be the final authority 
for deciding if the granting of such leave is in the best interests of the service.”150
The Morale Committee reported that the scheme “was greeted with derision by the majority 
and thought to be a vote catching device or, at the best, a proof that the period of PYTHON 
could have been reduced if the authorities had been willing to do so.”151 Despite this 
assessment, LIAP was particularly suited to those men who wanted to see the war out in 
Italy, with their mates, and infantry battalions seem to have reacted favourably. The 1st 
RWK battalion diary recorded that “Major Brock and 13 ORs were reported to be walking 
on air, having been detailed by the CO to proceed on leave to England.”152 The 5th Bn 
Grenadier Guards reported that “the first leave party to England, consisting of 9 ORs, left 
the Bn today amidst much excitement and revelry”.153 In the 3rd Bn Coldstream Guards 
“hearts were set a fluttering in the Bn when the first ten men were selected for home 
leave.”154
VII
Despite exploiting all possible sources of infantry replacements, the position grew steadily 
worse in the later stages of the campaign. On October 21st 1944 there was a total number of 
782 officers and 11,455 OR infantry reinforcements held in CMF, of whom 408 officers 
and 4,610 ORs were available for immediate posting. There were also a further 20 officers
149 NA WO 170/4 Gl(Br) AFHQ War Diary for October General Routine Orders by General Sir H. 
Maillland Wilson, Supreme Allied Commander Mediterranean Theatre, 13 October 1944. Item 818, Python
150 Ibid
151 NA WO 32/15772 The War Office Committee on Morale, Report of the Committee, The Army Overseas 
Dec 44-Feb 45 Part I, Section I, Morale in General.
152 NA WO 170/1419 Ist Bn The Royal West Kents War Diary for November 1944
153 NA WO 170/1350 5* Bn Grenadier Guards War Diary for November 1944
154 NA WO 170/1348 3rd Bn Coldstream Guards War Diary for November 1944
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and 550 ORs available for posting from hospital.155 It was estimated in October, however, 
that Infantry deficiencies would reach between 5,000 and 11,270 by December 31st, 
depending on the casualty rate.156 There were just not enough infantrymen available for 
immediate deployment.
Table 3.5
Officer & OR Infantry Reinforcements held in the CMF157
Held in CMF Available for
Immediate Posting
Date: Officers: ORs: Officers: ORs
December 27th 1944 484 9,732 175 263
January 3 1st 1945 558 10,680 229 2,283
The manpower shortage remained acute and by the end of 1944 all infantry battalions were 
reduced to three Rifle Companies.158 This was seen as “an unsatisfactory if inevitable 
solution” to the manpower crisis.159 But it had a detrimental impact on operational 
effectiveness. In December, when the 167th Brigade was operating on a wide front, “the 
absence of the fourth coy was very much felt.” Not only at times was there not even a 
reserve platoon in the Bn, but the lack of a reserve coy pushed more work onto the existing 
coys.160 The new WE might have helped with depleted battalions’ administrative 
problems, but did not add any manpower to the remaining over-stretched and war-weary 
units. Italy only received a small trickle of reinforcements in 1945:
155 NA WO 170/49 CMF Allied Forces Italy, GHQ 2nd Echelon War Diary for October 1944
156 NA WO 204/6615 Manpower Planning February 1944-June 1945 Summary oflnfanlry Reinforcement 
Situation, 4 October 1944
157 Figures taken from NA WO170/51 CMF Allied Forces Italy, GHQ 2nd Echelon, War Diary for December 
1944 and NA WO 170/4125 CMF Allied Forces Italy, GHQ 2nd Echelon War Diary for January 1945
158 Jackson, The Mediterranean and the Middle East, Vol. VI, Part II, p. 371
159 NA WO 170/1350 5* Bn Grenadier Guards War Diary for November 1944
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Figure 3.6
British Army (Male) Reinforcements arriving in Italy. 1945161
Date: Officers: ORs:
January 24: 299 1,524
February 7: 148 810
February 21: 76 1,366
March 21: 243 1,898
April 4: 11 186
Some relief was finally afforded to the hard pressed battalions in March 1945, when it was 
decided that units could demand reinforcements to replace personnel AWOL eight days 
after the commence of the absence or when the soldier was apprehended, whichever was 
the earlier. “As the numbers reported in this way are taken into account when unit rtf 
entitlements are being calculated, care will be taken to ensure that all absentees are 
included ...”162
VIII
The most serious indication of the problem in Italy was the number of soldiers with good 
records who eventually broke down under the strain of prolonged action.163 One soldier 
remembered:
Of course we got used to this diminution of strength ...but over time it had its 
effect even when in a static position; wider frontages, more frequent patrol and 
sentry duty, and less sleep (particularly during the long nights of winter). All 
this contributed to an added sense of strain and lower morale.164
160 NA WO 170/1432 1st Bn The London Irish Rifles War Diary for December 1944
161 Figures taken from NA WO 170/4125 CMF Allied Forces Italy GHQ 2nd Echelon Progress Reports G-l 
(B)/501/DAG Diary for January 1945; NA WO 170/4126 CMF Allied Forces Italy GHQ 2nd Echelon 
Progress Reports G-l (B)/501/DAG Diary for February 1945; NA WO 170/4127 CMF Allied Forces Italy 
GHQ 2nd Echelon Progress Reports G-1(B)/501/DAG Diary for March 1945; NA WO 170/4128 CMF Allied 
Forces Italy GHQ 2nd Echelon Progress Reports G-l (B)/501/DAG Diary for April 1945
162 NA WO 170/5040 Is* Bn The London Scottish War Diary for March 1945 Appendix B to 167 (Lon 
Infantry Brigade Administrative Order No. 6)
163 NA CAB 106/453 Operations of British, Indian and Dominion Forces in Italy, 3 September 1943 to 2 
May 1944, Part V, Monograph 5, The Problem of Desertion, p. 2
164 Anon., ‘The Desertion Crisis in Italy”, pp. 84-87
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The need to return men again and again to the line after evacuation for wounds or
exhaustion because of the lack of reinforcements, regardless of whether they went back to
their own battalion or not, provoked its own morale crisis. Such men felt that they would
go on being sent back into the line until they were killed, totally incapacitated by wounds,
or broke down and deserted.
Prolonged combat drains all men, that is all except for a few supermen I’ve 
heard of but never met, of their reserves of courage and resolve. Some 
completely, some only partially, some sooner, some later but the process, once 
begun, progresses with each fresh exposure to fire. Thus does the man 
eventually have to fight two wars, one without and one within. And as frightful 
as may be the first, it is almost as nothing, compared to the frightfulness of the 
second, for that one he fights alone, therein lays true bravery.165
A shortage of infantry reinforcements, insufficient to keep up with the losses sustained 
through illness or battle casualties, had a detrimental affect on the fighting spirit of the 
infantry. Infantry battalions often had to reduce their number of rifle companies, with 
fewer men shouldering an ever-heavier burden of responsibility. The pool of men available 
for patrolling shrank dramatically; men were forced to spend longer in the line; they 
became more exhausted and thus more liable to suffer from war weariness and breakdowns. 
Manpower shortages were elemental in degrading morale and it was against a background 
of acute manpower difficulties that the desertion rate rose.




Desertion is the illegal absence from duty by a soldier. “The offence of desertion -  that is 
to say, of deserting or attempting to desert his Majesty’s service - implies an intention on 
the part of the offender either not to return to His Majesty’s service at all, or to escape some 
particularly important service as mentioned in para. 16” [see footnote for para. 16].1 The 
criterion between desertion and absence without leave was intention.2 “ ...Absence without 
leave may be described as such short absence, unaccompanied by disguise, concealment, or 
other suspicious circumstances, as occurs when a soldier does not return to his corps or 
duty at the proper time, but on returning is able to show that he did not intend to quit the 
service, or to evade the performance of some service so important as to render the offence 
desertion.”3 Twenty-one days was the officially accepted length of time within which an 
absentee, whose intention was to return to his unit, would demonstrate that intention. After 
that period, he would be declared a deserter.4
The desertion and AWOL rate is usually seen as the most potent expression of discontent 
and poor morale and in Italy it reached endemic proportions (see Appendix IV), particularly 
towards the end of the campaign. The number of Court Martial convictions for Desertion 
and Absenteeism in all overseas commands from September 1st 1943-August 31st 1944 was
1 Manual of Military Law (London: HMSO, 1929/Reprinted 1939), p. 19 Para 16: “A man who absents 
himself in a deliberate or clandestine manner, with the view of shirking some important service though he 
may intend to return when the evasion of the service is accomplished, is liable to be convicted of desertion 
just as if an intention never to return had been proved against him.”
2 Ibid
3 Ibid
4 MacPherson, Discipline, p. 49
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4,819.5 The number of cases of AWOL and Desertion reported to 2nd Echelon in Italy 
between October 1943 and August 1944 was 5,380 (see below, Table 4.2). Not all of these 
cases, of course, ended up in front of FGCsM, but it is evident that the vast majority of 
British Army overseas deserters and absentees during that specific period were from the 
Italian campaign. Certainly, rising desertion from the winter of 1943/44 increasingly 
exercised the minds of corps and divisional commanders in Italy, who became aware of a 
steady increase in the figures during the winter of 1943 because it was occurring chiefly 
among front-line soldiers (see Appendix III) and was highly contagious. “It may well have 
been the appearance of the infection among men of excellent military character which 
started them worrying”.6 In February 1944 Lt.-General McCreery, Commander, X Corps, 
wrote to Lt.-General Harding, Alexander’s Chief of Staff, about his concerns and urged 
immediate action. “Often a considerable proportion of those deserting are not front line 
soldiers, they may be men from “B” Echelons etc. The great majority of deserters, 
however, are from the infantry, which clearly shows that the disease starts in those units 
which are most exposed to enemy action.”7 “Generally speaking”, wrote Brigadier Scott- 
Eliot, Commander 167th Infantry Brigade (56th Division), desertion “is an Infantry problem, 
due simply to the fact that men of other Arms are not subjected to the same degree of 
continuous mental and physical strain in battle.”8 The principal areas of investigation vis- 
a-vis desertion and morale are:
(a) What was the desertion rate in Italy?
(b) Why did men desert?
(c) Who deserted? Did ORs desert more readily than officers and NCOs?
5 NA WO 93/55 Judge Advocate General’s Office: Summary of Court-Martial Convictions (British Other 
Ranks) (Overseas Commands) Appendix 1(c)
6 NA CAB 101/224 “The British Soldier in Italy”, p. 35
7 NA WO 204/6712 Discipline: Deserters and Absentees McCreery letter to Harding, 15 February 1944
8 LHCMA Brigadier Scott-Hliot “The 5* Casualty, Battle Absentees”, p. 1
176
(d) Was there any difference between Regular and Territorial Divisions?
(e) When did men desert?
(f) What was the soldiers’ attitude towards deserters?
I
The British Historical Section, Central Mediterranean, produced the following statistics 
after the war. These are convictions by Field General Court Martial for Desertion in Italy:
Table 4.1
FGCM Figures for Desertion during the Italian Campaign9
1943: 1944 (contl: 1945:
October: 162 May 299 January 473
November 29 June 271 February 426
December 150 July 160 March 358
1944: August 251 April 476
January 177 September 245 May 150
February 173 October 184 June 258
March 285 November 251
April 330 December 586 TOTAL: 5,694
Table 4.2 is the total number of cases of AWOL and Desertion by United Kingdom troops 
reported to GHQ 2nd Echelon for the whole theatre:
Table 4.2
Total No. of cases of AWOL and Desertion reported to 2nd Echelon in Italy10
1943: 1944 (contl: 1945:
October 243 May 495 January 1127
November 212 June 994 February 616
December 369 July 779 March 404
1944: August 628 April 153
January 349 September 944 May 242
February 207 October 905 June 154
March 521 November 1200
April 583 December 1211 TOTAL: 12.336
As with all statistics, there are problems associated with the desertion and AWOL figures. 
Firstly, it is a possibility that what the figures really measure were the changes in the
9 NA CAB 106/453 Operations of British, Indian and Dominion Forces in Italy, 3 September 1943-2 May 
1945, Part V, Monograph 5, The Problem of Desertion, p. 6
10 Ibid
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willingness of the military authorities to use the system of formal discipline to punish 
offenders: the Absence Without Leave statistics (see Appendix II) show that less than 50% 
of AWOL cases were from the infantry, indicating that front-line troops were more liable to 
be charged with the more serious offence of Desertion.
Secondly, there is evidence to suggest that some AWOL cases in the front line went
unreported. To illustrate this with just one case, from an officer at Monte Cassino:
The soldiers had to lie in cramped positions in their two-man sangars, often wet 
and cold. They took it in turn to sleep by day; at night, they had to be alert and 
occasionally take turns in patrolling. There was a steady dribble of casualties 
with nightly evacuation of stretcher cases from the RAP. It was agonising to 
see a fine fighting team wasting away. Under these appalling conditions six 
Fusiliers, recent reinforcements to the Battalion attempted to desert. They 
abandoned three adjacent sangars leaving a defenceless gape that jeopardised 
the lives of their comrades. This was plain cowardice but I felt that arresting 
them and sending them for a court-martial was not a practical option. I had 
already made it clear that only wounded would be permitted to leave the battle 
area. A battle patrol was detailed to intercept the men and force them to return 
to their sangars. There was a sharp scuffle in the dark before they were led 
back to the front line. News of this spread round the Battalion and I was told 
that the outcome was considered ju s t ... There was, however, a happy outcome 
for our six. They worked hard and fought well to redeem themselves in the 
eyes of their comrades. Some months afterwards the men asked to see me; they 
said how sorry they were for the incident below the Monastery and expressed 
their relief that they had not had to face a court-martial.11
A third caveat in dealing with the desertion and AWOL statistics is that there is no reliable, 
established baseline from which to judge how excessive desertion was in Italy. In his 
report on operations in Sicily, Lt.-Colonel Wigram, a Territorial officer of the Royal 
Fusiliers, and commandant of the GHQ Battle School in England prior to his service with 
the 5th Buffs in Sicily, indicated that “the platoon in action is almost invariably only twenty- 
two strong, and, of whatever regiment, good or bad, every platoon can be analysed as
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follows: six gutful men who will go anywhere and do anything,” (who usually became the 
first casualties) “twelve ‘sheep’ who will follow a short distance behind if they are well led, 
and from four to six ineffective men who have not got it in them even to be really good 
soldiers.”12 Wigram suggested that the average number of deserters and men absent 
without leave per battalion before and during every campaign was 40-60 which, he 
believed, was a roughly accurate figure as was shown by the number of Courts Martial for 
running away that follow every campaign.13 But doubt was cast upon Wigram’s figures in 
another review of the Sicilian campaign, a report by an Observer, Major P.J.D. Johnson, 
who pointed out that while Wigram’s contention was supported by an (unnamed) Brigade 
commander and the (unnamed) Division commander, the views of other divisions were not 
obtained and that “without further investigation this theory should perhaps be accepted with 
reserve.”14 Brigadier Scott-Elliot believed that there were about 300-400 Battle Absentees 
in the average British division in any six month period in Italy.15 It is not possible to 
ascertain monthly averages for any single battalion during the campaign because battalions 
only started detailing absentees and deserters in their War Diaries towards the end of 1944. 
In addition, from the limited figures available, battalions differed widely in their rates of 
desertion both individually, during the course of the campaign, and in comparison with 
other battalions at any given time. What is evident from the figures for monthly 
convictions by Field General Court Martial statistics, however, is that there was a strong 
upward trend during both winters, particularly in 1944/45, and at the height of the 
Cassino/Anzio breakout period. In view of the manpower problems, each individual case
11 Lt. Col R. Porter (ed), CO 2LF 78 Division: The Battle Experiences o f an Infantry Commander, Brigadier 
J. Mackenzie (privately published, 1997) pp. 34-5
12 NA WO 231/14 Operations in Sicily: Notes on the Campaign, Operational and Administrative Reports,
9 December 1943
13 Ibid, Report by Lt-Col Lionel Wigram, Commander 5th Buffs.
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of desertion was considered by senior commanders to be far more serious than might have 
been the case earlier in the war, since every infantryman lost in Italy through desertion had 
a profoundly negative effect on the ability of front-line units to prosecute the war.
II
That being so, why did men desert? In the main, the reasons for desertion were agreed by
all commanders in Italy. The Adjutant-General outlined the causes in February 1944 thus:
A study of cases both at the trial and in prison show that deserters in the main 
fall into the following categories:-
(a) 5 per cent are criminals who have no interest in or intention of fighting.
They are a nuisance and a menace anywhere.
(b) Men desert who are nervous and should never have been in the line at 
all.
They are immature.
(c) They desert because they have been overseas too long, e.g. 2 Dorsets 
and 2 Devons of 239 Inf Bde from Malta
(d) Because they have been in the line too long or consider they have had 
too much continuous fighting
(e) They are sent as reinforcements to strange regiments or battalions in 
which they have no friends and find they cannot make friends.
Of the above factors (d) is the most prevalent, followed by (e). Manpower 
shortage is responsible for both.16
III
Long periods spent in the line was one of the major contributory factors in desertion. The 
longer a Division remained in the line, the more tired the soldiers became, and the higher 
the absentee rate. FGCM Figures for August and September 1943, per division, exemplify 
this. 5th Division was the only “fresh” division and its desertion rate reflected this.
14 NA WO 204/7543 Lessons from “HUSKY” Report by DMT Observer Major P.J.D. Johnson
15 LHCMA Scott-Elliot Papers, Battle Absentees, 10 April 44
16 NA WO 214/62 Alexander Papers Letters from Sir Ronald Adam to CAO, 25 February 1944
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Table 4 3
No. of men, per division, sentenced by FGCM in August and September 194317 
Division No. of Men





Field General Courts Martial figures for Desertion for individual battalions which fought at 
Anzio, although imprecise, indicate a similar experience. As Table 4.4 shows, 1st Division, 
which came to Anzio fresh, had considerably fewer deserters (36) than the battle-weary 5th 
& 56th Divisions (123 and 75 deserters respectively).
Table 4.4
Nos. of men, per battalion found guilty of Desertion by FGCM, April-June 194418 
Battalion Nos, found guilty of desertion
by FGCM April-June
2nd Bn North Staffs (1st Div) 8
1st Bn D.W.R. (1st Div) 16
2nd Bn Foresters (1st Div) 12
8th Bn Royal Fusiliers (56th Div) 19
9th Bn Royal Fusiliers (56th Div) 25
7 Ox & Bucks (56th Div) 31
1st Bn York & Lancaster (5th Div) 37
1st KOYLI (5th Div) 41
6th Bn Seaforths (5th Div) 45
Long periods of front-line duty was a factor highlighted by Lt.Col. John Sparrow, Secretary 
of the Adjutant-General’s Morale Committee, in a report he produced during a fact-finding 
mission to Italy in the summer of 1944. He discussed the problem of desertion in Italy in 
some detail, having been impressed “by its size and its urgency and the difficulty of solving 
it.”19 He discussed the situation with the staffs at AAI, Eighth Army, formation HQ,
17 NA WO 213/51 FGCM Abroad, 12 July -1 6  November 1943 and NA WO 213/53 FGCM Abroad, 17 
November 1943-9 April 1944
18 NA WO 213/58 and NA WO 213/60 Records of FGCM Abroad
19 NA WO 204/6701 AFHQ Morale Committee Meetings & Reports, 1943 December-1945 March Notes of 
Tour of Italy: June-July 1944, compiled by Lt. Col. J. Sparrow
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regimental officers, the senior Psychiatrist Eight Army and officers of the JAG’s staff,
including the Permanent President at Eighth Army’s Court-Martial and Holding Centre. He
also interviewed informally 16 prisoners awaiting trial or promulgation, and came to the
conclusion that the chief cause of desertion was prolonged action which was greatly
increased by close contact with the enemy. One soldier recalled:
They’d had enough. I mean, British infantry was in the line 10 times longer 
than the Yanks, the French, the Poles, any bugger else, the lads had had 
enough.....
You’d get ready to go into line, and then so-and-so would be missing. You 
knew they’d be back after three months, maybe they’d had enough. The 
longest I was in the line was 31 days without a wash, shave or a hot meal.
When we came out we had three nights’ rest, then we were back in the line 
again. Some men just couldn’t take it.20
He added:
The lads that ran away would have a fit of remorse and hand themselves in once 
they had had a rest and a couple of good feeds. Everyone understood that. I 
would never call a man a coward. I was very, very near to it myself. It was 
only better men than me that kept me in the line  21
IV
It was not just length of service and time in the line that contributed to the rising desertion 
statistics. The conditions in which the men existed in the front line were also of paramount 
importance. For most of the over-stretched infantrymen, the single most important element 
in degrading morale was the weather. The winter of 1943/44 was the wettest winter for at 
least 30 years, according to the locals, and the rain was followed by snow. The rivers 
flooded and the ground became a quagmire. The typical thunderous deluges of cold rain 
which fell that autumn and winter “numbed the mind, the body, and sapped the morale.”22 
In November the 1st Bn KOYLI noted that the weather was particularly vile, with sleet and
20IWM Sound Archives 16719 E  Grey, Reel 5
21 Ibid, Reel 6
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snow turning all paths into muddy rivulets by day, and that companies were being relieved
every 72 hours.23 One war diary, with typical British understatement, noted that the wind,
rain and very rough country on the slopes of Mt. Maggiore at the end of December all made
living conditions “very trying”.24 A journalist wrote:
Our troops were living in almost inconceivable misery. The fertile black 
valleys were knee deep in mud. Thousands of the men had not been dry for 
weeks. Other thousands lay at night in the high mountains with the 
temperatures below freezing and the thin snow sifting over them. They dug 
into the stones and slept in little chasms and behind rocks and in half caves.
They lived like men of prehistoric times and a club would have become them 
more than a machine gun. How they survived the dreadful winter at all was 
beyond us who had the opportunity of drier beds in the warmer valleys.25
At the beginning of 1944, the winter weather and the conditions in which the troops of 78th
Division existed were hard to endure. The Division saw in the New Year in the region of
Pescara. Snow made the roads completely impassable and electricity supplies were cut off
for several days.26 The Irish Brigade had the worse time. The 2nd Battalion The Royal Irish
Rifles withdrew companies from the hills and in blizzard conditions parties with mules had
to go to assist each company back. The snow was so deep, three feet in some places, that
three of the mules had to be abandoned.27 In the blizzards bulldozers and snowploughs
were useless and it was impossible to get supplies up to forward companies. A rations
truck from 6th Inniskillings became snowed up only two kilometres from the battalion
headquarters and a ski party of 16 Italian civilians had to go out with big rucksacks, which
could each hold 14 loaves of bread, to bring back the rations.28 One of their patrols, which
had gone out on December 3 1st, was lost and a Polish officer and two civilians went out on
22 Milligan, Mussolini, p. 120
23 NA WO 169/10244 I8* Bn The King’s Own Yorkshire Light Infantry War Diary for November 1943
24 NA WO 169/10252 6* Bn The Lincolnshire Regiment War Diary for December 1943
25 From an Ernie Pyle Scripps-Howard column, quoted in Morris, Circles of H ell, pp. 272-3
26 NA WO 170/1368 5* Bn The Buffs War Diary for January 1944
27 NA WO 170/1433 2nd Bn The London Irish Rifles War Diary for January 1944
28 NA WO 170/1404 6* Bn The Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers War Diary for January 1944
SUNNY ITALY
One day I picked up a book 
And read it through so rigidly,
‘Twas written by a man named Cook, 
Who called it “Sunny Italy”.
It said blue skies and burning sun,
And girls that sang so prettily,
And happy laughter, joy and fun,
Were joys of Sunny Italy.
And sitting there, a thought flashed quick, 
Went through my head unwillingly,
A place to visit I should pick,
Was surely Sunny Italy.
I landed one September mom,
The birds all sang “Tra-li=li-li”
The day had just begun to dawn,
And waken Sunny Italy.
I travelled up the Eastern coast,
And everything went swimmingly,
And I began to make the most 
Of lumps of Sunny Italy.
The sun shone less, the rain fell oft,
The black clouds gathered threateningly, 
The mud was thick, the ground was soft, 
In - O yes, SUNNY Italy.
My clothes were wet and so was I,
Indeed, I thought quite nastily,
Of him who wrote this blasted lie,
And called this Sunny Italy.
The Land was white, the snow was deep, 
The wind howled then so bittertly,
It even was too cold to sleep,
Outside, in Sunny Italy,
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And more and more my thoughts went thus, 
To he who wrote so liberally,
And had the awful nerve to pen 
“Go south to Sunny Italy”.
So if by heck I catch that crook,
I’ll break his neck so thoroughly,
He’ll never write another book,
And call it “Sunny Italy”.
Cpl. Brewer.
“S” Company
Source: NA WO 170/1368 5th Bn The Buffs, The Dragonette, No. 4, May 1944
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skis to try and locate the men. “They failed to do so, as wind had caused the snow to cover 
the tracks they had made.” Four of the men had managed to take shelter on a farm, but the 
patrol leader died from exposure. “He was found sitting in a drift, and tracks indicated that 
he had crawled the last two or three kilometres before he died.” 29 There were many cases 
of frostbite, and of the 108 cases of exposure in 78th Division, five men died.30
In February 78th Division moved over to the Fifth Army front to join the New Zealand 
Corps on the second assault on Cassino. Although they had come down from the bad 
weather in the mountains there was no respite from the miserable conditions. Instead of 
snow, they now had to contend with rain. ‘The Division trained and exercised in a dreary 
landscape of pools and semi-liquid quagmires.”31 As Table 2.8 (Chapter II) shows, 78th 
Division suffered 81 desertions at the beginning of the year, when they holding defensive 
positions in the mountains, where any kind of movement was difficult. The figure rose 
sharply to 207 when they left the mountains to start training: their “fight or flight”
imperative came into play as soon as its was physically feasible.
Soldiers manning the front line at Cassino spent days, sometimes weeks, in water-filled slit
trenches and the infantrymen’s ankle-high boots provided very little protection against cold
injuries such as trench foot.32 One soldier from the East Surreys remembers manning a
trench close to the River Rapido:
We remained near the trench for several days, sometimes occupying it by night 
only, sometimes for twenty-four hours at a time. It was below water level and 
we were constantly standing in water. My mate Fred was very annoyed at this
29 Ibid
30 Ray, Algiers to Austria, p. 110
31 Ford, Battleaxe Division, p. 144
32 Taylor, Combat Nurse, pp. 173-4
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and one night slipped away down to the river and took the boots off a dead 
German. He wore these every time we had to stay in the trench. I thought I 
would like a pair and so I too went down to the river with him and tried to get 
the boots off a dead German. With Fred holding the body down with his foot I 
tugged the first boot off, but when I came to get the second I pulled the whole 
leg off at the thigh. Fred took the jacket off the German and wrapped it around 
the thigh and held it tightly while I successfully wrenched the boot off the dead 
soldier’s foot. We always wore these boots when in trenches, but our own 
army boots at all other times. Wearing enemy kit was definitely not allowed.33
One soldier with the 4th Division, which arrived at Cassino late February, found himself at
the beginning of March taking over positions in the mountains. He described his journey
up the mountain and the conditions there thus:
We commenced the long climb up into the mountains. The only paths were 
goat tracks, which twisted and writhed agonisingly up and across the mountain 
slopes. It seemed we marched miles just to make a few hundred yards upward 
progress. Higher and higher we climber, despite the intense cold, very soon we 
were bathed in sweat, my legs ached cruelly from the effort involved.
Our positions were on Mount Omito, they consisted of a chain of sangars 
strung across the mountainside just below the peak. The sangars were covered 
by groundsheets to keep out the snow.
It was bitterly cold on the mountain, blizzards were frequent, icy winds blew 
the snow through unprotected openings in the sangars. No hot meals could be 
brought to us, our diet consisted mainly of frozen bully and hard tack biscuits.
We wore leather jerkins over our great-coats and, to further help us keep out the 
intense cold, we wrapped layers of sandbags around our legs. These we tied 
into place using strips of the same material.34
The Welsh Guards, too, suffered through the appalling conditions on Monte Omito:
The bitter cold at the top, with snow, sleet, and rain, and only one blanket, later 
two, caused many frostbite and exposure casualties.35
A deep-sided valley above Cairo village known as the Bowl, whose steep sides offered 
some shelter from the heights of Monte Cassino, was the nearest any battalion could get to 
enemy-held positions in the mountains around the Cassino Monastery. The infantry would
33 Ford, Battleaxe Division, p. 144
34IWM 85/18/1 C.T. Framp, p. 71
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climb up to the Bowl from San Michele, a divisional forward dump area, followed by pack
mules carrying in their kit, and concentrate there before going to the rocky outcrops held by
the Allies. Bn HQ was located in the Bowl, and supplies were off-loaded there. On one
side these positions were overlooked by the Monastery 800 yards away; behind were the
enemy-held heights of Monte Cairo and ahead of them was a German-held ridge on which
some if its defenders were just 90 yards from the British infantry. The men lived in stone-
built sangars since it was impossible to dig slit trenches in the stony ground. Any daylight
movement in the forward areas was out of the question. It was, according to Fred
Majdalany, “a cemetery for the living”.36 The hovel where he had his HQ:
consisted of two crumbly ground-floor ‘rooms’. The upper part of the dwelling 
-  which may once have belonged to a not-too-house-proud shepherd -  had been 
reduced to a decaying mass of rubble and battle wreckage. We set up our 
command post in one of the lower rooms.
Eight of us lived in this room, together with large numbers of centipedes and 
other crawling things. These had a disconcerting habit of dropping from the 
gaps between the damp, sagging planks which precariously comprised our 
ceiling. Some of the centipedes were over three inches long and were not the 
least unpleasant feature of the residence. Shells are not nice, but you can hear 
them coming.37
Following the rise in desertion during the winter months, the second peak occurred towards 
the end of the Cassino and Anzio battles in May and June. Again, the principal causes 
were morale-degrading living conditions and the strain of long periods of static warfare. 
One soldier, old enough to remember the First World War, said Cassino “looked like 
Passchendaele.”38 The suffering of the fighting troops at Cassino “cannot be overstated,” 
wrote John Ellis.39 Conditions for the battalions holding Cassino town were no better than
35 NA WO 170/1347 2nd Bn Coldstream Guards War Diary for February 1944 Appendix
36 Majdalany, The Monastery, p. 17
37 Ibid, p. 22
38 Quoted in Hapgood and Richardson, Monte Cassino, p. 147
39 Ellis, Cassino, p.xiv
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for those in the surrounding mountains. “All personnel in Cassino were rationed to half a 
gallon of water per day,” recorded one battalion diary.40 Cassino was held by three 
battalions, with a further battalion in the area of the Station 41 One battalion HQ was 
located in the Cathedral Crypt, hundreds of tons of rubble on top making it capable of 
withstanding hits, even by 210mm shells, which landed on it from time to time. The men 
lived in sangars, in most cases inside, but in some cases outside, ruined buildings in the 
town. They were more or less immune from mortar and to a large extent, from shellfire, 
but the forward troops were in very cramped conditions in close proximity to the enemy, 
with very limited fields of view, and liable at any moment to become out of communication 
with the rear. Worst of all, they were, to all intents and purposes, isolated as far as help by 
crossfire from neighbouring posts was concerned. The reason for this were the enormous 
piles of rubble which effectively blocked views and interfered with fields of fire. The town 
was also, literally, pocked with shell and bomb craters, some of them as much as 40 feet 
across and with six or seven feet of water in them. The shell holes had one advantage; they 
supplied water which, after chlorination, could be used for washing. But water supply 
shell-holes had to be carefully distinguished from the ones which after dark received the 
contents of the refuse bins and sanitary buckets 42
One soldier said: “The rats were revolting. They were so fat. We know they were gorged 
on the hundreds of bodies nobody could reach.”43 Another commented on the “nauseating 
and unbearable stench” of Cassino, made worse by the smoke-shells the Allies fired from
40 NA WO 170/1419 Is* Bn The Royal West Kents War Diary for May 1944
41 NA WO 170/1366 6th Bn The Black Watch War Diary for April 1944
42 Ibid
43 Trevelyan, Rome ’44, p. 208
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morning until dusk.44 It is possible that the number of dead bodies lying around Cassino 
was exaggerated: “The town was supposed to be full of putrefying bodies, but we did not 
experience as much trouble as was expected, but a supply of disinfectants and bleach was 
laid on in case of need 45
78th Division’s time at Cassino town was described as “perhaps the dreariest and 
unhappiest in its history, for the losses and the hardships it had suffered had been -  it 
seemed -  to no purpose. No victory had crowned its sufferings, and men had been lost not 
in a major battle but in nameless and apparently purposeless forays.”46 General Leese, 
Commander Eighth Army, pointed out that 78th Division “have been driven a little beyond 
bursting point,” but added: “The spirit of the Division is high.”47 Desertion figures bear 
this out: the number of 78th Division absentees and deserters from March 24th-June 2nd 1944 
were 289, which, averaging out at 32 per battalion, is at the lower end of Wigram’s 
suggested general level of absenteeism.
Conditions at Anzio were just as unendurable as at Cassino. The weather in the bridgehead 
for the first two months was appalling. At Anzio the summer temperatures could reach 
over 100 degrees of stifling head, but in winter the “steady, driving, sleeting rain which 
permeated everywhere” turned the landscape -  most of it former marshland -  into a 
quagmire.48 The Grenadier Guards’ diary recorded that “the mud on even the main supply
44 Lee Harvey, D-Day Dodgers , p. 87
45 NA WO 170/1366 6th Bn The Black Watch War Diary for April 1944
46 Ray, Algiers to Austria, pp. 20-21
47 NA WO 216/168 Leese Papers Letter to Major-General Kennedy at the War Office, 16 April 1944.
48 Vemey, Anzio 1944, p. 50
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track to the fun areas was in places knee deep.”49 The coldest winter in years was keenly 
felt in the bridgehead where slit trenches were filled with freezing water. It was impossible 
to dig down more than six inches without coming to water.50 Even newly-dug graves were 
half-filled with water before the burials could take place.
The natural trench system of deep ravines, known to the British troops as wadis, had names 
likened to their shape on the map. Apart from the Fortress there was The Boot (both in the 
5th Division sector); the Lobster’s Claw, the Starfish, and the Culvert, all three of which 
were the purview of 1st Division. Newcomers could hardly believe that life could carry on 
in the narrow dug-ins on either side of the gullies. “It was the ever-present squalor and 
boredom of the life in the wadis, as much as the danger of it, which eventually ‘got men 
down’.”51 Major-General Gregson-Ellis, Commander of 5th Division, called it “a 
nauseating bit of country to fight in.”52
In the winter of 1944-1945, men in the mountains had to endure not only the freezing cold,
but also the mud, and desertion rates peaked at this time. “Conditions were appalling for
both men and mules, the mud being very sticky and knee deep in places. A number of men
lost one or two boots on the way up.”53 One battalion recorded:
October 5: Another wet day. Everyone got soaked again. Mobile baths were 
set up in Castiglione and 25 men from each Coy trudged through the rain, much 
against their will, to get clean. Since however they have been in their clothes 
for five days and got completely filthy, this cleaning up process, although 
maybe unpleasant, was extremely necessary.
49 NA WO 170/1350 5th Bn Grenadier Guards War Diary for February 1944
50 NA WO 170/1354 1** Bn Irish Guards War Diary for March 1944
51 Vaughan-Thomas, Anzio, p. 223
52 Quoted in Vaughan-Thomas, Anzio, p. 223
53 NA WO 170/1382 1st Bn The Duke of Wellington’s Regiment War Diary for December 1944
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October 6: The rain continued throughout the night and day; slit trenches were 
falling in everywhere.
October 7: The patrol returned very wet but with no news of the enemy. It 
commenced to rain heavily and everyone was drenched again.
October 8: Weather was again the chief topic for the day. The rain continued 
to make life miserable for the men in the trenches -  varying from light drizzle 
to torrential showers. During the whole of the morning there was hardly a 
minute when it was not raining.54
Another battalion diary reported:
October 26: The rain from the previous day persisted during the night and 
daylight saw no abatement. River beds became torrents with swift currents 
making even small streams impassable. ... Coy positions had been just below 
the ridge crest of Monte Spaduro. The ground was clay and some trenches 
began to fill and flow as water ran down from above and welled up from below. 
Trenches collapsed, burying equipment, weapons, blankets. New trenches met 
the same fate as soon as dug, and no material was available for revetting. All 
coys could do was sit in the mud as the water drenched and soaked them, and 
no sign of a clearer sky appeared....Many were attended to at the R.A.P. for 
exposure and sickness.
October 27: The CO the 10 visited coys, whose morale was not as low as it 
might have been after what they had endured. Nevertheless the decline in 
numbers, mainly due to sickness, but partly due to the occasional shell 
casualties, and absence, caused increased concern and it was apparent that these 
conditions would not be endured much longer without wasting away the Bn. 
Officers and men who had been with the Bn since the African landing in 
November 1942 describe the conditions as worse than they had previously 
experienced.55
A week of torrential rain at the end of October made the supply problem in the mountains a 
serious one. The month’s rainfall rose from an average of two and a half inches to eleven 
and a half inches. Bridges all over Italy were washed away and there were quite a number 
of drownings when trucks, which had been driven into flood waters, were swept away with 
their drivers.56 Roads and tracks were in an appalling condition and on two occasions the 
diversion between Sassoleone and San Apollinare was washed away, making it impossible
54 NA WO 170/1348 3rd Bn Coldstream Guards War Diary for October 1944
55 NA WO 170/1425 2nd Bn The Lancashire Fusiliers War Diary for October 1944
56 R. Clarke, With Alex At War: From the Irrawaddy to the Po 1941-1945 (Barnsley: Leo Cooper, 2000),
p. 181
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for even mules to get through.57 Mules, 30,000 of them, were the saviours of the forward 
units.58 The Mule Corps, in terms of manpower and animals, represented the equivalent of 
more than three divisions.59 A comment that appeared regularly in battalion diaries was: 
“Owing to heavy rain during the previous night jeeps were unable to bring supplied forward 
and mule tpt had again to be resorted to.”60 “These mules were quite invaluable for 
supplying forward Coys down the atrocious track where no Jeep could hazard a journey. 
Over some tracks, where the rain did not drain off, the mud was so bad that even the mules 
used to fall down and drown in it.”61 An unending source of worry to OC HQ Coy was the 
threat of mutiny by the Italian muleteers, “when their ‘vino’ failed to turn up, as was often 
the case.”62 An officer of the Grenadier Guards told a junior officer of the RA: “Don’t let 
on, dear boy, but the war will be won by mules, not by men.”63 As the snow melted, the 
ground became very muddy and slit trenches filled with water. “Caved-in slit trenches 
caused conditions for troops manning the forward positions to be very uncomfortable.64 
One young officer recorded in his diary that there was “mud up to knees and much further 
in places (both mules and men have been suffocated).” He himself sank into the mud up to 
his small pack and had to be pulled out by members of his platoon who formed a human 
chain which began on firm ground.65
V
Holding positions in the mountains for long periods, in the winter of 1944-45, without any 
advance, as 78th Division was doing, was detrimental to morale in several ways. Inactivity
57 NA WO 170/1433 2nd Bn The London Irish Rifles War Diary for October 1944
58 Taylor, Combat Nurse, p. 183
59 Harpur, The Impossible Victory, p. 80
60 NA WO 170/1446 5* Bn The Northamptonshire Regiment War Diary for November 1944
61 NA WO 204/10425 “The Irish Brigade”, Part II, pp. 14-15
62 NA WO 170/1350 5* Bn Grenadier Guards War Diary for October 1944
63 Harpur, The Impossible Victory, p. 82
64 NA WO 170/5075 1st Bn The East Surreys War Diary For February, 1945
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itself, with time to consider the unpleasant or unknown something that could happen, was
bad for the nerves and therefore bad for morale. The cold sapped energy and patrolling in
such conditions was exhausting. The 2nd Bn The Lancashire Fusiliers had been on M.
Spaduro so many times since October 23rd 1944, when they first captured the feature, that
routine was automatic. “Coys always occupied the same sector to give men an incentive to
improve their positions to which they knew they would return. The familiar standing
patrols were adopted and the ground immediately to the front of the FDLs was known to
all.66 The Lancashire Fusiliers finally left the Spaduro area on February 12th after a stay of
112 days, one of the longest static periods ever experienced by the battalion.
We had been there the longest winter months of cold and darkness, with long 
and wearisome standing patrols to undertake and without the attacks and 
advances which bring success, keep everyone occupied and maintain morale.67
For the soldiers who served in the Northern Appenines in the winter of 194445, “no words
can adequately convey the measure of frustration, the depth of despair, almost of
resentment; the experience had to be lived through to be really understood.” 68 It is perhaps
not surprising that desertion rose to new heights in the winter of 194445 (see Appendix
IV). 46th Division fought in the advance on Forli in October and Lamone at the beginning
of December, but by then were a totally spent force, as their desertion figures indicate (see
Table 4.7). 78th Division and the Guards, meanwhile, were again in the mountains, on
Monte Spaduro. Another winter in the mountains, with a great deal of patrolling thrown in,
proved too much for many of the men of that division. Patrolling was never popular. At
Anzio, patrolling was one of the worst aspects of a soldier’s life in the wadis. Penny
reported that one corporal in the 1st Division was facing a court martial for refusing to go
65 Bratton, Ensign in Italy, p. 117
66 NA WO 170/5033 2nd Bn The Lancashire Fusiliers War Diary for January 1945
67 Ibid
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out on patrol, despite the fact that he was quite happy to man a slit trench in the front line.69
Patrolling could result in a slow but steady haemorrhaging of manpower, so most patrols
avoided risks. Up on Mount Sole, in the winter of 1944, the Guards had problems with
their patrol activities:
Patrols made a terrible noise in the crackling snow and always stood a good 
chance of being ambushed if their tracks were observed by an enemy patrol. 
Furthermore, the physical fatigue was tremendous and, owing to the bitter cold, 
ambush patrols could only remain hidden for a limited time.70
Rifleman Bowlby recalled that on the night of January 2nd-3rd 1945 they had two feet of 
snow. “Not much other fighting to be done in this, we thought.”71 He was proved right. 
The first night patrol sent out got stuck up to their necks in drifts and it took them eight 
hours to make a round trip of three miles.72 It is not surprising that front-line troops dug in 
more for warmth than protection from enemy fire, “burrows they were reluctant to leave”.73 
Patrols went to ground once out of sight of their own front line, “to return after a plausible 
interval and report that they had made no contact with the enemy.”74
In December 1944 the 2nd Lancashire Fusiliers were in line on Monte Spaduro for four
days, which was “a strain”. Regular patrols were the order of the day and
An American airman, part of the Rover Joe close support organisation, 
expressed a desire to participate in a ground patrol and walked over from Bde 
HQ in the afternoon. After tea he climbed Spaduro and went out with a patrol 
from ‘C’ Coy ... He returned with the relief at midnight and climbed down to
68IWM 90/29/1 J.B. Tomlinson, p, 212
69 LHMCA Penny Papers 13/14, p. 2
70 IWM 91/43/1 Major-General R.H. Whitworth, 24th Guards Brigade Operations August 1944 to May 1945: 
Chapter V, Static Operations in the M. Sole Sector, p. 40
71 Bowlby, The Recollections of Rifleman Bowlby, p. 204
72 Ibid, pp. 204-5
73 Graham & Bidwell, Tug of War, p. 382
74 Ibid, p. 383
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BHQ a wearier and wiser man. Cold, wet, fired at, mortared, he declared on his 
return that infantry life held no inducements for him.75
Patrolling did not just put men at risk of being killed or injured. It added to their
exhaustion. One tankman who had been turned into a reluctant infantryman for the winter,
when infantry manpower levels were at their lowest, recalled that when he first went up to
the front line at the beginning of 1945: “it became clear to us that infantry cannot sit still
and enjoy peace and quiet. They must patrol -  preferably at night when all good tankmen
are abed.”76 No matter how tired the front-line soldier was, he still had to patrol:
While the comparatively uneventful hiatus was being enacted, the awful routine 
of patrol duty followed by more patrol duty, both by day and by night, 
continued incessantly. The infantryman on whom all success depended at 
every stage of every battle was never allowed, once he was committed, to have 
any rest at all. It did not matter a damn how sick or tired he felt, if he had any 
life left in him and was capable of shoving one leaden foot in front of another at 
less than one minute intervals, he had to take his turn. It would be difficult to 
find any more frightening and soul-destroying activity of the individual, than 
going on patrol, especially at night.77
Army commanders were well aware of the problem. In December 1944 General Sir Sidney
Kirkman, Commander of XIII Corps, of which 78th Division was then a part, wrote to the
Fifth Army Commander, General Mark Clark:
I do not want to over-stress the factor of hardship at this period of the war -  we 
must all be prepared to undergo great privations, and as long as a man is fit to 
fight he must do so. The fact remains, however, that many of these hills have 
during the last month been enveloped in mist for long periods. The 
infantryman has in consequence to stand-to and be on the alert by day as well as 
by night. In a proportion of the positions movement is impossible in clear 
weather. The strain of holding forward positions is therefore considerable, and 
the garrisons invariably go short of sleep, the effect of which is cumulative. 
Generally speaking it has been found that if units spend more than 10 or 12 
days on the top of a hill under present weather conditions, with the inevitably 
unsatisfactory conditions for feeding, that they tend of become unduly sleepy,
75 NA WO 170/1425 2nd Bn The Lancashire Fusiliers War Diary for December 1944
76 IWM 978/3/1 Captain A.J. Stiebel p. 49
77 Harpur, The Impossible Victory, p. 37
196
lethargy and un-alert. These conditions also incidentally affect sickness and 
absenteeism. 78
Conditions were no better for the 56th Division on the Romagna and the troops were just as
tired. On the banks of the Senio, where the German Tenth and Allied Eighth Armies were
separated in some place only by the width of the great 25ft high dykes, the Germans had
been ordered by Kesselring to maintain an aggressive static line, and told that a live and let
live approach would not be tolerated.79 The Allied infantry therefore had to be
continuously alert and, consequently, exhaustion had set in there, too. 2/6* Queens
reported in January that, based on documents they had captured from a German Company
HQ, “the Germans estimate that 56 Division, due to heavy casualties and only a few R.A.
reinforcements, is not formidable as a fighting unit and will only be used in a holding role.”
The diary writer then commented, “Perhaps they’re right.”80 His opinion was echoed by a
56th Division doctor, Tim Elliott, who believed that:
taking a very broad view ... the division was fit for a holding role but not a
tough offensive role the solid type of soldier, i.e. the seijeant and corporal,
was beginning to crack. When questioned by the M.O. they invariably 
answered that they would willingly go back into the line, but they felt that they 
would not, at times, be responsible for their actions and they might well find 
themselves running away. This state of affairs was having an adverse effect on 
the newly joined reinforcements.81
On the Adriatic front, conditions were so bad and “there were cases reported ... of whole 
companies desertion because of the shocking conditions .. .’,82 The Romagna was one vast 
marsh. The rains of winter -  and it rained for days on end -  turned the rivers into torrents
78 LHCMA (GB99KCLMA) General Sir Sidney Kirkman Letter to Commanding General, Fifth US Army, 
23 December 1944
79 Howarth, ‘My God Soldiers’, p. 195
80 NA WO 170/5060 2/6* Bn The Queen’s Royal Regiment War Diary for January 1945
81 NA WO 106/3975 Directorate of Military Operations and Military Intelligence, Operations, Italy: Report 
to GSOl from Captain Harrison, 30 January 1945
82 IWM 82/37/1 E.P. Danger, Chapter 22, p. 219
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in which men drowned.83 They turned everything else into a quagmire. But, despite all
the rain, there was a shortage of palatable drinking water because the streams were so full
of mud that the filters of the unit water trailers failed. “Brews of tea, in which the British...
soldiers always found solace, were apt to be mugs of mud when they managed to find
enough shelter to boil the water.” 84 Mud became the dominant factor in everyone’s lives.
Every decision, remembered one soldier, was governed by it, and nothing could be
undertaken without its sanction.
Not all muds were of the same constituency; they ranged from the almost liquid 
variety to a dense glutinous substance which imposed on man and vehicles 
alike, the burden of immobility. Man could wade through the semi liquid stuff 
and vehicles plough through it like a boat through water, bow wave and all, but 
the other variety, in its most malevolent, adhesive form, could holds its victims, 
human and mechanical, in a vice like grip, not to be released by mere brute 
strength or engine power.85
At the beginning of January, 1945, Alexander wrote to the Chief of the Imperial General 
Staff re-iterating that he was “seriously worried about the effects of long periods in the line 
on British formations at this stage of the war” and included the information, which he had 
had from General Kirkman, that in 78th Division for every man killed or wounded one man 
went absent.86 Absenteeism was such a drain on rifle companies by the end of 1944 that all 
infantry battalions began listing AWOL and desertion figures in their weekly manpower 
returns. The CIGS’s reply, in view of the prevailing opinion that the desertion figures 
indicated a serious, and permanent, decline in the fighting ability of British troops, is 
perhaps surprising. “As far as we can estimate the figures seem to be fairly similar to those
83 NA WO 170/1350 5th Bn Grenadier Guards War Diary for October 1944
84 Jackson, The Mediterranean and Middle East, Vol. VI, Part II, p. 366
85 IWM 90/29/1 J. B Tomlinson, p. 210
86 NA WO 214/62 Alexander Papers Letter to CIGS, 4 January 1945
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which we suffered from during the similar period of last winter. In that case they should be 
again due mainly to the winter discomforts than to other causes .. .,,g7
The CIGS was proved correct. From a peak in December, both desertion and AWOL in all 
British infantry battalions began to fall, slowly at first and then more markedly. The army- 
wide FGCM figures (Figure 4.1) map the downward trend. Given the length of time it 
took for a deserter to come before the courts, it is reasonable to assume that the decline in 
desertion was felt first in the front line, and then in the courts. This is borne out by the 
absentee figures below:
Table 4 S
Overall Absence Figures (UK troops) -  December 1944-February 194588
December Januarv Februarv
Absent at beginning of month: 1710 1640 1531
Rejoined during month: 1237 1034 867
Reported during month: 1167 925 673
Absent at end of month: 1640 1531 1337
It is impossible to say what percentage of these absentees were from the rifle companies of 
infantry battalions, but the figures from individual battalions show the same general 
downward trend:
87 Ibid, Extracts from letter from CIGS, 11 January 1945
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Table 4.6
AWOL Figures for the period January -February 194589 
(based on available information: indicates no figures given)
Battalion: Week Ending:
6  Jan 13 Jan 20 Jan 27 Jan 3 Feb 10 Feb 17 Feb 24 Feb 3 Mar
78th Division:
5th Northants 9 6 4 2 - 2 - - -
5th Buffs 15 18 8 3 5 4 3 3 1
6th RWK 
Guards:
18 11 7 9 3 3 2 1 -
3rd Grenadier Guards 
56th Division
6 7 2 Nil Nil Nil Nil 1 Nil
1st London Scottish - - - - 4 8 2 1 1
277th Queens - - 7 4 4 9 5 5 3
VI
There were other reasons for desertion, apart from length of service and the conditions and 
length of time in line. Unhappy reinforcements, for example, especially cross-posted men, 
seem to have been more likely to desert than reinforcements who were returning to their 
own battalion. The 1st Bn KOYLI recorded that on April 30th 1944 they had had 52 
absentees since July 10th 1943. Twenty-three of these men were with the battalion on the 
initial landing in Sicily. All the other men had come from reinforcements received.90 
Unhappy reinforcements also appeared to be the main culprits for AWOL figures in the 5th 
Bn Grenadier Guards at Anzio. The absentees were all from the 6th Battalion Grenadier 
Guards, disbanded because of a shortage of manpower and merged into the 5th Battalion. 
There were as many as 21 absentees in the 5th Grenadier Guards. “This was very high for 
our Bn which had a light crime record,” recorded Sergeant Danger.
88 NA WO 204/6701 AFHQ Morale Committee Report for the Quarter Ending 28 February 1945 Appendix 
“A”
89 Figures taken from: NA WO 170/5051 5th Bn The Northamptonshire Regiment War Diaries for January & 
February 1945; NA WO 170/4993 5th Bn The Buffs War Diaries for January & February 1945; NA WO 
170/5022 5* Bn The Royal West Kents War Diaries for January & February 1945; NA WO 170/4979 3rd 
Bn Grenadier Guards War Diaries for January & February 1945; NA WO 170/5040 l 8* Bn The London 
Scottish War Diaries for January & February 1945 and NA WO 170/5061 2/7* Bn The Queen’s Royal 
Regiment War Diaries for January & February 1945
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A Bn, particularly a Guards Bn is very much a family and had very little 
contact with other Bns in the Regiment. Once you were a 3rd Bn, or a 5th Bn, or 
a 6th Bn man, you remained as such permanently and you tended to be quite 
unfriendly to men of other Bns and you certainly resented transfer.... Whole 
companies of the 6th Bn were transferred to us complete and it was from these 
that we had the absentees.91
Of the 16 men who went AWOL from the 277th Queens on September 25th 1944, eight men 
were from the 7th Bn Ox & Bucks, which had just been disbanded and whose men were sent 
as reinforcements to the Queen’s Brigade. The first contingent of Ox & Bucks men, about 
80 strong, including two officers, had only arrived at the 277th Queens on September 23rd.92 
The 276th Queens even instituted checking-in procedures for all reinforcements “when the 
Bn is in action or is likely to be in action”. The names of all new arrivals were to be 
checked against nominal roll in the presence of at least three men, whose names were to be 
noted on the nominal role as present. ‘The object of the above scheme is to ensure 
evidence to be available if desertion should take place.”93
VII
Low morale was contagious and one unhappy soldier could adversely influence a whole 
platoon. At the end of March 1944 a group of 6th Bn The Seaforth Highlanders refused, 
when in the field, to go forward when ordered to do so by their officer. They all seem to 
have been influenced by one man, who reportedly said, when the order was given, “I’m 
fucked if I’m crossing this open piece of ground.”94 The man in question himself said that 
he did not go forward because he was not feeling well and thought he was going down with 
another lapse of malaria. In another FGCM for mutiny, a group of 10 men from the 1st
90 NA WO 170/1411 Is* Bn The King’s Own Yorkshire Light Infantry War Diary for April 1944
91IWM 82/37/1 E.P. Danger, p. 159
92 NA WO 170/1467 2/7* Bn The Queen’s Royal Regiment War Diary for September 1944
93 NA WO 170/1466 2/6* Bn The Queen’s Royal Regiment War Diary for November 1944. Battle 
Instructions No. 14 Reinforcements -  Absentees.
94 NA WO 71/878 Records of the FGCM for mutiny, 6* Seaforth Highlands, 28-29 May 1944
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Duke of Wellington’s Rifles refused to proceed on a working party after one soldier said: 
“I’m not going up the line.”95
VIII
The longer the campaign went on, the more war weariness played an increasingly important 
role in desertion. One Morale Committee report stated that “the troops are in good heart, 
considering that we are now in the sixth year of war. On the other hand, there is some war­
weariness, and in the infantry, the strain of protracted period in the line, without rest and in 
unpleasant conditions, is finding out the weaker members. This is reflected in the size of 
the problem of desertion .. .’,96 “The war is now getting to a stage when most of the troops 
had long forgotten what they were fighting for and the Army as a whole was weary and fed 
up with the whole business,” one guardsman recorded in November 1944.97 An officer 
worried about the morale of some of his battalion’s war-weary desert veterans in view of 
the number of deserters in Naples at the end of 1944.98
The detention cells were crammed to overflowing, mainly with deserters from 
units in the north who were awaiting trial.... Those locked up here, the ones 
who had been caught, were only a fraction of the total. The rest were hiding in 
towns and farmsteads, and the hills -  so we were told -  were full of them.
These were the men who would suffer anything rather than facing the ‘line’ 
again. Desertion was not a matter of black and white, and never an easy option.
So much depended on the amount of pressure an individual was asked to bear.
For many, it had been a long campaign and a harsh winter; and for some this 
was the limit. A soldier who deserts does so not from simple fear of death or 
injury, but from a refusal of the body and spirit to face any longer the endless 
discomfort and racking dread, day after day. Then a sudden ungovernable 
reflex can drive him in desperation to flee the horror he can endure no more, 
regardless of the severity and ignominy of the consequences.99
95 NA WO 71/879 Records of the FGCM for mutiny, Is* Duke of Wellington Rifles, 26-28 May 1944
96 NA WO 32/15772 The War Office Committee on Morale Report of the Committee Part I, The Army 
Overseas, Sept-Nov 1944, p. 4
97IWM 82/37/1 EP. Danger, p. 253
98 Elliott, Esprit de Corps, p. 81
99 Craig, The Broken Plume, p. 140
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Another explanation was offered for why “good” soldiers deserted. “There is no doubt that 
there does exist a certain underlying current of frustration, of being generally ‘browned 
off’.... The outstanding reason, without any doubt at all, is absence from home; and the 
lack of any system of home leave.”100 Both were the result of the endemic shortage of 
reinforcements. Some Regular soldiers had served abroad for several years, most had been 
away from home for over at least a year. Bad news or anxiety about loved ones at home 
could adversely influence a man’s behaviour, and domestic stress was present in about a 
third of all absentee/desertion cases.101 Home worries were introduced in mitigation in 
some Court Martial proceedings.102
IX
The third question to consider is, who deserted? Sparrow identified the ‘involuntary’ 
deserter and the ‘deliberate’ deserter. The ‘involuntary’ deserter was a man “whose nerve 
breaks, a class which includes an infinite variety of types, from the genuine case of 
complete ‘shell-shock’ to the man whose real trouble is weakness of will. Many of these 
deserters would welcome ‘a second chance’, although it may be questioned how they would 
act if they were given i t ” The Judge Advocate General’s staff believed that the proportion 
of ‘deliberate’ to ‘involuntary’ deserters was 1:10.103 Brigadier Scott-Elliot, CO of 167th 
Brigade at Anzio, on the other hand, concluded from his experiences at Anzio, that 20% of 
all deserters were made up of what he termed “whole skinners”. “These are men who are 
quite determined not to risk life or limb. They are entirely selfish.”104 According to him,
100 NA WO 204/6701 AFHQ Morale Committee Meetings & Reports, 1943 December-1945 March. Subject: 
Morale -  British Troops, 25 February 1944, p. 1
101 Ahrenfeldt, Psychology, p. 124
102 See, for instance, NA WO 71/866, when the defence of an infantryman cited home worries and the effects 
of heavy mortar fire in mitigation against a charge of cowardice.
103 NA WO 204/6701 AFHQ Morale Committee Meetings & Reports, 1943 December-1945 March, Notes on 
Tour of Italy: June-July 1944, compiled by Lt. Col. J. Sparrow, p. 3.
104 LHCMA Scott-Elliot Papers, “The 5th Casualty: Battle Absentees”, p. 2
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men recently joining a unit, put into battle too quickly, and not knowing their leaders and 
commanders accounted for 10% of absentees; men put back into battle from hospital too 
quickly 4%; good men worn thin 10%; while the majority, 56%, were men with low 
standards or weak characters.105
In June 1944 Major-General Sir Brian Robertson, Chief Administrative Officer, HQ Allied 
Armies in Italy, in a Memorandum on Desertion, classified deserters as (a) Cowards; (b) 
Men whose nerve has cracked under strain and (c) Rogues. The Adjutant General, Sir 
Ronald Adam, felt that the claim that this was the only honest division of deserters was a 
very rough classification indeed. “It is not quite clear how the writer distinguishes between 
(a) cowards and (b) men whose nerve has cracked under strain. Presumably the only 
distinction which can be made is that the former have cracked sooner than the others.” He 
went on:
I feel that the writer considers that the only strain under which a man can 
excusably crack is the strain of battle. This may be sound ethics, but I do not 
think it is true in practice. If a man goes into battle for the first time with a 
heavy load of domestic anxiety and lack of confidence in his leaders he may 
well crack at an early stage.
The basic assumption in this paper is that the only causes of desertion are either 
cowardice, battle strain or roguery. I have not the slightest doubt that a very 
considerable proportion of A.W.O.L. and even of desertion can be traced to 
men bring just “fed up”. Indeed, there are cases where such men became fed up 
primarily because of lack of action against the enemy and not as a result of 
contact with the enemy. It is not uncommon for men who have been A.W.O.L. 





Most deserters were ‘involuntary’ deserters, men who had simply come to the end of their
tether. This was particularly prevalent towards the end of the campaign:
That was at the time that infantry were like that -  there were lads who’d been 
right up Italy, they’d had a belly full [sic] of that and at the first real thump a lot 
of them used to disappear.107
Enemy action could be an immediate spur to desertion. Alex Bowlby recalled his feelings
when a bomb landed near him:
Before the shock hit me, in the split-second between the blast and my reaction 
to it, I saw two different shades of red -  the dark-red of disintegrating metal, the 
funnel of flame opening round it. Then I went to bits myself. The reds of the 
explosion were clamped on my retina. For several minutes I could see nothing.
This plus the blast plus the fact that we couldn’t dig in reduced me to jelly. 
Desert. Desert. The next time, I promised myself. The next time I will. 
Before the attack. A court-martial’s better than this. I steadier myself by 
scratching the ground with my entrenching tool.108
Towards the end of the campaign, many of the men who deserted in action seem to have 
done so because, at that moment in time, they could do nothing else. Two members of the 
16th Bn DLI, who had been with the battalion since 1943, and both of whom had excellent 
records, were convicted of cowardice by FGCM in October 1944 after leaving the front line 
for about 30 hours. One had been wounded earlier in the year, and for a month before he 
committed the offence he took part in some very heavy fighting and endured a great deal of 
heavy shelling, which caused a considerable number of casualties in his company. The 
other man, a corporal, had, just before the offence, been completely buried with his platoon 
sergeant beneath the debris of a house hit by shells. The platoon sergeant was killed and
106 NA WO 214/62 Alexander Papers Morale, Welfare & Discipline. Comments on Memorandum by the 
Adjutant General, 27 June 1944
107 Quoted in Hart, The Heat of Battle, p. 142
108 Bowlby, The Recollections of Rifleman Bowlby, pp. 182-3
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POETS CORNER
(For Capts J.R. Nixon and B.J. Wilkinson 
and the rest at home sweet home!)
IF!!
(After Rudyard Kipling)
If you can keep yourself free from going crackers 
At all the things you are told to do:
When Hitler sends along his air attackers 
With squibs and bombs to try and frighten you:
If you can hear the hellish banshee warning 
Without that sinking feeling in your breast:
If you can sleep in dug-outs till the morning 
And never feel you ought to have more rest:
If you can laugh at every black-out stumble 
Nor murmur when you cannot find a pub:
If you can eat your rations and not grumble 
About the wicked price you pay for grub:
If you can keep depression down to zero 
And view it all as just a bit of fun:
Then, sir, you’ll be a bloody hero 
And what’s more, you’ll be the only one!
Anon
Source: NA WO 170/1422 6th Bn The Royal West Kents, The Invicta News, October 1944
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the corporal himself was very badly shaken.109 Both returned to their unit of their own
accord. The poet Vernon Scannell, who was himself a deserter, believed that no deterrent
could prevent such a man from deserting:
I think that the man who is going to desert in action is going to do it anyway 
because he is not thinking beyond that isolated moment of pure abject terror. It 
is not a rational act. He’s like an animal scuttling for safety; it’s almost 
reflex.110
Men who left the front line usually stayed in the battalion area, either heading for the 
medical tent or ‘B’ Echelon, and would then be dealt with either at battalion level or by 
FGCM. Others tried to avoid even going up to the front line to start with. As battalions 
were sent up to the front there were Regimental Policemen on the starting line. Would-be 
battle absentees
would go up and would belt one of them straight on the chin, flatten him. The 
object of the exercise was to go in the nick because it was better in there than 
up there. But they got wise to that so that what they used to do was bundle him 
up in the truck and get him up there, and then, when he came out, the first day 
he was on rest, try him and then bang him in the nick for the period you were 
out. All these little things happened with everybody - all units -  any excuse to 
get out of going back. Some again, genuinely frightened, had enough, were 
weary, and should have been relieved, and they would try anything to get out of 
going back.111
There were also incidents of what might be called “passive” desertion, deliberately 
allowing oneself to be taken prisoner. At Salerno, for instance, in one sector, on D-Day + 
2, troops in a section position saw armed figures coming towards them through the trees of 
an orchard. Before a shot was fired, several of the soldiers rose from their trenches and put 
their hands up. The newcomers turned out to be Americans.112 At Anzio, too, the nature of
109 Respectively NA WO 71/933 and NA WO 71/935
110 Holden, Shell Shock, p. 100
111IWM Sound Archives 16593 T. Chadwick, Reel 8
112 Pond, Salerno, p. 136.
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the fighting, with plenty of close contact and patrolling, allowed passive desertion. Penney 
complained there were “too many cases of easy surrender to the enemy.”113 In February 
1944 a company of the 1st Bn London Scottish reported that there were approximately 100 
enemy soldiers coming out of the wood in front of their position waving a white flag. As 
the flag-bearers came closer it was discovered that they were British.114 On another 
occasion some British soldiers, prisoners of the Germans, shouted at their colleagues that 
the situation was hopeless and they’d better surrender too.115 Most of the British PoW, 
however, were captured against their will and they returned to their own lines whenever 
they could, bringing back valuable information with them.116
XI
There were, however, men who deserted with the express intent of avoiding front-line duty.
The ‘deliberate’ deserter, according to Lt.-Col. Sparrow, was a man “who frankly prefers
three years PS, served in safety, suspended after six months, and terminated (as he
confidently expects) by an amnesty, to the dangers of the line.”117 Towards the start of the
1944 winter, on soldier recalled:
The ‘grapevine’ reported that there were thirty thousand men in Italy ‘on the 
trot’. I could well believe it. A rifleman on leave had gone back to Regello.
When he’s offered an Italian a cigarette the man said ‘Thanks, mate. I’ll ‘ave 
the packet.’ He was a deserter from ‘C’ Company. I wondered what the 
numbers would be when the weather broke.118
Deserters who were serious members of the ‘Trotters’ Union’ often had criminal records. 
An RAOC serviceman, stationed near Naples, remembered the gangs of deserters who
113 LHCMA Penney Papers 13/5, p. 2
114 NA WO 170/1434 1® Bn The London Scottish Rifles War Diary for February 1944
115 Vaughan-Thomas, Anzio, p, 122
116 See, for instance, NA WO 170/1373 2nd Bn The Cameronians War Diary for June 1944 Report by an 
Escaped British PoW of his Interrogation by Germans
117 NA WO 204/6701 AFHQ Morale Committee Meetings & Reports, 1943 December-1945 March, Notes on 
Tour of Italy: June-July 1944, compiled by Lt. Col. J. Sparrow, p. 3.
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operated in the city, some based in what appeared to be official transit camps for “special
units”. From these locations they preyed particularly on other soldiers.
 NCO deserters knew or learned the ropes very quickly. It takes one to know
one and they would chat to soldiers who they suspected to be deserters. It 
would take some time before the squaddy would admit this; he was afraid that 
these men might be from the SIB. When he was convinced he would go back 
to their so-called transit camp. As long as there was a pukka RP guard on the 
gate it all looked legal from the outside. Inside the Union members would 
organize thefts from individual soldiers -  this used to be called “rolling a guy”
-  it is called mugging today. Sometimes a couple of “union members” would 
pretend to be military police and would flag a truck down which they knew to 
be carrying NAAFI goods. The union members lived the life of Reilly; high­
jacking lorries, mugging. They were up to all sorts of tricks. They were on 
velvet. One of them, so the story goes, ran a string of girls in Rome. They 
worked in the Colosseum and he used to do a twice weekly journey to collect 
the money and to dish out rewards and punishment. From what I heard that is 
how the Trotters’ Union transit camp came unstuck. One of the girls became 
jealous and shopped the ponce. When he was interrogated he spilled the beans 
but when the SIB got to the Transit Camp only the guard on the gate was 
there. 119
Civilians could also be the victims of such deserters. In October 1944, a gang of them 
assaulted some villagers and molested the women when they could not find anything 
lootable. “The women were evidently spared from outright rape by the fear many of our 
soldiers share of contracting syphilis. ” 120
In the late summer of 1944, one group of American and British deserters “had had for some 
time in their possession 3-ton lorries, a 15 cwt truck and with two despatch outriders on 
motor bicycles.... had been running grain and olive oil across the country.... What 
appeared even more incredible was that the group operating this particular enterprise 
included within it one or two German deserters. ” 121 Others took to the hills and lived as
118 Bowlby, The Recollections o f Rifleman Bowlby, p. 177
119 Lucas, The British Soldier, p. 38
120 Lewis, Naples ’44, p. 42.
121IWM 81/5/1 N.J. Friskney, Chapter VI, The Black Market, V/3
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brigands. A group of deserters known as the ‘Free English’ enjoyed their freedom for a 
few weeks, but the bitterly cold winter proved too much for them and they gave themselves 
up to Colonel Watts of No. 31 Field Surgical unit. 122
As the war moved north, so too did the criminal element. It was reported that in October 
1944 gangs of allied deserters were operating in Rome, but that strong action by Allied 
Military Police had led to the apprehension of a number of members of these gangs. 123 The 
Red Caps used to raid the Alexander Serviceman’s Club in Rome looking for deserters. 
They arrived in vans equipped with cages for the apprehended absentees. 124 There was a 
drive, starting September 11th for a month, against the deserters by the provost personnel of 
all branches of the services, RN, RAF and Army, together with Dominion and Allied 
Provost, civil police, Intelligence Branch officers and garrison troops. 125 The number of 
absentees apprehended or surrendered in the L of C area between September 9th and 
November 10th 1944 was 2,845.126
XII
All indications are that ORs absented themselves far more readily than officers or NCOs.
One explanation given was:
Very few officers and serjeants failed in battle while many men did. Why was 
this so? There are many reasons, but the main ones are as follows:-
a. They had responsibilities for men under them and had more to do and 
think about
b. They had a stronger moral sense and were more keenly aware of what was 
expected of them
122 Taylor, Combat Nurse, pp. 178-9
123 NA WO 32/15772 The War Office Committee on Morale Report of the Committee, Part I, The Army 
Overseas, Sep-Nov 1944, p. 7
124IWM Sound Archives 17621 W. Virr, Reel 14
125 NA WO 204/6714 Allied Forces, Mediterranean Theatre, Military Headquarters Papers. Discipline: 
Deserters and Absentees. Plan for Special Drive Against Absentees and Deserters, 24 August 1944
126 Ibid, Discipline: Deserters and Absentees Letter from the Major General, DAG, G-l(Br), 25 November 
1944
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c. They were by character and mental training more self-controlled, more able 
to squash their fears and more able to force themselves to do what they 
know to be right. 127
This does not mean that officers and NCOs were immune to fear or war weariness. In one
case, at the Gothic Line, a Company Commander went missing. He had gone back to HQ
to get the orders for an attack:
but as H-Hour approached he had still not returned. HQ kept radioing and 
asking if he was back yet, and then had to ring through veiy basic battle plans 
so that the junior officers could carry out the attack. The CO never re-appeared.
He had a complete breakdown - he just chickened out, he was found in a ditch.
I couldn’t have been battle fatigue, he hadn’t been in enough ... he went and 
hid in a ditch. He was quietly sent home. 128
NCOs, like all soldiers, felt the strain of prolonged action. At Gemmano, a particularly
nasty part of the Gothic Line:
the strength of our unit was much depleted and morale was dropping. The 
majority of the survivors had seen action in Tunisia and in Italy south of Rome.
Some had served in France and lived through Dunkirk. A feeling grew among 
the veterans that their chances of dying of old age were pretty slim. They had 
seen mates wounded and killed. Years later I learnt from a well liked N.C.O. 
that he had talked despairingly of running away with others in his company.
We had all had enough. 129
XIII
The fourth question posed at the beginning of the chapter was whether Territorial divisions 
suffered a higher desertion rate than Regular Army divisions. As can be seen from Table
4.8, the level of desertion, at the time when desertion was at its peak, does appears to be 
lower for the 1st and 4th Division, the Regular divisions. The total Desertion and Absentee 
figures for the five months, August to December, during the Gothic Line Assault, for each 
infantry division were as follows:
127 LHCMA Brigadier Scott-Eliot, The 5th Casualty, Battle Absentees, pp. 3-4
128IWM Sound Archives 13878 Lt.-Col. R. Collins, Reel 11
129 IWM 99/85/1 N. Wray, “Infantry Man! Why Me?”, p. 175
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Table 4.7
Table of Desertion/Absentee rate, by formation, 
produced by Historian of 8th Army’s ‘A’ Branch
lO A
August-December 1944 





78th Division 927 (October, November and December only)
1st Guards Brigade: 81
24th Guards Brigade: 102
A closer examination of the battalion figures for the 1 st and 78th Divisions, however, would 
indicate that the situation was not as simple as it at first appears:
Figure 4.8
1“ Division and 78th Division battalion Desertion Figures for December 1944131
Battalion: 2 / 1 2 9/12 16/12 23/12 30/12
6 th Gordon Highlanders: - 5 5 2 3
2nd N. Staffs: 4 - 14 1 1
1st Loyal: 6 5 5 Nil Nil
1st DWR: 14 16 - 14 5
2nd Sherwood Foresters: 5 9 4 3 2
78* Division Desertion Figures for December 1944:
Battalion: 2 / 1 2 9/12 16/12 23/12 30/12
1st E. Surreys 29 2 0 15 1 2 1 2
5th Northants 19 19 2 0 26 15
8 th A & SH: 3 1 0 6 6 7
5th Buffs 1 2 1 0 9 1 2 16
6 th RWK: - 8 2 0 1 2 16
2nd LIR: 2 1 1 - 3 1
In 1st Division the 6 th Gordon Highlanders was a Territorial Army unit, but it had the lowest 
figures, and in 78th Division the 1st East Surreys, which was a Regular unit, suffered the 
second highest absentee rate in the Division. There was thus no clear relationship between
130 Jackson, The Mediterranean and Middle East, Vol. VI, Part II, p. 376
131 Figures taken from the December War Diaries of the following battalions: NA WO 170/1394 6* Bn The 
Gordon Highlanders; NA WO 170/1487 2nd Bn The North Staffordshire Regiment; NA WO 170/1429 1* Bn 
The Loyal Regiment; NA WO 170/1382 Is* Bn The Duke of Wellington’s Regiment; NA WO 170/1475 2nd 
Bn The Sherwood Foresters; NA WO 170/1484 Is* Bn The East Surrey Regiment; NA WO 170/1446 5th Bn 
The Northamptonshire Regiment; NA WO 170/1357 8* Bn The Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders; NA WO 
170/1369 5lh Bn The Buffs; NA WO 170/1422 6th Bn The Royal West Kents and NA WO 170/1433 2nd Bn 
The London Irish Rifles
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whether a unit was a Regular or Territorial Army unit and the propensity of its members to 
desert.
The Guards Brigades were less than a quarter of the size of a division. However, assuming 
that the desertion/AWOL rate was four times higher than given in Table 4.7, i.e. 324 and 
408 for the 1st and 24th Guards Brigades respectively, to bring them in line with a Division, 
what does stand out is the low desertion/AWOL rate of the these formations, which could 
only be reinforced with guardsmen. A Guards NCO believed that most Guards deserters 
were “simply psychological cases and deserted simply because they could stand no more. 
Others were simply interested in sex and both categories were living with, and as, Italians 
simply to escape front line duty.” He added: “Apart from one instance, due mainly to poor 
leadership, I do not think that ours [Guards] were deserters in the true sense. They were 
mostly looking for amusement, and sex. One man deserted time after time but he was 
usually found shacked up with some woman without much trouble. Because he did a good 
job, and was valuable to the Bn, he was never punished very severely. ” 132
XIV
In general, soldiers tended not to go AWOL or desert in the midst of battle. 133 At Anzio, 
for instance, the desertion rate was not high overall. But this might well have been due to 
limited opportunities. The Military Police did their best to ensure that absentees and 
deserters did not embark on craft leaving Anzio quay, and there were also military police 
on the look out for deserters at the port of disembarkation. 134 There were very few hiding 
places in the beachhead: most deserters hid in Padiglione Wood, which was no safer than
132 IWM 82/37/1 E.P. Danger, pp.254-5
133 Morris, Circles o f Hell, p. 399
134 NA WO 204/6713 Discipline: Deserters & Absentees Letter from Lt.-Col., DPM, 9 March 1944
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any where else in the beachhead. 1st Division Military Police made a determined sweep for
absentees in April: they rounded up eight on April 14th, seven on April 15th, three on April
16th and then the drive intensified, with further patrols in “scruff’, although no further
apprehensions are recorded. 135 The success of keeping deserters within the beachhead is
probably best signalled by the fact that when it was learnt that 56th Division were leaving
Anzio a cage had to be set up and a guard maintained on the large number of deserters and
absentees “recently coming to hand. ” 136 The reputation of Hellhole Anzio was so
pervasive that men deserted on the news they were headed that way. One Wiltshire
Regiment soldier, who had in fact “done a runner” when the battalion was fighting on the
east coast of Italy, was picked up just before the Wilts went to Anzio.
He was in a very recalcitrant mood and I said “what are we going to do with 
this chap? He’s got to go with us.” So when we were going to get up to the 
landing craft, my platoon sergeant said ”he won’t come out of the room.” He 
said “I’m not going to go there, Sir. I’m not going to Anzio. You’ll have to 
carry me on the truck,” he said. So he was put on the truck, put on the ship. He 
was carried ashore -  or assisted to wade ashore. After he had been up in Anzio 
for a couple of days he was a changed man and the charge was withdrawn. 137
Most desertions occurred when the men were out of the line, usually on rest periods or day 
trips to Florence, Rome and other approved towns, when they found reasons for not 
returning to their units. They usually surrendered to the CMP once their money had run 
out. One deserter, for instance, hitchhiked from his regiment to Taranto and while he was 
there he bought most of his meals from restaurants. He spent the nights with troops in 
various camps in the neighbourhood and told his Commanding Officer later that quite a lot
135 NA WO 170/396 1* Division Provost Comany War Diary for April 1944
136 NA WO 170/494 56th Division Provost Company War Diary for March 1944
137 Interview with Brigadier Roden (August 2001), IO of 2nd Bn TheWiltshire Regiment at Anzio
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of absentees did that. When he had exhausted his funds he surrendered to the CMP. 138 As
the campaign continued, the need to give soldiers time away from their fighting duties for
rest and recreation, and the rising absenteeism when they were away from the front, forced 
battalion commanders to become more stringent in their approach to the problem. The 1st 
Bn DWR pointed out in September 1944 that:
♦ During the present period out of the line, the number of personnel, NCOs 
and ORs, who have failed to catch returning leave tpt from Florence, has 
been very much too high
♦ Up to now these cases have been dealt with leniently
♦ In future, however, a very serious view will be taken of any cases of 
absence and they will be dealt with severely
♦ Inability to find the car park will NOT be accepted as an excuse. 139
XV
The final area of investigation posited was what the soldiers themselves felt about deserters.
Soldiers seem to have had varying attitudes towards absentees, depending on the
circumstances. Men who deserted to the enemy -  or tried to -  were treated with contempt
at the very least. In February 1945, according to one (unsubstantiated) personal diary entry,
a Guardsman did just that:
This Guardsman suddenly leapt out of his slit trench and ran towards the 
enemy, unarmed. This fact was immediately reported through the chain of 
command and on reaching [the Colonel] he ordered not only the Battalion DF 
to bear down on the spot where it might be assumed the deserting Guardsman 
would be crossing, but the whole DF of the Division and any other back-up that 
could be demanded. I was able to listen in to all this on my own wireless set 
which suddenly became monopolized by the Commanding Officer shouting,
’Kill him! Kill him! Kill him! ’ 140
138 NA WO 204/6713 Letter from the Queen’s Own Yorkshire Dragoons to Rear HQ Fifth Army, 12 May 
1944
139 NA WO 170/1382 l Bt Bn The Duke of Wellington’s Regiment War Diary for September 1944 Battalion 
Orders 25 September 44
140 Brutton, Ensign in Italy, p. 116
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The writer thought the Guardsman must be temporarily insane. The Commanding Officer’s 
mental state might also be questioned. It later emerged, when the guardsman was picked 
up by Military Police in Rome, that he had been accused by his comrades of having stolen 
some of their kit and had been assured, in consequence, that there could be an accident in 
the front line. 141 He apparently feared his comrades more than the Germans. In another 
case, when several men from the Fusiliers deserted, taking a three-tonner full of food and 
petrol with them, the initial reaction of most of the remaining men was to laugh, except for 
one, Baker:
When Rifleman Cooper shouted ‘Good luck!’ Baker snapped his head off.
‘Turn it up, Titch,’ said Cooper defensively. ‘If they’ve ‘ad enough now’s the 
time to pack it in.’
‘We’d be well there if everyone said that!’
‘Sammy’s right, said Phillips. ‘Better it ‘appens now than in the Line.’
‘Better it ‘appens nowhere!’ said Baker. 142
Most front-line infantrymen, however, seem to have taken absenteeism philosophically. 
The reason men deserted was that they were “frightened, only one reason, a man has had 
enough ... and believe me, if you are under shell fire and it’s near hand, you’ve got lads 
that can’t stand it. They are not entirely to blame . . . . ” 143
The Army, understandably enough, took a different view.
Do men realise the appalling gravity and consequences of this offence? To give 
a very mild analogy -  what would the Wembley crowd think of -  or do to - a 
man who deliberately, in a Cup Final, scored goals against his own side? 
Magnify this ten thousand times and you don’t begin to approach the enormity 
of this crime, whereby the lives of comrades, the safety and security of wives, 
parents, families and relatives, the very existence of Great Britain with all its 
future before it, are jeopardised. 144
141 Ibid
142 Bowlby, The Recollections o f Rifleman Bowlby, p. 16
143 IWM Sound Archives 10421, L  Thornton, Reel 21
144 LHCMA Penney Papers 13/13 1** Division May Day Manifesto: Points for Officers and for their Talks to 
their Men, 1 May 1944, p. 1
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XVI
Absenteeism and desertion during the first few months of the campaign seem to have been 
well in line with levels experienced in North Africa. It is clear from the figures in Table
4.8, however, that in the period August-December 1944, the rate of absenteeism per 
division was far higher than Brigadier Scott-Eliot’s suggestion of about 300-400 absentees 
per Division in any six months. The nature of the fighting in Italy, particularly in the 
mountains in the winter months, imposed intolerable strains on many over-stretched men, 
who had been on active service, away from home, for far too long. The shortage of 
manpower meant that men were even more over-stretched by the end of 1944 than they had 
been during the previous winter, and the lack of a successful follow-through to the hard 
fighting at the Gothic Line added yet another element to sap the morale of the hard-pressed 
troops.
The majority of absentees do not seem to have been motivated by an unwillingness to fight*
rather the reverse, in fact. They had experienced too much fighting, too much strain, and
most needed a break from the unrelenting pressure of front-line conditions. The British
Historical Section, Central Mediterranean, wrote that:
In one corps alone containing four divisions, 1,145 cases of desertion were 
reported between the beginning of October 1944 and the end of January 1945.
Of these, 600 cases occurred in one division [78th Division] which had a 
distinguished fighting record, had been considerably reinforced in the Middle 
East and on return to Italy went straight into the line and remained there 
throughout the winter. This division was not engaged in any major operation 
for four months, but was subjected to the strain and tedium of holding the line 
in arduous conditions without substantial relief. 145
145 NA CAB 106/453 Operations of British, Indian and Dominion Forces in Italy, 3 September 1943-2 May 
1945, Part V, Monograph 5, The Problem of Desertion, p. 7
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The divisions with the highest desertion rates were the most experienced, and therefore the 
most hard-worked. 146 This was particularly true of 78th Division. Another possible 
explanation for battalions with excellent reputations as aggressive fighters experiencing 
high desertion rates could hinge of the type of courage required during the winter months. 
If courage can be said to have two faces -  a masculine face which privileges “the glorious 
sacrifice, the greater love of the falling-on-the-grenade variety” and a feminine face of 
endurance - then the soldiers in Italy had to endure both types. 147 Endurance was the key 
requirement in the Italian winters and often men who excelled in the masculine face of 
courage lacked its feminine counterpart. In Italy, front line infantrymen were often forced 
to lie almost motionless during daylight hours in slit trenches or behind stone sangars. 
Their inability to answer the ‘fight or flight’ imperative proved costly in terms of physical 
and mental stamina.
XVII
To sum up, the desertion rate in Italy was undoubtedly manageable at the start of the 
campaign. Sicily was swiftly taken, and nothing bolsters morale like success. However, as 
the winter of 1943/44, the worst in living memory, took hold in the mountains, the 
desertion rate started to rise. A conscript army contains the same cross section of 
personalities as civil society, with criminals and cowards in both. What worried Army 
commanders most in Italy was not the number of ‘deliberate’ desertions, but the number of 
good men who were breaking under the strain of front-line conditions: the weather, the 
living conditions, static warfare, the noise, and the exhaustion of continuous tension. Any 
man can break down, and experienced soldiers said they could predict which man would 
become a liability in the line. “Yes, you could tell ‘em when they came in ... ‘wait till I get
146 Molony, The Mediterranean and MiddleEast, Vol VI, Part II, p. 376
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out to them Jerries,’ it was, ‘I’ll show you what I ’ll do to them’ ... I’d say ‘there’s another 
bomb happy case’ and mind I was right. ” 148 Often it was the most seemingly-confident and 
belligerent men who broke first.
The desertion rate peaked towards the end of the Cassino/Anzio operations, and then again 
in the winter of 1944/45. By then, the much-heralded promise of a quick break-though of 
the Gothic Line had been proved illusory and the prospect of holding a static line for a 
second winter was just too much for many men. The majority of deserters in the winter of 
1944/45, on the face of it, came from the 56th and 78th Divisions, neither of which were 
Regular formations, but closer examination seems to indicate that by this stage of the war 
there was little to choose between Regular and Territorial battalions. The esprit de corps of 
most units had been thoroughly diluted by the number of non-infantry reinforcements and 
cross-postings. It was only the Guards battalions that retained traditional discipline, since 
they could only be reinforced by guardsmen, but they, too, were showing increased 
absentee levels. Deserters were generally not cowards, they were often men from 
battalions with reputations of very high morale who, because of their willingness to engage 
the enemy, had been over-fought. When these men could no longer carry on they absented 
themselves, but were often positive, after a period away from the front-line, about returning 
to the fray. Despite the rising desertion figures, the majority of infantrymen carried on 
doing their duty because “our soldiers had grown accustomed to [war] and some of us had 
forgotten what any other life was like. ” 149
147 Miller, The Mystery o f Courage, p. 248
148 IWM Sound Archives 13080 J. Corr, Reel 15




The rising tide of desertions as the army fought its way up Italy provoked two major, 
lengthy discussions among army commanders: firstly, what measures could be taken to 
discourage desertion in the first place and, secondly, what to do with soldiers who had 
already been charged with desertion. Most commanders in the field felt that the usual 
sentence of three years penal servitude for desertion was inadequate as a deterrent. The 
death penalty for desertion and cowardice has been abolished, by the Army and Air Force 
(Annual) Act, in 1930, despite the opposition of the Army Council. Public sentiment, 
stirred by the outpourings of anti-war sentiment in the 1920s, and outrage at the military 
death sentences inflicted on First World War soldiers suffering from “shell shock”, had 
made the abolition a political necessity. But the Army continued to maintain that the threat 
of a death penalty was required to maintain proper military discipline. In the first half of 
1942, when the situation in the Middle East was parlous for the Allies, desertion was 
considered to be so serious that the then Commander-in-Chief, General Sir Claude 
Auchinleck, recommended the re-introduction of the death penalty for desertion in the field 
to the War Office. He had the unanimous support of his army commanders. His reason 
was that: “no less a deterrent is proved to be required from time to time, not merely in the 
interests of discipline, but for the conduct of operations in conditions of strain and stress. ” 1 
The War Cabinet considered Auchinleck’s recommendation in June 1942 and turned it 
down. 2
1 McPherson, Discipline, p. 54
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The sharp increase in the number of deserters in Italy during the winter of 1943-44 
prompted generals once again to seek stronger deterrents. It was Lt.-General Richard 
McCreery, Commander, 10th Corps, who started the ball rolling in a letter to the Lt-General 
Harding, Alexander’s Chief of General Staff, in February 1944. McCreery wrote that “it is 
clear that there is no chance of the death penalty being reintroduced into the Army Act 
during the present War, therefore other steps must be taken. ” 3 McCreery proposed three 
alternative deterrents. Firstly, in view of the fact that most deserters were not concerned 
about a prison sentence since they were counting on a general amnesty at the end of the 
War “on the same lines as took place after the last War,” he felt that there should be no 
general amnesty. Secondly, he moved that all sentences should be carried out in full, unless 
they were suspended for special reasons. “I am certain,” he wrote, “that 75% of all 
desertions would stop if men knew that the full sentence would have to be undergone”. 
Thirdly, he raised the question of drafting deserters into labour battalions for service in the 
Pacific in the war against Japan. McCreery also suggested fostering a stronger esprit de 
corps which “is particularly important when large drafts have to be absorbed quickly during 
prolonged operations.” 4
Three days after McCreery wrote to Harding, General Alexander, Commander, 15th Army 
Group, wrote to General Sir H. Maitland-Wilson, Supreme Allied Commander 
Mediterranean Theatre, pointing out that there were 450 men, from just three divisions, 
awaiting trial in Naples for desertion and absence without leave and that a further 25 men
2 NA WO 214/62 Alexander Papers Letter to General Sir H. Maitland-Wilson, Supreme Allied Commander 
Mediterranean Theatre, from The Adjutant-General, General Sir Ronald Adam, 7 April 1944
3 NA WO 204/6712 War Office: Allied Forces, Mediterranean Theatre, Military Headquarters Papers. 
Discipline: Deserters & Absentees: McCreery to Harding, 15 February 1944
4 Ibid
221
were being brought in every day by the Military Police in Naples. He opined: “The
abolition of the death penalty for desertion has undoubtedly been a great mistake. I have
repeatedly emphasised this; I am convinced that this penalty should be re-introduced. ” 5
Alexander finished his letter to Maitland-Wilson by stating:
It is unfair to the men who stay to fight without the aid of their disloyal 
comrade. It is unfair to the man himself. Most of these deserters are not bad 
men. Many of them have fought well. They would not have disgraced 
themselves if they had had the moral stiffening which the prospect of adequate 
punishment would provide.6
Maitland-Wilson took Alexander’s concerns to the Adjutant-General, General Sir Ronald 
Adam, who replied that there was little prospect of the Government considering something 
they had turned down less than a year previously. “There is no chance of getting the death 
penalty now. I tried before El Alamein, and was stopped, because it could not be 
introduced when the British Army was in trouble. ” 7 In a further communication Adam told 
Maitland-Wilson: “If anything, the chances of re-introduction have diminished since that 
date owing to the favourable turn of events which has taken place on all fronts. ” 8 In any 
case, faced with the suggestion that the only effective remedy for desertion was to create an 
ever greater fear -  that of execution - Adam stated that while he would not argue against 
the re-introduction of the death penalty in flagrant cases of inexcusable cowardice where a 
soldier had endangered the lives of his comrades, the problem, in his view, with the threat 
of the death penalty was that not all desertion was due to fear, so its re-introduction would 
not put an immediate stop to 90% of the incidence of desertion, as had been suggested by 
Major-General Sir Brian Robertson, Chief Administrative Officer at Alexander’s
5 Ibid Alexander to Maitland-Wilson, 18 February 1944
6 Ibid
7 NA WO 214/62 Alexander Papers Letter to General Sir H. Maitland-Wilson from Sir Ronald Adam,
14 March, 1944
8 Ibid Letter to Maitland-Wilson from Adam, 7 April 1944
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headquarters.9 In his view the figure would be 50% or less. 10 He also noted that the crime 
of self-inflicted wounds was almost unknown in Italy and that would certainly re-appear if 
the death penalty were re-introduced for desertion. 11
Despite Adam’s acknowledgement that there was no possibility of the death penalty being 
re-introduced for desertion, Major-General Penney, Commander, 1st Division, wrote in May 
1944 in a memo on Absentees and Deserters in the Anzio beachhead that the abolition of 
the death penalty was partly responsible for the rising desertion figures, “as it has removed 
the supreme reminder of the obligations of the individual to the community. ” 12 He added 
that the offence of desertion “is far too prevalent and the cure is extremely difficult to 
find. ” 13 Penney suggested that, at Anzio, a penal settlement could be established in a 
location “near an active battery or the docks or some similar place exposed to enemy fire” 
and that “the barbed wire perimeter could be sown with anti-personnel mines . . . ” 14 The 
Assistant Deputy Judge Advocate General considered Penney’s memo and replied that 
while he could see no legal objection to the suggestion of a military prison being set up in 
the Anzio Beachhead, “ I do think ... that there may be grave objections to surrounding this 
prison with anti-personnel mines even if there are notices to show their existence and the 
prisoners are informed of the risk they run if they try to escape. I foresee a furore being
9 NA CAB 106/733 General Oliver Leese’ Operational Correspondence Memo on desertion by Major- 
General Sir Brian Robertson, Chief Administrative Officer, to Lt. General Sir Oliver Leese, 7 June 1944, and 
included in a letter sent to The Adjutant-General by General Alexander in June 1944
10 NA WO 214/62 Alexander Papers Allied Forces, Mediterranean Theatre, Military Headquarters Papers: 
Discipline, Deserters and Absentees: Comments on Memorandum by the Adjutant General, 27 June 1944
11 Ibid Letter from Sir Ronald Adam to CAO, 25 February 1944
12 NA WO 204/6713 Memo from Major-General Penney, Commander, l 8* Division, to HQ VI (US) Corps 
(British Increment) (2) Absentees and Deserters, Paragraph 10, 2 May 1944
13 Ibid Paragraph 11 , 2  May 1944
14 Ibid Paragraph 16, 2 May 1944
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stirred up both in Parliament and the Press if an escaping prisoner was killed by a mine laid 
for the purpose of preventing an escape. ” 15 Nothing came of Penney’s suggestion.
In the end, three main areas of concern came to dominate the discussion about stronger 
deterrents in the absence of the death penalty: no general amnesty at the end of the war; 
forfeiture of demobilization priority; and the despatch of soldiers convicted of desertion to 
the Far East, all of which were contentious to some extent
I
Every soldier seemed to be under the general misapprehension that there would be a 
general amnesty after the war, despite the fact that there was no amnesty in 1918. Even a 
Lt. Colonel who acted as President of a General Court Martial in Italy was under the 
impression that the soldiers who were convicted in his court would be “certain to get a 
suspended sentence under a general amnesty” when peace came. 16 In April 1944 Adam 
wrote to Maitland-Wilson that he would put his proposal for a proclamation that no 
amnesty would be granted to the Army Council and ask them to agree to the publication of 
a statement that they did not intend to put forward or support any recommendation to the 
Government for the grant of an amnesty. 17 The Secretary of State for War, Sir James 
Grigg, prepared a paper on desertion for Churchill, trying to have the question of a post-war 
amnesty for deserters dealt with firmly. But in the summer of 1944 he failed to get an 
amnesty ruled out. 18 Adam, meanwhile, was dealing with the question of the 
demobilization status of deserters. “Our draft demobilization regulations already state that 
all periods of service for which the solder cannot claim pay (i.e. desertion, absence, under
15 NA WO 204/6713 Letter from the ADJAG, Judge Advocate General’s Branch, 5 May 44
16IWM 97/7/1 Brigadier KA. Ardeme, “An Army Life 1918-44”, p.69
17 NA WO 214/62 Alexander Papers Adam to Maitland-Wilson, 7 April 1944
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sentence, release to civil employment, etc) do not count as entitlement towards
demobilization priority. The publication of this rule, as soon as it has received approval,
should act as a definite deterrent upon the would-be deserter. ” 19 But he also attempted to
ensure that service prior to desertion would not count towards qualifying service for
demobilization. He failed at this, too, at that time. When the plan for the release of serving
personnel when the war with Germany was over was first published in October 1944 a
special ABCA pamphlet was issued giving full details. The pamphlet suggested that the
only penalty suffered by a deserter would be forfeiture of the time spent in a state of
desertion, or in prison or detention while serving his sentence. General Alexander wrote:
“It would appear that such deduction may only defer the release of these men for a very
short time, and it therefore is not a satisfactory deterrent. ” 20 He added:
I recommend that the War Office be pressed to take the following action 
forthwith:-
- To issue a statement that there was no amnesty for military offenders after the 
last war and that there will be none after this
- To issue orders that all men sentenced to penal servitude or imprisonment for 
desertion or absence will serve their sentences in full irrespective of the 
termination of hostilities
- To issue orders that men under suspended sentence will not qualify for release 
until they have earned remission, which they can only do after posting to a non- 
European theatre of war. 21
Churchill finally made a statement in the House of Comments in December 1944,
supporting Alexander’s proposals on the amnesty question, and, when the demobilization
regulations were published in early 1945 it was made clear that “all previous service
counting towards demobilization was disallowed if a man deserted. This meant that when
18 Peaty, “The Desertion Crisis in Italy 1944”, pp 76-83
19 NA WO 214/62 Alexander Papers Adam to Mailtland-Wilson, 7 April 1944
20 NA WO 204 /6714 Discipline, Deserters and Absentees Letter from General Alexander, 30 October 1944
21 Ibid
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his colleagues were demobilized at the end of the war in Europe the deserter would find 
himself posted to the Far East.22
With regard to the despatch of soldiers convicted of desertion to the Far East, Adam’s 
original view was that as soon as the war in Europe was over, there was “everything to be 
said for sending a large proportion of men convicted of desertion to the Far East.” He felt 
that:
a. Suspended men already serving with units at the termination of the war with 
Germany should be sent on early drafts to the Far East
b. Men serving sentences should be suspended and sent overseas from prisons 
under the same conditions and in the same proportion as at the moment;
c. Men who have completed their sentence should be sent on early drafts to 
the Far East. 23
Along with compulsory service in the Far East, it was also suggested that men found guilty 
of desertion should, after a short period in a penal establishment, be posted to special labour 
units to be employed on porterage and similar duties in the forward area. Both these 
proposals were rejected because:
- administration of units formed completely from men who had failed in the past 
would be extremely difficult
- the proportion of escapees would be very high and the number of guards 
required to prevent such escapes would be uneconomical
- It was obvious that Far Eastern theatres would be most reluctant to accept a unit 
of this type. 24
22 Jackson, The Mediterranean and Middle East, Vol. VI, Part III, p. 365
23 NA WO 214/62 Alexander Papers Letter from Adam to Maitland-Wilson, 7 April 1944
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II
Reducing the number of deserters also exercised brigade and battalion commanders. In 
October 1944, for instance, the 167th Bde Commander went round his battalions talking to 
officers, Warrant Officers, Sergeants and L/Sergeants on the subject of absenteeism.25 On 
November 27th 1944, when the 2/7* Queens (167th Brigade, 56th Division) was preparing to 
move to a forward area, all the men had to sign a statement to the effect that if they were 
absent from that date onwards they realised that they would be charged with desertion.26 
December 1944 seems the first month that any battalion informed its men that they would 
be declared deserters under the official time limit of 21 days. It is interesting to note, 
however, that 2nd Echelon started listing some absentees as “Deserters, Absent Under 21 
Days” from the beginning of June 1944, although this was, in all probability, illegal. 
There is no explanation as to why they did this, but such cases might have been absentee 
recidivists whom the Army felt deserved a more severe charge than AWOL. Since the 
threat of being charged with desertion instead of absenteeism under 2 1  days was not widely 
broadcast in battalion Orders of the Day as a deterrent and, in summer 1944, no additional 
manpower requests could be made to replace battalion deserters, there seems to have been 
no constructive reason to have started listing deserters in such a manner.
A different tack in its drive against absenteeism was taken by the 8 th Bn The Argyll & 
Sutherland Highlanders. Their CO tried to dissuade would-be deserters by pointing out the 
financial penalties accruing:
24 NA CAB 106/453 Operations of British, Indian and Dominion Forces in Italy, 3 September 1943 to 2 May 
1945 Part V, Monograph 5, The Problem of Desertion, p. 6
25 NA WO 170/1436 Is* Bn The London Scottish War Diary for October 1944
26 NA WO 170/1467 2/7* Bn The Queen’s Royal Regiment War Diary for November 1944
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It is felt that men do not realise the full significance of punishments for absence 
and desertion and the following points should be brought to notice of all ranks:
In the case of absence where Field Punishment is awarded pay is forfeited from 
the day of commencement of absence, throughout the period of absence and 
while in custody awaiting trial and for the full period of Field Punishment 
awarded.
In the case of desertion the above forfeitures apply and that pay is forfeited for 
the full period of detention served.
All Voluntary allotments cease after 28 days in Detention.
In addition men convicted of a charge of absence, the Pay Anniversary date is 
brought forward by the number of days absent, which means that when a man 
becomes eligible for upgrading to a higher class of pay the day which it reckons 
is the Pay anniversary date plus the number of days absent. 27
The 2 /6 ^ Queens made a point in its Battalion Orders Part 1 of January 18th 1945 of re­
printing the Prime Minister’s answer to a question in the House regarding the general 
remission of sentences after the war. “There is no reason why the men concerned should 
not complete their sentences irrespective of the end of the war with Germany or the end of 
the war with Japan.” The CO pointed out that “since the Bn left Monte Cassino to the 
present day, it has had a very small percentage of deserters. This is one of the reasons why 
the Bn has a very good name in the Bde.” To ensure that this state of affairs continued, the 
CO decided that, “commencing tomorrow, in ever issue of Bn Orders Part I, the names of 
those ORs who decide to desert will be published. ” 28 On January 19th 16 deserters were 
named. Ten of the men, who had deserted between November 29th and January 10th, had 
not been apprehended. Of the other six, four had been returned to the battalion within two 
days, and the other two in nine days, so they were really guilty of being AWOL rather than 
of desertion.29 By February 17th four more names had been added to the list, all of whom
27 NA WO 170/4988 8th Bn The Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders War Diary for March 1945 Battalion 
Orders 8 March
28 NA WO 170/5060 2/6* Bn The Queen’s Royal Regiment War Diary for January 1945
29 Ibid
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went AWOL on January 27th and who were returned to the battalion by January 31st.30 By 
the end of February almost all of the named “deserters” had been apprehended.
Ill
It was normal practice to promulgate verdicts and sentences, after confirmation, in the 
orders of all the formation in which the convening of the court had appeared, and in every 
case in the orders of the unit concerned. “Such actions can be used to support the argument 
that courts martial were used as warnings to others,” state Mark Connelly and Walter 
Miller, in an article in 20** Century British History?1 They drew a clear line between the 
preoccupations of the High Command -  particularly, Auchinleck, Montgomery and 
Alexander -  over what they perceived to be a major desertion problem, and the exemplary 
aspects of courts martial sentencing in North Africa and Italy between 1940-1943. They 
believed that the army commanders often overstated the scale of the “supposed” desertion 
problem and that their fears “created an atmosphere in which the details of individual cases 
were often overridden in the name of discipline and military efficiency. Paradoxically, 
such an attitude only added to the High Command’s concerns, for by ensuring a high level 
of convictions, the outcomes of courts martial appeared to confirm the validity of its 
views. ” 32 Connelly and Miller maintained that the obsession with lax discipline as the 
explanation for poor morale and poor behaviour reached two peaks, first in North Africa in 
1942-3, and then in Italy from late 1943, but that morale was never as poor as senior 
officers feared, and that the ‘stick’ method of punishment was often placed higher than the 
‘carrot’ method of encouragement and understanding. 33 Brigadier G.W.B. James, the 
Middle East Command psychiatrist, stated that: “Soldiers’ morale, in North Africa, was like
30 Ibid War Diary for February 1945
31 Connelly & Miller, “British Courts Martial in North Africa”, pp. 217-242
32 Ibid
229
an india rubber ball, quick to recover and never down for long. ” 34 Auchinleck and others 
disregarded the fluctuations and assumed a continually depressed state of morale and 
discipline that could be solved only by vigorous enforcement of military law.35
Certainly, in Italy, higher sentences for desertion were deliberately awarded on the Anzio 
beachhead, with the imposition of sentences of five years’ penal servitude for desertion, in 
place of the normal standard of three years. 36 But even in November 1944, when desertion 
was peaking, the ADJAG 8 th Army noted that a deserter, who had a clean conduct sheet, 
received a sentence of three years’ penal servitude.37 Other offences incurred heavier 
sentences, particularly cowardice. One soldier remembers that on the night of November 
11th 1944:
It was raining heavily and we were lined up waiting to attack. All hell was let 
loose. The platoon officer moved forward, always at the front, pistol in his 
hand. The order was ‘On your feet and move’. It was scary. It always was. At 
the start line H ... was not 20 or 30 yards away. He was the next man to me. I 
had got to be his corporal. As I got up I saw he didn’t. It was my job to keep 
my section going forward. I ordered him but he was lay on his back looking 
up. His eyes were glazed. He was glued to the ground. He was in shock. I 
gave him just three seconds. I had to move. He had frozen completely. That 
was the last time I saw H.... A few weeks later there was a one liner on 
battalion part II orders. It simply stated “Private H... was found guilty of 
cowardice in the face of the enemy. He was sentenced to 10 years in a military 
prison.38
There are no records of FGCsM for desertion in Italy available at the National Archives. 
The limited number of files there for the relevant period deal principally with cowardice
33 Ibid
34 Quoted in Connelly & Miller, “British Courts Martial”, p. 237
35 Ibid
36 NA CAB 106/453 Operations of British, Indian and Dominion Forces in Italy, 3 September 1943 to 2 May 
1945, Part V, Monograph 5, The Problem of Desertion, p. 10
37 NA WO 71/926 Note from the JAG Branch, 10 November 1944, with regard to the mitigating 
circumstances in the case of a man accused of cowardice and sentenced to five years’ penal servitude, “who 
does not appear to have been away from duty for as long a period as many a deserter.”
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and mutiny.39 In general, the sentence was cowardice was five years, in some cases 
remitted by one or two years.40 A lesser sentence, three years penal servitude, varied to 
one year’s hard labour, was awarded in the case of a man charged with cowardice in that, 
when holding a defensive position in the line, he had retired to the Rear HQ, but who had 
subsequently taken part in five or six night patrols.41 Other men charged with cowardice 
were sentenced to two-three years’ penal servitude 42 In one case a man who had gone 
AWOL seven times between 1940 and 1943, when he was dealt with at battalion level with 
a forfeiture of pay, and had two other charges on his record, one for being improperly 
dressed, and the other for allowing himself to be in a verminous state, was sentenced to six 
years’ penal servitude.43 Sentences for mutiny varied from death by being shot, commuted 
to seven years’ penal servitude; penal servitude for life, mitigated to five years penal 
servitude; and five to 10 years’ penal servitude.44
In the 1943-45 campaign, a Sergeant-Major recalled that whenever his battalion went out of 
the line to rest, “there was a building reserved in the back area ...which was a courts 
martial building. If the desertion was proved, they got three years. ” 45 One battalion, the 
2/7th Queens (167th Brigade, 56th Division) maintained a general record of all absentees 
from August to December 1944. There were 153 absentees who were responsible for 196 
individual acts of absence without leave -  34 of the men were serial absentees. The
38 Mills, One for Grandad!, p. 24
39 The records looked at were NA WO 71/833-956, not all of which were for the Italian Campaign
40 See, for instance, NA WO 71/834; WO 71/835; WO 71/840; WO 71/842; WO 71/843; WO 71/856; WO 
71/858; WO 71/868; WO 71/869; WO 71/870; WO 71/873; WO 71/885; WO 71/905; WO 71/926; WO 
71/936; WO 71/933;
41 NA WO 71/853
42 NA WO 71/842; WO 71/843; WO 71/866; WO 71/867; WO 71/872; WO 71/932; WO 71/935;
43 NA WO 71/850
44 NA WO 71/849; NA WO 71/ 878 and NA WO 71/879
45IWM Sound Archives 10421 L. Thornton, Reel 21
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majority of the 153 absentees were away from the battalion for a day or so, five at the most 
- before they surrendered to the Military Police. Of the 52 absentees recorded for October, 
23 men were tried by Field General Court Martial between October 22nd-26th. Sentences 
varied from 56 days’ detention (six men); 90 days’ detention (two men); six months’ 
detention (three men); and 2 years’ hard labour (12 men) . 46 Few other battalion war diaries 
contain a full complement of Orders of the Day, so it is difficult to make a definitive 
statement, but from the existing evidence it would seem that sentences awarded by FGCM 
at the end of 1944 seem to have hovered around the two-to-three-year mark, rather than the 
five year sentences of Anzio. In 56th Division, for instance, of 14 men sentenced by FGCM 
on October 22nd, one was sentenced to three years; five for two years; two for 18 months; 
four for one year; one for nine months and one for 28 days detention.47 In 4th Division, 
three promulgations in the 2nd Bn The King’s Regiment Battalion Orders indicated that 
three years penal servitude was awarded for desertion in November.48 Even in 78th 
Division, which suffered the highest rate of desertion of all the divisions, the length of 
sentence for desertion seems to have hovered around two-three years.49 Only in two cases 
were longer sentences, six years, recorded in the cases of men found guilty of both 
Desertion and Disobeying a Lawful Command. 50
It would appear, therefore, from the limited evidence available, that exemplary sentences 
were not the norm in Italy, except in exceptional circumstances such as Anzio, or in answer
46 NA WO 170/1467 2/7* Bn The Queen’s Royal Regiment War Diary for October 1944
47 NA WO 170/1466 2/6* Bn The Queen’s Royal Regiment War Diary for October 1944
48 NA WO 170/1418 2nd Bn The King’s Regiment War Diary for November 1944 Battalion Orders, 23 
November
49 See, for instance, NA WO 170/1446 5* Bn The Northamptonshire Regiment War Diary for October 1944 
Daily Orders, 21 October
50 NA WO 170/1422 6* Bn The Queen’s Own Royal West Kent Regiment War Diaries for November and 
December 1944 Routine Orders, 25 November, 16 December and 30 December
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to multiple charges. This had a historical precedent. Echoing, to some extent, what 
infantrymen were to feel in Italy in 1943-45, the mail censor in the 1918 Italian campaign 
wrote about “a feeling of personal victimization, which, coupled with a sense of revolt 
against uncongenial surroundings, gives rise to continuous and increasing discontent and 
weariness” . 51 This led, according to Gerald Oram, to the development of an “increasingly 
lenient approach to discipline within which capital convictions were avoided.” 52
IV
When a man was charged with an offence the first officer to look at his case was generally 
his company commander, who would deal with the matter if he was satisfied that the 
offence was one he was competent and authorized to try. Otherwise the case went before 
the commanding officer. The commanding officer could not try officers or Warrant 
Officers, but in the case of ordinary soldiers he could award a sentence of detention of up to 
28 days; a fine, for drunkenness only, up to a maximum of £2 ; pay deductions; 
confinement to barracks for a maximum of 14 days; extra guard and piquet duties; and 
admonition. If the soldier was on active service the commanding officer could award field 
punishment of up to 28 days and forfeiture of pay for the number of days the field 
punishment was carried out.53 If the case was sent to court, the soldier would be tried by a 
Field General Court Martial at a Courts Martial and Holding Centre. The number of 
deserters at large in Italy resulted in considerable administrative difficulties in bringing 
cases to trial as speedily as possible. Deserters tended to make their way south, as far away 
from the front as possible. When they were arrested it was generally impossible to bring 
them to trial on documentary evidence since the evidence that would prove that they had
51 Quoted in Oram, “Rous Peijury: Discipline and Morale in the British Force in Italy 1917-1918”, p. 430
52 Oram, “Rous Peijuiy”, pp. 412-130
53 McPherson, Discipline, p. 25
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deserted to avoid active operations was only available in their units, which were more often 
than not engaged in active operations. It was therefore impossible to bring deserters to trial 
until their unit had been withdrawn from operations for a period of rest. 54
In North Africa deserters had been held in Reinforcement Training Depots until 
arrangements could be made to return them to the forward area for trial. This had proved 
highly unsatisfactory for several reasons. Escapes were frequent as the only 
accommodation available was wire cages, and guards selected from reinforcements 
awaiting postings had no interest in stopping any determined attempt to escape. But far 
worse was the effect on the morale of reinforcements when such large numbers of deserters 
were present in the same depot. It was equally impossible for units in the line to 
accommodate and guard large numbers of soldiers awaiting promulgation or disposal to 
penal establishments after trial. The difficulty of holding and trying deserters was solved 
by the establishment of Courts Martial and Holding Centres. The first of these units was 
formed by Eighth Army in the Western Desert and then two more were formed in Italy. 
Two or more permanent Courts Martial sat at these centres. The President of each 
Permanent Court was a member of the Pool of Permanent Presidents, and the members 
were officers detailed by forward units for a week or fortnight at a time.
Permanent Presidents were found to be desirable for three reasons. Firstly, in Italy the 
supply of experienced field officers who had some knowledge of military law and who 
could thus be relied upon to conduct a Court Martial diminished rapidly, especially in 
fighting formations. Secondly, where large numbers of cases had to be dealt with a great
54 NA CAB 106/453 Operations of British, Indian and Dominion Forces in Italy, 3 September 1943 to 2 May
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deal of time was saved by their employment and, thirdly, greater uniformity in sentencing
was secured. 55 Some commanders in the field obviously disagreed with the latter point:
Presidents of F.G.Cs.M. especially permanent ones from Court Martial Centres 
have not convicted a man of desertion unless it can be proved that he personally 
was given a direct order to proceed up the line or else to do a definite job. In 
order to secure a conviction it has not been sufficient to prove that the Bn was 
in the line in contact with the enemy at a time when the man deserted.... As 
regards the awarding of sentences there appears to be no consistency at all. In 
one case 2 men had gone absent together, one man being awarded 5 years Penal 
Servitude, the other deprived of 42 days pay.56
As the distance between the location in Italy where the deserters were arrested and the 
forward Court Martial and Holding Centres became longer, the problem of moving the men 
became more acute. Owing to the unsuitable nature of the rolling stock, the long period 
occupied by a train journey and the frequent halts, parties despatched by train, even with 
100% escort, showed a very high percentage of escapes. There were cases of as many as 
50% of soldiers awaiting trial escaping during the course of a single train journey. Further, 
long delays resulted from the lack of suitable escorts: it was acknowledged that, for 
reasons of morale, reinforcements proceeding to the line should not act as escorts to 
deserters. The problem was solved by a new unit, known as a ‘Court Martial Escort Unit’, 
which was formed in January 1945. The unit was equipped with nine, 3-ton lorries fitted 
with special wire cages, each holding 16 soldiers in custody. The unit contained sufficient 
guard and administrative personnel to establish a staging post between Rome and the 
forward area, since the distance was too great to enable the trip to be made in one day. 57
1945, Part V, Monograph 5, The Problem of Desertion, p. 3
55 Ibid, p. 4
56 NA WO 170/1411 1st Bn The King’s Own Yorkshire Light Infantry War Diary for April 1944
57 NA CAB 106/453 Operations of British, Indian and Dominion Forces in Italy, 3 September 1943 to 2 May 
1945, Part V, Monograph 5, The Problem of Desertion, pp. 4-5
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By February 1944 the lack of space in military prisons forced the authorities to make 
greater provisions. It was decided to increase the capacity of No. 56 Military Prison and 
Detention Barracks from 300 to 600 and locate it in Brindisi; to increase No. 55 Military 
Prison and Detention Barracks from 130 to 400 capacity and locate it at Lecce; and to move 
No. 3 Field Punishment Camp from Sicily to Lucema and change it to both a Field 
Punishment Camp and Detention Barracks for 200 men. Furthermore, a new Military 
Prison for 400 would be sited at Portici, with Nos. 25 & 26 Field Punishment Camps and 
Detention Barracks to house 200 each.58 This action was taken following reports that the 
situation in Italy with regard to the disposal of soldiers awaiting trial by Court Martial, and 
the provision of penal establishments, was totally inadequate. 59 At that time, February 
1944, there were over 500 cases awaiting trial; No. 1 Court Martial and Holding Centre 
was overtaxed and additional holding accommodation had to be provided. In addition, No. 
25 Field Punishment Centre was full to capacity and an overflow of soldiers under sentence 
(SUS) were temporarily accommodated in a Prisoner of War Camp.
V
The question of how to deal with those sentenced to long periods of detention or imprison­
ment was difficult. They constituted a waste of manpower, and required a number of 
officers and men to look after then. In 1942 the Director of Military Training took over the 
training policy in detention barracks and as a result “the soldier spent all his time in hard 
training and came out fit to take his place in battle” . 60
Soldiers serving longer sentences were incarcerated in Canadian and British 
prisons that had been opened in Italy. They operated on the fundamental 
detention barracks premise that conditions should be sufficiently unpleasant to
58 NA WO 170/1 G1 (Br) AFHQ Jan-March 1944 Appendix ‘A ’ to DAG’s Fortnightly Conference Minutes 
(No. 4) held at AFHQ on Tuesday, 22 February 1944
59 NA WO 204/6712 Memo from AFHQ Adv. Adm. Ech, CMF, to AFHQ G-l (Br), 7 February 1944
60 LHCMA Adam Papers 3/13 Chapter V -  Morale and Discipline
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deter soldiers from casually choosing to endure them. The camp’s War Diary 
remarks that: ‘of necessity initiation must be tough, or the whole camp would 
fail in its purpose, that of instilling a sense of discipline in soldiers who ‘fall out 
of line’. It is hard to describe it -  the soldier under sentence in not touched in 
any way, but he is kept so busy doing things, and being constantly shouted out 
by four or five sergeants, that he doesn’t know whether he is coming or going, 
and soon he doesn’t care. All movements in camp were at the double. There 
was a daily half-hour talking period and a one-hour Sunday reading period 
when prisoners would read mail and write one letter. They might also at this 
time eat one issue chocolate bar. While conditions were undoubtedly tough, it 
must be kept in mind that prisoners were not being shot at by Germans.61
The last point was not lost on a deserter from Alex Bowlby’s unit when he was warned that
he would get three years in prison. “And I’ll be ‘ere when you’re pushing up daisies,” he
replied.62
Field Punishment Camps were not pleasant places, and discipline was reportedly even 
stricter there than in the detention barracks. “Very few soldiers have ... suffered the 
severity, humiliation and degradation of field punishment pack drill ... it was the ultimate 
for line dodgers. The object was to break you first and then make you. After your 
treatment there, you would obey any orders given to you or else. And so it was. ” 63 The 
prisoners’ hair “was completely sheared to the bone. One theory about this is when you are 
all hairless it takes some identity away from you all. You lose some of your individuality 
and personality and you become institutionalised. ” 64 The majority of each day was spent 
in close order drill.
The staff were master drill sergeants, and they worked in relays about every 
hour, in order to keep us incessantly pounding the square. It was heartbreaking 
endless monotony, which was only relieved by the change of voices in the 
words of command. We were drilled at lOOmph with a turn every 10 to 15 
paces continuously, ceaselessly and with no respite. The worst was to come in
61 Copp & McAndrew, Battle Exhaustion, pp. 65-66
62 Bowl by, The Recollections of Rifleman Bowlby, p. 108
63 Mills, One for Grandad!, p. 7
64 Ibid, p. 9
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the afternoons. That was pack drill. This was truly a test of strength and 
endurance. It started by counter marching and a torrent of screams, orders, 
threats and abuse poured out as we staggered and lurched round in a large circle 
at a fast doubling pace ... You were weighed down with your pack and 
equipment... the open cuts into the flesh from the equipment straps would not 
be felt at that stage. 65
This routine was carried out seven days a week. The prisoners were allowed to speak for 
only 30 minutes a day, there was no reading of any description, and no mail was ever 
received.66 Even so, some men were more than happy to sit the war out in prison. One 
deserter recalled:
In the glasshouse we got three meals a day, a roof over our heads and safety.
Up the line we slept in slits open to the pouring rain which fell most of the time 
in sunny Italy. Food didn’t always get to the forward positions so we often 
went hungry and then, on top of everything else, there was the danger. Time in 
the nick was hard, but I had had a hard life in civvy street, so whatever the 
screws could fling at me was water off a duck’s back. Some of the men doing 
time were well off in the moosh. They had got themselves some right khushti 
numbers; in the cookhouse as orderlies, in the Sergeant’s Mess as waiters -  a 
couple were said to have been bumboys to the screws. What did such nick 
wallahs want with remission of sentence? This was offered to those who had 
deserted from front-line units, in order to get them back up the line. After about 
six weeks the prisoner would be interviewed and told his case was under 
revision. On a second interview he would be offered remission of sentence if 
he returned to a front-line unit. At the end of the war in Europe this sort of 
offer was made in most nicks, in the UK and overseas, to bring the drafts for 
Burma up to strength. The attitude of most of the blokes doing time was that if 
we would not fight Jerry in Europe we were certainly not going to fight in a 
jungle against the Japs.67
VI
One of McCreeiy’s suggestions in February 1944 had been that sentences should be carried 
out in full. The object of suspension of sentence was twofold. Firstly it enabled the 
commander to effect a saving of manpower, by returning to duty those soldiers who, after 
serving part of their sentences, were considered fit to return to their commands, in order to
65 Ibid p. 13
66 Ibid p. 11
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show by their conduct that they intended to make good. Secondly, it gave the soldier a 
chance to rehabilitate himself.68 All sentences awarded by courts-martial and which were 
in execution were subject to periodical review by a superior military authority. The first 
review was carried out 42 days after committal and subsequent reviews took place at 
intervals not exceeding six months. Suspension of sentence meant that, although a soldier 
had been tried by court-martial, found guilty and sentenced, the part of the sentence which 
he had not yet served was held in abeyance for the time being, and the man was returned to 
his unit for normal duty. Sentences under suspension were also reviewed at intervals not 
exceeding three months, and the result of such reviews was mainly determined by the 
conduct of the man himself while under suspended sentence. If he had been of good 
behaviour for a reasonable period, the suspended sentence might be remitted.
Faced with crippling manpower shortages, commanders in Italy generally practised a 
system of suspended sentences, in the belief that many men had broken under strain and 
only wanted a change to redeem themselves. “Eighth Army are not suspending all cases 
automatically after any specified period, but are suspending fairly freely. The figures 
suggest that four out of five men whose sentences are suspended made good, at least for a 
time.”69 Between January and May 1944 only one in 100 suspended sentences were put 
into execution.70 Some men benefited from this policy. A twice-wounded soldier who 
had deserted at the start of the Sicilian campaign surrendered after the campaign and was 
sentenced to five years’ imprisonment. He wrote to his platoon commander a few weeks
67 Lucas, The British Soldier, p. 27
68 McPherson, Discipline, p. 34
69 NA WO 204/6713 Memo on Suspended Sentences, AAG(PS) to DAG, 1 May 1944
70 NA CAB 102/224 ‘The British Soldier in Italy”, p. 40
239
after his trial, saying that he hoped to have his sentence suspended so that he could rejoin 
the battalion.71
Not everyone, however, agreed with this policy. The author of a report for the Morale
Committee on the mood of British troops, like McCreery, personally believed that
suspended sentences were a short-sighted reinforcement policy, which demonstrated that a
severe sentence of punishment meant little and clearly illustrated that no grave consequence
followed the deserter’s method of escaping battle.72 A would-be offender realized that, in
most cases, a long sentence would probably be suspended and the balance remitted after a
portion had been served. Thus the actual length of sentences had small significance or
terror for the determined or hardened criminal. It also produced the converse effect:
Presidents of courts-martial, who wished to award a severe and exemplary punishment,
often awarded an excessively harsh sentence in the belief that this would in all probability
be suspended and substantially remitted.73 A point in case was a General Court Martial at
which 14 NCOs and men were charged with mutiny. The President of the Court recalled:
The accused were defended by two very good advocates, but they were found 
guilty of mutiny and inciting to mutiny, and of that there was not the least 
doubt. The court consisted of two full Staff Colonels. The other two 
Lt.Colonels and I came from the battle area. We voted for the death sentence, 
but the two Staff Colonels refused to join and we had to be satisfied with a long 
prison sentences.
When we voted for the death sentence we knew, of course, that they would 
never be shot. We simply wished to show that we considered death to be a 
fitting punishment for the crime and that we would be satisfied if it were carried 
out.74
71IWM 84/2/1 D.J. Fenner, p. 7
72 NA WO 204/6701 AFHQ Morale Committee Meetings & Reports, 1943 December-1945 March 
Subject: Morale -  British Troops, 25 February, 1944, p. 3
73 McPherson, Discipline, p. 54
74 IWM 97/7/1 E.A. Ardeme, p. 69
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The policy adopted in relation to suspension of sentence gave rise to some differences of
opinion between the field formations and AFHQ. Battalion commanders were almost
unanimous in saying sentences were being suspended too early, and criticised particularly
the frequent suspensions of sentences of soldiers sent to the Middle East after only six
months of their sentence had been served. They argued that conditions in prisons were
infinitely better than those in the line and that the return of men who had been guilty of
desertion for a comparatively short period in a “comfortable” prison encouraged others to
desert and had an adverse effect on morale. There is no doubt that in many cases men
under suspended sentence repeated their offences, taking with them other men from the unit
who had not previously offended.75 The policy could also cause resentment. One soldier,
who had endured 101 days in a Field Punishment Camp, and had learned that a former
comrade had been sentenced to 10 years imprisonment, was astonished to meet the man
two years later, walking down a main street in Alexandria, Egypt.
I could hardly believe my eyes. He was as free as a bird. He told me an 
unbelievable story. After three months he was released and taken out of the 
infantry and was put in the Royal Corps of Signals. He was sent to the Middle 
East where there was no fighting. He also got an increase in pay. It was the 
biggest con I have ever been knowingly subject to. I was cheated because it 
exposed a deliberate policy of high command to sentence a man to 10 years for 
cowardice then release him after 3 months and give him a base job with higher 
pay a 1000 miles away from the front line. If these facts were known at the 
time by the infantry in the trenches I am sure there would have been a mutiny.76
VII
The field officers’ concerns were addressed by concentrating on a more careful selection of 
soldiers under sentence for suspension and on their rehabilitation by a special course prior
75 NA CAB 106/453 Operations of British, Indian and Dominion Forces in Italy, 3 September 1943 to 2 May 
1945, Party V, Monograph 5, The Problem of Desertion, p. 11
76 Mills, One for Grandad! p. 46
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to their return to the line.77 In August 1944, it was decided to establish a ‘Rehabilitation 
Centre’ to which men who were considered potentially redeemable as soldiers could be 
transferred from military prisons. This ‘Rehabilitation Centre’, which was intended as a 
development of the Field Punishment Camp system, was opened in December 1944 and 
was known as No. 34 Special Training Barracks, CMF, with room for 300 men. Only 
category “A” soldiers under sentence were accepted in this unit. Suitable premises were 
found in a modem Italian barracks near Rome with adequate training grounds adjacent. Its 
purpose was to train as ‘fighting soldiers’ men under sentence and to act as a transition 
from a Military Prison to a line unit, and it appears that the intention was that some of these 
men might be given a chance to ‘redeem themselves’ following their previous desertion, in 
front-line action. The Special Training Barracks, therefore, concentrated on military 
training and strict discipline.78 The normal period spent at the Barracks was three months, 
and during this time there was a progressive increase in the ‘amenities’ of the barrack room, 
the amount of trust and relative liberty of movement, which a man enjoyed. During his 
progress through the three months the soldier was trained for battle up to and including 
platoon training and particular emphasis was laid on physical training. At the same time 
throughout the course the commandant and his company officers made a special study of 
the man, aimed at helping him to rehabilitate himself and ensuring that he had the intention 
and the ability to make good as a soldier in the line. By the end of August 1945, only five 
of the 416 soldiers whose sentences were suspended had been recommitted to serve the 
remainder of their sentence.79 The Rehabilitation Centre did nothing to lower the number
77 NA CAB 106/453 Operations of British, Indian and Dominion Forces in Italy, 3 September 1943 to 2 May 
1945, Part V, Monograph 5, The Problem of Desertion, p. 6
78 Ahrenfeldt, Psychiatry, p. 132
79 NA CAB 106/453 Operations of British, Indian and Dominion Forces in Italy, 3 September 1943 to 2 May 
1945, Part V, Monograph 5, The Problem of Desertion, p. 7
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of deserters, of course. It only attempted to return as many deserters as possible to the line. 
Given that it only became fully operational at the beginning of 1945, there was not 
sufficient time before the end of the war to indicate whether it would have been more 
successful at lowering the numbers of men re-offending than under the system of 
suspended sentences practised earlier in the campaign.
VIII
One psychiatrist examined six inmates of the Special Training Barracks in January 1945. 
He believed that four of them, who had been sick men when they deserted, and should have 
been sent back as sick prior to reaching the stage of desertion, would benefit from their stay 
at the Special Training Barracks and should be returned to duty; one man, a regular soldier, 
should be returned to prison to complete his sentence; and the sixth man he regarded as 
willing and determined to fight, but about whose ability to stand up to action he was 
uncertain. “In summary, the great majority of men suitable for 34 Special Training 
Barracks are those who would never have deserted had their superior officers, 
commissioned and non-commissioned, not failed to observe that they were very sick men at 
the end of their tether.”80 This last point was well-established at the time. The Oliver 
Committee, set up by the Government in 1943 to investigate and report on all aspects of the 
treatment of men under sentence in Naval and Military Prisons and Detention Barracks in 
the United Kingdom, had emphasised the importance of good welfare work in the units 
from which the men had come, as the principal means of saving offenders from getting into 
the trouble which had led to their detention. They considered that if the “admirable” Notes 
for Offices issued by the Adjutant-General under the title The Soldiers* Welfare were fully 
carried into effect, particularly by Company and Platoon Officers, perhaps as many as 50%
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of those soldiers who were under sentence would never have had to be committed to
detention.81 Attempts had been made to address this concern in Italy in 1944:
Renewed emphasis was placed on the duties of the platoon commander; he 
should receive and settle in all newcomers and should watch his men carefully 
for signs of strain so that cases could be taken in time.82
But nothing seemed to work in the winter of 1944/45. The threat of longer sentences was
counter-productive; suspended sentences worked for some men who were keen to get back
to their own units, but made no impact on determined deserters.
Crimes such as desertion and self-inflicted wounds were often difficult to deal 
with, especially when one knew that the accused simply wanted a court martial.
He would receive a stiff sentence and spend the rest of the war with good food 
and in safety. Some Commanding Officers simply dealt with desertion by 
sending the men straight back to duty. This often did not pay and might lead to 
legal trouble.83
IX
Were any of the measures considered by the Army Council in spring and summer 1944 
regarding no general amnesty and the forfeiture of demobilization priority, effective? The 
announcements, in December 1944, that, as far as the existing government was concerned, 
there would be no amnesty for deserters after the war, and then, in January 1945, that a man 
convicted of desertion after February 1st 1945 would forfeit all previous service for the 
purpose of the demobilisation scheme, came too late to influence the flood of deserters in 
the winter of 1944/45.84 The Morale Committee reported in February 1945 that many 
soldiers believed that a change of government at the end of hostilities might lead to a 
change of policy regarding a general amnesty, although the amendment to the release
80 CMAC GC/192/18 Memo on 34 Special Training Barracks by Lt. Co.l. J.D.W. Pearce, Adviser in 
Psychiatry, AFHQ, 13 January 1945
81 Ahrenfeldt, Psychiatry, p. 131
82 NA CAB 101/224 “The British Soldier in Italy”, pp. 40-41
83 IWM 97/7/1 E.A. Ardeme, p. 69
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regulations had undoubtedly made a great impression. The Committee could not say how 
far the reduced AWOL figures for February could be attributed to the December and 
January announcements. The fact that active operations during February were on a small 
scale and that weather conditions had improved were also contributory factors.85
The incidence of desertion not only took men away from the front line, but tied down a 
large number of men in the Court Martial and Holding Centre, the Field Punishment Camps 
and other penal establishments who might have been used more directly in the war effort. 
Adam believed that only five per cent of deserters were criminals who had no interest in or 
intention of fighting, and that the majority were men who broke down because they had 
been in the line too long, or had been posted to unfamiliar battalions.86 The same argument 
he applied against the re-introduction of the death penalty -  that desertion was not due to 
fear -  would therefore apply to all other forms of deterrent suggested during 1944. Adam 
had written to Alexander that he hoped the proposals put forward in April 1944 “will go 
some way towards solving this serious problem,” but added: “but even these punishments 
will not have a great effect. I am told by officers returning that it is cold, wet and absence 
of relief, much more than danger, that is producing the deserter.”87
The various legal approaches considered by the Army seem to have had very little effect on 
the majority of deserters. And in the view of many, not only the Adjutant-General, neither 
would the re-introduction of the death penalty:
84 NA CAB 106/441 Operations of British, Indian and Dominion Forces in Italy, 3 September 1943-2 May 
1945, Part IV, The Campaign in Lombardy, 1 April to 2 May 1945, p. 2
85 NA WO 204/6701 AFHQ Morale Committee Report for the Quarter ending 28 February 1945 Desertion 
and Absence, p. 2
86 NA WO 214/62 Alexander Papers Adam to CAO, 25 February 1944
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It is important here to mention that the futility of the death penalty for desertion 
in war-time -  a punishment so frequently and irresponsibly advocated as an 
alleged deterrent -  has been demonstrated beyond doubt by a comparison of the 
incident of desertion in the British Army in the two World Wars. Discipline is 
an integral part of morale, and in the absence of the latter will most certainly 
break down. Indeed, from the abundant evidence available, it should be clear 
and indisputable that morale depends not on threats, nor on driving, but on 
leading men.88
The greatest influence on morale, therefore, was not the threat of formal discipline, but
rather the ability of officers to persuade their men to stay in the line and fight.
87 Ibid Adam to Maitland-Wilson 7 April 1944




OFFICERS, OTHER RANKS, SELF-HELP AND MORALE
The Southborough Committee emphasized the corporate impact of morale rather than the 
individual. Morale, it stated, “is collective confidence, the spirit of a good team at 
football.”1 To continue the analogy, ORs were the footballers who went out on to the pitch 
to represent their team, but it was the job of the club directors, manager and trainers -  the 
executive officers at all levels -  to ensure that the team was physically and mentally 
prepared for the challenge they faced. The importance of officers, and their influence on 
the morale of the men under them, both positive and negative, cannot be understated. As 
The Soldier's Welfare indicated, it was the officers who had the responsibility of inspiring 
the men under his commend with a belief in the case for which they were fighting, and a 
readiness to fight to the last.2 If we go back to Lt.-Col. Wigram’s belief that out of every 
platoon of 22 men, there were six gutful men, twelve ‘sheep’ and four to six ineffective 
men, and then consider the fact that, apart from a hard core of determined deserters, many 
of whom were criminals, the majority of deserters were ‘involuntary’ absentees, it is 
evident that maintaining the discipline and morale of the twelve ‘sheep’ in each platoon 
was of paramount importance to the ability of the army to prosecute the war.3 Wigram’s 
assessment was echoed by Lt. Tiffin, a platoon commander in the 16th Durham Light 
Infantry, who said about the men under his command:
1 The Southborough Committee, Creation of Morale, p. 208
2 A Soldier’s Welfare, Foreword, p. 5
3 NA WO 231/14 Operations in Sicily, 9 December 1943
247
There would be 30 odd. As I got to know them better there would be 10,11, 12 
people you could rely on in practically any circumstances. There would be 
another 10, 11 or 12 who, if everybody else was doing their duty, could be 
relied upon to follow suit. Then there were 5 or 6 who were not particularly 
reliable.4
This chapter is concerned with two aspects of corporate morale. Firstly, by examining the 
role of officers and NCOs in sustaining bellicosity, and secondly, by exploring the ways in 
which units, and individuals, employed self-help to sustain corporate spirit.
I
The importance of leadership in terms of morale was re-iterated over and over again by the 
War Office. The Soldier's Welfare, for instance, was joined by a pamphlet entitled Suppose 
You Were A Nazi Agent. This proposed a situation in which an enemy agent was 
commissioned as a British officer in a British unit, but was forbidden to employ actual 
sabotage and was told to keep within King’s Regulations. The pamphlet listed all the 
actions the enemy agent might take in these circumstances to damage morale. They are 
worth listing in full as they detailed what actions the War Office regarded as characteristic 
of a bad officer. “Most of these actions are damaging to the convictions of competence, 
power and worth, and in their avoidance lies the key to good man-management,” 
concluded the summation.5
A: Damaging Trust in Leaders:
(1) By display or abuse of officer privilege at a time when conditions for the
men are bad
(2) By failure to explain the significance of orders, so that they appear inhuman
or arbitrary
(3) By failure to explain sudden interference with leave or other privileges
(4) By failure to take adequate disciplinary action when necessary
4 Lieutenant Douglas Tiffin, ‘D ’ Coy 16th DLI, quoted in Hart, Heat of Battle, p. 163
5 M. Lewis, “The Promotion and Maintenance of Mental Health in the Military Community” RAMC Journal, 
Vol. 96-97,1951, Vol. XCVI, February 1951, No. 2. Part II, Section VI, The Role of Medical Officers, 
Administrators, Commanders and Leaders with Regard to the Promotion and Maintenance of Mental Health, 
pp. 102-114
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(5) By taking severe disciplinary action without investigating the cause of the 
delinquency or the defect of morale which lay behind it.
(6) By sarcastic comment and criticism
(7) By failure to give praise where it is due
(8) By building up a fa$ade of discipline without a basis in morale
(9) By being too close on the heels of the Non-commissioned officers in their 
work
(10) By ignoring Non-Commissioned officers in their work
(11) By over-estimation of the enemy, or by inaccurate estimation of our own 
value
(12) By displaying ignorance of our aims, and a lack of interest in the Army 
and its history
(13) By display of social or political bias, disguised, if possible, under a 
different label
(14) By dodging questions and discussion
(15) By making it clear in behaviour, rather than speech, that Service is an 
unwelcome interruption in life
B: Damaging Group Morale:
(1) By breaking up groups of friends in platoons and barrack-rooms
(2) By changing men over so that they never get time to settle in one job
(3) By keeping an intelligent man in a boring job, or by putting an unintelligent 
or unsuitable man in a position of authority
(4) By boring men with parts of training they already know well
(5) By being bored with training instructions yourself
(6) By instructing men more frequently and more intensely in the maintenance, 
rather than the use, of weapons
C: Damaging Individual Morale:
(1) By failure to show interest or to encourage a man regularly
(2) By ignoring minor requests in relation to leave
(3) By refusing to listen to men’s grievances or, better still, by paying little 
attention when they do come to them
(4) By making men be excessively fussy about relatively unimportant affairs
(5) By writing to men’s families in an inaccurate or offhand way, or by not 
writing at all
There is no record of whether this War Office pamphlet reached Italy, and was seen by any 
of the officers serving there, but in Italy the importance of leadership was taken just as 
seriously. HQ, Allied Armies in Italy, produced their own semi-official pamphlet, partly 
authored by Eric Linklater, entitled Morale and the Officer. It was intended as an element 
of officer training and its concerns reflected those in Suppose You Were A Nazi Agent. 
According to the pamphlet: “An officer has no duty more important than of sustaining and
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raising the morale of his men.”6 A good officer, the pamphlet stated, was one who should
have the respect, and the liking of his men. Respect was more important than liking and
could only be obtained by the example an officer set, by his own competence and by his
fairness. If the officer was respected, liking would follow. The officer’s “performance in
the line, from showing guts to shaving, will be watched and reflected in his command. His
good example can pull up a poor command, but a bad example can wreck a good command,
and can wreck it in a very short time.”7 A good officer was an officer who led by example:
Officers could not afford to show their feelings as openly as the 
men; they had more need to dissemble. In a big battle a subaltern 
had little or no influence over the fate of his platoon -  it was the 
plaything of the gods. His role was essentially histrionic. He had to 
feign a casual and cheerful optimism to create an illusion of 
normality and make it seem as if there was nothing in the least 
strange about the outrageous things one was asked to do. Only in 
this way could he ease the tension, quell any panic and convince his 
men that everything would come out right in the end.8
Fred Majdalany remembered a Regular Army artillery major, who had risen through the
ranks and who definitely set a good example when he was with the Lancashire Fusiliers in
the mountains around Cassino, overlooked on all sides by the enemy:
He had the old soldier’s knack of making himself comfortable anywhere. The 
rest of us used to crawl between our blankets in our shirts and trousers. Not 
Harry. He never slept in anything but crisp, white pyjamas. And he slept 
between sheets. And in spite of the general squalor, the sheets and the pyjamas 
always appeared to be spotless. In the early morning he always shaved long 
before anyone else, and appeared spruce and fresh as if straight from a shower: 
his trousers were invariably well creased, and his boots shiny.9
Some officers became known for their quirks which men noticed and remembered. One
had a big black umbrella, which he produced when the morale of his men was noticeably
depressed. The effect was miraculous. “As they passed him there were cheers and shouts
6 NA WO 204/6702 Morale and the Officer, Forward
7 Ibid, Character of the Officer, p. 2
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of laughter and everyone walked out of the village whistling and singing ‘The Umbrella 
Man’.”10
A good officer led by example. One walked “along through the fire, swinging his stick like
he was out for a country stroll.”11 “Somehow one didn’t feel frightened when the Colonel
was there,” wrote one Fusilier about his CO.12 Any sensible person would run away from
danger, and a junior officer in Italy acknowledged that:
Unless someone tells you to get out of your hole and go somewhere, you won’t 
go. So I had to therefore show the way to my juniors and get up and go and tell 
them to come with me.13
An NCO who was a section commander agreed: “You’ve got to show willing, you’ve got
to go first, which everyone is happy to let you do.”14 Men under stress exhibited the
effects of the herd instinct when they were leaderless and if one man ran away, the rest
might follow.15 A good leader could prevent such behaviour. When the 2nd Bn The King’s
Regiment was in action across the River Gari on May 12th 1944, companies were unable to
cross because the boats were being destroyed, casualties were high and communications
were down. “Major Tuohy, although under heavy fire at the time, personally collected the
remnants of the other Coys which had become disorganised owning to heavy casualties
sustained, and withdrew them to his line of consolidation.”16
8 Craig, The Broken Plume, p. 75
9 Majdalany, The Monastery, p. 29
10IWM 97/7/1 W. H. Mitchell Letter, 22 March 1944
11 IWM 85/18/1 C.T. Framp, p. 104
12 Northcote Parkinson, Always A Fusilier, p. 197
13 IWM Sound Archives 12239 G.K. Barnett, Reel 5
14 IWM Sound Archives 16719 E. Grey, Reel 3
15 Horsfall, Fling Our Banner To The Wind, p. 59
16 NA WO 170/1418 2nd Bn The King’s Own Royal Regiment War Diary for May 1944
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There were several occasions, at Salerno, when frightened soldiers ran away from the front 
line towards the beaches. When men of the 8th Bn Royal Fusiliers came under a 
tremendous barrage, which nearly overwhelmed their positions, 50-odd fled. They were 
met by an Intelligence Officer, who, with the help of two senior NCOs, sorted them out in a 
nearby field.17 On another occasion, infantrymen trickling back down the road from the 
front asked an officer the way to the beaches. He told them they were going to wrong way 
and directed them back to the front line.18 When the 6th Grenadier Guards were pinned 
down by strong German mortar fire at the Tobacco Factory near Battipaglia, the majority of 
one platoon fell dead and wounded. The survivors began running in spontaneous panic. 
“On their right, some Fusiliers of the 167th Brigade had a similar idea. By mid-afternoon 
the small roads were full of frightened soldiers, many retiring pell-mell regardless of 
officers.”19 The runaways were eventually regrouped and a Guards officer was heard 
drilling them before they went back into the line.20
The importance of the steadying influence of officers was evident throughout the Salerno 
battle. When Lt.-Colonel John Whitfield, with the 2/5* Queen’s, for instance, was at 
Montecorvino airfield with his badly battered battalion, under heavy German artillery 
barrages, he ran from platoon to platoon, and spoke to all his men -  36 speeches in all. He 
told them: “We hold the airfield, which the enemy badly needs. I am certain he will attack 
tonight, tomorrow, or the next day. If the enemy does attack, it is our duty to ensure that he
17 Morris, Salerno, p. 217.
18 Ibid, p. 218
19 Pond, Salerno, p. 109
20 Selwyn, Davin, de Mauny, Hetcher (eds.), From Oasis Into Italy, p. 195
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gains only a foothold over your dead bodies and mine. I have complete confidence in every 
one of you.”21 The battalion never gave an inch during 10 days of constant shelling.
A good officer could inspire his men to continue fighting even when they had all but given
up. At the beginning of December 1944, when morale throughout the Army was fragile, a
platoon of the 6th Yorks & Lancs was ordered to assist some infantrymen holed up in a
building surrounded by Germans, trying to get
our blokes to surrender. The Company Commander digested this bad news and 
told me to go to the sections of the platoon sheltering in an outbuilding. I found 
them sprawled against an inside wall. There was light from a shaded oil lamp.
I sought out the section leader and told him the officer said “Get Dressed and 
Move Forward”. Morale hit rock bottom. They had come to the end. One or 
two enquired in worried tones, “What next?” Some were sobbing, too 
frightened to go out into the night. There was a lot of shelling and they said 
they were not going on. These men, in forward platoons over the months and 
years, had seen too many of their mates killed and wounded. They had gone 
through bouts of action in Tunisia, in Salerno, in the mountains in front of 
Cassino, and during the last four months of severe battles in the Gothic Line.
I went back to the officer and told him they had had it. He was drained, his 
eyes strained through lack of sleep and battle weariness. He went back with me 
to the bam. He began to persuade the frightened men that they were about to be 
relieved and this would be one of the last actions. He confirmed that the 
division was to go out for a long rest. He spoke gently and said that mutiny 
would be foolish as they were coming to the end of their stint. Also he pointed 
out some of our blokes were under threat and could be captured, and it was 
their job to rescue them. I expected bluster and threats of court martial from 
him but he handled an impossible situation with good sense. We were all shit 
scared, including him. We all went on together.22
If a good leader was killed, especially if he served as a father-figure and had gained the 
trust of the men under him, it adversely effected all the men. When the CO of the 2nd Bn 
Royal Fusiliers was killed in May 1944, “the news of his death seemed to dampen the
21 Pond, Salerno, p. 132
22 IWM 99/85/1 N. Wray, p. 199
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spirits of everyone.” The battalion had been shelled and was suffering from severe 
casualties:
The CO remained behind to attend to the dead and wounded and sent the Bn 
away to the rest area. It was a great blow to the Bn to learn from the doctor and 
padre who had remained with the CO that the Colonel had himself been killed 
while attending to the wounded. Every man in the Bn had been so proud to 
serve under such a courageous and unselfish commander as he was ..
The 6th Bn Black Watch sincerely mourned the loss of a good officer:
The next morning we were told to move forward about 700-800 yds to come 
into line with the Irish Brigade of 78 Div. A great tragedy occurred here. Capt.
D.R. MacArthur, the 2IC of ‘C’ Coy. and one of the finest officers in the bn,
was hit by a bullet during the advance, and instantaneously killed  His loss
was deeply felt throughout the battalion.. .M
So, too, did the 2nd Battalion London Irish rifles when they lost their CO. “He had
handled his Battalion with tremendous skill and energy ... and he had imported much of
this and his own personal bravery to all the lads in the battalion.”25 A couple of days later
the battalion lost a Company Commander, killed within 15 minutes of a battle beginning.
“His loss undoubtedly affected his men who had learned to adore this commander who so
completely gave himself to the well-being of his men.”26
There is some indication that the loss of officers could affect desertions rates. The 2/7* 
Queens’ general record of all absentees from August-December 1944, for instance, shows 
that the absentee rate in September was particularly high, with 16 absentees in just one day, 
September 18th. Eight days previously, the battalion had suffered high casualties, among 
them three officers killed and three wounded, one of whom later died of his wounds. Then, 
on September 13th, two companies tried to go forward against heavy small arms fire and
23 NA WO 170/1389 2nd Bn The Royal Fusiliers War Diary for May, 1944
24 NA WO 170/1366 6th Bn The Black Watch War Diary for May 1944
25 NA WO 204/10425 “The Irish Brigade in Italy”, p. 21
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again suffered heavy casualties: ‘A’ Company lost all its officers (wounded) while ‘C’ 
Company lost one officer and one Sergeant Platoon Commander killed.27
A good officer was “one that regards his men as an asset, never talks down to the men. He 
knows who you are, he knows what you do, he never looks down on you.... They were 
terrified, like we were, but they still went forward.”28 A good officer was someone who 
did not panic, who did not show that he was worried, and looked after his men. “You can 
tell when you’ve got a good, efficient officer who knows what he’s doing. A man that can 
turn round to a Commanding Officer and say that he cannot take this position until he gets 
what he wants. ... not going bullheaded into a situation and losing half his company.”29 
He “doesn’t wave his pistol and push men ever forward. He knows when to withdraw”.30
A good officer was a fair officer, who treated himself and his men equally. In one incident 
an officer struck a private who did not want to go into the line. The private agreed to go, 
but the major put himself on a charge for striking the private. The case did not go ahead: 
the private refused to press charges, saying that the major had been right to hit him and he 
was now a good soldier.31
26 NA WO 204/10425 “The Irish Brigade in Italy”, p. 24
27 NA WO 170/1467 2/7* Bn The Queen’s Royal Regiment War Diary for September 1944
28 IWM Sound Archives 16719 E  Grey, Reel 4
29 IWM Sound Archives 10421 L. Thornton, Reel 23
30 Ibid, Reel 21
31 IWM Sound Archives 13080 J. Corr, Reel 5
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II
It was reported that in general, in Italy, relations between officers and men were good in
forward units.32 The most important officer in the front line with regard to morale was a
platoon commander.
You often find that one Company (or Platoon) has a bad reputation... When 
this is so, it is always the fault of the officers, for the men are[the] same value.33
Platoon commanders had to take on a great deal of responsibility, often at an age when their
contemporaries before the war would have been enjoying life at university or just starting
out on the career ladder.
The hardest rank for commissioned officers is platoon commander, because he 
takes the big patrols, but he does everything forward. His boss, the company 
commander, is back at company headquarters, so the three platoon commanders 
are up with the three platoons. They take the rough edge. Plus, he’s got the 
platoon tactics, he’s got to do it all. The thing people don’t keep in mind when 
they criticize officers -  they weren’t much older than us, platoon commanders, 
but they had a hell of a lot of responsibility for 21 or 22 year olds. I have a lot 
of admiration for them.34
Platoon commanders also suffered the highest casualty rates amongst officers, and their
replacement, especially in the later stages of the war, by men who were not infantrymen,
might have had a detrimental effect on morale. New officers, especially those transferred
from non-infantry units, often found it extremely difficult to make the battle-hardened ORs
they commanded follow them:
He was a very smart young man but he’d been transferred over from the Royal 
Artillery so he’d done no infantry training. Consequently, when he took over 
the platoon he was forever on about, “Fix bayonets!” and this, that and the 
other. Of course the old soldiers just told him where to go, because you just 
didn’t fix bayonets and charge. But he’d read it up and he was trying to do
32 NA WO 32/15772 War Office Morale Committee Reports, The Amy Overseas, June-August 1944,
p. 18
33 IWM 97/7/1 W. H. Mitchell Utter, 29 May 1944
34 IWM Sound Archives 16593 T. Chadwick, Reel 8
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everything by the book. Weeks later he was into the groove and he was a first 
class officer.35
Most new officers shaped up well with a little practical experience. One CO noted:
The new officers had a Tactical Exercise under the 2nd in Comd. One of the 
objects of this exercise was to find out what they know. It was again 
encouraging to discover that their Basic or Book Knowledge of elementary 
tactics and order giving was reasonably sound. If they can be taught a little 
leadership and be given a chance to develop some self confidence there is no 
reason why they should not do well.36
Some, however, did not “Our fighting patrol was taken out by a new officer. It was a 
failure because the officer did not make a proper plan, nor maintain control of his party.37
Ill
A bad officer was “someone who took care of himself rather than his men.”38 “The worst 
possible situation in the line is a body of troops led by a neurotic officer. Troops that have 
fought well under another break and run when under an officer they know to be himself 
abnormally nervous and vacillating.”39 Unsuitable officers could demoralise even the best 
units. In Sicily, “The platoon officer had decided to prepare to face the night his own way 
with the help of a bottle of gin. It must have come ashore as part of his ‘battle order kit’, 
and his quick round of the trenches did nothing to boost our confidence, and in our minds 
we rehearsed our own action for survival if the attack did come.”40
In December 1943, when a battle patrol from the 6th Yorks & Lancs was sent out to a farm 
to find out the strength of the enemy there, the whole battalion was caught in a heavy
35 Sgt. Tommy Cooper, C Coy, 16th Bn The Durham Light Infantry, quoted in Hart, The Heat of Battle, p. 168
36 NA WO 170/1401 I8* Bn The Hertfordshire Regiment War Diary for December 1944
37 Ibid
38 IWM Sound Archives 12825 T. Lister, Reel 10
39 Copp & McAndrew, Battle Exhaustion, p. 54
40 IWM 92/1/1/ C. Richard Eke, p. 33
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German artillery barrage. Two of the signallers dived into the Company Commander’s 
sangar.
In dived the Company Commander. The curt bastard told us to get out. It was 
his hole. No way! We ignored him. Slowly the shelling eased off. No more
firing from the patrol The [patrol] men trickled back to our H.Q. area,
shocked, some shaking. The walking wounded were moved back through us to 
the M.O. at Battalion H.Q. The rest sat dazed and quiet in an irregular line.
Out of the Sanger [sic] came the Company Commander asking questions but 
getting few replies from the spent soldiers. The Lieutenant Patrol Leader now 
on the scene was as yet unable to give a coherent account to the Captain’s 
badgering. Up bustled the Colonel. He told the Company Commander to join 
him in the sangar. What went on in there we could only guess. A few weeks 
later the Company Commander left the battalion. As it became light I have a 
recollection of the Colonel with his arm round the patrol leader, coaxing gently 
a response, anxious to know the details of the clash with the enemy round the 
farms.41
In the worst-case scenario, a bad officer could provoke mutiny. Towards the end of 1944, a
16th Durham Light Infantry NCO was passing on an order from an officer with a reputation
for wasting his men:
I ordered the men to get their kit on and I was told very, very sharply, in a most 
soldierly manner, that they weren’t going to get their fucking kit on and old ...
[the officer] could fuck himself. They weren’t going to get themselves killed 
for that stupid cunt. They were absolutely unanimous. They really felt very 
strongly. However, you can’t run an army on this basis. So I said I would 
shoot them and they very reluctantly got up. They had no confidence in the 
Company Commander, they had seen their platoon commander turn and run 
and we had suffered casualties, unnecessary casualties...42
IV
But despite the examples above, most men seem to have had confidence in their officers. 
Censorship reports indicated that relations between officers and men were generally good. 
Some young officers sent out from the UK were judged far too green by senior officers, and 
Morale Committee reports noted that “newly commissioned officers still know little of
41 IWM 99/85/1 N. Wray, p, 128
42 IWM Sound Archives 13251 K.C. Lovell, Reel 20
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man-management” and “some instances still come to light of junior officers being out of 
touch and out of sympathy with their men.”43 Overall, however, the Chief Administrative 
officer, AAI, Major-General Robertson, felt that the quality of junior officers was 
“remarkably good in view of the circumstances.”44
Writing about the officer selection process, Colonel R. M. Rendel, the President of a War
Office Selection Board, reflected that around 90% of officers selected by the WOSB were
regarded by Commanding Officers as ‘wholly satisfactory”.45 He continued:
What is a fighting subaltern, and what is it that a W.O.S.B. has been asked to 
do? It has been asked to consider all manner of men, men of different ages, 
education, environment, experience and even nationality, and to decide which 
of them is capable of being in some sort a judge, in some sort a doctor, in some 
sort a father, a brother, a schoolmaster, and at the same time a stem master of 
men. All these he has to be under conditions of the greatest difficulty imposed 
on him not only by circumstances over which he has no control, but 
deliberately imposed by a ruthless enemy and all the hazards of War, so that he 
must make quick, calm decisions involving the lives of his men and the success 
of the cause for which he is fighting when he is hungry and thirsty and tired and 
sleepy, wet, cold and even possibly afraid.46
The 10% of unsuitable officers were, hopefully, weeded out before they could do too much 
harm to a unit’s morale.
V
Non-combatant officers also played their part in maintaining morale, taken in its wider 
connotation of wellbeing. Army chaplains were responsibility not only for the spiritual 
welfare of their flock, but also for the men’s mental and physical comfort and morale. The 
1st Bn King’s Own Yorkshire Light Infantry maintained that the fact that they had only one
43 NA WO 32/15772 War Office Morale Committee Reports, The Army Overseas, June-August 1944, p, 18; 
NA WO 163/162 War Office Committee on Morale Draft Report of the Committee The Army Overseas 
March to May, 1944, p. 3
44 NA CAB 101/224 “The British Soldier in Italy”, p. 23
45 CMAC, GC/192/18, Colonel R.M. Rendel, “Some Reflections by a President of a W.O.S.B.”, p. 3.
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man missing on the beachhead “Sgt Musson -  who is popularly reported to be a PW - is a 
great tribute to our Chaplain, the Rev. W J . Hill,” while the Irish Guards took great comfort 
from the sight of their Padre, Father Brookes walking up and down with a steel helmet 
perched on top of his cap reading his breviary.47 Not all army chaplains were as well 
regarded:
Most of them felt out of place; when things started to happen everyone except 
the padre knew exactly what they had to do, unpleasant though it might be, and 
they did not want any interference however well intentioned. One padre tried to 
be ‘one of the boys’, swearing and telling dirty jokes; it was embarrassing, there 
was only one way to gain the men’s respect that was never to ask them to do 
anything you were not prepared to do yourself.48
Many chaplains carried out their pastoral duties in difficult situations. As one soldier put it:
“It’s a day to day existence, what day or date it is matters little; shells can drop just as
easily on a Sunday as on a Tuesday and the padre holds a service wherever possible.”49 It
could also be a dangerous job. “We seemed unlucky with out Padres, for this was our
second in six months. Both were killed by shellfire.”50
A chaplain held no official rank, the idea being the soldiers could talk to him in confidence 
in a way they might not do with an officer. “Most of their work seemed to consist of 
writing letters to the relations of those who had not survived -  a miserable task.” 51 They 
did, however, often also see to the men’s, or battalion’s, more immediate welfare needs. 
One battalion diary recorded that “The Padre did some sterling work by going to Arezzo to 
the CRU and fetching back some of the ex-hospital cases, among whom was our highly
46 Ibid
47 NA WO 170/1411 1st Bn The King’s Own Yorkshire Light Infantiy War Diary for May 1944; Vemey, 
Anzio 1944, p. 64
48 IWM 94/8/1 I. Mackay, p. 80
49 IWM 83/36/1 R.H. Day, p. 24
50 IWM 81/10/1 H. Buckle, p. 110
51 IWM 94/8/1 I. Mackay, p. 80
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valued and much tried ORQM.”52 And a Morale Report noted that “Padres’ rooms are 
amongst the most popular features of large clubs,” while another Morale Report noted that 
“The padres, medical and nursing officers are especially praised.”53
The Medical Officer had to maintain the health, both physical and mental, of a battalion,
but he also had responsibilities with regard to the battalion’s fighting ability.
Attendance rates of the M.I. Room fluctuate with the morale of units as well as 
with the exposure to a variety of other risks. The Medical Officer, like every 
other officer, has the duty of steering a middle course between undue sternness 
and over-benevolence towards those in his care. By sternness he will deter men 
from approaching him until their sickness is advanced. By softness he will 
lower morale by encouraging men to give in to minor complaints. .. .Individual 
and group morale may be lowered by many causes. Some of these can be 
entirely eliminated by the Medical Officer ... The Medical Officer is the 
C.O.’s adviser in all matters of health, efficiency and morale.54
The Southborough Committee had acknowledged that “a good medical officer can not only
anticipate many cases of exhaustion neurosis in individuals, but can feel the pulse of the
unit as a whole.”55 It also acknowledged that, more often than not, it was the NCO who
first spotted something wrong.
Those are the men, of course, who are the first to notice anything, the Colour- 
Sergeant, the Corporal in his room, the Sergeant in his Company, those are the 
men, and they would at once go to the Company officer, or, as I know very well 
from experience, to the medical officer and say: “Beg pardon, sir, I do not like 
the look of Private so-and-so, lately he has been funny in his manner. His 
room-mates have told me so and so.”56
52 NA WO 170/1416 1st Bn The King’s Shropshire Light Infantry War Diary for August 1944
53 NA WO 204/6701 AFHQ Morale Report for the Quarter Ending 31 August 1944, p. 6: NA WO 32/15772 
The Morale Committee, The Army Overseas, June-August, 1944, p. 18
54 NA WO 222/218 Morale, Discipline & Mental Fitness: Circular to MOs from AMD II, p. 2 (n.d.)
55 The Southborough Committee, Active Service Period, p. 151
56 Ibid, Lt-Gen Sir John Goodwin, p. 184
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VI
NCOs were the “backbone of the British Army.”57 If the role of the officer was to provide
leadership, “the role of the Warrant Officers and NCOs was to provide supervision.”58
They provided an interface between officers and ORs, transmitting orders from above and
keeping officers appraised, as already indicated, about the mood of the men. They were the
day-to-day template of how a soldier should behave. On the Garigliano front a Regimental
Sergeant Major from the Inniskillings
who, like all of us busy with his various duties and being blown about by the 
odd shell, emerged every morning from his little trench as smartly dressed as it 
he were about to take a drill parade: boots shining, gaiters whitened and brass 
buckles gleaming ... In my eyes he was to good order and military discipline 
what Einstein was to science.59
Regular Army formations, the Guards Brigade, the 1st and 4th Divisions, tended, at the
beginning of the campaign at any rate, to have lower desertion rates. These units had
strong traditions of service, strong esprit de corps, and the NCOs who survived from before
the war, provided the strong, disciplined core of their battalions.
A soldier of the ‘Old School’, Sgt Matheson was hard as nails and thoroughly 
reliable. Sound as a bell in action too ... On reflection now, I realise more and 
more what good soldiers they were from the days of the late 30s and early 40s. 
There was a stamp of efficiency on them: brought about no doubt by stem 
discipline. It stood them in good stead again and again.60
57 Ibid
58 D. French, Military Identies: The Regimental System, the British Army and the British People, c. 1870-2000 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) p. 147
59 Cole, Rough Road to Rome, p. 171
60 IWM 81/10/1 H.Buckle, p. 98
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A good NCO would steady the nerves of junior officers as well as ORs. “If you had a good 
sergeant, you usually had a good officer.”61 One Fusilier remembered that, on the bank of 
the Garigliano:
Sgt. Mills discussed our next move with our platoon Commander. The latter 
was a young man of about twenty years of age. He was a tank officer 
temporarily on loan to an infantry battalion. I wondered what his thoughts 
would be leading an infantry platoon with the knowledge that his two 
immediate predecessors had both been killed. In Sgt. Mills we had an ideal 
man to help boost his confidence.62
A young lieutenant, just coming up to his 21st birthday in the days before the summer
Cassino offensive, remembered his NCOs: ‘The Troop Sergeant was Jim Beresford, a
Regular soldier, and McGrogan was the Corporal -  a very fine pair of N.C.O.s to whom I
was to owe a debt of gratitude for all that they did to educate me in the mysteries of troop
leading and who gave me their complete loyalty during the future trying times and dangers
we shared.”63 One man remembered the reaction of his sergeant-major when he returned
to his unit after being wounded:
“Hello, Sergeant-Major,” I said ... he turned towards me -  then he saw -  the 
delight, which came over his face, as he recognised me was unmistakable. He .. 
grabbed my hand, and proceeded to pump it vigorously. I’ve always been a 
little embarrassed in such circumstances but the glow of pleasure I felt then far 
outweighed it. Sergeant-Major Davison made me feel like I’d come home after 
a long, long absence.64
Sergeant-Majors were the butt of jokes, loathed, perhaps grudgingly respected, but their 
importance to the cohesion of any unit was undeniable. They also held a special place in 
the ORs’ pantheon of pet hates. “All Sergeant-Majors develop a Sergeant-Major look,” 
explained one soldier. ‘This takes the form of a tracer-eyed, tight-lipped, completely 
humourless and aggressive expression on all their faces.” The root cause of this look was
61 IWM Sound Archives 12825 T. Lister, Reel 10
62 IWM 80/46/1 G. Allnutt, p. 56
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because the Sergeant-Majors were lonely. “Sergeant-Majors never have friends, except 
amongst other Sergeant-Majors, which means, as there is only one of them to a company, 
for all practical purposes they are completely friendless. Ordinary Sergeants, at the rate of 
about five to a company, have friends ... but not Sergeant-Majors.”65
VII
The difference in working relations and interaction between officers, NCOs and ORs, or 
even between men of the same rank, was marked between the front and the rear. In the 
front line, relations tended towards the informal. “The smouldering friction between the 
commissioned ranks and the common soldiers in England, was soon replaced by a man to 
man relationship. Survivors knew each other better as the battles took their toll. Esprit de 
Corps grew from privates to colonels.” 66 The same was true of the relationship between 
ORs and NCOs.
You can’t compare war-time NCOs with peace-time NCOs. It’s a totally 
different discipline, a totally different ball game altogether. By and large... the 
experience they’d gained in the job they were doing at the time... they were 
very good. The lads I had the pleasure to serve with had that tact of man- 
management, but there was no ‘Corporal Sir’ and spring to attention, it was 
‘Bill’ or ‘Joe’ up to sergeant, then you called him ‘Sarg’. A different discipline 
in action.67
An infantry sergeant who was seconded away from his fighting battalion for a short while
was struck particularly by the formal atmosphere that existed in the rear:
As most of the men who were on the staff were either Seijeants or Warrant 
Officers, the Seijeants Mess was enormous but I noticed that the atmosphere 
was very different from the fighting units and that hardly anyone spoke to 
anyone else, although they might be working with them all day. One day there 
was quite sufficient for me.68
63 IWM 98/3/1 H.A. J. Stiebel “The War Story”. Part Two, Italy, p. 18
64 IWM 85/18/1 C.T. Framp, p. 118
65 Ibid, p. 108
66 IWM 99/85/1 N. Wray, p. 189
67 IWM Sound Archives 16593 T. Chadwick, Reel 5
68 IWM 82/37/1 E.P. Danger, p. 247
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VIII
One officer believed that each officer up the chain of command should be able to inspire
those men under him. From the lowliest subaltern to the army commander, “A single
break in the ‘chain of inspiration’ and you get tired and dispirited troops.”69 A Corps
commander should therefore be able to inspire his Divisional commanders. At Anzio, the
American commander, General Lucas, failed to encourage his British subordinates: he
seldom visited them, in fact he rarely came out of his cellar at all.70 It was noticeable to
many commentators that the further away from the front -  or as far as one could get at
Anzio - the lower the morale.71 Lucas was tired when he arrived at Anzio and it has been
suggested that he was suffering from exhaustion.72 He was replaced by General Lucian
Truscott on February 22nd 1944. “The knowledge that Truscott was at the helm had a
heartening effect on the men holding responsible positions on the beachhead ... there was
an air of confidence blowing through the underground corridors of Sixth Corps.”73
Truscott, himself, had an above-ground office in Nettuno. It was not only American
commanders who were moved on: when the 3rd (Br) Infantry Brigade commander was
judged to be no longer capable of doing his job, he was replaced.74 Divisional
Commanders were also replaced.
General Keightley had been promoted to G.O.C. of the 5th Corps at the 
beginning of August [1944], and unfortunately this had left the 78th Division in 
a period of interregnum at a time when a sure hand on the helm was desperately 
needed ...one was heading for trouble with the dismemberment of formations 
and frequent changes of command.75
69 IWM 97/7/1 W.H. Mitchell, Letter, 29 May 1944
70 Trevelyan, Rome ’44, p. 79
71 Vemey, Anzio 1944, p. 147
72 In his examination of fatigue in war, Dr. Hugh L’Etang suggests that ‘fatigue may have settled the fate of 
General John P.Lucas” -  quoted in J. Stockman, Seaforth Highlanders 1939-45: A Fighting Soldier 
Remembers (Somerton, Sumerset: Crecy Books, 1987), p. 160
73 Vaughan-Thomas, Anzio, p. 200
74 A.M. Cheetham, Ubique (Formby: Freshfield Books, 1987) p. 147, and LHCMA, Penney Papers
75 Horsfall, Fling our Banner to the Wind, p. 201
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The appointment of a new Divisional Commander, Major-General Butterworth, a senior
major-general who had spent most of the war in a lower establishment division in England
and who had not had any combat experience since Dunkirk, adversely influenced the
morale of the 78th Division. News of the in-coming commander filled the officers with
some apprehension for they wondered what a Home Forces general knew about real war.
An officer recalled one of the first training workouts:
The General elected to hold a grand divisional cloth model exercise to bring us 
up to speed in advance and attack. Now if there was one thing that the Division 
prided itself on it was its efficiency as a follow-up division and its ability to 
pursue and drive the enemy before it. Our standard operating procedures were 
well practised and honed to a ‘T \ and our co-operation between all arms was 
second to none. Furthermore our previous divisional commanders had been 
first class generals inspiring confidence in their battle plans.
Everything the general said showed that even the most junior officer there knew 
more about the Germans and their way of fighting, about battle procedures and 
the realities of Italian topography, than he did. I shall never forget sensing the 
disappointment and dropping morale throughout the hall as the event proceeded 
and the grim looks superseding the eager anticipation with which it started. It 
was as though a dark cloud of calamity had settled upon us all.76
“Butterworth,” wrote the Corps Commanding Officer, General Kirkman, ’’was an officer
with much experience as a Div Comdr in England, but none in fighting. He failed and I
sent him away on 10th Oct.”77 There was also some question as to the fitness of the new
commander appointed to 56th Division at the beginning of 1945:
I am not quite happy that Whitfield is the man to get 56 Division back into first- 
class form. There is no doubt he is, I think, a bit above his ceiling commanding 
a Division. This Division has many good qualities and a very fine fighting 
record since Salerno, but it has had a very hard time, losses have been 
exceptionally heavy, particularly at Anzio and in the Gothic Line battles, and an 
outstanding man is required for this Division. Their desertion problem is a very 
serious one.78
76 Quoted in Ford, Battleaxe Division, pp. 189-90
77 Hand written note by General Kirkman in his copy of Horsfall’s Fling our Banner to the Wind.
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The whole ethos of an Army could be shaped by its Commander. To many, Montgomery
was the Eighth Army. He believed that a Commander should know and be known
personally by his troops, and that a “successful Army becomes like a large family.
Everyone knows ‘the form’ and they know each other. Above all they must know the head
of the family, i.e. the Army Commander.”79 Montgomery’s morale-raising visits to his
troops always followed the same pattern. He would gather the men around his car and tell
them how well they looked, and ask whether they were getting sufficient NAAFI supplies.
Prior to the Sicily invasion Major Sym remembered that when Monty (who liked being
called that by his troops, since he thought it showed that a great bond of faith existed
between him and them80) visited the 2nd Seaforth Highlanders:
He began by congratulating us on being chosen to lead the allied 
attack on Europe, he then said that opinion was divided as to 
whether Italians were or were not good fellows that that anyway it 
did not concern us. They had entered the war of their own free will 
at a critical period, if things were now going against them, they had 
asked for it and must take the consequences. Our job was to kill 
them first and ask questions afterwards. He looked round and 
picking out several badges asked men where they came from. He 
twitted us Scotsmen and the Londoners saying he would rather be 
where he was than in Scotland or London. There was no doubt 
about his popularity with the men as they showed when I called for 
three cheers for the Army Commander.81
Another man recalls that Monty “addressed all officers and made a tremendous impression
on me. He vowed that he would never commit his troops to battle unless he was assured of
success -  that was his contribution to morale.”82 When Montgomery visited the 1st Bn
London Irish Rifles, which had just joined the 50th Division from PAIFORCE, “all ranks
78 National Army Museum, Harding MSS 8908/144/4, McCreery to Harding, 4 January 1945
79 LHCMA W/C/ 20/9 Major Munroe Sym, Part II, p. 58; Brooks (ed.), Montgomery, p. 269
“ Ibid
81 LHCMA, W/C 20/9 Major Munroe Sym, Part II, pp. 58-9.
82 IWM 99/19/1 B. Westcott, My War, p. 24
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were extremely pleased by his visit and there was a noticeable rise in morale -  already 
extremely high -  when it was realised that the Bn was to be in his Army.”®
But Montgomery was received less than enthusiastically by 78th Division, who felt that
their contribution in the First Army to the North African campaign was belittled by Eighth
Army. “When he told the veterans of 78 Division, who had almost taken Tunis within
three days of landing at Algiers, that they should feel proud to be joining the Eighth Army,
the temperature dropped below freezing in a second.”84 They were to chalk up on many of
their trucks in Sicily the words: “Nothing to do with Eighth Army.”85 Yet, when he had
visited the Division in June, Dick Spurgin (78^ Divisional Artillery) noted that “the men
had never met any officer of high rank with a personality quite like that of General
Montgomery before, and there is no doubt that they were delighted with his free and easy
way of talking to them.” 86 When Monty visited the 36th Infantry Brigade (78th Division) at
their concentration area near Hammamet in July 1943, one officer noted in his diary that:
He was very complimentaiy about the Division, and his theme was 
that he will never embark on any operation unless he has got 
everything he wants to do the job properly; that he will never start 
until he is ready in spite of Winston trying to force his hand, and 
finally the fact that once he has started an operation it is bound to 
succeed ... I think most of the troops are very impressed by his 
manner of speaking to then, though Robert Gill overheard the 
following conversation between two of his troops after a Monty 
talk: “Stirring stuff that, Bill,” said the one. “Stirring arseholes!” 
replied the other.87
83 NA WO 169/10254 1st Bn The London Irish Rifles War Diary for June 1943
84 D. Healey, The Time of My Life (London: Michael Joseph, 1989) p. 55
85 Pond, Sicily , p. 162
86 IWM 02(410.654[Royal Artillery Field Regt]/5-2 99/392 R. Spurgin, “With the British 78* Divisional 
Artillery”, p. 79
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However they regarded him, Monty gave his Army what it needed: he gave his men the 
morale-boosting prestige and recognition that they craved if they were to continue fighting. 
One journalist at the time wrote: “His compact with his troops is a straight business 
proposition; they gave him their best and in return he gives them victory and its attendant 
glory. ” 88
His successor, General Sir Oliver Leese, did not have the same deft hand with his Army. 
His pre-Gothic Line exhortation was the most costly example of an own-goal in the whole 
of the Italian campaign. Oliver Leese, one 46th Division doctor remembered, told his 
officers and soldiers that his plan was to get to the Lombardy Plain and Vienna by 
Christmas, 1944.89 Another officer, from 217th Queens, recalled Leese addressing his 
battalion on the eve of battle and telling them that in two days they would be in Bologna, in 
four days Venice and seven days in Vienna. 90 Pat Scott, the CO of the Irish Brigade, 
wrote: “We had been encouraged by the idea that the war was ending; that the Hun was 
pulling out; that he had ‘had it’ and didn’t intend to fight any more, that he was going back 
to the Po as hard as he could leg it, if not beyond. ” 91 Eric Linklater was later to term this 
optimism “curious. ” 92 Eric Morris believed that “Alexander’s generals displayed a 
confidence that bordered on fantasy. They believed the Gothic Line could be assaulted on 
the run, so to speak. ” 93 It was extremely dangerous for morale, which was artificially
87 IWM 90/20/1. J.K. Windeatt, Very Ordinary Soldier, based on diaries and produced privately by the Oriel 
Press, Exeter, 1989
88 Quoted in d’Este, Bitter Victory, p. 98
89 IWM 91/16/1 Captain H.M. Jones, Italy and Austria July 1944-November 1945
90 Doherty, A Noble Crusade, Footnote, p. 240.
91 NA WO 204/10425 “The Irish Brigade in Italy”, Part II, p. 5
92 Linklater, The Campaign in Italy, p. 368
93 Morris, Circles of Hell, p. 371
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heightened and, as one contemporary put it, “If the war is not over this year the big shots 
will get a shock. ” 94 He was prescient.
Operation OLIVE, the plan to breach the Gothic Line, was put into effect on August 25th
1944. At first the attack seem to be going well, with the enemy taken by surprise, but by
the beginning of September the Germans were once again, with their usual determination
and efficiency, spoiling the advance. The first and second battles for the Coriano and
Gemmano Ridges, and the village of Croce, a mile north of the Gemmano Ridge
(September 4th-9th and September 12th-218t 1944) involved some of the heaviest fighting
Eighth Army had yet experienced. 95 The battles were a planning fiasco, a fact which one
usually circumspect battalion diary was happy to comment upon.
It is interesting to note that over a period of nine days nine different Bns from 
three different Divs were concerned in the action ... Without presuming to 
criticize the higher plan which was working under two very great difficulties -  
firstly the impossibility of finding suitable assembly areas for Bns without 
getting some elbow room in which to do it and, secondly, the congestion of the 
roads in the Montefiore area which was constantly under harassing fire, one big 
fact does emerge.
The task of attacking [the] feature required either a fresh Bn unhampered by 
any other commitments or a concerted plan....%
But these were just the beginning of a series of bitter engagements. The 276th Queens 
reported that “there is evidence that the Bosche has pulled back. The term ‘he is pulling 
out’ is not used with the Bn much these days -  mention of this phrase usually brings down
94 NA WO 204/6701 AFHQ Morale Report for the Quarter Ending 31 August 1944
95 NA CAB 106/427 Operations of British, Indian and Dominion Forces in Italy, 3 September 1943 to 2 May 
1945, Part III, The Campaign in the Northern Apennines, p. 12
96 NA WO 170/1412 2/4* Bn The King’s Own Yorkshire Light Infantry War Diary for September 1944
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a stonk. . . ” 97 The joke current in the 8 th Army at the time was that Jerry was retreating, 
“but he’s taking the last ridge with him. ” 98
The early pre-Gothic Line over-optimism which had infected the Army from the top 
downwards soon turned to pessimism. The advance was obviously not proceeding along 
the lines originally envisaged and the lack of success dramatically lowered morale. The 
failure of the Allied armies to exploit their initial success at the Gothic Line and debouch 
from the mountains condemned the soldiers to a miserable static winter in conditions far 
worse than any they had experienced before. “Worse than the Sangro, worse than the 
snowy wastes of the Central Appenines, worse even than Cassino.” 99
Dr. Tim Elliot, who until the end of 1944 commanded a company of the 214th Field
Ambulance in 56th Division, believed that the main reason for the depression at the end of
1944 could be traced back to Leese’s pre-Gothic Line Operation speech when he suggested
that the Allies would be sweeping into Austria in six weeks. This supposedly morale-
boosting speech had a disastrously negative effect when the soldiers found themselves once
again suffering through another Italian winter. Indeed, many of the men who had suffered
through the 1943/44 winter began to wonder how often the cycle of spring offensive and
winter stalemate would be repeated. 100
Certainly the front line soldier, wallowing in mud, shivering in sub-zero 
temperatures, drenched by freezing rain and sleet, manning his shallow slit 
trench or crawling into the doubtful hospitality of his flimsy bivouac to the cold 
comfort of sodden blankets, without heat, without light and very nearly devoid
97 NA WO 170/1466 2/6* Bn The Queen’s Royal Regiment War Diary for October 1944
98 Orgill, The Gothic Line, p. 141
99 IWM 90/29/1 J.B. Tomlinson, p. 193
100 NA WO 106/3975 Directorate of Military operations and Military Intelligence: Operations in Italy, 1944 
June-1945 June GSOl Report, 30 January 1945
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of hope that his tribulations would ever end -  the fighting soldier, I say -  had 
forthright, not to say forceful, views on the strategy which condemned him to 
that dreadful winter of hardship and suffering. 101
The final victory, “the most unlikely miracle in military history,” according to Brian 
Harpur, has been attributed to new High Command appointments in December. 102 General 
Alexander took over as Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Forces, on December 
12th 1944, and Mark Clark moved up to take Alexander’s place as Commander. Fifteenth 
Army Group. Command of Fifth (US) Army devolved to Lucian Truscott, while at Eighth 
Army Lt.-General Richard McCreery had taken over from Oliver Leese in September. 
According to Harpur, each man had something to prove. Alexander wanted to get to 
Vienna before the Russians. Mark Clark needed to prove he was a great commander. 
General Truscott needed to be his own man, out from Clark’s shadow, and prove he could 
do at army level what he had done so successfully at divisional level. McCreery “had 
perhaps the greatest personal ambition of them all”, because it was unthinkable that he 
should be the one to lead the famous Eighth Army “shuffling into obscurity rather than 
marching to the matchless victory which its final days deserved. ” 103 “Fortunately,” 
commented McCreery, “Alexander, Mark Clark, Truscott and I were united in our purpose 
of achieving a total victory in Italy. ” 104
IX
Training and discipline were the officers’ responsibility and, according to the 
Southborough Committee, training was of particularly importance in forming both 
individual and corporate morale. “Morale is confidence in one’s self and confidence in
101 IWM 90/29/1 J.B. Tomlinson, p. 193
102 Harpur, The Impossible Victory, p. 101
ia3 Ibid, pp. 101-2
104 Ibid, p. 124
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one’s comrades....It is the product of continuous and enthusiastic training. ” 105 Discipline,
according to Morale and the Officer, too often “means only punishment; fatigues,
whitewash, eye wash and so forth. Nothing could be further from the truth.”
... Discipline implies the teaching of certain rules of behaviour which 
experience has shown are necessary for the efficiency of the soldier and the 
efficiency of the army to which he belongs. When these rules have been learnt, 
they must be observed. There are do and do not rules. The majority are the do 
variety.
Disciplined troops were those who had been taught their trade and remembered what they 
had been taught, and put it into practice throughout the whole course of a battle. “Neither 
individual bravery nor mass bravery make up for lack of discipline.” 106 The key to a 
disciplined response from the men was training. “A high standard of training results in 
confidence, and confidence results in morale -  the biggest battle-winning factor of all. ” 107 
Most battalions trained whenever they had the opportunity. Towards the end of the war the 
1st Division was faced with the situation that two-thirds of some of the rifle companies were 
reinforcements and, as the Division had been in continuous action with usually at least six 
battalions deployed, it was not easy for COs to organize even basic training. 108 The 
shortage of manpower meant that battalions were often kept in an indefinite state of 
readiness, at 24 hours’ notice to move, an unsatisfactory state of affairs which prevented 
them from training properly. 109 As much training as possible was, however, organised. 
The 4th, 46th and 56th Divisions did have time out of the line for rest and training towards the 
end of 1944. Hardening up and general fitness were emphasized: for the first time
105 The Southborough Committee, Creation of Morale, p. 208
106 NA WO 214 /6702 “Morale and the Officer”, Section II, Discipline, p. 3
107 NA WO 170/1487 2nd Bn The North Staffordshire Regiment War Diary for July 1944 Training Policy 
15-31 July
108 LHCMA (GB99KCLMA) General Sir Sidney Kirkman Letter to Lt General Sir Richard McCreery, 15 
December 1944
109 NA WO 170/1366 6th Bn The Black Watch War Diary for October 1944
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battalion diaries mentioned the attachment of Physical Fitness instructors from the Army 
Physical Fitness Corps to units. 110
General Kirkman of XIII Corps worried that the men under his command were reasonably 
efficient in defensive operations, but were largely untrained for major offensive action of 
moving warfare. 111 His view was echoed by one of the battalion COs. The 1st Herts’ 
training programme for December 1944 included individual weapon handling and section 
Leading. “The Bn is very out of practice at Mobile Warfare and the standard of Section 
leading is extremely low. ” 112 78th Division, which had become used to the problems 
presented by fighting in the mountains, needed training in river crossing and in mobile 
fighting, along with armour. The Lancashire Fusiliers reported that one week “the Bn was 
kept well occupied by its training programme which included Coy Schemes, boating, signal 
exercises and movement in Kangaroos.” The following week “the Bn was engaged in 
further training, including night-time exercises, assault boating, the construction of a short 
Olafsen bridge by jeeps and anti-tank guns; street fighting exercises.” The battalion was 
also visited by the Army Physical Training Staff. 113 The Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders’ 
training programme included gas training, wireless, training, patrolling night and day, 
section attacks, obstacle crossing, assault boat training, silent night attack, house clearing, 
route march, PT and range practice. They also had recreation training and lectures. 114 By
110 See, for instance, NA WO 170/1382 Is* Bn The Duke of Wellington’s Regiment War Diary for October
111 LHCMA (GB99KCLMA) General Sir Sidney Kirkman Letter, 23 December 1944
112 NA WO 170/1401 1st Bn The Hertfordshire Regiment War Diary for December 1944
113 NA WO 170/5033 2nd Bn The Lancashire Fusiliers War Diary for March 1945
114 NA WO 170/4988 8th Bn The Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders War Diary for February 1945
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February 14th 1945, the battalions of 78th Division were training hard, “and one heard the 
usual remarks expressed by people, wishing they were back in the line. ” 115
The Scots Guards enjoyed four weeks’ training, before the final offensive, in the Forli area, 
which had provided winter quarters for the bulk of army units in the Eighth Army sector. 
Physical fitness was again emphasised, and companies were expected to include in their 
training a 10-mile march in the first week of training, a 15-mile march in the second week 
and an 18-mile march in the third and fourth weeks. The CO also wanted NCOs to be 
trained to assume higher command at short notice, a not unreasonable consideration given 
the attrition rate among junior officers. 116
The 2/6th Queens decided that the emphasis in their training would be on physical fitness
and for that purpose an assault course was built up in the mountains.
March 19th: The mountain villages where coys are staying for their 3 days’ 
training and general fitness are untouched by war. The scenery is beyond 
description, and the people themselves very hospitable. Eggs are plentiful. The 
men come back looking brown and very fit and the change of surroundings is 
good for morale. The scheme has caught on in the Bde since it has proved so 
successful
March 21st: The ground is excellent for training and the men show great 
keenness. If it is possible to get a company .... living out in the country for 
training there is never any lack of enthusiasm, and all ranks learn more readily 
this way. 117
X
At battalion level, officers were also concerned with other areas of soldiers’ lives such as 
recreational activities, sport and entertainment, which brought an element of normality into
115 NA WO 204/10435 ‘The Irish Brigade in Italy”, p. 37
116 NA WO 170/4981 1st Bn Scots Guards Notes On Commanding Officer’s Conference, 12 March, War 
Diary for March 1945
117 NA WO 170/5060 2/6* Bn The Queen’s Royal Regiment War Diary for March 1945
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the lives of front-line soldiers and re-affirmed their links with civilian society. Such
activities could also enhance group cohesion and help mould the troops into an effective
and efficient unit One battalion diary noted, as soon as the unit came out of the line: “The
Bn Entertainments Officer held a conference, representatives from each Coy attended. A
meeting was held by the Sports Officer. ” 118 Sports encouraged physical fitness, especially
for men who had been forced to lie still in the line for long period of time. They also
fostered team spirit, so important between the veterans and the incoming reinforcements.
“Sport provides a very important part of the soldier’s recreation,” commented a Morale
Committee report, adding, “Football matches, of which both the players and the onlookers
cannot have enough, are without doubt, extremely important for morale. ” 119 Football was
of enduring interest to -  and a great form of relaxation for - all soldiers. When the 2/6* Bn
Queens had a few days rest at Salerno they immediately created a football pitch and
challenged the brigade team to a match. The Queens won. 120 Some men even had a game
of football under gun fire, and while waiting to move up the line. 121 Pioneers constructed
two football pitches for use of the 211th Queen’s in October 1944.122 For the real diehards
of 46th Division, the UK footballs results were printed in the Divisional newspaper, The
Oak. 123 Football was instrumental in maintaining the front-line camaraderie out of the
line. On St. Patrick’s Day, 1944 the Inniskillings organised an officers v. sergeants football
match and some of the officers:
were certainly a sight for sore eyes. The C.O. was dressed in K.D. shirt and 
shorts, vivid socks, boots and Italian black coat, and a green port pie hat pulled 
down over on eye. Smudger was resplendent in khaki trousers, shirt and
118 NA WO 170/1404 6* Bn The Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers War Diary for February 1944
119 NA WO 204/6701 AFHQ Morale Committee Meetings & Reports, Morale Report by the Assistant 
Chaplain-General, December 1944, Appendix ‘A ’, Recreation and Amusements
120 NA WO 169/10282 2/6* Bn The Queen’s Royal Regiment War Diary for November 1943
121 Hillier, The Long Road to Victory, p. 113; Horsfall, Fling our Banner to the Wind, p. 42
122 NA WO 170/1467 2/7* Bn The Queen’s Royal Regiment War Diary for October 1944
123 NA WO 169/10252 6th Bn The Lincolnshire Regiment. War Diary for November 1943
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beautiful net veil.... Badger Dicker appeared round the comer on a donkey,
Stan Pollard riding pillion with black eye and adhesive tape [the result of the 
previous night’s celebrations], and holding an enormous aspidestra. 124
But it was not just football that was used to develop cohesive units. Rugby was also
popular among many battalions, and basketball become quite a popular game. “Our rules
are very much our own, and it helps to fill up games afternoon.” 125 Even the snow in the
mountains brought some compensation. Skiing became popular, but was not without its
own danger:
Many persons were learning to ski for the first time and casualties from this 
activity were definitely higher than due to enemy action. A brigade skiing 
meeting was provisionally fixed for mid-February, but the snow had begun to 
melt by this time, so it never took place; this was perhaps fortunate! 126
Battalions also organised boxing matches and whist drives. 127 Sport of a different nature -  
the Sport of Kings - was not forgotten either. “During the afternoon a Bn Race Meeting 
was held in the Arena near the MBU, this proved a great success. Prizes for the winners, 
runners up, and the best dressed jockey were distributed by the CO. It was generally felt 
that another meeting ought to be held in the future, the linings of some pockets are still 
bare. ” 128 The 16* Durham Light Infantry included a race meeting, The Redcar Races, in a 
Fete they arranged in the summer of 1944 which included “side shows of all types -  Roll 
The Penny, etc -  and a knockout football Competition which was won by A Coy. 129 Race 
Meetings were popular in the Queen’s Brigade too. “Horses (wooden ones) are pulled by 
signal cable and side shows are built by the Pioneers who aptly name their horse
124 NA WO 204/10425 “The Irish Brigade in Italy”, Part I, p. 6
125 NA WO 170/1467 2/7* Bn The Queen’s Royal Regiment War Diary for November 1944
126IWM 91/43/1 Major-General R.H. Whitworth, 24* Guards Brigade Operations August 1944 to May 1945, 
Chapter V, Static Operations in the M. Sole Sector, p. 40
127 NA WO 170/1404 6* Bn The Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers War Diary for February, 1944
128 NA WO 170/1467 2/7* Bn The Queen’s Royal Regiment War Diary for November 1944
129 NA WO 170/1385 16* Bn The Durham Light Infantry War Diary for August 1944
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‘Something out of Nothing by Pioneers’ . ” 130 46th Division battalions preferred Fairs: The
Lincolnshire Regiment recorded that the troops spent the morning preparing for the
‘Poacher Fair’. “An English fair ground was extremely well imitated and all the usual
amusements and games could be enjoyed. ” 131 The attractions included:
Poaching the Rabbit (Lincolnshire style), Poker Dice (as played by the 
backroom boys); Skittling for a Pig (if we can find a pig); Cock Fighting (a 
game of strength and skill; Tug of War (an open challenge by a team of seven 
men to any eight), darts competition, guessing competitions, quoits and 
booths. 132 Profits from the Poacher’s Fair -  a grand total of £61.10/-, was spent 
on behalf of the battalion on fruit, eggs and NAAFI goods. 133
In August 1944, the l/4th Hampshire Regiment was also Fair-inclined:
The Battle of Minden [a famous regimental victory] was celebrated in the Bn 
by a day of amusement and entertainment. A site in a field in the centre of the 
Bn area had been turned into a miniature Fair Ground -  various stalls being 
arranged by all coys and sections of the Bn. During the afternoon ... a brisk 
trade was carried on at a snack bar arranged by the Cook Sjt. The evening saw 
the snack bar turned into a ‘vino’ bar ‘ with an “all star” Bn concert, followed 
by a presentation of prizes by the Commanding Officer for prizes won on the 
various stalls during the afternoon. 134
At Anzio, where the lines between front and rear areas were blurred, off-duty men began to
play five-a-side football, even though sometimes shellfire forced a sudden end to the game.
The 1st Bn Northants started a football competition in April, and the 6 th Seaforths organized
inter-company football matches, and shooting competitions. 135 Shooting and sniper
competitions were held throughout the beachhead as a means not only of raising morale but
also of training. Sixth Corps ran a sniper competition won by a Cameronian rifleman. His
prize was seven days’ leave away from the beach head and $50.00.136 Battalions
130 NA WO 170/1466 2/6lb Bn The Queen’s Royal Regiment War Diary for October 1944
131 NA WO170/1428 6th Bn The Lincolnshire Regiment War Diary for August 1944
132 Ibid
133 Ibid
134 NA WO 170/1397 114* Bn The Hampshire Regiment War Diary for August 1944
135 NA WO 170/1445 2nd Bn The Northamptonshire Regiment War Diary for April 1944; NA WO 
170/1474 6th Bn The Seaforth Highlanders War Diary for April 1944
136 NA WO 170/1373 2nd Bn The Cameronians War Diary for April 1944 and Beachhead News, p. 1
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organised Sports Days. The CO of the 1st Bn York & Lancs won the egg and spoon race, 
and in another egg and spoon race, “there was great consternation among the competitors 
when they thought they would have to use powdered eggs. But the situation was saved by 
the substitution of onions. ” 137
Beetle racing was the sport that swept through the beachhead, attracting big crowds.
A large wooden tray, about four foot long, was divided by slats into five lanes.
The large indigenous black beetles were collected and stabled in match boxes 
when not racing. The rules were simple. You first caught your beetle by 
digging a small slit-trench, and in an hour the bottom of the trench would be 
black with beetles, all struggling to get out. From the numerous runners you 
made careful tests to select the fastest mover: certain beetles gained fame on 
the Beachhead and changed ownership at high prices, the champion being sold 
for over three thousand lire. The lira stood at 50s or $10 to the thousand, so this 
insect can claim to be one of the most expensive black beetles on record.
Colours were painted on the beetles’ backs and they were paraded around the 
ring in jam-jars. When the bets were placed the jam-jar was dumped into the 
centre of a circle six feet square, the beetles came under ‘starter’s orders’, the 
starter lifted the jar and the beetles made for the end of the ring. The first to 
cross the circles was the winner.
The Anzio ‘bookies’ brought off their smartest coup when they bought up the 
beetle which was far too consistent a winner at Divisional Headquarters races -  
and promptly stamped on it! 138
There was also the Beachhead Racing Association, the proud possessor of mules, donkeys
and horses, which ran the Anzio Derby. First prize was a can of ‘C’ rations and second
place won a can of spaghetti and meatballs. 139
XI
Battalion Entertainments Officers became busier as the campaign progressed and positions 
in the winter of 1944-45 once again became static. “It is proposed to form a Bn Concert
137 NA WO 170/1490 1st Bn The York & Lancaster Regiment War Diary for May 1944; NA WO 170/1373 
2nd Bn The Cameronians War Diary for May 1944 Divisional Weekly News, 28 May 28, p. 4
138 Vaughan-Thomas, Anzio, p. 216
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Party,” noted the 211th Queen’s war diary for October 1944. “Coys will render to the 
Entertainments Office names of those who are willing to perform. Returns should state 
experience and type of entertainment provided. ” 140 The Morale Committee recognised that: 
“Unit shows, by the troops for the troops, are definite morale builders. The men who take 
part on them are very enthusiastic, and say without exception that they provide one of the 
most satisfactory methods of passing spare time. Audiences enjoy seeing their friends and 
acquaintances perform. ” 141 “Coy concerts are now coming into vogue” wrote one diarist 
in October 1944. “The Bn [The Royal West Kents] produced a very good concert in which 
officers and men took part. A good time was had by all. The stage was constructed of 
wood covered by tarpaulin. Two 3-ton trucks each side formed very effective dressing 
rooms and also supplied very good stage lighting with the help of mortar boxes and 
reflectors. ” 142 The 211th Queens organised a battalion concert in the form of a ‘Spot the 
Talent’ competition, and the 6 th Lincolnshire Battalion War Diary recorded that “The 
Officers’ pantomime, with an all-star cast, was staged before a crowded house in the San 
Giorgio Opera House. ” 143
Battalions also arranged dances. The 6 th Lincolns held a dance at a hotel in Urbino when 
they were staying there. “Relations were a little cold until the tea and buns arrived, but 
afterwards became a first class evening. The most entertaining event was the Paul Jones
139 Trevelyan, Rome ’44, p. 237
140 NA WO 170/1467 2/7® Bn The Queen’s Royal Regiment War Diary for October 1944 Battalion Orders, 
17 October
141 NA WO 204/6701 AFHQ Morale Committee Meetings & Reports, Morale Report by the Assistant 
Chaplain-General, 4 December 1944, Appendix ‘A’, Recreation & Amusements.
142 NA WO 1709/1419 Is* Bn The Royal West Kents War Diary for October 1944
143 NA WO 170/1467 2/7® Bn The Queen’s Royal Regiment War Diary for October 1944; NA WO 
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when the females were actually herded into the centre. ” 144 The 1st Bn King’s Shropshire 
Light Infantry held a less entertaining dance in the theatre at Borgo San Lorenzo. The 
Regimental Band played, but it was ruined because “local Fascists prevented any girls from 
attending. Nurses from F.D.S. and C.C.S. saved the Dance from being a complete 
‘flop’ . ” 145
Other recreational amenities were organised at battalion level as well. In the summer of 
1944, the 2/5* Leicestershire Regiment was training, and was confined to the camp area. 
For the men’s recreation, an empty house was taken over and organised into the “Tiger 
Arms” [a reference to the regimental nickname] where wine was served under battalion 
arrangements. “It is hoped to assemble an orchestra of some kind to play during the 
evening. ” 146 The CO of the 6 th Royal West Kents decided to open an Inn when the 
battalion was out of the line in Bertinoro in February 1945. The pub was to be known as 
the White Horse Inn [again, a reference to the regimental nickname] and suitably decorated 
with murals. The battalion Welfare Committee was told to put that into operation, along 
with an Information and Reading-Writing Room. A week later the White Horse Inn was 
officially opened. The walls had appropriate murals, and red and white wine and a 
concoction known as ‘White Horse Special’ was on sale. All this met with the approbation 
of the men. An Italian band, comprising six instrumentalists, was engaged to appear at the 
Inn for the duration. In addition, the Queen’s Own Parlour was opened for the use of all
144 Ibid, War Diary for October 1944
145 NA WO 170/1416 1" Bn The King’s Shropshire Light Infantry War Diary for December 1944
146 NA WO 170/1427 2/5“* Bn The Leicestershire Regiment War Diary for July 1944
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ranks. Amenities there included a Reading and Writing Room-cum-Information room, with 
a snack bar where tea and sandwiches were sold. 147
XII
At an individual level men did what they could to sustain their own morale and that of their 
comrades. Sing-songs were popular. At Anzio not a night passed in the rest area without a 
dozen or so little parties “regaling the encircling ammunition dump with their singing and 
laughter. ” 148 The Irish battalions used to spend evenings singing songs of “a national 
character”.
The attractions of an evening like this grew so much that we decided to publish 
a book called “Songs of the Irish Brigade”, so that we could all join in when we 
felt inclined. We collected material from various sources, and though still 
incomplete, had the book printed at Campobasso. This song book has been an 
invaluable asset during many an evening in many odd places and is much 
sought after by people outside the Brigade. 149
The ordinary soldier’s ability to make his surroundings and day-to-day activities more
comfortable showed considerable invention, particularly at Anzio. During January and
February the underlying wetness of the ground made it difficult to dig too deep, but as the
ground dried out the men were able to dig deeper -  and bigger. “Dug-outs became more
ingenious and elaborate, constructed out of doors from ruined farms, piles of broken
ammunition boxes and even, in some cases, from the huge wine vats left in the cellars of
Anzio and Nettuno. 150
Parked vehicles left unattended lost alternators, dynamos, batteries and seats, 
looted in the greater cause of making dugouts a home-from-home. Petrol cans 
became stoves and brass artillery shell cases chimneys. Everything had a use. 
Gunners did a brisk trade in the heavy cardboard wrappings for shells, which 
made excellent insulation for dugout walls. Italian holiday villas along the
147 NA WO 170/5022 6th Bn The Royal West Kents War Diary for February 1945
148 Cole, Rough Road to Rome, p. 210
149 NA WO 204/10425 ‘The Irish Brigade in Italy”, p. 6
150 Vaughan-Thomas, Anzio, p. 209
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seafront were raided for furnishings, drapes, crockery and cutlery; after all any 
fool can be uncomfortable. 151
In one ‘B’ Echelon rest area the troops excavated roomy sleeping holes, each containing
real beds. Most of the holes were given names such as ‘Seaview Hotel’, ‘The Nook’,
‘Sunny Side Up’ and ‘Hawkers and Shells Not Welcome’ . 152 Even at the Fortress attempts
were made to render dug-outs as homely as possible:
Squash and Sergeant Chesterton have been busy reorganising the decor of the 
foxhole, and have made shelves out of Yankee ration boxes. Polished mess-tins 
and some chipped china cups hang in rows on bent nails, and the sergeant has 
made paraffin lamps out of cigarette tins with pieces of four-by-two as wicks. 153
It was not just comfort and safety that the soldiers were seeking, although they were
paramount. They also wanted to create a sense of civilized order in a disordered world, a
space where they could enjoy the illusion of privacy in the overcrowded beachhead. The
very lack of a rear area made those intangibles all the more important. “It is extraordinary
how the most primitive slit trench shelter can seem like home sometimes!” the Grenadier
Guard battalion diarist wrote. 154
The value of good slit trenches was noted in the December War Diary of the 1st Bn KOYLI,
when it reported five lessons learnt from fighting in Italy:
3. Value of digging in was brought to the notice of all ranks. In an area heavily 
shelled, both D and B Coys who dug in quickly and deeply suffered no 
casualties, although bombarded day after day. When rain and snow fell and 
slit trenches were filled with water, certain sections were allowed to go into 
houses. The only casualties that the Bn suffered from hostile shell fire were 
incurred whilst men were sheltering in houses as opposed to slit trenches. 155
151 Morris, Circles of Hell, p. 301
152 Trevelyan, Rome ‘44, p. 237
153 Trevelyan, The Fortress, p. 40
154 NA WO 170/1350 5* Bn Grenadier Guards War Diary for February 1944
155 NA WO 169/10244 1st Bn The King’s Own Yorkshire Light Infantry War Diary for December 1943
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Despite the seemingly greater safety of a trench, it is doubtful whether many soldiers would
have preferred to stay in a cold, water-filled trench if some kind of warm, waterproofed
shelter was available. The Germans knew how important shelters for the troops were in
winter: “If troops are unable to find shelters they will not defend their positions well ....
they always think that conditions in the rear are bound to be better. This frame of mind is
always disastrous. ” 156 The British soldiers were in bivouacs in the winter of 1944.157
“Everything possible was done to improve conditions. Such houses as still existed (during
the winter of 1944) were patched up as much as possible; Nissen huts and shelters were put
up in the most difficult places. ” 158 The 1st Division ADMS reported in November 1944
that: “Troops have built themselves dwellings out of tent bivouacs surrounded by stone
walls. Mud has been used for cement. Floors have been lined with logs and bracken.
Shacks have been constructed for cookhouses. ” 159
The ability of these soldiers to improvise anything out of anything was 
staggering. For example, when the official petrol burning cooker was not 
available, they simply punched a few holes in a jerrican, warmed the petrol 
inside until it started to vaporise, and then put a match to it. Out shot a long 
flame at ground level. They bridged the flame with improvised grills on which 
rested improvised pots and kettles and mugs to produce hot food and beverages. 
Wherever there was necessity there was plenty of invention.
Each man acquired a private stock of little things which helped to make life 
more comfortable. For example, he would make a wire cradle for a mug out of 
an empty tin so that hot tea did not bum his fingers. He would acquire a pair of 
pliers because there was always wire to be cut or a tin to be opened.... He 
would appropriate a discarded German helmet, not as a souvenir, but because 
with the lining taken out it became a portable wash basin. 160
156 Quote from Lt.-Gen. Frido von Senger und Etterlin in Bowlby, Countdown to Cassino, p. 47
157IWM 98/3/1 J.W. Thraves, p. 15
158 Ray, Algiers to Austria, p. 179
159 NA WO 177/375 Medical Diary -  ADMS 1st Division November 1944 Appendix A “Med” 1 Div letter 
M. 150,18 November 1944
160 Harpur, The Impossible Victory, p. 93
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Feeling clean and tidy was a great morale-booster, especially for troops who had been in
the line for some time. As soon as units came out of the line the men would wash, shave,
put on clean clothes and visit the barber, if necessary. In Isemia, in November 1943,
barbers, tailors and cobblers were set up under the auspices of the Inniskillings.
... a full length wardrobe mirror was erected on the pavement outside Battalion 
HQ, right at the end of the sentry’s beat. Above the mirror was painted the
question ‘Do you look like a victorious British soldier now?’  it did make
us polish up after the weeks we had spent in the mud. 161
The battalion mirror took up permanent residence at battalion HQ, and survived the journey 
up Italy. In February 1945 it attracted “much attention from the residents” of the town in 
which the Iniskillings were resting. 162 But it had a beneficial effect not only on the 
Inniskillings but on other battalions. “General cleanliness, and smartness of the Irish Regt, 
attracted much attention, at first laughs, but after a day whole-hearted attempts by other 
units to follow the same example were noticed. ” 163
XIII
What the men hungered for, above all, was news. At the beginning of the Italian campaign, 
shortage of paper meant that very little could be done with regard to battalion news sheets. 
Even Montgomery was forced to write letters on Fascist headed notepaper. 164 But as the 
campaign progressed, and paper and especially printing presses became more readily 
available, every opportunity was taken in divisional, brigade and battalion newspapers to 
keep the soldiers up to date with news of the war in general, and on matters of specific 
battalion interest. The 2nd Bn The Wiltshires, in its Notes on Recent Operations issued at 
the end of Anzio, reported that “the issue of a daily Bn newsheet for each PI and det paid
161 Cole, Rough Road to Rome, pp. 120-121
162 NA W0170/5018 2nd Bn The Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers War Diary for February 1945
163 Ibid
164 Brooks (ed.), Montgomery, p. 281
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hands down in addition to normal Div and Bde Intelligence Summaries and Newsheets. In
battle ... soldiers are constantly thirsting for news.” 165 The 1st Bn Northamptonshires
started a Bn News Board outside Bn HQ in March 1944 onto which were pinned any items
of interest in the news, with the progress of Soviet Forces in Russia shown daily. 166 The
2nd Inniskillings published the first issue of The Shamrock on April 19th 1944, containing
“topical and humorous items by members of the Bn. ” 167 The 1st Division magazine sheet,
Divisional Diversion, solicited contributions to the magazine giving “divisional news,
humorous stories, interesting points, tales of valour, opinions on general affairs, etc. ” 168
The King’s Shropshire Light Infantry News of May 1944 reported:
The first real indication we have had that we are “winning the war” was when 
the M.T.O. and M.T. Sjt were seen returning from a doubtful expedition some 
considerable distance North of the FACTORY. No questions were asked -  but 
the paniers of the ‘bikes’ were suspiciously full. 169
Battalion newspapers provided a useful outlet for grievances and gripes, and keeping in
touch with battalion members who were in hospital or had been posted elsewhere. During
the static warfare conditions so common in Italy, men often experienced relatively long
periods of time without action, when boredom, so deadly to morale, could set in. Writing
contributions to battalion newspapers gave some men something to do during these periods
of inactivity. The 5th Bn The Buffs produced a particularly lavish monthly newspaper, The
Dragonette, from January 1944. It ran to over 30 pages and contained information on each
company in the battalion; a Locations Column about where various members of the
battalion were currently to be found; Letters to the Editor; a Personal Column; poems and
165 NA WO 170/1489 2nd Bn The Wiltshire Regiment War Diary for June 1944
166 NA WO 170/1445 2nd Bn The Northamptonshire Regiment War Diary for March, 1944
167 NA WO 170/1403 2nd Bn The Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers War Diary for April 1944
168 NA WO 170/1416 1st Bn The King’s Shropshire Light Infantry War Diary for April 1944 Routine Orders 
14 April 1944
169 Ibid, War Diary for May 1944
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features of topical interest; cartoons and competitions. 170 The same mixture of subjects, 
news from all fronts, humorous stories, jokes and cartoons, appeared in the Coldstream 
Guards’ battalion newspapers, The Medjez Mail.111 The Invicta News (6 th Bn Royal West 
Kents) reproduced the BBC news and carried items of general interest. One such item was 
“Statistics of Jane” (the popular Daily Mirror cartoon strip). In a period of ten months 
during which Jane was featured in two stories, as a British Agent in an Aircraft Factory and 
the Ersatz Queen, she was apparently partially or completely “exposed” 208 times. 172 
Battalion newspapers became particularly important to morale after D-Day, when the focus 
of attention back in the UK switched from Italy to Normandy. If the British press was 
going to turn its back on Italy, the only thing to do was provide your own news, and there 
was a rash of new battalion newspapers: the first edition of the 274th Hamps’ Tiger Rag 
went to press in October 1944, and the 2nd King’s produced the first edition of The 
Scouser’s Spasmodical in November 1944.173
XIV
Officers, NCO and individual soldiers all made their contributions to corporate morale. In 
general their actions were positive but, in some unfortunate cases, ‘own goals’ proved very 
disheartening to the players. From the evidence available it would appear that, certainly up 
until the winter of 1944/45, the majority of officers were good, hard-working leaders who 
tried to provide for their men’s physical and mental wellbeing and comfort to the best of 
their abilities, both in and out of the line. War-weariness, however, eventually caught up
170 NA WO 1709/1368 5th Bn The Buffs War Diaries for April -  June, 1944
171 NA WO 170/1347 2nd Bn Coldstream Guards War Diary for June 1944
172 NA WO 170/1421 6* Bn The Royal West Kents War Diaiy for March 1944 Invicta News 30 March
173 NA WO 170/1399 2/4* Bn The Hampshire Regiment War Diary for October 1944; NA WO 170/1418 
2nd Bn The King’s Regiment War Diary for November 1944
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Pain in  your abdomen be blowed/ itot you’ve
got i s  a pain  in  your stunnick. only o r fic e r s
•as abdomens!"
( Drawing by P te, Edwards, I  Sec) 
-24- '
Source: NA WO 170/1368 5th Bn The Buffs The Dragonette No.3 April 1944
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Hollo Joe,wa'd 9ya know ?
Oiweiirourself 10 points fif or everyone <of the following 
questions you answer correctly; A score of 60' is average* 80 
is pretly^ood, 100 is exceptional and if you score 120 what the 
heck are you doing in the Infantry ?
1 • A .wind, becomes a gala when it
(i) blows the ness tent down,
(ii) .blows at 40 oup«h« or acre,
(iii) blows at over 60 vup.h.
2. The ajhglish Regiment known as the "MDonrakars" is the
(i) Viltahires,
(ii) *West Kents, ,
3« The oldest Military body in Sqgland is'
(i) General Sir Alan Brooke,
(ii) The Chelsea Pensioners,
(iii) The Teomen of the Guard.




5* A German 0-boat is so called from the first letter of its 
name, which is








(iii) A red lion.
7* The £meri*nn equivalent to the V.C. is
(i) The Rirple-Heart,
(ii) Halted States -Star*..
(iii) Congressional Medal of Honour.








10. "New that the political i& ia m n c e  o f  every-woman has been 
enfranchised and added to the- political ignorance and 
folly of everyman, Government is. by .Anybody,, chosen by 
Everybody* - was written by
(i) George Bernard Shaw,
(ii) H.G. Wells,
(x±±) Beachcomber.
. 11. The lithosphere is
(i) part ©f the Orderly Boom's copying machine ;
(ii) the outer crust of the earth,
(iii) the space above the stratosphere.
12. A ge©pb©ne is a device for
(i) locating sounds which come through the ground,




1: 40 nup.h. or more.
2. The Wiltshires.
3. The Teamen of. the Guard*
4; One ninth.
5, Unterseeboot. 
i i  A White horse.
7.3 Congressional Medal of Honour.
& Italy (Venice).
9. 200 miles.
10. George Bernard Shear.
11. The outer iarust of the earthXten miles .thick).
12. locating sounds which came through the ground. '
oooOOOooo
It seems that our London coppers aregettinguaed to 
Allied soldiers airing their knowledge, now that Basic Bnglish 
has come to stt$r, because a Csech approached one the other day 
and said \
"Which watch" ?
The policeman knew he was after the time, so he showed Mu 
his wrist-watdh.
. "Hhn" - said the man, "six watch - such much" I I
oooOOOooo
TAILPXEXIB.
We have itr on good authority that the latest way of 
catching polar bears is to dig a hole in the ice, put a 
circle of peas all round the edge of the hole. Then 
when the bear comes for a pea, kick him in the icehole .
S'fact.
( w>)
Source: NA WO 170/1368 5th Bn The Buffs The Dragonette No.4 May 1944
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with officers as well as the men. One officer recalled the general wearing away of the 
spirit:
I felt in September 1943 that if I was given a job I just went and did it. But by 
the end I was beginning to feel, instead of saying ‘come on chaps, follow me’, I 
was starting to say ‘I’ll put my headquarters here and you go there’, which 
many people had done from the beginning, but that was not my way. 174
This had a knock-on effect on the men under their command, and might have been a 
contributory factor to the rising absentee toll.
174IWM Sound Archives 13878 R. Collins, Reel 11
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CHAPTER VII
THE WAR OFFICE, THE ARMY AUTHORITIES IN ITALY
AND MORALE
Senior commanders, both at the War Office and at GHQ, Allied Armies in Italy, 
implemented a whole raft of measures during the course of World War II to try to alleviate 
concerns which might adversely influence their soldiers’ morale. A soldier who had home 
worries, or whose living conditions out of the line were unsatisfactory, would not be an 
efficient soldier. The rising desertion rate in Italy in 1944 forced commanders to take a 
keen interest in addressing any and all such problems. They needed to conserve their 
manpower and prevent soldiers worrying about external influences which took their minds 
off the execution of their duties. The measures they put in place covered the whole 
spectrum of a soldier’s life, from his domestic considerations, his living conditions, his 
education and his future once the war was over. The major concerns were home leave, 
domestic worries, mail, cigarettes and food, clothing, rest out of the line and entertainment. 
Each area will be examined to ascertain how successful the Army was in dealing with these 
problems affecting soldiers’ morale.
I
The Army Council began to organize this effort in 1942, when they instituted a Morale 
Committee. Commanders in Italy, recognizing that morale was slipping, especially after 
the winter of 1943/4 and the long drawn-out battles for Cassino and Anzio, established their 
own AFHQ Morale committee in June 1944.1 Its terms of reference were:
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(a) To study morale in its broadest aspect, including future problems 
when hostilities have ceased
(b) To-co-ordinate and prepare quarterly morale reports to the War 
Office.2
The Committee was made up of Sir Brian Robertson, the Chief Administrative Officer, 
Allied Armies in Italy; the Deputy Adjutant General; the Deputy Quarter Master General; 
the ADAG (P); and the Director of Welfare. The Italian Morale Committee reports dealt 
with disciplinary matters such as desertion to a far greater extent than the War Office 
Reports, but other than that their principal area of concern mirrored, to a large extent, those 
of the War Office: the general welfare of the men.
Welfare was an area in which the Army Council placed great emphasis, indeed, “on a scale
never previously contemplated in war or peace.”3 Following the adverse comments in
North Africa about the inadequacy of amenities provided for British servicemen in contrast
to the Americans, an office new to operational command was created in November 1943
when the Directorate of Welfare was set up at AFHQ under Brigadier A.L.W. Newth, the
Director General.4 The object of Army Welfare, according to the Army Director General
of Welfare and Education, Major-General Harry Willans:
May be stated as being the maintenance of the morale of officers and men; 
primarily to make them fit to carry out their duty as soldiers when the time 
comes ... with the utmost possible efficiency ... In order to achieve this object, 
it is necessary to cater for the whole needs of the man -  the needs of his mind,
1 See NA WO 204/6701 AFHQ Morale Committee Meetings & Reports, June 1944
2 NA WO 204/6701 Directive -  Morale Committee, 8 June 1944
3 NA CAB 106/454 Operations of British, Indian and Dominion Forces in Italy, 3 September 1943 to 2 May 
1945, Part V, Monograph 18, NAAFI/EFI, p. 2
4 NA CAB 101/224 “The British Soldier in Italy”, p. 17
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his body and his spirit... which together will result in a contented soldier and 
so a contented Army.5
Welfare personnel were not included in the phased programme of built-up after the Italian 
invasion, because of shortage of shipping. After the capture of Naples in October 1943 a 
small advance party was sent to the city to lay the groundwork for future expansion, but 
while the fighting remained fluid and the advance continued not much attention was paid to 
the welfare services. However, once the line became static in December, and no doubt 
spurred on by a rise in the desertion figures, real effort was put into improving the general 
welfare of the men. In January 1944 a section of the Welfare Directorate, under the Deputy 
Director Welfare, was attached to AFHQ Adv. Admin. Echelon to deal directly with the 
welfare branches then operating in Italy. These were the AKS (Army Kinema Service), 
ENSA (Entertainment National Service Association), CVWW (the Council of Voluntary 
War Work), SSAFA (Soldiers’, Sailors’ and Airmen’s Family Association), Broadcasting 
Service, BAN (The British Army Newspaper Unit) and the normal services concerned with 
the supply of welfare stores.
The staff at AFHQ, from both the Welfare Directorate and the Adjutant General’s branch, 
were involved in a step-by-step improvement in the amenities available to soldiers in Italy. 
It was an ongoing battle, very much at the forefront of attempts to maintain morale. In 
September 1944, Robertson wrote that “as it now seems very probable that we shall be 
faced with the continuation of the war into 1945, and an offensive in this theatre in the
5 NA WO 277/4 Army Welfare, p. 28
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Spring of that year, my C-in-C is most anxious that everything possible shall be done to 
sustain and build up the morale of the troops during winter.”6
II
Operational imperatives often ran counter to the soldiers’ needs. The principal factor
degrading morale in Italy was war weariness: too many soldiers had been involved for too
long in a war far away from home. Home leave remained a sore point to the troops in Italy,
especially towards the end of the campaign. MPs reported after their visit to Italy at the
beginning of 1945 that some troops believed that leave was available after shorter service in
some units than in others. “Frequently we were told that men in some units had gone on
leave after eighteen months, while in the complainant’s unit it was running at three years
plus.”7 Equally, opinion within Eighth Army, from top to bottom, was that the period of
overseas service for the army should be shortened.8 They also felt they were being treated
unfairly compared to troops in Western Europe, who had been granted home leave after just
six months, and the far shorter length of overseas service for airmen. In August 1944, a
AFHQ Morale Report stated that from every source came confirmation that long service
overseas caused the breakdown of family life.
Men feel widely that the Government in general, and the Secretary of State for 
War in particular, have no interest in the matter and this is alleged to be 
evidenced by the different treatment given to the RN and RAF. Explanations 
have failed to change the outlook which has varied from “gloomy resignation to 
bitter resentment.”9
6 NA 204/6701 AFHQ Morale Committee Meetings and Reports, December 1943-March 1945. Report of 29 
September, 1944, p. 1
7 NA WO 106/3975 Extract from Report by Members of Parliament on their Visit to Italy, January 1945
8 Ibid
9 NA WO 204/6701 AFHQ Morale Report for the Quarter Biding 31 August 1944, Section 1: Morale, p. 8 
Home Affairs, Post War and Demobilisation
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The belief that the powers-that-be had no interest in soldiers’ family worries did nothing to
build up morale. Lt. Colonel Batten, Secretary of the Overseas Department of the
Soldiers’, Sailors’ and Airmen’s Family Association, told a SSAFA Annual meeting:
For various reasons, owing to long separation, changes of address and location, 
unkind letters, etc., a large number of men, at some time or another, have 
worries about their families at home. These worries, if not removed, 
unquestionably affect the man’s morale very seriously as a fighting soldier and 
make him either inefficient or discontented.10
“Goodness knows how much we think of you people at home. The further away the more
you mean to us,” wrote army chaplain Bill Cook to his fiancee at home.11 A British officer
reported to the Army Morale Committee that: “the two main factors affecting morale of the
soldier overseas are the mail and the female.”12 The “unkind letters” referred to by Lt.-Col
Batten usually related to a wife’s supposed infidelity. An Army chaplain wrote to his
financee about one such letter to a soldier: “There was a letter to say that his Missis had
been getting fed up and bored, and is playing about with another man. Goodness, this
separation is making such a mess.”13 There were also the “Dear John” letters. The
accepted wisdom at the War Office was that infidelity generally occurred either within
three months of separation or shortly after three years. A Morale Report noted that:
Family conditions inevitably tend to deteriorate in direct ratio with the length of 
service abroad, and many distressing cases of infidelity on the part of wives 
point to the gravity of the problem. Chaplains are impressed by the number of 
men who are prepared to forgive their wives when misconduct has become 
obvious and advocate every assistance bring given to these men to get home 
and straighten the tangles caused by long service abroad. This serious state of 
affairs, which strikes at the very root of national life, is completely disastrous to 
good soldiering.14
10 Soldiers’, Sailors’ and Airmen’s Family Association (hereinafter SSAFA) 57* Annual Meeting, 2 July 
1943
11 Cook, H & Cook, B. Khaki Parish (Worthing, Sussex; Churchman Publishing, 1988) p. 77
12 NA WO 163/162 Report to the Morale Committee, August-October 1943, B -  Overseas Forces,
Item 13 (b)
13 Cook, Khaki Parish, p. 184
14 NA WO 204/6701 Morale Report, 4 September 1944, p. 1
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The War Office accepted the reality of the situation. “It is obvious that the protracted 
separation of husbands and wives is going to lead to many cases of illicit co-habitation. 
Provided that the necessary precautions are taken, I think that this must be accepted ...”15
Men at the receiving end of such a reality were not so pragmatic. One soldier recalled how
he had to break the news to a friend that the latter’s wife back home in England was
expecting another man’s child.
I’m sure if he could have got home on leave a year earlier, he would have been 
able to sort out any problems. This was the trouble with a unit such as ours ... 
our battle experience in what was now our fourth theatre of war meant that we 
were picked for any operation that was going. For instance, after the war 
finished in Africa, we saw soldiers sent home on leave from units who had been 
a short time abroad; including France, we have been overseas for nearly 3 years 
and things do go wrong at home with wives and sweethearts, and there is 
nothing that one can do about it, except that hope that someone such as SSAFA 
can make a home visit and sort something out. One could not blame 
completely those left at home ... the loneliness must have been awful and 
temptations very strong.16
A report to the AFHQ Deputy Adjutant General, AAI, at the end of 1944 refuted “the
widely held theory that infidelity occurs after 3 years’ absence.” Based on the analysis of
the number of requests for compassionate posting considered by the AFHQ Committee
between June 1st and November 30th 1944, the report concluded that “the peak figure is
between one and two years. It falls slightly between two and three years and very rapidly
after three years.”17 Given the length of service of many of the soldiers in Italy, the
possibility of morale problems brought about by home difficulties was a real danger, one of
which the War Office was well aware. It did what it could, via the pages of newspapers
15 NA WO 163/161 Morale Report May-July 1943, B -  Overseas Forces, Item 10(b), MEF
16IWM 98/3/1 J.W. Thraves, pp. 13-14
17 NA WO 170/5 G1 (Br) AFHQ War Diary, December 1944 Minutes of DAG’s Fortnightly Conference 
(No. 22) held at AFHQ 5 December 1944. Appendix ‘B’. Report of ADAG(P), Item 17 Compassionate 
Posting
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and magazines, to encourage women in the UK not to write “Dear John” letters, but, due to 
the manpower crisis, it was unable to tackle the root of the problem, lack of adequate home 
leave.
Ill
Since home leave was not possible given the manpower crisis, a good mail service was 
paramount. The Adjutant General, Sir Ronald Adam, “always put the mails first as a 
morale factor. ” 18 Letters reminded men what they were fighting for. “If you ask them 
what they are out there for, they say they are fighting for their homes,” Lt.-Col. J.F. Batten 
told the SSAFA Branch Conference in 1943.19 The majority of British soldiers had no deep 
ideological motivation, they were just doing a job and were looking forward to going home. 
Over and above their vital role in conveying news from families and friends, letters had 
their own intrinsic value in maintaining a soldier’s morale: the very act of writing and 
receiving letters provided a link with “home” and all the unarticulated sentiment the word 
implies. Individual soldiers might be adversely affected by bad news from home, but 
whole fighting units were demoralised if the mail was delayed. Bad news was never 
welcome, but even bad news was better than no news at all. Soldiers abroad could easily 
become cut off from “normal” life, and letters were one of the few means open to them to 
remain grounded in their civilian lives. The act of letter writing itself allowed every soldier 
the means of mentally retreating from any uncongenial situation in which he found himself, 
to overcome the sense of isolation, loneliness and fear experienced by front-line troops 
between engagements. Letters and photographs were carried next to the heart, traces of 
personal actuality.20 One soldier wrote: “The one thing that keeps chaps going, that gives
18 SSAFA 57® Annual Meeting, 2 July 1943
19 SSAFA 57® Annual Meeting, 3 July 1943, Report of the Council & Accounts, 1942, Item 5
20 R. Blythe (ed.), Private Words (London: Penguin Books, 1993), p. 217
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them a sort of dogged persistence in living through these interim days, is the thought of 
Home.” 21 An infantry officer referred to the necessities of life in the front line as “food, 
water and ammunition -  and mail and rum. ” 22 The content of most letters was forlorn. 
There was hardly any talk of “death and glory”, or even fear. Most were concerned with 
mundane domestic matters and the discomfort of their present conditions.23
The Army Director General of Welfare and Education, Major-General Harry Willans, was 
one of the first senior officers at the War Office to appreciate the importance of regular and 
speedy mail delivery overseas.24 A representative of the Welfare Directorate sat on all 
Morale Committee Meetings from their inauguration in 1942, and on the Troops Mail 
Policy and Planning Committee, established in 1943. Field Marshal Montgomery was of 
like mind:
Letters from home play a great part in morale .... There must be no unnecessary 
delays, either in the soldier receiving his letters, or in the letters he writes 
getting home. A good delivery system, prompt censoring, and an accurate 
record for purposes of re-directing when a man leaves his unit, are all 
necessary. 25
The Army tried to ensure, within the constraints under which it was working, that there was 
a regular flow of letters between the UK and Italy, and as the campaign progressed, the 
mail service improved considerably. There were various types of letters available to 
soldiers. Regular letters, carried between the UK and Italy by ship, were restricted only by 
the availability of paper. Airgraphs were an innovation introduced in 1941 to speed up the
21 The Journal of Private R.L. Crimp in Blythe, Private Words, p. 192
22 Horsfall, Fling Our Banner to the Wind, p. 24
23 Joan de Smith (ed.), Dog Easy: The Love and War Letters of A Cambridge Professor (Sittingboume, Kent, 
SAWS Publication, 1991), p. 107
24 NA WO 277/4 Army Welfare, p. 41
25 Reid Marshal Sir Bernard Montgomery, “Notes on the Conduct of War and the Infantry Division in Battle”, 
November 1944, quoted in Sparrow, Morale, p. 4
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mail. Single page letters were reduced on negative film with a special Kodak machine, and
then reproduced at their final destination in positive form, smaller than the original (4” x 5
3/8” when reproduced), but large enough to read easily. A film containing negatives of 250
airgraphs weighed only a few ounces and provided a temporary solution to the problem of
shortage of aircraft space. Due to the obvious lack of privacy their popularity declined
when there was no longer any need to ration the issue of air letters. The air letter was
light-weight paper, slightly larger than quarto size, which could be folded into four and
sealed on two edges to keep the communication private. 26 They were issued to soldiers on
a weekly basis, in steadily increasing numbers, as the campaign progressed. One soldier
wrote of the air letter:
Every soldier will carry with him something of the agony and ecstasy brought 
about by the arrival of those little thin rectangular missives ... Agony if there 
was nothing for him at all or if there was and it contained news of a love that 
was lost, of an infidelity, or perhaps of a bereavement. Ecstasy simply because 
there was a letter for him, and he knew he had not been forgotten. 27
Most mail was unit-censored and the Army did try to ensure that there were no unnecessary 
delays in censoring these letters. If it did happen, the officer responsible was reprimanded. 
The initial censorship was exercised by the platoon commander, who had to read the 
personal letters of his men, all of which were handed in unsealed. “The fact that this never 
seemed to cause the slightest mutual embarrassment in quite extraordinary”, wrote one such 
officer.28
The officer who regarded it as just another bloody chore would skim through 
the wording -  inevitably as far as he was concerned a boring blend of love­
laden and laboriously written banality. If he spotted anything like a place name 
or anything in the way of a fact or a figure which might conceivably be of help 
to the enemy he would simply scratch it out In the same way the soldier saw
26 IWM Accession No. 83/3275 R. Gould & E. Proud (eds)., History of British Army Postal Service, Vol. Ill, 
1927-1963 (Proud, Bailey & Co., n.d.), p. 113
27 Harpur, The Impossible Victory, p. 97
28 Ibid
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the whole thing so impersonally that he was seldom if ever deterred from 
pouring out his love, his heart, and masses of kisses. In the many hundreds of 
letters, perhaps thousands of them, which it was my duty to read, not once did I 
detect any inhibition displayed by the writers because they knew that I or 
someone else would be reading them.29
There was also a “green” envelope, for letters relating to private and family matters only, 
which was censored at base. Lt.-Colonel John Sparrow, noted that “while some men feel 
constrained in writing where their letters are unit-censored, they write quite freely in green 
envelopes ... Indeed, most writers seem to forget the censor -  whether the Base Censor or 
their officer -  when they write. ” 30 Privilege Air Mail Letter Cards, which were subject only 
to Base Censorship in the same manner as the green envelopes, and not at battalion level, 
became available in Italy in January 1944 and issued at the rate of one a month.31 In May 
1944, all ORs’ air letters became subject to the same censorship regulations as the green 
envelopes, so the task of reading the men’s letters no longer fell on officers -  a relief for 
both officers and men.32 For really urgent messages there were telegrams. For 2s.6d a 
soldier would send up to three phrases out of a prepared list of 81 standardized messages 
(see next page). The charge included the address and the name of the sender.
Detailed postal planning for Sicily was drawn up prior to HUSKY. There were frequent 
delays in the transmission of surface mail from the UK to Sicily, routed via Algiers, due to 
the congestion in that port. At one stage the number of vessels awaiting unloading was 
such that mails were held up for as long as 18 days.33 A satisfactory airmail service, 
however, was soon established and during July and August 1943 the average transit time
29 Ibid
30 Sparrow, Morale, p. 36
31 NA WO 170/1396 1/4* Bn The Hampshire Regiment War Diary for January 1944 Battalion Orders,
3 January
32 NA WO 170/1382 1** Bn The Duke of Wellington’s Regiment War Diary for May 1944
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Source: NA WO 170/1428 8th Bn The Lincolnshire Regiment War Diary for March 1944
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for airmail between the UK and Sicily was six days. The 6 th Durham Light Infantry got 
their first mail on July 19th and all the way through the Battle of Sferro (July 20lh-August 
3rd 1943) the mail continued to arrive for the Gordon Highlanders.34 One 78th Division 
man, however, compared the mail service in the Eighth Army unfavourably with the First: 
“No air letters or green envelopes in this country,” he wrote in his diary on August 28th. 
“We would prefer I Army administration! Mail in seems to be delayed too. ” 35
At Salerno, letters were always the best morale-booster. “In general when the mail arrived, 
an atmosphere of silent abstraction, comparable only with the Church, enveloped the 
battalion,” reported one officer.36 When the Eighth Army landed in Italy they had no mail 
for some weeks. Montgomery signalled 15th Army Group: “No letters received for long 
time and adverse comment and grumbling from troops. Nothing has such an adverse effect 
on morale as lack of mail from home. ” 37 It usually took about two weeks for airmail letters 
to arrive from the UK, and surface mail up to six weeks.38 Postal Units reported 
disappointing mail arrivals during the whole of September 1943, and no explanation could 
be found. The 46th Division Postal Unit reported on September 25th that “Division mails 
stated to be held at Bizerta, but are being forwarded. No advice yet to hand. There is no 
reason why mails should not have come to hand, as regular both way service was signalled 
by Postal Directorate, AFHQ on 21st September.” 39 The situation became so worrying that 
in September the GOC, X Corps ordered an officer to fly to Bizerta to investigate the mail
33IWM 83/3275 Gould & Proud, History of British Army Postal Services Vol III 1927-1963, p. 218
34 NA WO 169/10203 6th Battalion The Durham Light Infantry War Diary for July 1943; Pond, Sicily , p. 161
35 IWM 62/89/1 P. Pettit, 28 August 1943
36 Cole, Rough Road to Rome, p. 112
37 NA WO 214/62 Alexander Papers Signal to Alexander, 23 September 1943
38 NA WO 169/8727 5th Division Postal Unit RE War Diary for September 1943
39 NA WO 169/8776 46* Division Postal Unit RE War Diary for September 1943
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delay.40 Even in October 46th Division was questioning the long transit time for mail from 
the UK and headquarters was expressing “extreme dissatisfaction” with the lack of mails 
and the transit times.41 The situation was, however, gradually improving in both armies and 
in a morale-boosting exercise Montgomery made it known throughout the Eighth Army in 
October that he had “asked Mr. Churchill that a direct air-mail service be flown from 
England to Foggia” now that the airfield was in Allied hands 42
There were few complaints about mail at Cassino. In fact, a good mail service was 
regarded as so important that one battalion placed its priority in the supplies going up to 
forward companies ahead of ammunition, just behind medical requirements and food.43 
Soldiers who were pinned down by day could still read and write letters.44 “Throughout the 
battle, the rations and mail had always come up ...” remembered one officer.45 For those in 
the mountains around Cassino, supplies were divided as widely as possible among the 
mules in case of loss, and the mail was carried in waterproof containers.46 When two 
battalions of 28th Infantry Brigade suffered heavy casualties and were withdrawn to an area 
east of Monte Trocchio for rest and re-equipment, the 4th Infantry Division Postal Unit 
formed a mobile Field Post Office to serve these units immediately they came out of the 
line, and made sure airgraphs were available.47 By this time the allotment of air letters was 
six a month. In March 1944 it was possible to send photographs home in personal mail 
“provided that, if the photograph has been taken by a civilian photographer, the address of
40 Ibid
41 Ibid, War Diary for October 1943
42 NA WO 169/10251 2nd Bn The Lancashire Fusiliers War Diary for October 1943
43 NA WO 170/1404 6th Bn The Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers War Diary for January 1944
44 IWM 90/29/1 J.B. Tomlinson, p. 132
45 Brutton, Ensign in Italy , p. 70
46 Ray, From Algiers to Austria, p. 119
47 NA WO 170/425 4* Division Postal Unit RE War Diary for April 1944
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the photographer does not appear on the print. ” 48 The mail service was good at Anzio as 
well, with a special LSI sailing from Nisida carrying letters to the beachhead. The only 
hiccup was when 56 bags were lost by shipwreck.49 Generally, by the summer of 1944, 
most soldiers were very pleased with the mail service. There were, however, calls for the 
cost of air letters outward from the UK to be reduced from 6 d to 3d. The War Office 
refused to consider this demand on the grounds that it would call for addition air lift which 
was not available. 50 There was also widespread criticism at the imposition of purchase tax 
on gifts sent to the UK, but by the end of 1944 the increase of the value of concession 
labels from £ 8  to £ 1 2  per annum, and the arrangements which allowed such packages to be 
sent by registered post at the letter rate did much to reduce the complaints.51 By the end of 
the campaign the Army was able to introduce free air mail to the UK for troops and a great 
expansion of the air mail service from the UK. These moves were enthusiastically received 
and a number of commanders pointed out “that the good effect of this concession is far in 
excess of its monetary value. ” 52
Soldiers wanted to read about domestic minutiae that had made up the day-to-day living 
they remembered from before the war, allowing them to hold together their fragmented 
lives. Right from the start of the war there was a flood of advice to women on how to write 
to their soldier husbands or boyfriends. Woman's Own, for instance, advised its readers to:
48 NA WO 170/1404 6th Bn The Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers War Diary for March 1944
49 NA WO 170/397 Is* Division Postal Unit RE War Diary for February 1944
50 NA W032/15772 War Office Morale Committee Report, Part I, The Army Overseas, June-August 1944,
p. 6
51 Ibid, Part I, The Army Overseas, December 1944-February 1945, p. 6
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Try to get into your letter something of your own personality so that when he 
reads it he can say to himself: “I can just imagine her doing that, saying 
that....”
Remind him of amusing episodes you have shared, chaff him a little about that 
snap he sent you.
And remember he is never tired of reading in actual words that you love him, 
that you want him home again and that nothing has changed through his having 
answered the call of his country.53
Writing worrying letters to a soldier overseas was frowned upon: women’s magazines’
Agony Aunts always maintained that since the soldier was facing danger, privation,
loneliness, possible pain and death for the sake of his family, no one should add to his
hardships by sending him bad news.54 Whatever advice they were given about the contents
of their letters, the fact was that women wrote fewer letters than their menfolk. Perhaps
they were busier in their daily routine. The discrepancy in the number of letters to and
from home caused considerable concern to the War Office Morale Committee, particularly
during the latter half of the war. A representative of the Welfare Directorate, for instance,
told the Troops Mail Policy and Planning Committee in December 1943, that he was
hoping to arrange publicity urging wives to write to their menfolk overseas more often. 55
This seems to have been a perennial problem. Eighteen months later the Adjutant General
was invited to take up the question of a circular letter to the Women’s Institutes and
Townswomen’s Guilds “urging women whose menfolk were serving in overseas theatres to
write to them more frequently. ” 56 At least one battalion instituted a pen-pal service for its
men:
52 Ibid, Part I, The Army Overseas, March-May 1945, p. 16
53 “I Sent A Letter To My Love,” Woman’s Own, 27 July 1940, p. 5
54 See, for instance, “Mrs. Marryat Advises”, Woman’s Weekly, 24 July 1943, p. 113
55 NA WO 163/217 Troops Mail Policy and Planning Committee. Ninth Meeting, 17 December 1943
56 NA WO 163/166 Minutes of the Thirty-Eighth Meeting of the Morale Committee, 28 May 1945
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Our battalion took notice of the people who hadn’t any letters come regular, 
and they sent their names and addresses back to Britain to the YMCA for 
people to write to them. Gave him a pen pal. I know of one man -  three times 
we came out of the line, he never had a letter from home, and I says to him ‘you 
not married?’ and he says ‘no’ . ‘No girlfriend?” “No”. And I sent his name 
back and it was months and months after, he got a letter and he came to me and 
he says “I’ve had a letter from a girl. She wants to be a pen pal. Did you send 
me? I said I was told to send you. He says, “Thanks, I’ve got someone to write 
to now’ I really felt sorry for the ones who didn’t get letters. 57
IV
Troops needed recognition from the wider community as well. “If the nation validates the 
sacrifices which the soldier is making, then the soldier is given the sense that the cause in 
which he is fighting is right. ” 58 His belief in the importance of that what he was doing, and 
thus his morale, was reinforced. Recognition from a grateful nation was not often 
forthcoming in Italy. During the defensive periods of March and April 1944, despite the 
constant patrolling and the continuous drain on manpower through enemy action, most 
papers reported that there was “little action” . 59 Then Cassino became headline news. 
Philip Ure, The Times' special correspondent, wrote on May 18th: “British troops looked 
down on us from the lesser height of Castle Hill and waved cheerfully. They are 
irrepressibly cheerful, these men who have endured so much with stolid, simple courage. ” 60 
The troops were finally getting the recognition they knew was their due, but sometimes not 
quickly enough. General Leese was concerned at the end of May that the censorship 
authorities were not releasing the names of units which had done particularly well in action. 
“It does a great deal to boost morale both out here and I submit also at home if the exploits 
of units can be recorded in the Press as soon as possible after they occur. If one waits a
57 IWM Sound Archives 17622 W. Cowans, Reel 11
58 H. Strachan, “Some Historiographical Comparisons” in P. Addison & A. Calder (Eds.), Time To Kill, p. 376
59 Taylor, Combat Nurse, p. 177
60 Quoted in Strawson, The Italian Campaign, p. 163
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week or a fortnight the glamour of a particular action dwindles as it becomes less important 
in the Press owing to more recent developments.” 61
More recent developments included the Normandy Landings. June 6 th 1944 marked a 
profound watershed for the troops in Italy. The emphasis of the war, and interest at home, 
shifted from Italy to Normandy. Soldiers started to feel that people at home had lost 
interest in, and were neglecting, the troops in Italy; that the troops in North West Europe 
were better regarded and given preferential treatment when they were on leave in the UK; 
and that Italy was considered a sideshow, without danger, hardship or importance.62 “It 
was, therefore, particularly galling to men who had served away from home for so long and 
had engaged in two or three D-Days on their own before Normandy, to find themselves 
branded D-Day Dodgers by MP Lady Astor. ” 63 “There was almost a tendency in some 
quarters to disparage the lads from Italy as men lurking in luxury among the vineyards and 
signorinas (such was the impression certain popular illustrated magazines created) whilst 
real soldiers were slogging away in the mud of the Ardennes. ” 64 Many of the soldiers had 
been fighting for several years, unlike many of the men of 21 Army Group, who had only 
been in the line since June. “The Fifth Army has almost dropped out of the radio news” 
noted one battalion diarist in November.65 ‘There were some desertions, the troops felt 
they were forgotten, they had been abroad a long time, there didn’t seem much point in 
bashing on. ” 66 This feeling that the Italian theatre was now of minor importance was noted
61 NA WO 216/168 Leese Papers Letter to Major-General Kennedy at the War Office, 26 May 1944
62 NA WO 204/6701 AFHQ Morale Report for the Quarter ending 28 February 1945, p. 1
63 One version of the story is that Lady Astor received a letter from soldiers in Italy signed ‘D-Day Dodgers’. 
She assumed this to be a unit nickname and repeated it either in a speech or in a letter. See Doherty, A Noble 
Crusade, p. 276
64 Renshaw, Memoirs of An Army Surgeon, p. 306
65 NA WO 170/1348 3rd Bn Coldstream Guards War Diary for November 1944
66 IWM 91/16/1 Captain H.M. Jones Italy and Austria July 1944-November 1945, p. 10 September 1944
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with some dismay by army commanders. “If this is not checked there will be a decrease of 
effort and enthusiasm. A message, emphasising the importance of the Italian Theatre in the 
whole plan to knock out Germany would do good. ” 67 Luckily, from the point of view of 
morale, the soubriquet “D-Day Dodgers” was adopted almost as a badge of pride by Eighth 
Army, and various versions of the D-Day Dodgers song was sung to the melody of Lili 
Marlene. “Jon” (Welshman W.J. Jones, whose Two Type drawings appeared in 8 h Army 
News, Union Jack and Crusader) produced cartoons which mocked such attitudes, but 
some resentment remained and the dissociation of the front line men from the home front 
was not helped by such misguided comments.
The soldiers, in turn, were particularly scathing about men who had remained back in the
UK. One soldier wrote in his diary: “I was at Ortona, fought hard for Castelfrantano,
Orsogna ... those tough towns that won’t fall, is it worth the lives lost daily and back home
they just talk about coal strikes. ” 68 Another wrote: ‘The news of those of us who bore the
main burden of the war when dockers, miners or industrial workers went slow or struck for
improvements in pay and conditions were more bitter than those in reserved occupations
were aware of.” 69 Yet another soldier in Italy was even more scathing:
I suppose in England it seems nearly over now. Out here it seems interminable.
I was thoroughly disgusted to read in 8 th Army News (our own excellent army 
paper) that seats for the Victory parade were being sold for 20 guineas. The 
racketeering little swine who thinks we’re fighting and dying for their right to 
make a profit from our victory ought to be shoved up the line for a week or so. 
Maybe they’d realise that we’ll expect a little more than sophisticated applause 
from people with 20 guinea seats and cheap Union Jacks.70
67 NA WO 20476701 AFHQ Morale Report by the Assistant Chaplain-General, 4 December 1944
68 IWM 86/24/1 R.M. Roach, Sunday 20 February 1944
69 IWM 81/5/1/ NJ. Friskney p. IV/6
70 IWM 85/34/1 Major J. Harper-Nelson Undated letter
‘Which D-Day do they mean, old man?’
Source: Jon’s Complete Two Types {London: Bellew Publishing, 1991) p.74
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THE D-DAY DODGERS
(sung to the melody, ‘Lili Marlene’)
We are the D-Day Dodgers out in Italy,
Always drinking Vino, always on the spree 
8 th Army sky vers and the Yanks,
6 th Armoured Div and all their tanks,
For we are the D-Day Dodgers, the lads that D-Day dodged.
We landed at Salerno, a holiday with pay,
Jerry brought the band down to cheer us on our way.
We all sung the songs and the beer was free,
We kissed all the girls in Napoli 
For we are the D-Day Dodgers.
The Voltumo and Cassino were taken in our stride 
We didn’t have to fight there. We just went for the ride. 
Anzio and Sangro were all forlorn 
We did not do a thing from dusk to dawn.
For we are the D-Day Dodgers.
On our way to Florence we had a lovely time.
We run a bus to Rimini through the Gothic line.
All the winter sports amid the snow.
Then we went bathing in the Po.
For we are the D-Day Dodgers.
Once we had a blue light that we were going home 
Back to dear old Blighty never more to roam.
Than somebody said in France you’ll fight.
We said never mind we’ll just sit tight,
The windy D-Day Dodgers in sunny Italy.
Now Lady Astor get a load of this.
Don’t stand on a platform and talk a load of piss.
You’re the nation’s sweetheart, the nation’s pride,
But your lovely mouth is far too wide 
For we are the D-Day Dodgers in sunny Italy.
If you look around the mountains, through the mud and rain 
You’ll find battered crosses, some which bear no name. 
Heart break, toil and suffering gone 
The boys beneath just slumber on 
For they were the D-Day Dodgers.
So listen all your people, over land and foam
Even though we’ve parted, our hearts are close to home.
When we return we hope you’ll say,
‘You did your little bit, though far away 
All of the D-Day Dodgers out in Italy’.
Source: Selwyn, Davin, de Mauny, Fletcher (eds), From Oasis into Italy, pp. 230-1
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V
The BBC was co-opted to strengthen ties between servicemen and home. A BBC unit was
sent to formations “for the purpose of ‘Sending messages home’ from troops. ” 71 The BBC
was at Anzio, recording news items and “Messages for Home” from troops there, but it
appears that BBC was not the first choice for radio listeners on the beachhead. The men
infinitely preferred listening to the German propaganda station, Radio Rome, than to the
BBC. In fact, Radio Rome’s seductive-voiced announcer, Axis Sally, and her companion
George were a great boost to morale.
‘Hello suckers’ she would begin. ‘Who has who surrounded?’ Then might 
follow a list of recent prisoners. Although they were intended to show German 
success, the lists were rather a source of consolation that some officer or man 
was not killed, as had been feared, but captured. Then would follow relays of 
the latest popular tunes from America, and the seductive never-to-be-forgotten 
strains of ‘Lili Marlene’, the adopted tune of both sides.72
One AFHQ Morale Report stated that “Wireless broadcasts by the BBC unfortunately live 
up to the BBC’s reputation. German and American programmes are much more frequently 
listened to. There is a very great shortage of wireless sets and spare parts. ” 73 Those that 
could listen to the BBC, however, often found it a great morale booster. Sapper Richard 
Eke, who was part of a Beach Group charged with clearing a beach and water of obstacles 
and mines following the invasion of Sicily, remembered that when the Beach Group 
reached their assigned location on the afternoon of D-Day, they were strafed and bombed 
continuously by German planes.74
71 NA WO 170/116 AFHQ Welfare -  Sicily & Italy: Progress and Information Report No. 4 ,9  February 
1944, Item 11, Broadcasting.
72 Vemey, Anzio 1944, p. 217
73 NA WO 204/6701 AFHQ Morale Committee Meetings & Reports, Morale Report, undated, but with 
August 1944 papers, item 3 (b) (iv)
74 IWM 92/1/1 C.R. Eke, p. 24
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Our spirits were suddenly raised by the bewildering sound of a Vera Lynne 
record blasting across the beach. It was coming from the tannoy speakers, and 
was followed by ‘This is London, and this is the seven o’clock news’ .. .the first 
announcement that ‘Our forces have landed in Sicily and met only slight 
resistance’ brought derisive jeers from the platoon. But the news that the 
infantry were holding the main road to Syracuse about three miles inland was 
the first information we had had of the success of the landing. It was strange 
that the only information of the desperate advance taking place only three miles 
from us had to come from London nearly two thousand miles away. 75
The BBC was the source of almost all of the news the troops learnt of the overall
development of the campaign in Sicily and Italy. The 5th Division’s newspaper, Front Line,
used the BBC as the basis for its editorial and gave details of all the theatres of war in
which the Allies were active.76 But the BBC was more than just a conveyor of news: it
brought the troops closer to home. Like letters, it was an:
... invaluable link with old values and past pleasures. That, I’m sure, is why 
front-line soldiers go for that “Home” type of nostalgic sentiment -  also why 
Forces Favourites and Messages from Home are such popular programmes.
We all listen solemnly to messages from Hartlepool just to hear those homely 
voices saying silly, ordinary things.77
VI
Recognition of another kind, medals to be exact, also provoked some concern. Several 
officers told Lt-Col Sparrow, during his tour of Italy in summer 1944, that “it would 
improve morale if the proportion of MMs to DCMs [medals for Other Ranks] awarded was 
considerably increased. There is a feeling that the ratio of MCs [only given to officers up 
to and including Major] is too high. ” 78 The infantry also believed, rightly or wrongly, that 
men of the RASC were receiving medals for doing what the Infantry had to do every day
75 Ibid, p. 26
76 For examples of Front Line, NA WO 169/10289 2nd Battalion The Royal Scots Fusiliers War Diary, 
August 1943
77 IWM 85/34/1 J. Harper-Nelson Undated Letter
78 NA WO 204/6701 AFHQ Morale Committee Meetings & Reports, Notes of Tour in Italy, June-July 1944
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without similar recognition.79 In a unilateral move, the 78th Division overcame this to some 
extent by producing, in March 1945, a divisional “Mark of Esteem”, a black and gold bar to 
be worn under the divisional sign. The award was granted to men who performed actions 
of personal courage or showed devotion to duty above the average and was backdated to 
cover actions since October 1st 1944. “The Mark of Esteem will not be given to those who 
have already received awards or have been mentioned in dispatches, nor will it continue to 
be worn if an award or mention in dispatches is subsequently given for the same action. ” 80
VII
The War Office could do little about leave, and family problems in the UK, but it did try to 
do what it could about conditions for the soldiers in Italy, especially with regard to one of 
the soldiers’ major concerns which, from the number of times it was mentioned in letters 
home and in diaries, was food. The food supplied by the Army in Sicily, despite the 
regular knee-jerk grouses of the soldiers, was a great improvement over what had been 
available to Eighth Army in the desert. The rations issued to the troops in the first weeks of 
both the Sicily and the Italian campaigns were “Compo” (composite) rations, which had 
first made their appearance in Tunisia.81 They were far better than anything issued before, 
and a great contrast to the bully beef and biscuits which were the mainstay of the Desert 
campaign. The basic compo ration held rations for 14 men for one day, or seven men for 
two days: 42 tinned meals, sweets, cigarettes and toilet paper, all contained within a 
wooden box. Under active service conditions biscuits were issued to replace bread. They
79 See Selwyn, Davin de Mauny & Fletcher (eds.), From Oasis into Italy, p. 219; and Renshaw, Memoirs of 
An Army Surgeon, p. 310
80 NA WO 170/4988 8th Bn The Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders War Diary for March 1945 Battalion 
Orders, 13 March
81 Ray, Algiers To Austria, p. 36
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had to be hard, to withstand the rough handling they would suffer, but they were just about 
palatable.82
The tins came in half a dozen different assortments and bully beef was 
conspicuous by its absence in nearly every kind. Instead, there were tins of 
Scotch broth, diced vegetable stew, steak and kidney puddings, Spam and the 
like, not to mention the wonderful tinned puddings -  “like mother made” -  in 
several varieties. Even the rice pudding was pure delight. 83
The food could be eaten hot or cold and it was, according to many soldiers, a palatable 
diet. 84 The exception were the soya sausages. These became the butt of a long-running 
joke during the Italian campaign. “It was widely rumoured that the staunch defence of the 
German Army in Italy was due to a belief that if they fell into our hands as prisoners they 
would be fed soya-links. It was their determination to avoid such a diet that kept them 
fighting to the very end. ” 85
The Compo rations were carried in battalion vehicles. Individual soldiers, during an assault 
landing or when cut off from any other source of supply, carried an Emergency Ration, 
which could keep a man going for 24 hours. It could be chewed dry or ground into power 
and mixed with hot water to be drunk. Additionally, there was the 48 Hour Mess Tin 
Ration, which was packed into the two halves of a mess tin, and consisted of preserved 
meat, biscuits and chocolate or boiled sweets. A Tommy Cooker, which used solid 
methylated spirits, was issued with it for heating the water for hot drinks.86 There was also 
a tin which contained tea, sugar and powered milk already mixed.87 “The idea was to heat
82 Lucas, The British Soldier, p. 28
83 IWM 99/49/1/ B.R. Christie
84 Selwyn, Davin, De Mauny, Fletcher (eds.), From Oasis into Italy, pp. 212-213; and Ray, Algiers to 
Austria, p. 36
85 Lucas, The British Soldier, p. 29
86 NA CAB 101/224 “The British Soldier in Italy”, p. 3
87 Selwyn, Davin, De Mauny, Fletcher (eds.), From Oasis into Italy, p. 206
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the water almost to boiling and then pour in the mixture. The result looked rather like 
porridge, and it was best strained before drinking through a mosquito net. ” 88 The main 
complaint was that the tea ration was less than the Middle East Field Scale.89 The Eighth 
Army was used to brewing up at every possible opportunity and there was much grousing 
when the order ‘no private brew-ups’, either in camp or on the march, was made in Sicily.90
In Sicily fruit was plentiful and was a welcome addition to rations, especially to those 
Eighth Army veterans whose teeth had loosened in their sockets during the desert campaign 
through vitamin deficiency.91 Tomatoes were plentiful, and eggs and fish could always be 
obtained locally. Fresh bread, baked in Malta, was available in Sicily shortly after the 
initial assaults, although one battalion noted that the bread issued in the bulk rations was 
blue and mouldy.92
In Italy, the standard ration (Field Service Ration) approved by AFHQ in October 1943, 
which were issued in bulk and therefore could only be issued when a certain level of 
maintenance had been achieved following a landing, aimed at providing the British soldiers 
with approximately four and three quarter pounds of food a day. 93 This was made up of 
seven and a half ounces of meat (excluding bone), 12 ounces of potatoes, 14 ounces of 
bread, 1 2  ounces of fresh fruit and vegetables and another five and a half ounces of dried 
fruits for puddings or cake. An extra quarter of a pound of special energy-giving food -
88 IWM 99/49/1 B.R. Christie, Sicily
89 NA WO 222/1494 “The Campaign for Sicily”, p. 13
90 IWM 99/49/1/ B.R. Christie
91 Renshaw, Memoirs of an Army Surgeon, p. 157
92 NA WO 222/1494 The Campaign in Italy, Medical, p. 13; NA WO 169/10234 6th Bn The Royal 
Inniskilling Fusiliers War Dairy for August 1943
93 NA CAB 101/224 “The British Soldier in Italy”, p. 2
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biscuits, sugar, chocolate and a little margarine -  was added for troops working at high 
altitude, anything over 2 , 0 0 0  feet. 94
Dairy produce, eggs, cheese and butter, was almost unobtainable in Italy, or at least in 
forward areas. One battalion diary reported, when they were in Naples on the way back to 
the UK, that “butter in place of margarine was included in the rations for the first time 
since leaving England and we reflected on the advantages of living at the base. ” 95 Fresh 
meat was also very limited. Meat was usually supplied frozen, tinned or dehydrated. Fresh 
fruit was more readily available, including grapes and peaches, which were “exotic” by 
home standards.96 At Anzio food was considered to be good. There was the first issue of 
bread on February 8 th, and fresh meat was on the menu in March.97 Most troops had a hot 
meal every 24 hours, even in the thick of the fighting and that, according to one soldier, 
“was one of the most significant features” of the Anzio campaign. 98 Troops were told that 
“the food position of the civilian population in this area is not good and that any 
thoughtless depletion may easily make it critical” so “the purchase or acquisition of 
foodstuffs by military personnel is strictly prohibited.” 99 An amazing number of cattle, 
however, “attacked” soldiers and had to be killed. 100 A good deal of dried food also found 
its way onto the beachhead:
94 Ibid, p. 1
95 NA WO 170/4980 5th Bn The Grenadier Guards War Diary for March 1945
96 NA CAB 101/224 “The British Soldier in Italy”, p. 2
97 Vemey, Anzio 1944, p. 133 & p. 217
98 Ibid, p. 155
99 NA WO 170/1487 2nd Bn The North Staffordshire Regiment War Diary for February 1944 Headquarters 
VI Corps Memorandum, 12 February
100 D’Este, Fatal Decision, p. 312
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dried potatoes, milk, fruit, carrots and even meat. There was a new 24 hour 
ration pack, just evolved, which was entirely dry. The meat, tea, sugar, milk 
and even porridge being in the form of blocks; they were quite appetising 
although they tasted quite different from fresh food. There were reports that 
some men had tried putting all the blocks into a stew in one go. 101
Dehydrated food, according to the Morale Reports, was not popular. 102 But it was the 
inspiration behind a Special Item which appeared in the 17th Infantry Brigade News Sheet 
of March 30th:
It is intended to drop thousands of dehydrated paratroops behind the German 
lines when the second front starts. By this method one bomber can probably 
carry a complete division of troops, who, on reaching the ground, make for the 
nearest river and jump in. Within five minutes they will have returned to 
normal size and be ready for the fray. 103
There were frequent complains about the standard of British rations compared to American 
rations. One officers at Anzio rhapsodised over a “glorious treasury of tinned food, such as 
we hadn’t seen for years, even in England” which the Americans had bequeathed his 
platoon, but the Morale Committee reported that on the beachhead, “it is noticeable that, in 
cases where Units have been issued with the American rations, there is great satisfaction 
when they return to their own British scale again. ” 104 The Green Howards also noted that 
some Americans preferred British food. When the battalion was enduring static conditions 
on the River Sangro and the men were brought back from forward positions for hot food, 
the same American sergeant appeared with a contact patrol. “The only time we got any hot
101 IWM 82/37/1 E.P. Danger, p. 161
102 NA WO 204/6701 AFHQ Morale Committee Meetings and Reports, Morale Report, undated, but among 
papers for August 1944, p. 2
103 NA WO 170/1471 2nd Bn The Royal Scots Fusiliers War Diary for March 1944
104 Trevelyan, The Fortress, pp. 31-32; NA WO 204/6701 AFHQ Morale Committee Meetings & Reports, 
undated report within the papers for August 1944, p. 2
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chow is when we come over to see your boys,” he said. Generally, in forward areas, the 
Americans subsisted on K rations. 105
VIII
The regular Army food ration was supplemented by the canteens run by either the NAAFI
or the CVWW (the Council of Voluntary War Work, which was made up of the Young
Men’s Christian Association, the Young Women’s Christian Association, the Catholic
Women’s League, the Salvation Army, the Church Army, Toe H, and the Church of
Scotland, among others). A mobile canteen was usually allotted to a division by Corps and
would work with it throughout Three YMCA Canteens were attached to X Corps at
Salerno, but since there were not enough of them at the start of the campaign Eighth Army
were still without any in late October 1943.106 However, additional canteens were
forthcoming. 107 There were four mobile canteens at Anzio at the beginning of April
1 9 4 4  u* The appearance of the NAAFI van always raised spirits:
We were amazed when a NAAFI van turned up. It was probably intended as a 
morale booster because it was only selling chocolate and we got our NAAFI 
ration in the ordinary way but in such close proximity to the line, and in the 
rather desperate situation of the bridgehead it was quite an occasion. 109
The Army Welfare Services considered that during fluid operations the mobile canteen was 
one of their most valuable assets. “There are still not enough of these, but those which do 
exist have done splendid work. ” 110 From September 1944 there were 56 Mobile Canteens 
with a 25% bias in favour of forward troops, and 40 static canteens run by the EFI and
105 G. Powell, The History of the Green Howards: Three Hundrd Years of Service (London: Arms and 
Armour Press, 1992) p. 204
106 NA CAB 101/224 “The British Soldier in Italy”, p. 25
107 NA WO 170/116 Welfare, Italy & Sicily, No. 18,23 August 1944, p. 2
108 Ibid, 5 April 1944
109 IWM 82/37/1 E.P. Danger, p. 146
110 NA WO 204/6703 Welfare -  Policy Eighth Army, Letter from Chief Welfare Officer, Eighth Army, 
21 June 1944, p. 1
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CVWW. 111 One such canteen was the Dutch Cheese, in Forli, which boasted a bar, lounge, 
reading and card rooms. 112 It served tea and cakes between 1030-1200hrs; 1300-1500hrs 
and 1830-2000hrs. It also provided dinner between 1700-2000hrs. In addition to the Dutch 
Cheese there were three canteens in Forli; one run by the Church of Scotland, one by the 
Salvation Army and Tommy’s Bar, run by the EFI. 113 Morale Reports noted that services 
rendered by mobile canteens were particularly praised. 114 One artillery officer wrote home: 
“This afternoon a worthy woman from Manchester appeared driving a mobile canteen, and 
stopped in the middle of our gun position during a shoot to dispense tea and cakes. ” 115 In 
Formicola, out of the line, the Church Army opened a canteen and “everyone was surprised 
to find that it was run by a young lady from home. ” 116 As one battalion was moving up to 
their assembly area at the start of the May 1944 offensive, Red Cross workers were 
handing the soldiers a sandbag each containing a few luxuries -  an orange, a few sweets, a 
few cigarettes and a packet of dates. At the same time there was a Salvation Army canteen 
trying to get nearer to the front, but it was being prevented from doing so by the military 
police. “I remember the chap in charge of it was maintaining a furious argument with 
them, to no avail I imagine. ” 117 Despite this, it was believed possible by the army welfare 
services that the mobile canteens could operate within a few miles of the front line and as 
troops advanced the canteens should too. 118 For the final offensive, plans were laid to 
provide welfare facilities as far forward as possible when operations became mobile once
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more and these worked well. 119 In fact, one mobile canteen looking for the London 
Scottish strayed into the Fusiliers’ front line and was so far up front that it almost ran into 
the Germans. 120 These visits to forward companies seem to have started very early in 1945. 
The 2/6* Queens reported in early January: “Arrival of a Toe H van in the morning is a 
new idea and one which goes down very well. This is the first time Toe H or any other 
such organisation has supplied our fwd coys in the line, we are grateful, and hope it goes
IX
Alcohol and cigarettes were also of paramount importance to soldiers. Beer was the first 
choice of drink among British servicemen, but it was in short supply for most of the Italian 
campaign. Soldiers turned to other forms of alcohol, and many drank wine for the first time 
in Italy. At Anzio, wine was available in the cellars under Nettuno. A doctor at Anzio was 
taken to one of them by the CCS Padre. In the wine vault he saw casks ranged on the 
muddy floor:
...vast tuns or vats capable of holding many score gallons. There were barrels 
of all sizes down to the convenient 50 or 100-litre size, which were in such 
demand among the troops .. .The M.P.s did their best to clean up such places, 
for the risk of contracting diseases in these filthy cellars was considerable. But 
the wine was required. “A slug of the vino” made a good night-cap, and, being 
in demand always, it was obtained. 122
There was also crude brandy, distilled using copper tubing from shot-down German planes.
“A slug of this dubious spirit gave many of those besieged on the beaches a better night’s
sleep and the courage to face the anguish waiting them the next day. ” 123
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The shortage of beer was attributed by soldiers to bad management by the NAAFI, but in 
fact it was originally due to shipments from Canada being held up by a shortage of 
bottles. 124 One Morale report pointed out that “the lack of beer is an easy second to long 
absence from home as a cause of complaint and a source of trouble.” 125 Another Report 
pointed out that “it is quite clear that if more beer was obtainable, less ‘Vino’ would be 
drunk, and since the soldier drinks Vino as if it were beer there would be less 
drunkenness. ” 126 As the front line moved further north local breweries were appropriated, 
but again, it was shortage of bottles which provoked an overproduction and overstocking of 
beer in the Rome Brewery in the winter of 1944. In order to reduce drunkenness caused by 
the excessive consumption of wine in EFI clubs, and to relieve the situation at the Rome 
Brewery, it was decided to issue to certain servicemen’s clubs that proportion of the Rome 
Brewery’s production that it was not possible to bottle. The effect on the clubs was 
instantaneous. Wine bars closed, drunkenness as a result of consumption on the premises 
was eliminated and the number of troops using the clubs on various days bore a direct 
relation to the beer delivery days. 127
Cigarettes were regarded by some as “the number one morale booster for our troops.” 128 
Huge amounts of scarce dollars were spent by the British Government importing tobacco. 129 
Montgomery always travelled with thousands of cigarettes, which he distributed to his 
troops. The free Victory “V” cigarettes, in purple coloured packets with the yellow letter
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“V” on the outside which Montgomery handed out, were “awful”. They were made in 
India and the tobacco, if tobacco it was (desert veterans believed they were made from 
camel dung130) was coarse and black. Yet they were cigarettes and better than nothing at 
all. 131 Players were a rarity and could fetch up to a pound for 20. 132 The average basic pay 
for an OR at that time was two shillings and six pence a day. 133 When the First Army and 
the Eighth Army finally met up in North Africa, the Desert Rats were not pleased to find 
that while they were issued with “V’ cigarettes and Canadian Rye whisky, the First Army 
received English cigarettes and genuine Scotch whisky. “Many were the anecdotes told 
about unsuspecting First men swapping packets of good Players for the ‘Special V 
Cigarettes’ issued to the Eighth Army. ” 134 Troops were issued with tins of 50 cigarettes, 
which were soon finished, and a shortage of cigarettes could quickly damage a unit’s 
morale. When there was a temporary shortage of cigarettes, one battalion was reduced to 
smoking dried leaves wrapped up in blank army forms. 135 In May 1944 the weekly 
allowance of cigarettes rose to 100 per man, with further supplies for sale in canteens. 136 A 
highlight of Anzio for one man was not getting V cigarettes. 137
X
It was not only a regular supply of mail, food, drink and cigarettes that could influence an 
individual’s morale. Clothing, living conditions, and recreational facilities also contributed 
to the physical and mental wellbeing of troops, both in and out of the line, as did a regular
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supply of news and the feeling that what they were doing was recognised and appreciated. 
The Army succeeded better in some of these areas than others.
One of the problem areas was undoubtedly clothing. There seems to have been very little 
thought, while planning for the Italian campaign, as to the type of weather troops might 
face if they were forced to fight in the mountains during the winter months. “Why was it 
possible,” asked one commentator, “that twentieth-century Englishmen should have been so 
ignorant beforehand about the climate of another European country? ” 138 Large arbitrary 
cuts in clothing production had to be made in the UK during 1943 due to shortage of labour 
and raw materials. The effects of this were felt for the rest of the war. 139 Despite setting up 
a clothing factory in Italy, using local labour, during the winter of 1943-44 the troops 
lacked sufficient cold-weather uniforms and equipment. 140 At the start of the campaign 
troops were still in khaki. Soldiers were issued with a pair each of khaki drill shorts and 
trousers and two pair of boots. Sometime in October 1943, at the discretion of the 
formation commander, drill changed to wool, with battle dress and greatcoats the order of 
the day. The change from winter to summer clothing was authorised to start towards the 
end of April 1944. In addition to the winter and summer uniforms, each soldier was also 
issued with two blankets and a groundsheet. 141 As winter set it, the first British troops 
were to experience in Italy, it was quickly realised that the regular uniform issue would not 
be sufficient. “Battle dress and greatcoats were no protection in such conditions. ” 142 The 
standard-issue army boots were not water-proofed, and it was only at the end of October
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that 78th Division acquired gumboots as well as battledress, woollen underclothes and 
greatcoats. 143 Battledress was issued to all British troops in October, but the Medical 
Officer of 46th Division considered that the clothing scale was not adequate and that a 
second battle dress should be issued “so that sodden suits can be cleaned and given a 
chance to dry. ” 144 There were also problems with the greatcoats and gas-capes in the 
weather faced by the troops in the mountains: the greatcoats were not waterproof and the 
rubber gas-capes made men sweat and did not keep out the cold. 145 The Army tried to 
provide special clothing to meet the cold and wet of the Italian winter, leather jerkins, 
woollen gloves and mufflers, denim overalls, patrol boots and gumboots, and the allowance 
of blankets was raised to four per man. 146 But the supply did not meet requirements. 
“Leather jerkins were issued in the winter but they didn’t have enough to go round, so we 
used to take it in turn to wear it . . . ” 147 The jerkins, denim overall and gumboots were in 
such short supply that when 46th Division left Italy at the beginning of March all these 
items of clothing had to be handed over to the incoming division. 148 Self-help was also the 
order of the day. Veteran Eighth Army officers brought out their Syrian sheepskins, 
leather jerkins and flying boots, with woollen mufflers sent over from the UK. There was 
also improvisation: in the Irish Brigade (78th Division) the sleeveless leather jerkin was 
modified by the addition of sleeves and collar (usually from American army blankets) into 
an all-purpose jacket. One Sergeant Major improved on the original, however. His sleeves 
and collar were of panther skin, “acquired from the lord knows where, and, crowning glory
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'W ell, you wouldn’t lend me your duffle coat!’
Source: Jon's Complete Two Types (London: Bellew Publishing, 1991) p.85
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as it were, a muff of the same material provided a decidedly unorthodox and unmilitary 
effect, even in the forward areas in Italy where regulation ‘uniforms’ were conspicuous 
only by their absence. ” 149
The following winter, the army tried its best to provide sufficient winter-proof clothing and 
equipment to keep the men as dry and warm as possible. In most cases it seem to have 
succeeded. Although a fourth blanket was issued this was felt to be inadequate for the 
climate and sleeping bags were made available. Battle dress, string vests, Angola shirts, 
duffle coats, leather jerkins and white snow suits were issued, as were instructions on how 
best to use them. Notes on the Uses and Care o f Certain Items o f Mountain Warfare 
Clothing and Equipment advised men to “keep warm in cold weather, never get hot.” 
Windproof smock and trousers were not waterproof, because “if they were the moist air 
continually given off by your body would condense and soak you, so that you would 
always be wet even in dry weather.” Boots should be greased slightly -  never heavily -  
while still damp. “When quite dry they do not absorb the grease. Fit boots over two pairs 
of socks and ensure that you can move your toes freely. ” 150
Natural wool socks and snow boots were needed if frostbite and trench foot were to be 
avoided, yet socks, at any rate, were not readily available. “The great sock scandal”, as 
one officer called it, was causing additional misery to men living in unbearable 
conditions. 151 In December 1944 The Buffs had seven cases of trench foot on one day, and
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four of these were reinforcements with only one pair of socks each. 152 A world-wide 
shortage of wool was apparently to blame. 153 The scandal was reported to a visiting MP, 
who cabled Churchill and “quite a lot of socks turned up rather smartly. ” 154 In November 
1944 the ADMS 78th Division was told that he would be receiving a large consignment of 
natural grease socks. 155
British soldiers recognised that his clothing was adequate most of the time, but “he noticed, 
sometimes as a fact that had to be accepted, sometimes with acerbity, that it could not 
compare with American or Dominion wear. Shabby material and poor cut were mentioned 
quite frequently in censorship reports. 156 Every effort was made, however, to ensure that 
the troops and their uniforms were as clean as the situation allowed. “Clothes were kept 
clean by mobile laundries, one of which was usually allotted to each division, and an 
efficient repair service, run by Italian women, was also provided.” 157 For the soldiers, out 
of line, there were the mobile bath units. These could be very basic, just a supply of hot 
water, but one particular mobile bath unit stood out. “It had cover for people who were 
waiting, with periodicals and papers to read, a Church Army tea car, a barbers shop, and 
real hot water. Moreover it was British and we wondered why all M.B.U.s cannot be like 
this one. ” 158
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XI
A particularly strong welfare push was promoted in the establishment of clubs in leave 
towns and rest camps for soldiers at the end of 1944, but this was built on a firm foundation 
of establishments instituted from the time the Allies landed in Italy. In Naples, for instance, 
a building in the centre of the town had been rapidly converted into a NAAFI club for ORs. 
It opened in November 1943 and became known as the Services Club. There was 
accommodation for 1,600 men in the Lounge and Reading Room and an orchestra played 
daily from 1400hrs to 1600hrs.159 The Yacht Club opened in Bari on November 24, 1943, 
the first of the Other Ranks-only clubs. Fourteen other OR-only clubs opened in Italy 
during the campaign. 160 The Yacht Club had to contend with a wide range of shortages, 
from furniture to cups and saucers. At this time a club merely offered a tea, cakes and 
snack service. With each new club opening the situation improved as supplies were 
sourced from local manufacturers. 161 The Alexander Club, in Rome, for instance, which 
opened on August 10th 1944, had once been a department store and facilities were available 
on several floors. On the ground floor there was a restaurant, with a band, where the men 
could get a meal anytime. There were also cloak rooms, an information bureau and a WVS 
Help Centre. In the basement there were showers, a valeting service, haircutting, chiropody. 
On the first and second floors there were snack bars; on the third floor there was a rest 
room with a small orchestra and a gramophone room. The forth floor had a games room 
and a shop selling souvenirs. There was a reading room, a library and a chaplain’s room on
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the fifth floor; and a cinema, snack bar and a hairdresser’s shop on the sixth floor. 162 The 
Alexander Club averaged 27,000 cups of tea a day. 163
In May 1944 a letter issued by the War Office stressed that NAAFI accommodation, 
“subject to operational requirements ... should be given high priority in order that troops 
might be appropriately served.” Facilities prior to May 1944 were limited to a restaurant, 
games room, reading and writing room, library, a Soldiers Room, a Corporals Restaurant 
and certain Staff Quarters. The newly-conceived clubs provided far more facilities, such as 
shower baths, slipper baths, sundries shops, gift shops, barbers shops, shoe-shine parlours, 
extended games facilities, gramophone and radio rooms, lecture rooms, piano and other 
music practice rooms. In addition, the Women’s Voluntary Services was introduced to 
control amenities. 164 By April 1945 there were Super-NAAFIs, which offered a voice 
recording department. For one shilling and nine pence a soldier could send 150 words to 
family and friends on a tiny recorded disc. The room was very popular with soldiers. 165
The further north the Allies pushed, the more towns were opened as leave centres. Rome
was the favourite. One soldier remembered his visit to the Eternal City:
Sightseeing -  all the places Rome is famous for and lots of good food in the 
clubs that were opening. These were run by N.A.A.F.I. and the welfare 
organisations like Y.M.C.A., Salvation Army, Toe H and Church of Scotland. 
These were clubs in the strict sense of the word and nothing was spared to give 
Servicemen comfort, very cosy surroundings and excellent food and other 
amenities. 166
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Facilities for troops in Florence included 10 hotels; two clubs (one for officers and one for 
ORs); six restaurants; 2 ORs’ Institutes; a canteen and a wine bar; a theatre, three cinemas 
and an opera house. All the entertainment was free except the Opera, which was operated 
by a civilian syndicate. 167
By the end of 1944 the main area for Eighth Army recreation, as well as training, was 
around Forli. “Forli was a great metropolis, full of canteens and cinemas and libraries, and 
above all the magnificent Dorchester Club, which provided meals and music and barbers 
and every conceivable amenity. ” 168 The Club was housed in a magnificent Fascist building 
and provided meals and entertainment for anything up to 10,000 men daily. Its scope was 
terrific. A soldier could do anything there from sending flowers home to his wife to 
learning to play the piano. 169 Spoleto, used for recreation during the early months of 1945, 
boasted three cinemas and a theatre as well as various NAAFI and YMCA canteens. 170 By 
the later stages of the war “Commanders had been educated to press for a high standard of 
facilities for the troops. ” 171 The Dorchester Club was but one example -  although a 
shining one -  of the welfare facilities which had been steadily improving in Italy over the 
past year. Furthermore, during December 1944 and January 1945 a drive was started to 
improve welfare amenities in forward areas. A programme of installing well-fitted clubs, 
restaurants, libraries and other institutions in forward areas was put in hand and five such 
clubs for ORs were opening between December 1st and January 11th.
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Rest camps were an important asset in Italy.
At a high level, an invaluable innovation during the winter of 1943/44 was the 
Divisional Reinforcement Camp. It served both to rest and build-up men 
suffering from strain and also to receive reinforcements and men returning from 
hospital. The historian of 56 Division, whose Camp was started by Major- 
General Templer in December 1943, is of the opinion “that this did more than 
anything to keep down the number of deserters”, and in fact such a Camp was 
eventually to be included in the War Establishment of a Division. 172
A common feature of the censorship reports was the frequent and favourable comments 
regarding leave hostels and other such establishments all across Italy, and particularly the 
8 th Army Rest Camp. 173 The Army Rest Camp at Bari, which opened in early 1944, was 
well publicised in the Eighth Army News: “It seemed that army welfare was looking 
up.” 174 A party which stayed at the Camp reported it “to be the nearest thing the army has 
produced to a Butlin’s Holiday Camp. They had beer, cinemas, good beds, good food, and 
a fine time. ” 175 There was another Eighth Army Rest Camp near Alifi, and 78th Division 
started up its own leave town, called “Axeminster” . 176 As the army advanced, so did the 
rest camps, and the Eighth Army camp moved from Bari to Senegallia in July 1944.177 
There were Army, Division, Brigade and Battalion Rest Camps. The Army Camps near 
Rome and Florence were built to accommodate 4,000 ORs. All camps aimed at providing 
cheerful surroundings, meals served by waiters, bathing, outdoor games, a good EF1 
canteen, comfortable lounges and furniture, a theatre or cinema, and daily transport to the
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nearest town. No charge was made in any camp for ORs. 178 The 4th Division established a 
Division Rest Camp at Castel Gandolfo, near Rome and individual battalion Rest Camps 
were opened for men who had had no leave and for whom places could not be found in the 
official Rest Camps.
XII
Entertainment for the troops also came under the auspices of the Welfare Directorate.
ENSA, the Entertainments National Service Association, had been set up before the war
with the declared aim of “meeting the need for all forms of national service entertainment
which experience might show to be required for maintaining public morale. ” 179 By the
summer of 1944 there were 22 ENSA Parties in Italy. Opera and concerts were extremely
popular, and “it is most noteworthy how many men have found that they appreciate good
music. ” 180 The quality of live shows, however, was variable and some adverse comments
on the standard of humour of ENSA shows were made. 181 Despite this, there were calls for
additional ENSA shows in Italy, and a number of new Parties arrived in October 1944. The
AFHQ Welfare Committee noted that:
Ensa London appear to be most anxious to improve the quality of parties, but to 
do this to any great extent with existing parties in Italy, would mean 
withdrawing about 6  companies for re-forming and rehearsing. It is felt that 
with present lines of communication, quantity is more important than quality. 182
The ENSA Production department in Italy was also responsible for arranging Italian 
concert parties, such as the one called “Soho Serenade”, which supplemented those from
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the UK. 183 By November 1944 there were permanent ENSA shows at Pesaro, Cesena, Forli 
and Faenza for Eighth Army, and at Florence, Leghorn and Prato for Fifth Army. 184 There 
were also special “turns”, such as the Rome Opera Company and other Italian performers. 
In addition, there were a large number of regimental bands called upon to entertain the 
troops, and a number of soldiers’ concert parties, under the central control of the War 
Office and independent of ENSA, which were inaugurated in September 1941 when the 
Central Pool of Artistes, with a small establishment of 50 other ranks, was sanctioned. 
Two years later the establishment of the CPA was doubled, and later on, it was doubled 
again. 185 Central Pool parties were known as Stars in Battle Dress and were a welcome 
addition to the entertainment available in Italy. Films and newsreels were supplied by both 
ENSA and the AKS (the Army Kinema Service), and, again, both the quantity and the 
quality could be patchy. There was a shortage of projectors and films and “demand 
continued to exceed supply. ” 186 Most of the available films were American, but not all. 
On September 8 th 1944 the 5th Grenadier Guards noted that a “cinema show was held at 
Rocco, where the programme included a newsreel in Afrikaans which was rather puzzling 
to understand.” Then, on September 15th: “A cinema show was given at Monsummano and 
the newsreel show was much enjoyed. Although it was ancient enough to include pictures 
of the Anzio landings, it was not in Afrikaans.” 187
XIII
It was not just entertainment that improved morale. The more martial concerns of any 
soldier, his equipment, also saw an improvement towards the end of the campaign, with a
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concomitant raising of morale. The shortage of shells, which was peculiar to the
Mediterranean theatre in most of 1944, but became a worldwide shortage by the end of the
year, was overcome by careful husbandry to ensure that troops in battle were never stinted
of artillery support. 188 This was particularly important since British military doctrine
emphasized the “policy of expending shells rather than lives” . 189 The demands put on
infantry rifle companies, and the lack of reinforcements, meant that “every feasible way of
reducing infantry casualties had to be adopted. The most profitable was found to be the
increased use of artillery. ” 190 But it was not just artillery support that gave heart to
infantrymen. The arrival of new equipment, which had principally been developed for the
Normandy Landings, prior to the final push in Italy, had an immediate and positive effect.
Never before had we in 78 Division been so well furnished with new and 
devastating weapons and watching these being used in training -  and later in 
battle -  I was struck by the vast changes in methods of waging war; the new, 
sophisticated weapons not only revolutionised methods, but attitudes too -  and 
confidence! 191
The new equipment included Crocodiles (flame-throwing Churchill tanks), Kangaroos 
(armoured infantry carriers), Fantails (tracked landing vehicles), DD (amphibious) tanks, 
flail Shermans for mine clearance and Arks (mobile bridges). The Kangaroos were of 
particular importance to infantry morale. In an armoured sweep to clear a pocket of 
Germans which remained on the Allied side of The Senio, north-west of Faenza, the 276th 
Queens used these new carriers and reported: “Our casualties have been 7 men wounded. 
This small number being entirely due to the Kangaroos armour and our consequent 
immunity from mines, S.A. fire and everything but direct hits from mortars. On our feet
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casualties would have been considerable. ” 192 Anything that reduced casualties was to be 
welcomed. Flame throwers, which also helped save Allied soldiers’ lives, occasioned 
much comment:
Wicked tongues of fire sought out every opening and poured death and 
destruction into the building among the defenders: not a sight for the 
squeamish, but then, to be a front line soldier and survive, is not for those of 
delicate susceptibilities. Earlier in the war, the task of winkling out brave, 
fanatical soldiers would have occupied large numbers of troops considerably 
longer with correspondingly greater casualties. 193
XIV
The Army’s various morale-building initiatives showed considerable development as the 
Italian Campaign dragged on. And while it would be unfair to suggest that the Army in any 
way ignored this area of concern before the invasion of Sicily, since the Welfare 
Directorate and the Morale Committee had been active since 1940 and 1942 respectively, it 
must also be noted that it was the manpower crisis and the rising desertion figures which 
seem to have given a more forceful impetus to morale-building concerns in Italy. That 
being said, it is also true that the Army in Italy was hampered, in common with other 
theatres of war and the home front, by a lack of supplies, and that it did its best, within the 
constraints under which it operated, to maintain the physical and mental wellbeing of the 
soldiers under its command. It thereby contained, but could not eliminate entirely, the 
morale crisis experienced by the infantry.
191 IWM 90/29/1 J.B. Tomlinson, pp. 239-40
192 NA WO 170/5060 2/6th Bn The Queen’s Royal Regiment War Diary for January 1945
193 IWM 90/29/1 J.B Tomlinson, pp. 260-1
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CONCLUSION
In this study of infantry morale in the Italian campaign, three areas of investigation were 
posited in the Introduction. Firstly, to what extent did the War Office doctrine, as 
expressed in Comrades in Arms and The Soldier*s Welfare, correctly identify and weigh the 
main factors likely to degrade and sustain morale. Secondly, the extent to which the 
prophylactic measures the War Office doctrine recommended were pursued in Italy; and, 
finally, their success or failure and the reasons for them.
Both The Soldier*s Welfare and Comrades in Arms laid great stress on the importance of 
battalion officers in both leading, and ensuring the welfare of, the men under their 
command. The Soldier*s Welfare in particular cited leave; messing; health; sexual 
behaviour; sports and games; entertainment; the NAAFI and other Institutes and canteens; 
and domestic problems as areas of concern for officers. Comrades in Arms added the 
importance of keeping friends together and grouping men carefully. These were certainly 
key elements in sustaining or degrading morale, but other areas of concern, not enumerated 
in either pamphlet, gained in weight during the course of the war and were taken on board 
by the Morale Committee. These included high casualty rates and lack of reinforcements to 
replace casualties; continuous noise and exhaustion; an unfavourable climate; primitive 
and monotonous living conditions; physical illness or the fear of illness; and the feeling of 
being forgotten and unappreciated. 1 Too long spent in the line and a lack of training and 
identification with the unit in which the soldier served were also acknowledged as 
degrading morale.
1 Sparrow, Morale, pp. 3-4
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The prophylactic measures recommended by War Office to maintain morale were actively 
pursued by most battalions in Italy, but the results were often patchy since outside 
influences, over which the Army had little or no control, also played their part in degrading 
morale.
The most important element in maintaining morale was considered by the Army to be 
strong leadership and good officer-men relations. In Italy the soldiers were perhaps not 
best served by their political and military leaders. The Italian campaign was, from the 
beginning, the result of a compromise between the Americans and the British who never 
constituted a clear, coherent policy in the Mediterranean once the war in North Africa was 
over and by June 1944, “The British and American Chiefs of Staff were becoming steadily 
more at odds about the future policy of the campaign in Italy. ” 2 The failure of the British 
Commander, Oliver Leese, and the American General Clark, to co-operate with each other 
fully during the Cassino battles and the run-up to the Gothic Line operation in 1944 
“condemned both armies to the ‘Winter of Discontent’ in grim conditions. ” 3 Clark’s push 
for Rome, against orders, allowed the German army to retreat in strength to their Gothic 
Line bunkers, and Leese’s insistence on using armour to lead Eighth Army’s advances, 
despite the terrain in Italy being unsuitable for armour, allied to his wildly over-optimistic 
predictions on the outcome of Operation OLIVE, contributed greatly to the conditions 
which sapped the infantry’s endurance and morale.4 It was only with the appointment of 
McCreery to succeed Leese at Eighth Army at the end of 1944 that the situation changed. 
McCreery “produced more imaginative plans, his final offensive being as well conceived
2 Molony, Brigadier C.J.C., The Mediterranean and Middle East, Vol. VI, Part I (London: HMSO, 1984), 
p. 29°
3 Carver, The War In Italy 1943-1945, p. 317
4 Molony, The Mediterranean and Middle East, Vol. VI, Part I, p. 290
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as it was executed . . . ” 5 It was McCreery who insisted on his divisions each having 
sufficient time out of the line to rest, re-train and re-group, and the results of this policy 
were reflected in the higher morale of 1945.
Army commanders shaped their men’s lives from afar, but it was the junior officers who 
had the most immediate influence on morale, and while all reports indicated that the 
majority of officers in Italy were conscientious in the pursuit of their duties towards their 
men, both in and out of the line, the growing shortage of officers as the campaign 
progressed played its part in degrading morale. The men with the highest morale, the 
greatest willingness to fight, were the ones who died first, and young junior officers, who 
were obliged to lead their men by example, often paid the price for their bravery. Many 
infantrymen were only persuaded by their officers’ exhortations to go forward into battle 
rather than follow their very natural inclination to back away from danger. A few officers 
were not up to the job in Italy; others did not survive long enough to gain the trust of their 
men; most served their men well. The growing shortage of NCOs as the campaign 
progressed also impinged on morale. The loss of experienced NCOs, men who could guide 
junior officers and provide “stiffening” for young infantrymen, often by example, was a 
serious blow to the fighting fitness of battalions. NCOs, like officers, suffered high 
mortality and casualty rates. The recognition of this meant that potential leaders from 
among the ranks of the ordinary infantrymen often refused to consider promotion, 
particularly as the end of the war came into sight and a return to civilian life beckoned.
5 Carver, War in Italy 1943-1945, p. 317
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The fear of being killed or wounded in action could cripple a soldier’s will to fight. Army 
commanders tried to ensure that casualties were kept to a minimum through the use of 
heavy artillery bombardments prior to infantry operations, and that was a morale-booster to 
the man in the front line: no man likes to be thought of as cannon fodder. Casualty rates in 
Italy varied in intensity across the campaign and across battalions, but in some battles they 
were particularly severe, severe enough to render battalions incapable of functioning. As 
indicated in Chapter II, there was not a straightforward correlation between casualties and 
poor morale, in the form of desertion, particularly in the first half of the campaign. 
However, over time men became less keen to put themselves in a position where they could 
become the next statistic, particularly as they knew the war was coming to an end. One 
NCO recalled that “always at the back of your mind is the thought ‘Am I going to be 
killed’” while an officer said: “Everyone I knew had been killed and it weighs on your 
mind that your time is coming. ” 6
An infantryman’s health could be endangered out of as well as in the line. Malaria and VD 
were the main culprits here. Malaria was endemic in parts of Italy. The whole coastal belt 
where Eighth Army landed in Sicily was malarious and so was the Catania Plain, where 
they were concentrated for much of the campaign.7 A captured document showed that the 
dangers of this area were known to the Germans and that this might have influenced their 
tactics.8 The British, who were initially unprepared for the illness, both on a personal and a 
corporate level, fell victim in their thousands, and even when malaria discipline was 
tightened up and measures put in place to eradicate the problem on the ground, relapses 
added to the army’s manpower woes. A sick man cannot fight, whatever the state of his
6 IWM Sound Archives 10421 L. Thornton, Reel 21; IWM Sound Archives 13878 R. Collins, Reel 11
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morale. There is little evidence, however, to suggest that soldiers deliberately courted 
malaria, through poor morale, to avoid battle. Nor did they seek to infect themselves 
deliberately with VD, the principal cause of manpower wastage in 1945, to get out of front­
line duty.
High casualty and illness rates pointed up the lack of infantry reinforcements. The shortage 
of manpower made itself felt from the beginning of 1944: after four years of war the 
available pool of young conscripts was very shallow. Military leaders must, however, bear 
some of the blame for the infantry manpower shortage in Italy. They initially underrated 
the difficulties attendant upon the campaign and the number of reinforcements required. 
The problem became particularly acute during the Gothic Line battles in the autumn and 
winter of 1944. The official history pointed out that the rapid decline in infantry strength in 
the autumn of 1944 was a result of inadequate measures taken earlier in the year to address 
the problem. The disbandment of existing infantry battalions and the selection of units for 
conversion to infantry took longer than had originally been anticipated, and by the time 
these reinforcement reached their intended units, the units had even fewer fit men than 
expected, so that supply never came close to matching demand. 9 Further insult was added 
when divisions in Italy were sent away to OVERLORD and then DRAGOON. A direct 
result of the manpower shortage, the expediency of cross-postings and sending men from 
hospital to whichever battalion had the greatest need, regardless of regimental loyalties, 
provoked sentiments ranging from doleful acceptance to desertion and potential mutiny. 
Esprit de corps, traditionally considered the most vital ingredient in the maintenance of 
morale by the Army, was eroded significantly during the Italian campaign, which made the
7 NA WO 222/1494 The Campaign for Sicily, p. 13
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advice proposed in Comrades in Arms, of keeping groups of friends together, particularly 
telling. Battalion officers, particularly towards the end of 1944, endeavoured to do just 
that, particularly with former AA men who were more often than not unwilling infantrymen 
and who needed the bonds of group loyalty and friendship to maintain their morale.
The lack of reinforcements resulted in the infantrymen remaining at their posts shouldering 
an ever-heavier burden, and enduring the never-ending downward spiral of exhaustion, 
which was “accentuated by the number of attacks to which they were committed which 
clearly had only slender chances of success, especially round Cassino and in the last 
winter. ” 10 Exhaustion was one of the principal causes of breakdowns. To exhausted men, 
“every twist of fate which made their lives more disagreeable became exaggerated to tired 
minds and bodies. ” 11 Most sufferers could be treated by a regime of rest away from the 
front line, but for some nervous strain, fear and exhaustion produced genuine battle fatigue 
which required far great medical intervention. Exhausted men also became physically ill 
more easily, and illness was a far greater drain on manpower in Italy than the casualty rate. 
The conditions in which men lived in the front line, usually spending hours at a time in slit 
trenches or behind sangars, avoiding the wickedly accurate German mortars, and the 
weather conditions, as often as not wet and cold, brought on illnesses of exposure: colds, 
flu, skin and digestive problems, and trench foot. The elements also deeply influenced 
men’s morale: “When campaigning, one’s well-being, thoughts and feelings were entirely
8 Ibid, p. 25
9 Molony, The Mediterranean and Middle East, Vol. VI, Part 1, pp. 449-450
10 Carver, The War in Italy 1943-1945, p. 315
11 Vemey, Anzio 1944, p. 154
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governed by the clemency or otherwise of the weather. ” 12 One soldier, when asked what 
most adversely influenced morale in Italy, replied succinctly: ‘The weather” . 13
Leave, getting away from the dangers and insalubrious conditions of the front line, was
cited as a morale-builder in both The Soldier*s Welfare and Comrades in Arms, but both
short term leave in Italy and home leave were heavily influenced by the manpower crisis.
Most men in the Eighth Army had been out of England for at least two years, some
battalions had been away for longer, and they had had no home leave. The length of
service abroad was a potent element in diminishing morale, both in terms of an individual’s
continuing willingness to fight and his mental wellbeing. Newcomers to battalions which
had been out of the UK for some time noticed that there was a “subtle peculiarity of
psychology” that changed the veterans. 14 They became less intellectually active, more
liable to get drunk and more prone to stupid or senseless actions when they came out of the
line. The fear of men who had been away from home for years was that they would never
see home again, and this grew in intensity the longer the campaign lasted. A doctor
remarked at the height of the Gothic Line advance that:
It struck me that these men had lost some of the snap and sparkle they had 
shown in the Desert days. The answer to this tailing-off of the high spirit and 
enthusiasm which had been such a wonderful feature of the ranks of the Eighth 
Army was very obvious, as one went the rounds, asking them how they felt -  
they wanted home. “Blighty? Where’s that?” one veteran explained, in serio­
comic style. 15
In his view, morale began to go down in the last quarter of 1944 owing to a combination of 
circumstances:
12 Horsfall, Fling Our Banner to the Wind, p. 19
13 Conversation (August 2001) with a Regular soldier who fought in the Italian campaign.
14 Crew, The Army Medical Services, p. 540
15 Renshaw, Memoirs of an Army Surgeon, p. 275
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First and foremost, the failure of the ‘push’ to break right through to Venice 
was a great disappointment. They usual crop of rumours went round: ‘There 
hadn’t been a Gothic Line; Jerry had simply lured the army on and held it on 
the Coriano Ridge’. The advance to Rimini, though steady, was not quick 
enough for impatient souls. Most of us had now been away well over three 
years. When would we see home again? 16
The soldiers often cherished an idealized memory of home, and in their letters to their 
families would more often than not dwell on the minutiae of domestic trivia such as the 
colour of curtains and wallpaper, or how they would buy a cottage with a rose trellis around 
the front door when they got home. Sights or sounds of Italy would recall memories of 
loved ones. Turning a comer in an Italian lane, or the chiming of church bells, might bring 
forth “a thousand recollection of home and quiet English lanes and dear ones separated by 
the fate of war ... then indeed did the agony of one’s soul reach its bitterest pang! ... 
Would we ever see Blighty again? ” 17 The men worried about their families back home, 
but the intensity of their feelings was sometimes not returned in equal measure. Women at 
home, who were fully occupied in war work or taking care of their children, did not have 
the same periods of inactivity as soldiers during which they could write letters. A lack of 
contact, especially a steady stream of letters from family and friends, or unwelcome news, 
could devastate a man’s mental equilibrium and render him incapable of behaving sensibly 
in battle. He would feel forgotten and unappreciated.
Morale, on a corporate scale, was challenged after the Normandy Landings, when Italy fell 
out of the news and troops there began to feel that people at home had lost interest in, and 
were neglecting, them; that the troops in North West Europe were better regarded and given 
preferential treatment when they were on leave in the UK; and that Italy was considered a
16 Ibid, p. 278
17 Ibid, p. 240
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sideshow, without danger, hardship or importance. 18 They were faced with the 
“demoralizing influence that they were playing second fiddle to the cross-Channel 
invasion; that victory was not going to be won by them, and that their sacrifices and 
suffering were not essential to it and were not appreciated. ” 19 In an attempt to keep the 
Italy at the forefront of the national consciousness, the War Office tried to charm and cajole 
newspaper editors into publishing more positive stories on the campaign, but they could not 
compel them to do so. And editors were more interested in publishing news from Western 
Europe, where the war against Germany would be won. Some men in Italy resented the 
belief expressed in the British press that they were sitting pretty in Italy, doing little for the 
war effort, but others seem to have taken it in their stride, even gloried in the soubriquet of 
‘D-Day Dodger’. This melded the troops together, gave them a bitter-sweet group identity 
and cohesion, on a large scale, that was lacking, by the later stages of the war, in many 
battalions.
The conflation of elements over which the War Office had little or no influence, 
encompassing the number of casualties; illness; domestic worries; the belief that their 
efforts were unappreciated and unrecognised by people whose approbation was needed to 
encourage the soldiers to carry on fighting; a dearth of junior officers and NCOs; the lack 
of reinforcements and consequently too few infantrymen working themselves into ever- 
greater levels of exhaustion, converged in the winter of 1944/45, to produce an inescapable 
outcome: war weariness. This is reflected in the desertion figures.
18 NA WO 204/6701 AFHQ Morale Report for the Quarter ending 28 February 1945, p. 1
19 Carver, War in Italy 1943-1945, p. 325
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The desertion rate was regarded as a key indicator of the state of the army’s morale. Every 
book on the Italian campaign pointed out the fact, in greater or lesser detail, that during the 
campaign desertion was a major problem and the inference, although never explicitly 
stated, is that the British infantry was inadequate to the task it was facing, that British 
infantrymen were deliberate deserters, that their morale was totally degraded and they had 
no will to fight. There were undoubtedly men in the British infantry who did not see the 
need to face the same front-line dangers as their comrades, who preferred to wait out the 
war in prison, but opinion at the time, from both the War Office and front-line soldiers 
themselves, indicate that the causes of desertion were varied and many, and that cowardice 
was not the most potent motive.
There is no accepted ‘norm’ for the level of desertion, only a suggestion, by Lt.-Col 
Wigram, as to what might be expected. The number of deserters at the start of the Italian 
campaign fall well within the suggested parameters, rose when the soldiers got their first 
taste of the worst winter in Italy in living memory, dipped as the weather began to improve, 
then rose again during the terrible battle conditions of Cassino and Anzio. The failure of 
the Gothic Line operation, after such high expectations, condemned the infantry to another 
winter of static warfare, soul-destroying patrolling, exhaustion and growing war weariness. 
Many men could no longer muster the necessary endurance. For most of them, it was not 
so much an unwillingness to fight, more a temporary loss of the mental and physical 
stamina necessary to sustain bellicosity. The end of 1944 was “pathetic” and the early days 
of 1945 were marked by “sickening numbness and apathy,” when the Italian campaign 
“seemed doomed to suffocation under the pillow of its apparent unimportance and
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irrelevancy.” 20 Yet this was a seasonal phenomenon. From January 1945 many of the 
‘involuntary’ deserters returned to their units of their own volition and one Morale 
Committee Report stated that many of the petitions received from soldiers under sentence 
“contain a statement that the man wishes to return to the line and redeem himself.” Anxiety 
about their position in relation to the release scheme equally influenced their decision.21
Victory depends not so much on the number of men killed as the number demoralized. 22 
To deal with the every growing number of deserters, the Army put into effect various 
‘carrot and stick’ initiatives. The stick was charging absentees with desertion when their 
push for the re-introduction of the death penalty for desertion failed. However, all attempts 
to reduce the desertion level by punitive measures failed. Deserters either deliberately 
sought to avoid front-line action by whatever means, including a prison term, or their need 
to escape an untenable situation was so great that no threat could sway them.
The ‘carrot’ initiatives were all aimed at boosting the soldiers’ general feelings of 
wellbeing, giving him peace of mind and as much comfort as possible, at least when out of 
the line. In this the Army was far more successful, certainly if the Morale Reports are to be 
believed. In the area of welfare the Army, from top to bottom, must be deemed to have 
been successful as far as was possible within war-time constraints. The welfare programme 
was organic in nature, growing apace from 1939 as time and circumstances allowed. By 
the time the Allies landed in Italy, the basic framework had been put in place. An adequate 
mail service, so important to soldiers’ peace of mind, had been established and generally
20 Harpur, The Impossible Victory, p. 101
21 NA WO 204/6701 AFHQ Morale Report for the Quarter ending 28 February 1945, Desertion and 
Absence, p. 2
22 Ahrenfeldt, Psychiatry, p. 166
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worked well throughout the Italian campaign. Rest camps and leave centres were speedily 
established; a great deal of time and effort was given to ways and means of ensuring that 
the British serviceman had cigarettes and beer, although there was always an insufficient 
supply of the latter. A memo to Major-General Robertson, Chief Administrative Office, 
AAI, about the need to build up the morale of the troops during the winter of 1944/45 
pointed this out. Beer “is very important. Present supplies are woefully inadequate, and 
there is a lot of complaining about it. ” 23 Reports indicated that the number of complaints 
were reduced with an increase in the supply of beer “which now amounts to one bottle per 
week per man, and more in the case of forward troops. Draught beer is also being served in 
some EFI Clubs. ” 24 The initial unpopularity of EFI diminished over the course of the 
campaign, “and the growing number of luxury type clubs are greatly appreciated. Some 
criticism continues that resources and efforts are too much concentrated on these clubs and 
upon large towns generally, but this has diminished since EFI have been able to follow the 
advancing troops more closely and more quickly. Forward commanders are now giving 
special priority to EFI requirements in newly captured towns, to the great benefit of their 
troops.” 25 Army food was adequate: indeed many men had no complaints. Uniforms were 
a different matter; the cut and material of the battledress lacked style. More serious was the 
lack of special cold-weather clothing and sufficient socks and waterproof boots. The Army 
did what it could, but in some areas their options were limited. They could not overcome 
world-wide shortages of materials and goods which affected the military and civilian alike.
23 NA WO 204/6701 Memo to Major-General Sir Brian H, Robertson, 29 September 1944




As well as the Army Council and Army commanders, divisions and battalions did their best
to ensure their men’s comfort and wellbeing. Most divisions established their own 48/72
hour rest camps “and many of these are quite first class. They are of course much
appreciated by the men, and the fact that it is their own ‘Show’ acts as a fillip to ‘esprit de
Corps’ . ” 26 Battalion sporting arrangements were encouraged: “football matches, of which
both the players and the onlookers cannot have enough, are without doubt, extremely
important for morale. ” 27 Another morale-building initiative at battalion level, which sought
to encourage esprit de corps, and gave men the opportunity to air their grievances, or have a
laugh, were battalion newspapers. The editors of The Dragonette, the 5th Buffs newspaper,
encouraged the men to contribute:
Now we’ve finally got our paper going, lets keep up the good work and there is 
no limit to the dizzy heights to which we may climb. Just imagine your articles, 
comments and opinions being quoted in ‘The Times’! Don’t be faint-hearted 
because you have done nothing of the kind before, we know what you can do 
because we’ve censored a few thousand of your letters in our time ... This is 
your paper more than any other and its what you have to say that we want to 
print. 28
The success of the measures Army commanders took to deal with morale problems can best 
be summed up as patchy. Within the resources available to them, and in areas where they 
had influence, the War Office and officers in Italy worked hard to ensure the comfort of 
their troops, and welfare arrangements improved considerably as the campaign progressed. 
They could not, however, provide a panacea for war weariness. The end of the war was 
needed for that.
26 Ibid, Morale Report from Assistant Chaplain-General to HQ, AAI, 4 December 1944, Leave, p. 3
27 Ibid, Recreation and Amusements, p. 3
28 NA WO 170/1368 5® Bn The Buffs War Diary for April 1944 The Dragonette, No. 3, April 1944, p. 1
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Morale, as was suggested before, can be likened to an india rubber ball, and this property 
was clearly exhibited towards the end of the Italian campaign as desertion started to fall. 
As one commentator put it: “We were certain now that the end was approaching, and such 
knowledge buttressed morale like nothing else could do. ” 29 The fact that active operations 
during February 1945 were on a small scale and that weather conditions had improved were 
also contributory factors.30 A new optimism became pervasive. Even deserters seem to 
have been infected with a fresh spirit and reappeared from their private winter quarters in 
time for the spring offensive. Some were sent to detention centres. But most were returned 
to their units rather than being brought up before a FGCM. The battalions either distributed 
the deserters among the platoons, or concentrated them in a single platoon, with the best 
NCOs and a top rate platoon commander. “This worked wonders. ” 31
In February 1945 battalion diaries started mentioning morale on a positive note once again.
One, for instance, stated:
During this period in spite of its being a defensive position the morale of the 
rifle company was very high indeed. This was due to a number of reasons, 
there was not much enemy shelling and mortaring, casualties were light and 
there was enough to keep people busy without tiring them out, wiring digging, 
improving positions and so on. Above all everyone fired their own weapons a 
great deal as there was no restriction on small arms ammunition, this gave 
people something to do and gave them the feeling that they were hitting
back Before the bn had almost always experienced a considerable degree of
superiority either on the enemy side or on our own, but here both sides were 
roughly equal and as time went on everyone felt that we were slowly but surely 
getting the better of the enemy and causing more casualties than we suffered 
ourselves. ” 32
29 Horsfall, Fling our Banner to the Wind, p. 212
30 NA WO 204/6701 AFHQ Morale Committee Report for the Quarter ending 28 February 1945, Desertion 
and Absence, p. 2
31 Morris, Circles of Hell, p. 421
32 NA WO 170/5044 1st Bn The London Irish Rifles War Diary for February 1945
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The withdrawal of formations from operations at die beginning of 1945 for rest,
reorganisation and training gave the troops a welcome breathing space. ‘This, together
with the successful progress of the war on other fronts has raised morale to a high pitch. ” 33
A War Office representative visited Italy in April, just before the start of Operation
GRAPESHOT, and reported back that:
 I went to Italy convinced that I should find embittered troops unwillingly
joining in a battle in the outcome of which they had no confidence. Nothing 
could have been further from the truth. I spoke to men of various regiments 
and different arms both at Headquarters and in units ... Nowhere was I told 
tales of woe. Everywhere they felt there were on the last lap and that they 
would make the Germans pay a price for having held them up so long.34
By the start of the Spring Offensive morale was high and “a sense of purpose pervaded the 
Army; the number of soldiers reported absent in April 1945 was the lowest for any month 
since the landings in Italy. ” 35 Lt.-General McCreery believed that the British soldier was 
“the meat in the stew ... the most solid part”, and attributed the success of the Final 
Offensive in Italy to the “magnificent fighting spirit, endurance and gallantry” of his men.36
Italy was, par excellence, an infantry war. The troops fought a long slogging battle over 
mountains and across rivers, in often appalling conditions, yet still managed to find that last 
gasp of courage sufficient to finish what they had started with the invasion of Sicily so 
many months previously. One of the best tributes they could have asked for came from a 
non-infantry 78th Division officer:
33 NA WO 32/15772 The War Office Committee On Morale Report of the Committee, Part I, The Army 
Overseas, December 1944-February 1945, p. 2
34 NA WO 106/3961 Report on a Liaison Visit to the Mediterranean Theatre by GSOI, M 05 ,4-17 April 
1945, Morale and Welfare Arrangements, 22 April 1945
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As any division soldier will confirm, the salt of the earth in this last war, as in 
others, was the infantryman ... all those who made up the establishment of a
Division will be as one in lauding the prowess of the infantryman In the
maelstrom of the battlefield, there is no substitute for valour, the courage of the 
man at the “sharp end”, with nothing and no one between him and an equally 
brave and determined adversary. Salute the brave; salute the infantryman
 !i !37
Morale, which had dipped somewhat, despite the Army’s best efforts, was re-invigorated at 
the end of the campaign:
...all knew that this was not just another battle but the battle to end all battles in 
this conflict. Oddly enough (and this is one more tribute to the discipline, skill, 
and self-assurance of the British soldier) the near certainty that this was to be 
the final fling and therefore the last time he would be called upon to face danger 
and death, made not the slightest difference to his attitude; no hanging back 
because it would be a pity to “cop one” at the eleventh, or even the twelfth, 
hour: no reluctance, no temporising; the preparations and the approach were 
exactly the same before the during this battle as in many others he had seen.38
There are some obvious parallels between the state of morale and its influences explored by 
the secondary literature for the First World War and those examined in this thesis for the 
Italian campaign. Firstly, the importance of the paternal officer-men relationship in 
sustaining morale which Gary Sheffield examined for the 1914-18 War, and which the War 
Office put first in its pantheon of morale-boosting suggestions in 1942, was as relevant in 
Italy as it had been on the Western Front.39 There is, however, no documentation with 
regard to the Italian campaign to support Sheffield’s contention that the drawback to officer 
paternalism was that an officer could identify too closely with his men which could, in turn, 
lead to a reluctance to take aggressive action against the enemy. The high turn-over of 
both infantry officers and men, particularly towards the end of the Italian campaign, might 
account for this. There was often no opportunity in the front line for officers to get to know
35 Doherty, A Noble Crusade, p. 288
36 Harpur, Impossible Victory, p. 128: McCreery, “The Final Offensive”, p. 13
371WM 90/29/1 J.B Tomlinson, pp.270-1
38 Ibid, p. 239
39 See, Sheffield, Leadership in the Trenches; and Comrades in Arms, first lecture
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their men well enough that their safety was of more importance than the prosecution of 
battle.
Timothy Bowman and Gerard Oram argued that the death penalty as an exemplary measure 
in the First World War was replaced, as the war progressed, by a more lenient approach to 
discipline. The reasons for this were two-fold: either it was the result of troops enduring 
appalling conditions with a concomitant lowering of morale; or it was because the 
automatic consent of the British soldier could no longer be taken for granted.40 The same 
pattern, without, of course, recourse to the death penalty, can be traced in the Italian 
campaign. The abolition of the death penalty was lamented by many of the commanders in 
Italy, but the early policy of exemplary sentencing there did not have the desired effect of 
lessening desertion, any more than the imposition of the death penalty had in the previous 
war. By the end of the Italian campaign many deserters were being returned to their units 
without even first stopping at a detention centre. This was, in essence, a repeat of the 
development of a more lenient disciplinary policy dictated by circumstances.
Oram, Fuller and others emphasised the growing importance of bottom-up influences in the 
maintenance of morale in the trenches 41 This lesson was taken on board by the War Office 
early on in the Second World War and by the start of the Italian campaign the Welfare 
Directorate was firmly established and The Soldier's Welfare was a tenet of army life. 
Top-down welfare arrangements in the Italian campaign were matched by bottom-up, 
battalion level endeavours.
40 See Bowman, Irish Regiments in the Great War, and Oram, “Pious Peijury”.
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Identification by soldiers with the wider society, according to Tony Ashworth, influenced 
combat behaviour in indirect but positive ways in the First World War.42 This was true at 
the start of the Italian campaign, but, once the eyes of the world turned from Italy to 
Normandy in 1944, the wider society’s indifference to their sacrifices might well have 
seriously degraded infantry morale. But comradeship among the soldiers fighting in Italy 
turned the soubriquet D-Day Dodgers from a term of disparagement to a badge of pride, 
although some men did wonder what they were risking their lives for. In fact, the soldiers 
were overwhelmingly fighting, not for King and Country, but for their mates.
There are areas of the Italian campaign, however, which did not run along parallel lines 
with the Great War on the Western Front. This is particularly true of the weather and 
length of service/time away from home. The average British soldier was unfamiliar with 
mountains and ill-equipped to fight in them, particularly during the two worst winters in 
living memory. Many veterans’ most vivid memories are of snow and mud, the two 
elements which controlled their lives for so much of their time in Italy. Both sapped 
humour and health, and consequently morale. The other degrading influence on morale 
was the length of service for many of the soldiers in Italy. Many of the Regular soldiers 
had been stationed in the Middle East in 1939 and had remained in North Africa or the 
Middle East before the start of the Italian campaign. Others had left the UK at a later date: 
78th Division, for instance, had left the UK to take part in Operation TORCH in November, 
1942. Some reinforcements had come to Italy direct from the UK in 1943, but these were a 
drop in the ocean compared to the overall number of British soldiers in Italy. Most of these
41 See Oram, Military Executions during World War I
42 Ashworth, Trench Warfare 1914-1918.
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men were ineligible for home leave until 1944 and the impact of this on morale was 
impossible to quantify, but was recognized as a deleterious influence on fighting spirit.
Despite suffering similar morale-degrading conditions commented upon by the secondary 
literature for the First World War, and also enduring hardships peculiar to the Italian 
campaign, the D-Day Dodgers rose magnificently to their final challenge. Victory in 
Europe was announced on May 8* 1945, but the D-Day Dodgers had had the satisfaction, 






Apart from the structural fittin g s -  Tvhieh -will include an e f f ic -  . 
lent means of suaply of hot v,Titer -  and the medical stores, very l i t t l e  is  re­
quired. . A table'and d few chaire for the orderlies, s ix  buckets, 'cleaning 
u ten sils.
Class A PAG. Class B PAC.
Towels, ro ller  6 doz. 4  doz.
S ter ilizer  (for ste r iliz in g  syringes 1 1
& bowls)
Forceps s te r iliz e r , Cheatlcs -1 1
Bowls, 2 .1 , 10“ * 24 12
Stove, Primus ‘1 1
Syringes, Urethral 10cc with rubber 24 12
bulbs
Brushes, -scrubbing 6 4
Sheaths, (rubber preventive)  ^ 5000 2500
Capsules, (preventive) '* 10000 5000
Envelopes for B.T. Packets 5000 2500
Solr_ riydrarg Perchlor, 1/1000 or 
tab lets for preparation o f the soln.
Soln. of Argent Protoinate (Argyrol 2$).
Soap, Soft & Hard. .. ... ,
TECHNIQUE TO BE USED ’
The follow ing procedure w ill be followed by the patient, s u p e r - - -  
vised, instructed and helped by the orderly. ’’Clear instruction in  non-medical, 
terms, using illu stra tio n s, .should be placed so as to be in  front o f eachpatient 
as he perforros the d isin fectant r itu a l.
1. Patient urinates in  gushes.
2. Removes the trousers and pants.
3 . Washes the hands.
4. bashes the penis, scrotum, lover abdomen and front of the 
thighs with soap and warm water, raising a prof use lather & 
rinses off the soap. Foreskin to be retracted fu lly  during 
th is  process.
5 . Sponge for 2 minutes with 2ozs of 1/1000 Hydrarg Perchlor soln. 
using a bowl and small pieces of wool. Special attention . . 
given to frentca and coronal sulcus.
6. Orderly in jects 5cc of 2$> Argyrol in to  urethra. The patient 
retains tiiis  far 2 minutes by compressing the glens. Argyrol 
allowed to excape (only essen tia l in  coses ■where an hour or mor 
has elapsed since exposure).
7 . Apply contents of capsule of Calonsel-Coycyanide Cream. Rub in  
thoroughly over penis, scrbtum and surrounding parts, giving.
special attention to coronal sulcus (C ollar) frcnum (Bridle 
String) and meatus (mouth of p ipe).
8. Cover genitals with paper or single thickness of cotton or 
gauze. 1 • .............
9. Patient is  instructed not to urinate for several hours.
A record of to ta l treatments and of ET Packets or condoms issued
RECORDS
is  desirable; ' .
The patient should be given a small tick et on which i s  recorded 
his attendance -  Tinnes and Units should not be recorded unless sooo ia lly  required
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In every area where troops nay boqone infected with V,B. i t  i s  the 
resp onsib ility  o f the area adndndatrstian toprbvide adequate prophylactic trea t-  
want f a c i l it ie s , which vd.ll be si$ml£jaentary -to and w ill so t replace Unit *ET' 
Roano,
The centres provided w ill be of a high standard and the m*aber re­
quired w ill be daaidcd by Cossaand or A.F.H.Q,
(a)
<b)
SITES. Thx3 w ill be close to the lo c a lit ie s  in  which 
troops congregate for recreation or transport* The ocntre wust 
be easily* located, oven by strangers to the area, both by day 
and n ight. Suitable signs w ill be provided to  wake i t  Recognis­
able and to  point out tho route* The location of centres should 
bo advertised by notices in  Caqc>3 etc* , and by provision o f Town 
Maps, on viiich  the s ite  o f P.A. Centres i s  ‘worked.
The standard se t must be that of a Medical C lin ic  
and not that o f a m k csh ift la tr in e . The premises west be w ell 
ligh ted , c e l l  ven tilated  with good drainage and water supply. 
Provision o f a hot water supply i s  necessary, and a lso  la trin es  
for s ta f f  and p atien ts.
A sketch plan of a suggested dosign Is  given but th is  oust 
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Curt- IfcUor Towel N^hclf with'
1 . Soap H001*
2 . A ntiseptic
3. Cotton wool for*
4* Capsule with .
ifcreurial Clothts
Croon 1
that -orderly can supervise trca t- 
nen$
The provision of a bidot in  a sw ell oubiolo i s  oohsidored much pre­
ferable -to wen standing over a  trough or urinal. The pat&bxt should face so 
that the orderly can supervise, A ntiseptio (t/1000 bya. Berahlar) should be 
given te  each individual in  a saftll bowl along with sw ell pledgets o f ‘wool, A 
largo stock o f towels sore required -  I  advise ro ller  towels placed at such a  
height that a nan cannot use then for drying the g e n ita ls .
Tho nuniber o f cubicles provided w ill depend on the rnwber o f attend­
ances expected -  i t  i s  bettor to  err on the generous side for i t  i s  vo$y undosire- 
able to keep non waiting for atten tion . A Class ♦A* Centre should have 12 cub­
ic le s  and a Class *Br Centro 6 oubiolC3, /
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The present Y7r*r Establishment ( jiiddle East W.F..)
Class A Class B
1 S.jt. (2T0) 1 Cpl. RttC (STO)
1 l/C p l. RAH? (STO) k. Pte3. (Regimental)
6 I'tes, (Regimental)
A ll these men may be of low medical category.
Responsible and trustworthy lacn ore required.
The s ta ff  of P. A. Centres i s  provided under A.F.K.Q. arrangements.
supervision  urn jjm m sm u s ia s
Administration of P,A, Centres i s  an area resp on sib ility , and these 
are miscellaneous non-medic c l u n its, which are to be administered by the nearest 
convenient u n it, Tho equipment and stores should be taken on charge by th is unit
The officer in  medical ciisrge of the adianisterxng unit w ill be responsible for
replenishment of Medical Supplies, Regular supervision and inspection of the 
management of the Centre, both by Combatant and Medical O fficers is  essen tia l. 
These units should not be placed under C.K.P. control.
Regular hours of duty, with adequate fa c ilit ie s  for meals and o ff 
duty to be arranged. The nature of tho duties makes i t  desirable to exchange 
personnel after 3-6 months. This should be staggered.
IMT E.T. ROOii
This may be se t up in  a sn a il ten t, ox* i f  the unit i s  s ta tic  a more
elaborate building may be provided. In Camps and Borrrcks one larger E.f .  Rooc
near the entrance may provide for a ll  units within the Camp. The 2.T . Room 
should be accessib le but not conspicuous, a s ite  near the it ,I . Room is  often ex­
cellen t, but part of a latrin e is  not satisfactory.
Orderlies must be trained by the Unit II. 0 . in  the d eta ils of E.T. 
technique, and a duty roster prepared. These men must bo found within the e s t­
ablishment of the Unit or Camp. Tlie E.T, Roon is  a convenient means of distribu­
tion of E.T. Packets and condoms.
The technique advocated is  the same as that in  a P.A. Centre so far 
as the fa c il it ie s  penait. Whore supervision by medical sta ff is  not c lo se, 1/£|0CI 
Pot Porsaang v.-ill be substituted for r^rdrarg Perchlor Lotion. The mardjaua essen­
t ia l requirements are a supply of clean water, soap, a b ottle of an tisep tic, 
cotton wool, a supply of capsules of calomel cream and receptables for used water 
and wool e tc .
Source: NA WO 204/6725 VD Measure for Control: Aspects of Disciplinary Action
APPENDIX II
Comparison of Absentees: 























INFANTRY AND TOTAL BRITISH ARMY IN ITALY












□  Total British Army in Italy 






















INFANTRY AND TOTAL BRITISH ARMY IN ITALY









□  Total British Army in Italy 






















COMPARISON OF ABSENTEES: 










□  Total British Army in Italy 























INFANTRY AND TOTAL BRITISH ARMY IN ITALY






□  Total British Army in Italy 
■  British Infantry
366
APPENDIX III
Comparison of Deserters: 
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